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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Benedikt Springer 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
June 2018 
 
Title: Building Markets? Neoliberalism, Competitive Federalism, and the Enduring 
Fragmentation of the American Market 
 
Why do interstate barriers persist and proliferate in the US and go unnoticed by 
neoliberal policy-makers, while in other places, like the EU, they get systematically 
addressed? I challenge the common assumption that the EU is trying but failing to emulate 
the single market created in the US a long time ago. I show that in many ways, the EU has 
adopted more liberal rules for the exchange of goods and services across its members states 
than the US has in effect across its state borders. 
Focused on the US, I assemble a wide-ranging set of evidence for this assertion 
ranging from federal policies pursued by conservative administrations since the 1980s and 
conservative think tank scholarship to an in-depth study of mobility and market barriers in 
the construction industry. To explain this, I develop two arguments. Firstly, I argue that 
American and European free-marketeers fundamentally conceptualize markets differently, 
with American conservatives seeing them as the natural product of government-non-
intervention, and European officials seeing them has a deliberate creation of central 
authority. This leads to different market building strategies with differential effectiveness. 
At the same time, I argue that the fragmentation and decentralization of the party and 
interest representation system in the US incentivizes state by state and sector by sector 
thinking and dis-incentivizes political action—leaving the bigger picture, i.e. interstate 
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barriers, unchanged. Especially interest groups struggle to articulate preferences for inter-
state or cross-sectoral cooperation due to organizational incentives.  
Applying a Bayesian process-tracing logic to mostly within-case and some cross-
case evidence, I test conventional structural and institutional theories against my account. 
Tracing the lack of mobilization of conservative policy-makers and agenda-setters around 
federal market authority since the 1980s, and interviews with firms, regulators, and 
legislators about interstate barriers in the construction industry, clearly demonstrate how 
their imagination of markets prevents a single market building agenda top-down while 
institutional structures prevent it bottom-up.  
This is a novel argument, speaking to broader debates about the socially-
constructed nature of markets. Studying the US, shows that interstate barriers and local 
protectionism flourish when no central authority deliberately creates ‘free markets’.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Market governance in Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), and the 
United States (US) has undergone a striking but little remarked divergence since the 
1970s, leading to somewhat puzzling outcomes. During this neoliberal period of pro-
market politics, Europe has pursued a vast single market project, promising that the 
reduction of barriers to interstate exchange and mobility would bring economic 
dynamism. EU institutions have sought systematically to replace state regulations with 
unified rules, and to restrict anti-competitive practices of member states. There are 
numerous examples of this: due to the Service Directive, Spanish lawyers practice easily 
in Germany curbing the protectionist impulses of state regulators (M. Egan 2015). The 
European Commission used many different tools to open up national monopolies, for 
instance forcing Sweden to allow their citizens to buy wine outside their national alcohol 
monopoly (Huyghe 2014). Similarly, countries cannot act discriminatorily against other 
European countries or firms. EU states must tender public contracts equally to any EU 
firm and cannot subsidize businesses without approval by the European Commission 
(Eisinger 1988; Hoffmann 2011). To increase efficiency and mobility of its construction 
industry, Europe established universal building codes and mutual recognition of building 
professionals’ qualifications (EcoBuilding 2012). Non-discrimination has also been 
expanded to the individual level. European students of higher education can freely choose 
between universities and can expect to be treated the same as any citizen (Your Europe 
2017). The European single market is an unfinished, ongoing project; the European 
Commission constantly monitors progress and proposes new measures to reduce 
interstate market barriers. Underlying the EU approach is what I will call an ordoliberal 
theory of markets; the assumption is that neoliberal goals, like expanding competitive 
markets, require strong central authority and rules. In their imagination of market-
relationships, EU officials tend see government as generative for, not in opposition to 
markets.  
In the late 1980s, Australia embarked on a similar pro-market trajectory, creating 
institutional structures that allow representatives of states and territories to make binding 
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regulatory harmonization decisions and creating a powerful agency to monitor single 
market progress (Walsh 2012). These steps dismantled many interstate barriers. For 
instance, the 1986 National Preference Agreement (NPA) prohibits state and local 
governments to tender public contracts preferentially to regional firms (Grier 2006). 
Similarly, through inter-governmental cooperation sub-national jurisdictions have 
established automatic mutual recognition of all occupational qualifications with the goal 
of increasing inter-provincial mobility (Walsh 2012). Similar to the EU, the Council of 
Australian Governments, makes qualified majority decisions that are binding for 
territories and provinces; the Productivity Commission, founded in 1998, investigates 
whether regulatory heterogeneity creates internal barriers to trade (D. Brown 2002, 
Chapter 7). 
Pro-market advocates in Canada have similarly pursued a single market building 
project, culminating in the Agreement on Internal Trade in 1995 (D. Brown 2002, 
Chapter 6). Since then Quebecois attorneys, for instance, practice easily in British 
Colombia (Hinarejos 2012). However, despite some progress, the internal market has 
stayed on the political agenda, with recent governments pursuing a renewal of the 
Agreement on Internal Trade “to end all provincial trade barriers, which cost Canadian 
economy $50 billion annually” (Ivison 2014). A Senate report from 2016, entitled Tear 
Down these Walls, Dismantling Canada’s Internal Trade Barriers, calls for renewed 
efforts to establish mutual recognition and regulatory harmonization between Canadian 
territories and provinces (Tkachuk and Day 2016). Among other things, the report 
laments that a “Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the 
European Union would make it easier for European businesses to trade with Canada than 
it currently is for Canadian businesses in one province/territory to trade with other 
provinces/territories” (Tkachuk and Day 2016, 4). While there are many obvious 
institutional and contextual differences between Australia and Canada on one hand, and 
the EU on the other hand, all three polities share the idea that more central rules, 
established through federal government or binding sub-national cooperation, are 
necessary to maintain and enhance their single market. 
All of this might not seem very surprising. After all, globalization is generally 
acknowledged to force more and more countries to liberalize trade and investment flows; 
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negotiations at the WTO focus more and more on technical barriers to trade and regional 
trade agreements are on the rise (Cerny 1995; Andrews 1994; Keohane 1996; Rodrik 
2002; T. Friedman 2006; WTO 2012). Most observers assume that this movement is 
spearheaded and inspired by the US (among others Blyth 2002; Harvey 2005; Prasad 
2006). Alternatively, one might assume that single market building efforts have simply 
been more prominent in Australia, Canada, and the EU, because they needed to ‘catch 
up’. This is in fact a common refrain among European policy-makers, often expressed 
along the lines of “We [the European Commission] could learn a lot from America about 
how to utilize and develop a single market” (Vivian Reding cited in Egan 2015, 1). 
However, this common notion is far from the truth, as I will demonstrate—in 
many cases, the EU, and to a smaller degree Australia, and Canada, have dismantled 
interstate barriers that persist in the US: Ohioans who visit or move to Indiana must 
acquire new licenses in order to practice for a variety of professions from lawyer to 
hairdresser to plumber (Egan 2015). Mississippians cannot order wine from other states 
and are forced to buy it from the state monopoly (NCSL 2016). US states and cities often 
legally favor local providers in public procurement as much as they want and provide 
subsidies to attract firms across state-borders without scrutiny by the federal government 
(Eisinger 1988; Hoffmann 2011). Construction firms in the US wrestle with state or city-
specific licensing rules and 20,000+ building codes (EcoBuilding 2012). States give their 
residents preferential treatment in a variety of circumstances, that would be considered 
discriminatory and protectionist in the EU. For instance, US universities routinely triple 
the fees charged to out-of-state students, thereby basically undermining a free national 
market for higher education. More abstractly, no institution in the US reports on or 
monitors the internal market in a fashion similar to the European Commission. 
Conceptually, policy-makers and federal institutions often assume that non-tariff barriers 
are only an issue for external trade; regulatory heterogeneity among states and local 
jurisdictions in not considered a potential market barrier. Due to that, information on 
interstate trade barriers is rare, leading scholars to assume that no single market has gone 
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as far as that of the US.1 This dissertation will demonstrate that in many ways the 
opposite is true. 
Given the contrast of Australia, Canada, and the EU, the US regulatory trajectory 
appears as an anomaly. This is particularly puzzling because in the US, increasing 
interstate barriers have coincided with a strong rhetoric about the virtues of free markets. 
However unlike in Europe, American champions of markets since Reagan have focused 
on weakening federal authority and bolstering states’ rights—using quite different 
language than EU officials, who emphasize the importance of central rules for free 
markets. Promising that the reduction of ‘out-of-touch’ federal regulation and 
distortionary spending will bring economic dynamism, American Conservatives have 
sought to loosen federal rules and argued that the states “should be encouraged to take the 
lead,” as Paul Ryan puts it (House Republicans 2016d, 6). As these few examples have 
demonstrated, this market-building strategy is not only unique in international 
comparison, it is also not successful in curbing interstate protectionism. 
One might assume that because interstate exchange nonetheless remains far 
higher in the US than in the EU, because the US has smaller inflation-, and price-
differentials than the EU, because the US has a higher labor mobility than the EU, and 
because big nationally-operating firms account for more of the US economy, the political 
and regulatory trajectory is somehow unimportant (Parsley and Wei 2002; Dao, Furceri, 
and Loungani 2013; Pacchioli 2011; Economist 2016a). However, the more liberal rules 
are itself in need of explanation and, in the long run, should lead to more economic 
exchange and mobility.  
One might object that any EU-US comparison is misplaced, because they are 
ontologically different categories. I will argue that in terms of the outcome of interest, 
they are very similar entities, whose divergence is in need of explanation: The EU and 
US have similar authority and responsibility over an economic area, dealing with similar 
issues of central economic regulation (from anti-trust law to environmental regulation), 
policing sub-national units (from explicitly protectionist measures to regulatory 
heterogeneity), and external trade policy. Both have complex federalized decision-
                                                 
1 With a few notable exceptions: Anderson (2012), Hoffmann (2011), and Egan (2015). 
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making structures with a strong horizontal and vertical diffusion of power (McKay 2001). 
Both share intergovernmental/interstate and supranational/federal features (Compound 
Democracies), leading to similar debates over the merits of local vs. central regulation 
and a perceived democratic deficit of bureaucratic decision-making in far-away 
Washington or Brussels (Fabbrini 2010). Even if one were to conceptualize the EU and 
US as fundamentally different entities, on a theoretical level the variation in outcomes is 
still surprising and poses major challenges to existing theoretical accounts of political and 
economic integration on either side of the Atlantic. If Americans transact and move 
across states more than Europeans, should they not perceive greater incentives to reduce 
barriers and fragmentation? Most conventional approaches have in common an 
expectation that the US should have more liberal rules for economic exchange. This is 
true for materialist arguments that explain central market authority as a reaction to 
incentives from gains from free exchange (Moravcsik 1998; Chandler 1993; Beer 1973), 
for institutionalist accounts that see expansions as path-dependent on initial delegations 
of central authority (Sandholtz, Fligstein, and Stone Sweet 2001; Skowronek 1982), or 
ideational accounts that emphasize the prevalence market ideas and identity formation 
(Dobbin 1994; Fligstein 2008). Similarly, scholars of federalism have often treated the 
existence of a common market within the US as an (unexamined) assumption rather than 
a variable (Weingast 1995; Kelemen 2009) or have exclusively focused on fiscal 
relationships (Walker 1995; Conlan 1998). Ideational studies of neoliberalism often 
describe the US as the spearhead of the movement, ignoring all the described ways in 
which actual policy has fallen short of neoliberal expectations of constant transformation 
toward more market (Blyth 2002; Prasad 2006; Harvey 2005). 
These three aspects—unlike in Australia, Canada, and the EU, the neoliberal era 
has not led to a buildup of central authority in the US to create markets and police anti-
competitive behavior of the states; the US has left many interstate barriers intact making 
it in some important ways a less liberal or integrated market than the EU; and at first 
sight, these empirical observations seem to run counter the expectation of conventional 
theories of economic integration—justify a renewed empirical and theoretical inquiry into 
the basis of when and how federations create single markets. In particular, it makes the 
US’ regulatory trajectory stand out as a puzzle in need of explanation. Many specific 
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questions might be asked based on the reported observations: What is the general level of 
market integration in Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US? What creates demands for 
single market-building? What role do economic benefits play? What different 
institutional arrangements exist and which ones are more likely to overcome specific 
barriers to exchange? What is the empirical and theoretical connection between 
neoliberalism and single market building? Beyond neoliberal agendas, what type of 
policies actually lead to market integration and what policies undermine the market? 
Each of these questions raises several sub-questions and implies numerous 
dependent variables. For example, the scope of comparison is hard to define: is the proper 
universe of cases the US and the EU, should one add other Western democratic 
federations like Australia and Canada, or would a proper assessment of single market 
building need to entail countries like Brazil and India? Is it sufficient to focus on 
regulations, or does a proper analysis require explaining regulations, economic flows, and 
prices? Is it ‘fair’ to focus on market building in the latter half of the 20th century when 
major economic integration in the US happened in the 19th century? It is easy to see how 
asking how federations create single markets will easily snowball into an insurmountable 
research project.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, it is therefore prudent to ask a question that 
narrows in on the most salient features of the puzzle, which I think is the persistence of 
interstate barriers in the US and the degree to which this has gone unnoticed by free-
marketeers and scholars alike. Given the single market projects of Australia, Canada, and 
the EU, I am therefore asking: Why has the so-called neoliberal era, in the world’s 
foremost liberal market economy—the US—not led to a buildup of federal market 
authority2? This question addresses the puzzle outlined in this introduction directly. In 
addition, answers will offer some direction for research on the bigger questions about 
federations in general. These implications can be generated because the study treats the 
EU as a ‘shadow-case’ to which comparisons are drawn whenever resources allow, and 
                                                 
2 I will use federal market authority and central market authority as interchangeable, emphasizing 
the similarities between the US and EU, and increasing readability. However, acknowledging that the EU 
does not have an entity properly described as federal government, when referencing the EU specifically, I 
use central market authority. 
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theories employed here have been developed in references to the EU. In this sense, any 
result from this case study will suggest tentative conclusions about the EU and new 
avenues of research for similar cases.  
Asking the question this way, restricts the time scope of the investigation to the 
1970s to today, but leaves open what specific dependent and independent variables to 
explore (economic flows, federal regulation, state laws, public opinion, and policy-maker 
attitudes). The specific dependent variable, or more broadly the explanandum I focus on, 
is federal market authority and its flipside, the existence of state and local regulations that 
undermine federal market authority. I understand federal market authority not merely as 
the existence of central authority to curb anti-competitive behavior of market actors and 
governments, but more positively, as the existence of mandates for federal agencies, 
agendas of federal policy-makers, commitments of the judiciary, and interstate 
cooperation to create harmonized regulations, standards, and rules that guarantee 
interstate competition. In this understanding, federal market authority does not only mean 
federal resources, but also the use thereof and the mobilization of political actors around 
those rules. Less federal market authority implies state and local policymakers as well as 
executive agents use their authority to regulate as they see fit, thereby creating barriers 
between their jurisdictions. This means in addition to federal agendas, the existence of 
explicit legal barriers on the local level is part of what is being explained. Because this 
still implies a rather broad scope of investigation, this dissertation combines a focus on 
federal policy and national political agendas with a concrete empirical application to the 
construction sector of the economy. This does not only create a clearer picture of the non-
use of federal market authority and the actual effects of interstate barriers, but also allows 
me to develop and test a new theoretical account of market-building.  
In accordance with this line of inquiry, Chapter II theorizes single market 
building. In particular, I show that Europe’s regulatory departure from the US model has 
gone largely unnoticed in the literature. Subsequently, I discuss existing theoretical 
accounts of European integration, US market building, as well federalism and how they 
contribute to our understanding of how and why multi-level polities create single 
markets. The result of this literature review is that conventional explanations, while 
ostensibly successful in the EU case, cannot account for the inaction of the US on 
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interstate barriers. However, existing theories are helpful in developing a novel 
explanation. In turn, I develop and present my own hypotheses that focus on combing 
specific types of institutional inertia with prevailing ideas about free markets and federal 
authority. A methods section, starting with some meta-theoretical considerations, lays out 
the rational for the empirical research strategy followed in this dissertation.  
The empirical part of this dissertation, organized over four chapters, explores the 
research question in two concrete case studies. In both cases, I first present evidence to 
establish the outcome; i.e., I show stagnating or declining federal market authority, 
whenever possible drawing comparisons to the EU. After this confirms my puzzle, I use 
different types of process-tracing evidence to test conventional explanations against the 
here-developed theory. The first case study, starting in Chapter III, shows that under 
conservative rule in the 1980s, 1990s, and today, self-described neo-liberals have not 
mobilized around single-market rules or taken actions that would curb interstate barriers. 
Instead they have focused on tax-cuts, federal deregulation, and state’s rights. 
Conventional structural, institutional, and ideational theories cannot account for this, 
particularly because, as elaborated, they would expect more federal market authority in 
the US than in the EU. In turn, I present evidence that increases confidence in my 
ideational explanation, which focuses on ambiguities in neoliberal thought. Specifically, I 
show that US policy-makers combine market ideas with antipathy toward central 
authority in contingent ways that lead to a conception of markets, I call competitive 
federalism, which tends to undermine any interest in deliberate single market building. 
Instead, they imagine markets to flow naturally from their deregulatory efforts. Evidence 
from analyzing primary documents like memoirs of policy-makers and elite-interviews 
shows that this particular conception of markets accounts for the agenda of ‘Reagan 
Republicans’ in the 1980s, ‘Gingrich Republicans’ in the 1990s, and ‘Ryan Republicans’ 
today.  
Chapter IV enriches this account by tracing the ideational history of competitive 
federalism and showing how strongly it still captivates the imagination of conservative 
policy-entrepreneurs and agenda-setters. By looking at the reception of neoliberal ideas in 
the US mid-20th century, I demonstrate that the competitive federalism conception of 
markets as a specific interpretation of Hayek’s neoliberalism was very influential in 
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economics and political science research in the 1950s and 1960s. From there it diffused 
into conservative think tanks asymmetrically, losing its character as field of inquiry, and 
becoming a set of axiomatic principles. As such, it defines how conservative think tank 
scholars do—or more accurately do not—think about interstate market barriers. My 
analysis demonstrates this based on interviews with scholars at the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation (Heritage), and the CATO Institute (CATO). 
The second case study focuses on the construction sector of the economy and 
establishes that significant legal obstacles to the national flow of construction services 
exist. Based on interview research, Chapter V documents how much mobility is 
undermined by a lack of federal-market authority and the tendency of local jurisdictions 
to proliferate and follow licensing laws, building codes, and public procurement practices 
that disadvantage out-of-state firms. Chapter VI traces the mobilization of diverse 
political and economic actors for and against those rules, again based on interviews with 
construction firms, regulators, politicians, and interest groups. Considering specific 
causal mechanisms, I contrast the explanatory power of the conventional theories laid-out 
in Chapter II, with the ideational and institutional elements of my theoretical account of 
market-building. The overall picture that evolves is that fragmentation, decentralization, 
and separation of powers prevents interest groups and state policy-makers from 
mobilizing for federal market authority to curb interstate barriers. At the same time, in 
many instances it becomes clear that given a different ideational context, many actors 
could be mobilized for federal market authority. There is somewhat of a divide: national 
actors, particularly self-described pro-market groups, tend to take the competitive 
federalism conception of markets for granted, leading them to pursue policies that 
undermine federal market authority. The potential interests of firms and state regulators 
in reducing interstate barriers is much more thwarted by the institutional configuration of 
American federalism, which dis-incentivizes transfers of powers to the federal level, 
binding cooperation between states, and dealing with policy-problems from a broad, 
cross-sectoral perspective.  
Overall, as the conclusion in Chapter VII discusses, my explanation contrasts with 
the failure of conventional theories of European integration. Interstate barriers persist 
despite the mobilization of powerful economic interests against it and despite significant 
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federal resources as well as an orientation of elites toward the center, which all had been 
thought to induce a self-reinforcing dynamic towards more federal market authority. 
Despite limitations, this dissertation challenges us to take ideas about markets more 
seriously and consider the subtle differences of institutions of federalism. Taken together, 
this suggests a broader research agenda expanding my findings to other federations and 
other policy areas. The concluding section focuses specifically on how the mostly 
qualitative approach of this dissertation can be complemented by a quantitative approach 
in the future. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND METHODS 
This theory and methods chapter is structured into four sections. First, I discuss 
how scholarship on the political economy of the EU and the US has mostly stayed 
separate. Subsequently, I review existing explanations of federal market authority, 
looking at structural, institutional and ideational approaches. Following suit, I present my 
own theoretical account of market-building, based on different ways to conceptualize the 
role of federal authority in markets, and some salient features of US federalism. Lastly, I 
justify and describe the methods used in this dissertation to answer the question why 
there has been no mobilization around federal market authority to curb interstate barriers 
in the US during the neoliberal era.  
II.a.  The EU-US Contrast in the Literature 
If we accept the examples of deeper liberalization and stronger federal market 
authority in the EU than in the US as true and illustrative, pending empirical verification 
in the following chapters, political scientists and political observers from both sides of the 
Atlantic would be surprised: Can it really be true that few have noticed Europe’s 
regulatory departure from the US model? As is shown in the following paragraphs, it is. 
The literature on European integration, comparative federalism, US federalism, 
comparative law, and regulatory competition all contain some parts of the empirical 
pieces, but nobody has put them together. Due to scholarly separation between subfields 
and disciplines, the major and counterintuitive development of the US has gone largely 
unremarked3. 
Nobody has remarked the puzzling regulatory trajectory of the US. US-EU 
comparisons are fairly new. Experts on both polities have mostly stayed in their ‘camp’. 
The literature that directly tries to explain European integration treated the EU as being in 
a distinct category: one an international organization, the other a state. Work on the EU 
first regarded it as the most powerful among regional trade association and then as a 
                                                 
3 Except in a few handful of pioneering works (see Footnote 1). 
12 
system sui generis. This was particularly true for early approaches coming from the field 
of International Relations either focusing on functional incentives (Haas 1958; Haas and 
Schmitter 1964; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), security imperatives (Rosato 2011) or 
inter-governmental bargains (Moravcsik 1998), describing the EU as ‘would-be polity’, 
‘balancing solution of European nations’ or ‘tightly constraint international organization’.  
However, with the progress of the single market in the 1990s scholars started 
noticing certain similarities between European multi-level governance and power-sharing 
arrangements in other federations (Burgess and Gagnon 1993; Knop et al. 1994; Sbragia 
1992; Marks et al. 1996). They started using the language of federalism, all while 
maintaining that that “The particular kind of federalism […] is distinct from the 
federalism associated with state government and politics,” but no real comparisons 
between those the polities were made (Burgess 2006, 7).  
In the 2000s, EU scholarship joined with the literature on comparative federalism 
and started debating how closely the EU’s economic and “core state powers” compared 
to that of other federations like the US or Switzerland (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014; 
Fabbrini 2005). This literature mostly asks what “Europe can learn from America's 
history” and to which degree the EU is reproducing the US model of federalism 
(Nicolaidis and Howse 2002, 7). Scholars increasingly realized that the EU and the US 
“are two different species of the same political genus: the compound democracy” 
(Fabbrini 2005, 3). This realization led to a growing literature on comparing specific 
powers, institutions, and theoretical discussions of the meaning of federalism (Jabko and 
Parsons 2005; Menon and Schain 2006). As I do in this dissertation, scholars increasingly 
come to the conclusion that “while federal governments in the US and Switzerland 
control key capacities that the EU conspicuously lacks—a federal military, federal taxes, 
a sizeable federal administration—the EU’s capacity to regulate sub-central (national) 
core state powers is at a level and potentially even superior to theirs” (Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2014, 255). However, these edited volumes and other recent monographs 
never compare or explain levels of market integration (Schakel, Hooghe, and Marks 
2015; Fabbrini 2015). 
A few books deserve special mention, because they seemingly address the issue, 
but not quite: Daniel Kelemen shows that because the EU and the US faced similar 
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functional challenges, they developed similar patterns of governances, using regulatory 
agencies and relying on court enforcement through “adversial legalism” (Kelemen 2011). 
In his careful study of environmental regulation and food safety, he finds that as 
differences in implementation become widely recognized, “The federal government 
comes under increased public pressure to take on a larger role in implementation […] in 
order to remove distortions to the common market created by differences in 
implementation” (Kelemen 2009, 14). Therefore, his theory explains the opposite of the 
phenomenon addressed here; it cannot explain why in some cases distortion to the 
common market do not trigger federal action for harmonization. 
Michelle Egan maybe comes closest to addressing why the US has not mobilized 
around a single market-building project (M. Egan 2015). She compares EU market-
building to US integration in the 19th century focusing on capital, goods, labor, and 
services. Egan highlights four explanations but never arbitrates: ”the role of law, interest 
group mobilization and business influence, distributive politics, and the centralization of 
regulatory activity” (M. Egan 2015, 21). It remains unclear which factor is more 
important and why, is it “pressures emanating from courts and business” (22), the 
“developmental role of the state” (75), or the “legal doctrine” (76) even though we never 
learn why judges pursue this action, or is it “disparate ideas about how to stabilize and 
regulate markets” (20) which is different from “widespread demand for social and 
political reform” (76).4 Her final assessment is that, “both grapple with the some of the 
same issues of legitimacy, coordination, and authority” (52). “The instruments used to 
promote market integration, though sometimes differing in name or political usage, are in 
fact similar in terms of their rational and objective” (22). However, the comparison is 
never really systematic or detailed enough to answer the question, “What accounts for the 
political success or failure in creating integrated markets in their respective territories” 
(3).  
The real pioneer is Leif Hoffman and his mostly unpublished work. In a careful 
empirical study of hairdresser licensing, elevator safety regulations, and public 
procurement laws, he first noted how much further federal market authority has gone in 
                                                 
4 These are all statements that describe the ‘main causes’ of market integration. 
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the EU compared to the US (Hoffmann 2011). I am building on his work by developing a 
more sophisticated theory and expanding the empirical scope.  
The EU-US divergence in federal market authority is explicitly addressed by 
exactly one recent edited volume, that tries to compare levels of market integration across 
Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US (G. Anderson 2012). However, the volume is 
fundamentally not comparative (considering one country at a time) and does not develop 
or test a theory: instead it simply offers “some lessons”: Accordingly sustained attention 
to market integration is always precipitated by an event like “an economic crisis, an 
international trade negotiation, or a high-profile report demonstrating the need for 
political change,” as well as the perception of a serious problem (G. Anderson 2012, 
198). Successful integrating reforms are likely if there are “strong central legislative 
powers,” “political leadership committed to a well-conceived reform agenda with 
significant private sector support,” an institutional actors tasked “with conceptualizing 
and promoting an internal market agenda,” cooperative inter-governmental relations, 
absence of a strong tradition of state autonomy, invention of creative decision-making 
processes, and the enshrining of reforms in law (G. Anderson 2012, 211ff.). 
In sum, the increasingly comparative literature coming from EU scholars has 
fundamentally not addressed the question of this dissertation. One might therefore turn 
toward the US subfield of political science. The relative powers of the US federal and 
state governments are presumably one of the most studied subjects in all of political 
science (a discipline invented and still dominated by American academics), and yet major 
holes in federal authority to create markets, do not draw much attention. Prominent 
accounts of US market integration invoke the same theoretical logic as their EU 
counterparts, but work even less comparatively, therefore overlooking ways in which EU 
market authority has gone farther than in the US (Beer 1993; Chandler 1993; Bensel 
2000; Skowronek 1982; Dobbin 1994). The same might be said for the US federalism 
literature that is mostly concerned with the US itself. Scholars here often treat the 
existence of a common market within the country as an assumption rather than a variable 
(Weingast 1995) or exclusively focus on fiscal relationships (Walker 1995; Conlan 
1998). The editor of Publius, the subject matter journal for US federalism scholars, 
remarks, “U.S. federalism scholars seem to be mired down in the traditional questions 
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and tied to their own federal system” (Weissert 2011, 966). Comparative questions, like 
“why are intergovernmental interests in Washington so weak,” have remained 
“unanswered” (Weissert 2011, 966). 
Instead, one might turn to legal scholars, who have noticed the general similarities 
between “Article 10 of the EC treaty and the dormant commerce clause” (Haibach 1999, 
155). While they seem well aware of differences in US and EU, they have not 
systematically studied or explained the outcomes. Instead, they usually focus on 
examining the legal reasoning or making normative claims about alternative legal norms 
that might lead to better outcomes. For example, Halberstam notices the curiosity that in 
the US constitutional system with its ‘powerful’ federal government, ‘commandeering‘ 
has been deemed unconstitutional, while the European Union can legally force states to 
act (Halberstam 2001). In another example, Donald Regan, a law professor at the 
University of Michigan remarks that the ECJ decisions in Dassonville and Cassis are a 
‘fetishization’ of market principles that goes far beyond what US courts have embraced 
(D. Regan 1988). Another US legal experts notes that the absolute value put on the 
freedom of contract by the US Supreme Court in its laissez-faire era compares to the 
ECJ’s view of freedom of movement (Caruso 2005). Comparing the ECJ, Prof. Catherine 
Barnard argues, “The approach of the US Supreme Court […] allows a much greater 
degree of deference to state actors and to state regulation” (Barnard 2009, 577). Despite 
these insights, a descriptive and explanatory inquiry into market authority in both polities 
is missing from the comparative law literature.  
Economists have analyzed different aspects of the puzzle. The vast literature on 
jurisdictional competition in in the US has explored to which degree it forces regulatory 
conformity, either via a race to the bottom or a race to the top (Rhode and Strumpf 2003; 
Banzhaf and Walsh 2008; Tiebout 1956). But a recent literature review concluded, 
“Although the four empirical literatures we surveyed cover a wide range of regulatory 
situations, we have found few unequivocal instances of regulatory competition. This 
result is perhaps not surprising because, even in its most stylized form, a regulatory race 
depends upon a complex causal connection” (Carruthers and Lamoreaux 2016, 90). 
Similarly, a recent review of the vast literature on fiscal and tax competition among US 
states concluded that there is little evidence of it (Chirinko and Wilson 2011). What they 
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all have in common is, that while noting heterogeneity among states, they all are firm-
focused and do not ask why single-market building is or is not taking place. The same 
can be said for the huge literature on occupational licensing. There are plenty of 
illustrations of barriers among states but scholars only ask about wage and price effects, 
leaving the question of why there is no federal government action toward market 
integration completely unanswered (Kleiner and Krueger 2013).  
Lastly, there is a vast empirical literature trying to measure the benefits of market 
integration. Since the Common Market White Paper in the 1980s, the European 
Commission regularly issues progress reports and funds new research on the benefits of 
the single market (Cecchini 1988; Ilzkovitz et al. 2007; Pataki 2014). As a result, there is 
plenty of empirical information on the current state of integration as well as the costs and 
benefits of new single markets initiatives (Pacchioli 2011; Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti 
2014; Bekaert et al. 2017; Pelkmans 1988; Stráský 2016; Erixon and Georgieva 2016). 
Similar documents exist for other federal polities. The so-called MacDonald Report lists 
in detail the obstacles to free trade within Canada and estimates the benefits of single 
market reforms, as does a 2016 Senate inquiry (D. Brown 2002; Tkachuk and Day 2016). 
The Productivity Commission of Australia regularly publishes reports on remaining 
barriers among Australian states and territories (Walsh 2012). However, no such 
literature exists in the US. In fact, “the most comprehensive critic of US state barriers has 
been the EU” with several publications that assess the amount of mostly external but also 
some internal barriers to trade with the US (Weiler 2012, 12; Pelkmans 1988; Business 
Europe 2015; Berden et al. 2009). As a result, the look at the empirical literature on 
internal market barriers just emphasizes the puzzle: Why have internal market barriers in 
the US been mostly ignored by the theoretical and empirical literature as well as by US 
policy-makers?  
II.b. Explanations of Federal Market Authority 
How have theories in political science and related fields thought about single-
market building? Scholarship addressing why authority is centralized and used to 
create/maintain a single market can be most broadly categorized as structural, 
institutional, and ideational. Versions of prominent theories addressing this question 
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struggle to explain the trajectory of federal market authority in the US. However, they 
offer important clues on how to solve the puzzle. Note that this literature review broadly 
considers theories on European integration because it is in light of the EU that the US 
case is in need of explanation.  
II.b.1.Structural Explanations 
One broad theoretical school suggests that choices are a direct reflection of 
material incentives. Since these objective material facts are highly general, if not 
universal, structural theories often expect similar trends if not long-term convergence of 
cases. Two ways of constructing such a theory are to focus on military technology and 
the need for survival (realism) or on production technology and opportunities for 
economic gains (liberalism). 
There are only few realist approaches to explain federal market authority, so they 
will only be covered briefly. Most generally, accounts of state formation emphasize how 
war and the preparation for war incentivized the building of state institutions (Tilly 
1990). According to Tilly, the centralization of political authority across previously 
independent jurisdictions is mostly a function of challenges to survival (by other entities) 
and available military technology. Over the long run, only the most efficient 
organizational form (given a certain technology) survives. The most efficient 
organizational form did not only include certain extractive and representative institutions 
(i.e. the nation state in Europe), but also a certain organization of the economy. 
According to Spruyt, nation states gained military advantages because they integrated 
their economies, standardized factors important for economic transactions, and provided 
a stable system of property rights (1994). These arguments do not directly address how 
centralized a state has to be and how integrated the economy has to be to survive; instead 
they leave open a broad variety of regimes above a minimum threshold of efficiency that 
guarantees military survival (like Soviet communism). Nonetheless, this type of thinking 
can be applied to more recent developments in centralization and market-building. 
The application of realism to the EU has generally been regarded skeptically 
because it challenges axioms of the theory like states defending their sovereignty with all 
means possible (Grieco 1995). Nonetheless, Rosato argues that the integration of the 
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European market can be explained by geo-political balancing considerations (2011). 
Accordingly, the European institutions were created to facilitate a European military 
alliance against the Soviet Union. This argument has been widely dismissed for many 
reasons (many methodological), one important reason being the observation made earlier, 
that it is unclear how much market integration is really necessary to maintain defensive 
capabilities (Parsons 2013; Moravcsik 2013). In fact, the evidence suggests that 
economic integration progresses mostly in peaceful times. This implies that a focus on 
structural factors of economic nature, which might be overshadowed by survival 
considerations in more uncertain times, is more promising. 
Realism has also been used to analyze the creation of a federal structures in the 
US. According to Riker, federalism is “a bargain between prospective national leaders 
and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the 
better to lay taxes and raise armies” (1964, 11). Accordingly, the degree of centralization 
varies with the degree of military challenges in the environment or the desire for 
expansion. To explain the non-reversion of centralization in peaceful times, Riker 
stresses the structure of the party system and dual citizen’s loyalties, which he describes 
himself as “tautological” (1964, 111ff.). This argument, while well suited to shed light on 
the original foundation of several federations, is difficult to apply to economic 
integration. In fact, market integration has often happened when direct military 
challenges were less present, like in Western Europe after 1950 or the US in the 1880s, 
and 1930s. We can therefore leave realism behind and instead turn to theories rooted in 
liberal political-economic theory.  
According to liberal approaches, the creation of centralizing institutions and 
subsequent market integration can be explained by individuals (aggregated) rational 
responses to economic opportunities and current production technologies given certain 
preferences (maximize material wealth etc.). On the one hand, the institutional outcome 
might reflect the optimal technique to take advantage of the current state of production 
technologies (functionalism). On the other hand, it might reflect the power of 
distributional coalitions that would lose from the most efficient outcome or certain 
collective dilemmas (strategic constellations) that have not been overcome yet. Variation 
then is explained by the differently-situated presence of uncompetitive ‘losers’ and 
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‘concentrated captures’, who hold political power in sub-units or differences in mobility-
facilitating technology and bridgeable geography. However, the assumption of liberal 
thinkers is that open markets are beneficial to consumers and most producers. The most 
competitive actors will push for more open markets, and the polity will design 
mechanisms (compensation, marginalization) to get the ‘losers’ on board. So, in the long 
run these obstacles will be overcome in favor of the more efficient outcome.  
The distinction to a more institutional argument is often blurred. North, for 
example, argues that “the on-going tension between the gains from specialization and the 
costs arising from specialization not only is the basic source of structure and change in 
economic history but is at the heart of the modern problems of political and economic 
performance” (North 1981, 209). While these costs are a reflection of technology, 
geography, and population (i.e. structural), North argues at the same time that inefficient 
institutions may persist indefinitely due to security competition and institutional lock-in 
effects. 
Liberal arguments have been successfully developed with regard to the EU and 
the US. Their weakness is in explaining the comparative difference because they use the 
same objective conditions to account for rather different outcomes. Nonetheless, after a 
brief review of the more common arguments, I will address how this theory might still be 
helpful in explaining variation in federal-market authority. 
The liberal argument has been developed most comprehensively in the context of 
European integration. Arguments of interdependence and externalities are found in neo-
functionalism (Haas 1958), inter-governmentalism (Moravcsik 1998), and transaction-
based theory (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). According to Moravcsik, economic 
interdependence creates policy externalities and incentives for cooperation, leading to 
reciprocal market-liberalization and policy harmonization. The outcome is explained as a 
“series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic 
interests—primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and 
secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions” in 
response to increasing economic interdependence (Moravcsik 1998, 3). Similarly, 
Genschel and Jachtenfuchs argue that the development of state-like qualities of the EU is 
directly related to policy externalities and economies of scale (2014). According to these 
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arguments the impetus for European integration came largely from producer groups that 
were to gain from market opening due to high amounts of intra-industry trade and 
globalization in form of external competitive pressures. The pressures of competitive 
industry groups have been limited by less competitive players and states’ defenses of 
their sovereign power but could eventually been overcome through payoffs in form of 
agricultural subsidies, regional development funds, and control over new ‘federal’ 
institutions. Those bargaining outcomes however, reflect asymmetric interdependence, 
meaning that negotiations are dominated by the big countries because small countries 
cannot “go-it-alone”(Gruber 2001). Centralization can be thought of as elaborate inter-
governmental cooperation that creates a few central institutions to solve credible 
commitment problems.  
While neo-functionalism has been described as proto-institutionalism or proto-
constructivism, it is equally based on economic incentives that drive economic elites (not 
states) to pursue the centralization of economic policy-making (Niemann and Schmitter 
2009; Haas 1958). The functional logic of economic spill over—the efficient regulation 
of one economic issue requires centralizing other issues—explains the sustained dynamic 
of shifting authority to the center. Even though they add some institutional elements later, 
Sandholtz and Sweet argue that the density of trans-border interaction broadly explains 
sectorial variation in European integration (1998). All these scholars agree on economic 
benefits determining the level of government where regulation happens; they disagree on 
whether the main mechanism of change is through national interest groups and 
governments (Moravcsik 1998), or trans-national actors like multi-national corporation 
and trans-national interest groups (Cowles 1995). Accordingly, European integration can 
be thought of as sequence of inter-governmental bargains through which economic actors 
have realized efficiency gains through harmonization. The process is highly controlled by 
nation states.  
Other authors have explained the salience of the economic incentives in light of 
globalization. According to Sandholtz and Zysman, the 1992 single market program is 
the direct result of Japanese competition that threatens US financial and economic 
hegemony: “Europe was not first, it was second, and a series of individual bargains by 
governments and companies could suffice. However, it would be quite another matter to 
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be third” (1989, 106). Similarly in his comparison of economic union reform in Canada 
and Australia, Brown argues that “increasing international economic integration and 
market liberalization forces economic adjustment on nations states” in particular of their 
economic union (2002, 9). However, he goes on to make an institutional argument about 
the shape of the reforms. Globalization pressures or the perception thereof might be 
important in explaining when the issue of internal market barriers come onto the agenda. 
At the same time, it is not clear that there is a necessary connection between globalization 
and domestic liberalization, deregulation, or market integration. The creation of the single 
European market can be said to have been created by globalization (cause), but at the 
same time it is responsible for a big part of what economic globalization is measured as 
(effect). While globalization might be important, it will always be filtered through 
national perceptions and institutions; otherwise we would observe a global convergence.  
The same economic logic has been applied to many other cases. For example, it 
can be argued that the impetus for unifying territories like the German, the Italian, or 
American stems mostly from economic gains (with some geo-political ambition). Ziblatt 
compiled data showing that the supporters of German and Italian unification in the 19th 
century were economically advanced states whose producers were to gain from bigger 
internal markets (2006). Similarly, an important factor in the US constitutional 
convention was the fear of state protectionism under confederal rule. However, as Ziblatt 
goes on to argue, potential economic gains do not predict the institutional structure of the 
unification (see institutional approaches). 
Despite the obvious differences in outcome, economic arguments are commonly 
applied to explain 19th century US market-building. Beer argues that the secular trend 
toward centralization can be explained by modernization that gives rise to ever growing 
networks of interdependence (1973, 54). Under these conditions local government leads 
to externalities that are internalized by more and more transfer of power to a central level. 
According to Beer, modernization is driven by technological and scientific developments 
leading to an increasing differentiation of economic roles and an increasing scale of 
markets (1973). This produces a self-reinforcing dynamic of growing interdependence 
that necessitates the development of centralized organizational capacity and general 
market rules to reap gains from trade. The crucial causal mechanism for the translation of 
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economic pressure into policy is that business elites are powerful. Responding to 
incentives, they will steer a federation through a sequence of different modes of policy 
making—pork-barrel politics (distributive), spill-over coalitions (regulatory), class 
politics (redistributive), technocratic coalitions (instrumental)—culminating in 
centralization of all tasks necessary for maintaining an integrated market (Beer 1973, 57). 
A similar argument can be found in Bensel’s treatment of national market building in the 
second half of the 19th century. His argument is that the Republican Party basically 
designed a system of policies and institutions that could either pay off or politically 
marginalize losers of market-building and integration (Bensel 2000). This argument is 
complemented by Chandlers account of the rise of managerial capitalism (1993). The 
same processes described by Beer, lead to the transformation of small local enterprises to 
the national corporation, implying a mirroring of this process in the market regulation by 
governments. In fact, McCurdy makes exactly this connection arguing that the central 
regulation of the market is a direct result of the “revolution in business organization” 
(1978, 631). 
Given uniform tendencies of modernization and technology, why is economic 
integration and political centralization restricted to specific areas instead of encompassing 
the whole globe? Alesina and Spolaore create a simple economic model conceptualizing 
the “size of nations” as trade-off between satisfying heterogeneous preferences 
(increasingly difficult with size) and the benefits of large markets as well efficient public 
good provision (2003). Then they present several comparative statics that show that 
democracy leads to smaller and more decentralized states, as does global economic 
integration, while the threat of war and dictatorship reduces the number of states. They 
conclude that the optimal size of a nation cannot be reached because democracies fail to 
design redistributive schemes that satisfy heterogeneous preferences. Unfortunately, the 
book does not endogenize internal or external economic integration. In fact, they assume 
that markets are internally integrated and that in a world of free trade, political borders 
would not matter. However, countries’ internal markets are not similarly integrated. Here 
as well, the general liberal approach leaves us with a puzzle.  
Liberal theory uses similar causal configurations to account for very different 
outcomes (US, EU, 19th century Europe) which is logically inconsistent. They offer three 
23 
arguments to rescue their theory, but as I show, those are unconvincing. One way is to 
argue that the degree of interdependence and production technology is generally lower in 
the US; unfortunately, it is not. Technology is fairly globalized across the Western world. 
There are higher interstate flows and more big corporations in the US, but they do not 
mobilize against interstate barriers as the theory suggests. US states are also more 
interdependent than EU states due to the geographic division of labor in the US 
(Krugman 1991). Hence, we can dismiss this argument.  
A second way is to characterize the outcomes as broadly similar. However, this 
directly contradicts the evidence presented in this dissertation. For instance, in their 
inquiry into the size of nations Alesina and Spolaore simply assume that countries have 
created internal single markets, but as we have seen there actually is significant variation 
(2003). The same can be observed in Kelemen’s study of regulatory politics in the US, 
the EU, Germany, Australia, and Canada (2009). His “central claim is that the vertical 
division of power common to all systems of regulatory federalism leads to a similar 
division of regulatory competences between federal governments and state governments” 
(9). The main actors are not rational individuals but governments and courts. If a new 
issue becomes salient (assumingly this happens across all cases), the strategic interaction 
between state and federal governments, as well as courts will lead to federal regulation. 
The difference between lax and strict states (externalities) leads to a near consensus of 
transferring power to the federal level which is supported by federal courts because it 
expands their scope of power. In the beginning the federal government delegates 
implementation to the states. However, “as differences in implementation become widely 
recognized, “the federal government comes under increased public pressure to take on a 
larger role in implementation […] in order to remove distortions to the common market 
created by differences in implementation (Kelemen 2009, 14).  
For Kelemen, variation mainly persists in regulatory style. If there is fragmented 
power in the federal system (EU, US), policymakers adopt two strategies to halt 
bureaucratic and political drift. They draft statutes in great detail and judicialize the 
implementation process, leaving little discretion to bureaucrats and state governments 
(Kelemen 2009, see also 2011). In countries with Westminster political systems 
(Australia, Canada) effective protection against drift is impossible (parliamentary 
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supremacy, weak judicial review) leading to the enactment of vague laws that give state 
governments more discretion in implementation. This implies (but Kelemen does not say 
that) that despite a similar distribution of competencies, concentrated federal power will 
lead to more remaining internal trade barriers due to state discretion.  
Kelemen interprets the evidence from environmental regulation largely consistent 
with the evidence. However, the evidence contradicts the thesis that the politics of 
competencies are roughly the same across all cases. Due to public awareness, the US has 
preempted much environmental regulation but many standards remain private or 
determined on the state level. The federal government is not able ‘commandeer’ states 
into taking action on pollution issues, as the EU can. In the EU’s competencies ‘spilled 
over’ to environmental regulation leading to the harmonization of many standards and 
‘federal’ policing of member state behavior. Furthermore, the outcomes in terms of 
federal market authority are even more different and against Kelemen’s claims, the 
structures of federalism are very different between the US (dual federalism) and the EU 
(executive federalism). Overall, it is unconvincing to characterize the polities as roughly 
the same.  
The last way would be to assume that US firms are somehow nationally and 
internationally less competitive and therefore form local distributional coalitions against 
market integration. However, this is not the case. US firms dominate globally, and big 
firms that would benefit from lower transaction costs across state borders dominate the 
national market (Economist 2017). Clearly stated, there are more ‘import-competing’ 
small local businesses in Europe that would theoretically oppose market integration 
(Weissmann 2012). Another way to think about this would be to assume US companies 
can navigate jurisdictional differences between states more easily than their foreign 
competition. In this case, outcomes might reflect differences in firm strategy. EU firms 
pursue the economies of scales of unified markets and lobby on the ‘federal’ level for 
protection, while US firms proliferate state-level barriers to deter foreign competitors. 
Rational Choice scholars have long argued that in situations of multiple-equilibria, 
strategies might reflect traditions and taken-for-granted assumptions (J. Goldstein 1993). 
However, this explanation does not fit any of the cases examined in this dissertation. For 
instance, the EU does not only have a more open market for public procurement 
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internally, but also externally (Álvarez-Fernández and Brandstrup 2013). European and 
American construction firms are similarly competitive, and foreign competition does not 
play a big role in either market (U.S. Congress 1987; Jiang Weiyan et al. 2016).  
Overall, liberal theories do not help me to explain the US case. But they do raise 
the questions that lead into institutional or ideational territory: are there specific reasons 
why the winners of market integration cannot compensate/marginalize losers 
(institutional) or are there cultural reasons making demands for market integration 
politically not viable in the US (ideational). Nonetheless, I can now formulate what kind 
of evidence and what kind of outcomes would be supportive of a liberal theory explaining 
federal market authority: 
H1: The transfer of authority to the center and the creation of single market rules 
are the direct result of its economic benefits (bigger markets, economies of scale, lower 
prices for consumers) that reflect current production technologies. The central actors here 
are interest groups. Therefore, I pay specific attention to them in my empirical case 
studies. Particularly, I investigate whether there are some overlooked material reasons for 
big national firms or consumer groups to support interstate barriers, i.e. they somehow 
benefit from them. However, what I find is that they generally would benefit from federal 
market authority, but due to institutional and ideational reasons they do not mobilize as 
liberal theory had assumed.  
In sum, liberal theorists have addressed many aspects of market integration, in 
particular its economic benefits, but have paid less attention to specific structures that 
allow the realization of these gains. These theories are very good in pointing out 
incentives for creating unified rules but very weak in explaining why there is still so 
much divergence in actual outcomes. The main variables to look out for according to the 
reviewed theories (economic interdependence, externalities, density of economic 
transactions, efficient distribution of power, globalization pressures, and rent seeking 
behavior of distributional coalitions) do not seem to vary according to the outcomes. 
However, they do instruct us to pay careful attention to the real-world preferences and 
strategies of interest groups. Therefore, I investigate alternative sources of strategies (i.e. 
institutional incentives federalism) and alternative sources of preferences (i.e. 
conceptions of markets). 
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II.b.2. Institutional Explanations 
Institutional approaches do not dismiss the influence of broad economic 
incentives for centralization but argue that their effect is contingent on an existing 
institutional landscape. The important mechanisms5 that explain divergence are path-
dependency due to positive feedback effects of previous decisions and unintended 
consequences of (bounded) rational decisions (Pierson 2004). Accordingly, one would 
expect that polities develop rather different levels of federal market authority based on 
channeling of societal interests through previously established institutional arrangements. 
Historical decisions to give power to federal agencies and courts might create a feedback 
loop for further centralization, while states’ vested interests might work against economic 
incentives. Mobilization around single-markets might also differ because representative 
institutions differently aggregate functional and territorial interests. Institutionalist 
arguments are quite common in the literature on US state building and European 
integration but are seldom applied comparatively. They are generally amenable to 
explaining the outcome of interest, the crux being to identify the institutional 
configuration of causal significance. 
According to early EU scholarship, the original design of the European 
institutions had, in addition to economic spill-overs, the unintended consequence of 
shifting political loyalties of elites and interest groups toward the center—a political spill 
over (Haas 1958). Based on the economic incentives, European actors, like the 
commission, were able to cultivate business/country coalitions that would support 
increasing central power.  
This argument has been updated by historical institutionalist scholars. Pierson 
identifies the tension between national executives as EU decision-makers and actual 
EU/federal officials as tilting the EU toward successfully pursuing market integration 
(1996; also Sandholtz and Sweet 1998): National executives have short time horizons 
while Commission officials can wait for the window of opportunity for their proposal. 
The Commission is always interested in increasing its power. Unintended consequences 
                                                 
5 For more mechanisms see: Karen and Orren (2004); Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992); 
Streeck and Thelen (2005).  
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(in the form of state-opposed federal policy) multiply with high issue density because 
national executives are not able to completely comprehend their decisions and micro-
manage the formulation of policy. Spill-overs into unanticipated areas of policy making 
become more common. Because shifts in government preferences are quite frequent 
(election), existing arrangements will diverge from original designers’ preferences and be 
out of synch with current office holders’ preferences. In some instances, national 
executives participating in EU/federal decision-making may incentivize transferring 
power to the higher level of government because it increases their power and discretion. 
While ministers are held accountable by parliament in national decision making, they can 
decide more freely on the European level, in particular because parliaments have been 
relatively unsuccessful in prescribing how governments should vote in the Council of 
Ministers. Finally, interest groups develop co-specific assets, like influence in EU policy 
networks, that make them invested in maintaining or increasing central power. Other 
scholars have called this logic towards more centralization “institutionalization” and have 
focused on activism of supra-national institutions like the ECJ or the Commission that 
partly arises from principal agent problems (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998; Sandholtz, 
Fligstein, and Stone Sweet 2001). 
Other scholars stress the role of law and judicial activism. Egan argues that “in 
dealing with the discriminatory effects of regulatory barriers to trade, the European Court 
of Justice has played an active role in negative integration, by invalidating discriminatory 
national rules” and that “the Court has provided the window of opportunity for the 
Community to foster positive integration through the creation of a new regulatory 
regime” (2001, 108). In effect, the delegation of power to the ECJ led to the creation and 
mobilization of pro-integration interests on the sub-national level (Burley and Mattli 
1993). The strongest parallel between US and EU market integration is probably how 
much it relied on supreme court decisions that restricted states’ rights under the 
acquiescence of litigating businesses (M. Shapiro 2005; M. Egan 2015). 
In general then, institutionalist scholars hold that while economic benefits create 
integration demands, only an examination of European institutions can explain why there 
has been a sustained dynamic towards deeper integration (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). So 
comparatively, the task would be to identify the characteristic that blocks the integrative 
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dynamic in the US. In fact, it is rather surprising how self-evident or logical the dynamic 
process of integration starting with the Treaties of Rome is described in the literature, 
given that ‘trans-national’ elites in the US or Canada do not automatically support more 
centralization despite higher amounts of ‘trans-national interaction.’ The EU literature 
has not identified which comparative conditions lead to integrative feedback effects and 
which do not. This becomes increasingly clear when I turn to institutionalist literature 
from other areas that cite the exact same logic for different outcomes. 
Ziblatt’s analysis of conditions that lead to the emergence of federations or 
unitary states is stresses similar conditions to the EU scholarship (2006). While the realist 
or liberal approach would have predicted Prussia to create a unitary state in Germany, 
and Italy to unite as decentralized federation, it happened the other way around because 
institutions are often converted and reshaped but seldom created from scratch. In both 
cases, the unifiers followed the path of least resistance: German states were already 
strongly institutionalized (high infrastructural power) so Prussia could negotiate with 
strong executives and use pre-existing state institutions for taxation and policy-
implementation purposes once the federation was created. For Piedmont, despite its 
relative military weakness, unification by conquest was the only feasible option because 
regional patrimonial rulers were no reliable negotiation partners there were no local 
administrative apparatuses in place (low infrastructural power) to which authority could 
have been devolved. In his analysis, Ziblatt demonstrates that elite ideological 
commitments (strong federalism discourse) and ethnic cleavages were roughly similar 
across both cases making it plausible to relate the outcome to the supply of institutional 
possibilities (2006).  
For the US case, Skowronek relies on the same macro variables as Beer or 
Chandler but sees their effect on political centralization as highly contingent on 
institutional legacies and political alignments (1982). According to him, the early 
American state was held together by parties and courts, implying a limited set of market 
unification possibilities (negative integration). Industrialization provided general 
centralization demands that were transformed into policies by administrational activism 
within the constraints of existing institutions. The result was a state that is better suited to 
integrate a market but not the most “efficient” version of it. Instead existing institutions 
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are repurposed by institutional entrepreneurs (professional elites in this case) creating a 
federal government with more authority, but one that lacks decisive power due to 
horizontal fragmentation, politicization of the bureaucracy, and reliance on 
decentralized/autonomous implementation mechanisms. In short, limited US federal 
power can be explained by low federal resources and vested state interests going back to 
the time of the constitution.  
Other scholarship in American Political Development mirrors these arguments, 
showing on the one hand how constraint the development of federal power was, and on 
the other hand how economic and social pressures led to creative regulatory integration 
(Daniel Carpenter 2001; Lewis 2003; Skocpol 1992). As in the EU, conflicts get resolved 
by the delegation of authority, with unintended consequences toward more federal power.  
In his analysis of the FDA, Carpenter makes an argument that in many ways 
mirrors arguments over the European Commission and the ECJ (Daniel Carpenter 2010). 
“The United States is not under-regulated, he argues: the FDA has led the world in 
stringency of drug regulation, establishing processes emulated by agencies abroad” 
(Rasmussen 2011, 162). Carpenter describes how the activism of ‘supra-national elites’ 
led to America’s most powerful regulatory agency. He stresses that is was not the whim 
of legislators or industry that made it so. Instead, the initial delegation of power a created 
feedback effects, and most notably an elite that behind the façade of apolitical regulation 
centralized power.  
However, this literature only makes sense if we compare “a meager concentration 
of governmental controls at the national level” in the US to the unitary nation state in 
Europe (Skowronek 1982, 8). If we think that federal market-authority is undermined by 
initially low federal resources and sub-national vested interests, we should expect less 
interstate barriers in the US than in the EU. While the US federal government might have 
been weak initially, it had more legitimacy and resources than the initial European 
institutions and confronted less established and powerful sub-national units than the EU. 
If we focus on how non-state actors shift their loyalty to the new center when there is 
high transaction density, we must still conclude that this seems more likely in the US 
(Sandholtz and Sweet 1998).  
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One might object, saying that it was never the sole goal of the US constitution to 
create a single market while different EU treaties always explicitly formulated the single 
market as a goal6. In other words, does the initial legal framework explain the difference? 
I am not aware of anybody making this kind of argument, and as we will see, it does not 
really carry. While the US constitution ‘only’ specifies that “Congress shall have the 
power to regulate foreign trade, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes” 
it has been widely acknowledged that “commerce was what had led to rejection of the 
Articles of Confederation after a dozen years, because the confederation tolerated barriers 
to trade that interfered with creation of a common national market” (Lowi 2006, 96) 
Most legal scholars have interpreted the Commerce clause as intended to limit 
interstate barriers. Even ‘originalists’ like Robert Bork argue that “This analysis shows 
that the Clause was crafted, among other reasons, to vest the federal government with the 
ability to protect commerce between the States from the discriminatory interference of 
self-interested States (Bork and Troy 2001a, 850; Barnett 2001). Furthermore, “Though 
[the dormant commerce clause] has undergone significant doctrinal evolution over the 
years, the central premise—that the centralization of commercial regulatory authority in 
Congress implied judicially enforceable restraints on the states' regulation of interstate 
commerce—has remained constant” (Denning 2008, 421). One of the few studies of 
federal constitutions concludes:  
The American Constitution […] with a clear supremacy clause […] 
nevertheless engendered a union where state governmental units repeatedly 
challenged federal supremacy over a wide range of issues. In Europe, by 
contrast, the Treaty of Rome said nothing about its own authority to negate 
future, conflicting laws adopted by signatories to the treaty, but the European 
Court of Justice successfully interpreted the treaty as carrying this 
implication and provoked relatively little state resistance to the move. (L. F. 
Goldstein 2001, 147f.) 
                                                 
6 Article 3 of the EEC treaty specified that “[…] the activities of the Community shall include… 
the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import 
and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect; […] the abolition, as between 
Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital [and] the 
approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the 
common market.” 
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So legally, both polities have broad federal market authority and could use it to 
create single markets. The US Supreme Court and the ECJ have similar potentials to 
strike down discriminatory behavior of sub-national units. If they do not use it, I must 
specify either specific institutional or ideational causes. For instance, there is no legal 
reason why US Supreme Court has exempted states from acting non-discriminatorily in 
their public procurement, while the ECJ has not (Manheim 1990). Under judicial review, 
judges look for the ‘substance’, i.e. the idea behind laws, bringing in their ideological 
commitments or attitudes (Atiyah and Summers 1987; Segal and Spaeth 2002). When we 
observe different trends in interpretation, we have to look for a political interpretation. 
Either judges face completely different incentives, or we have to turn to more ideational 
explanations.  
I therefore dispose of the initial institutionalist hypothesis. The following cannot 
explain my puzzle: The opportunities to take advantage of economic benefits are 
extremely constraint by how institutions have structured the relations between federal and 
state governments, as well as business. Policymakers choose the path of least resistance 
to achieve unification of rules (Pierson 1996). Initial centralization leads to a dynamic of 
increasing centralization of authority and more harmonization (Sandholtz and Sweet 
1998). 
However, this type of argument implies several questions that might help to 
modify the theory: What is the potential for Commission activism toward market 
integration? In particular,  why do federal regulators in some countries put forward a 
broad agenda to reduce internal trade barriers but not in others (Hoffmann 2011; D. 
Brown 2002)? What is the potential for cooperative inter-governmental relations; how do 
current decision-making mechanisms influence the relations between different levels of 
government (D. Brown 2002; G. Anderson 2012)? Are legislators or judges situated to 
gain or lose from market unification? How do existing institutions affect popular 
mobilization for market integration?  
Based on these questions, I hypothesize specific conditions directly from the 
literature under which we might see the creation of federal market authority. Obstacles to 
market-building are overcome when power is delegated to very specific types of 
institutions (like the European Commission or the ECJ) and when interest representation 
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is organized in certain ways that transform state-vested and industry interests (like in the 
EU). This suggest that we have to look at how the structure of institutions dealing with 
single market issues in the US systematically differs from the EU. The institutional 
literature provides many ideas about what kind of processes might be at work in 
producing the outcomes but it does not provide a clear hypothesis about which particular 
institutional relationship is of most causal importance. However, two general institutional 
factors can be identified. Legacies like high fragmentation of power, the party system, 
competitive inter-governmental relationships (etc.) supply some kind of institutional 
opportunity structure that defines what kind of institutional conversions are possible for 
addressing internal market barriers. At the same time, institutional factors seem to 
influence whether demands for addressing market fragmentation are formed due to the 
different situation of policy-makers and bureaucrats. This argument will be further 
developed in the theory building section. 
In sum, institutional theorists have addressed how the economic incentives toward 
federal market authority are mediated by path-dependencies and unintended 
consequences of institutional decisions. Their main idea is H2: we will see increasing 
federal market authority with more federal resources, less state vested interests, high 
interaction density leading to re-orientation of loyalty and institutional autonomy of 
market-builders. While these main variables and dynamics provide good explanations for 
single cases, they cannot really account for the difference. However, by paying careful 
attention to the institutional obstacles potential winners from singe market building face, 
we might discover specific institutional conditions that enable federal market authority. 
While this is part of the story (see theory building section), we need ideas to understand 
why certain institutions are created. This is what we turn to next.  
II.b.3.Ideational Explanations 
Ideational approaches look at how ideas, identities, norms, practices, or political 
discourses shape the construction of federal market authority (Powell and DiMaggio 
1991). While pressures like globalization or institutional obstacles do exists, what actors 
make of it (their ‘rational’ self-interest) depends crucially on what these pressures 
“mean” and what actors define as appropriate responses. Scholarship on the political 
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economy of markets has long inquired into the ‘social purpose’ of market arrangements 
(Ruggie 1982). Polanyi is one of the first scholars to take this position in his account of 
19th century liberalism. He argued that “the road to the free market was opened and kept 
open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism” or in short “laisser-faire was planned” (Polanyi 1944, 140f.). This 
directs us to inquire into the different ideological agendas and ideas underlying market 
construction. Thus, Americans may interpret the problems and appropriate solutions of 
market authority differently from Europeans.  
The 1990s and 2000s have seen an explosion of ideational scholarship addressing 
the political development of the EU and the US. Here, one might differentiate arguments 
that stress the ideas of elites and arguments that stress the general political culture or 
mass attitudes. However, as the review will show, this literature has similar difficulties in 
accounting for differences in federal market authority as the other approaches do. 
Nonetheless, ideational explanations lead us on the right track to construct a new theory.  
Since Max Weber, scholarship on political culture has suggested that open and 
competitive markets are more likely in the US than in Europe (Weber 1976). American 
political culture is seen as exceptional in accepting market ideas as the only legitimate 
ideology (Hartz 1991; Lipset 1979; Schuck and Wilson 2008). On the level of broader 
political culture the most famous work is Frank Dobbin’s analysis of industrial policy in 
the US, England, and France (1994). He argues that despite objectively similar problems, 
these countries pursued differing policies due to different social constructions of 
economic efficiency. In the US, the federal government was seen as “enforcing price 
competition as a way of guarding Americans’ economic liberties against the demon of 
concentrated economic power” (Dobbin 1994, 24). “In the United States, restraints of 
trade were associated with political tyranny, and policies adopted to guard liberty by 
precluding restraints of trade were soon cast as positive measures to promote growth” 
(Dobbin 1994, 225). Similarly, many leading economists, like Benjamin Friedman at 
Harvard University, describe the US as exceptional because “more so than any other 
large nation, America has maintained a flexibility and fluidity in its economic 
arrangements that has facilitated the continual reallocation of both labor and capital 
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resources and has fostered economic initiative, entrepreneurship, and creativity” (B. 
Friedman 2009, 88f.). 
Other approaches, focusing more on the contingency of the development of 
federal market authority based on elite competition and autonomy, come to similar 
conclusions (Bensel 2000; Berk 1994). Berk suggests that “industrialization and state-
building in the United States were much more contested and open-ended than” broad 
cultural arguments imply (Berk 1994, x). Elites within the Republican Party worked 
tirelessly to overcome the Southern and local barriers to national market construction, in 
particularly by relying on the Supreme Court to strike down all possible obstacles to 
trade. It was the party elites that “choose to make construction of a national market 
economy one of the highest policy priorities the party would pursue” (Bensel 2000, 518). 
Recent scholarship focusses on neoliberal ideas and how they ‘persuaded’ countries to 
pursue broadly similar economic policy in the late 20th century (Hall 1989; Blyth 2002; 
Prasad 2006; Roy, Denzau, and Willett 2007; Harvey 2005). Prasad for example tries to 
ascertain why neoliberal transformation has gone so much farther in the United States 
and Britain than anywhere else (2006); scholars of political-economic ideas generally 
seem to agree that compared to Europe, “there is no question that the US economy is 
much closer to ‘free market capitalism’” (Art, Denzau and Willet 2007). 
All those descriptions clash with the outcome if we bring the EU into the picture. 
The cultural arguments suggest that the EU should be less successful in constructing a 
single market. Why would social-democratic Europeans aggressively act against internal 
market barriers while neoliberal Americans tolerate them? This question is particularly 
salient for the literature on neoliberal ideas: Blyth and Prasad both focus on fiscal and tax 
policy, not noticing that in many ways neoliberal goals are not achieved because little 
attention is paid to creating competitive markets (Blyth 2002; Prasad 2006).  
Ideas have also been stressed in explaining the creation of the EU. Neo-
functionalism includes several ideas that have some resemblance with constructivism. 
Theorists stress how interaction of politicians and bureaucrats on the European level 
leads to shift from national to supra-national loyalties or the creation of a European 
identity (Egeberg 1999). Elite ideas explain the centralization of power and 
harmonization of policies in Europe. According to Fligstein, the core dynamic of 
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European integration is the transformation of elite identities (2008). The increased 
interaction of policy-makers, bureaucrats, managers, and professionals has transformed 
their identities toward feeling European. In turn they prefer more regulation on the 
European level. What holds the EU back from becoming a federal state in this theory is 
the fact that the average person’s outlook remains national due to limited European 
interaction. However, this theory fares oddly when compared to the presumably stronger 
national identity of politicians in the US. 
More recent approaches have traced how discrete ideas about markets and the EU 
became powerful in new and contingent ways, key ‘variables’ being elite autonomy, 
cross-cutting ideas, and strategic use of language. For example, Parsons stresses that key 
national executives held ideas of creating a European community that did not become 
politicized because they cross-cut cleavages. Due to low domestic salience and powerful 
allies that pursued different but compatible (liberalization) agendas, elites were able to 
strike deals in absence of domestic political support (2003). Others have stressed the 
power of economic ideas like monetarism (McNamara 1998) in creating the EMU and 
‘the market’ (Jabko 2012) in creating the legitimacy for transfers of competencies and 
supra-national policy making. Jabko describes how the European Commission was able 
to use “the market” as powerful but flexible metaphor to sway even opposing groups to 
reimagine their interest and support increasing federal power (2012). 
Unfortunately, none of this work addresses the EU and the US comparatively. 
Nonetheless, these scholars pave the way theoretically and methodologically by 
suggesting new ways for how to think about market ideas: Duina analyzes the EU, 
Mercosur, and NAFTA, arguing that “In any market, sustainable buying and selling 
requires that participants share some basic understandings of the world,” in particular 
about “what is exchanged,” “what is desirable,” and “what is safe”(Duina 2006, 4). 
Different regional trade areas have adopted different “cognitive guidebooks” depending 
on law tradition (that presumably exemplify how people think). Economic integration in 
common law traditions does not lead to complex guidebooks of reality. Instead they 
adopt a reactive and minimalist approach to regulation in which conflicts are settled by 
courts as they occur (NAFTA). In contrast, policy-makers in civil law traditions try to 
regulate and harmonize the economy before conflicts arise (EU). This suggests, that 
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being market-friendly might have different implications in different areas shaped by 
different ideological traditions.  
This might be supported with a re-reading of Hartz: “Since Americans never were 
obligated to use state power to liberate themselves from feudalism, they were ‘born 
equal’ and could afford to look upon the state as an unmitigated threat to natural liberty. 
The government that governs best governs least. Let the Europeans say otherwise” 
(Ackerman 1993, 26). In her analysis of 19th century US states, Goldstein argues, 
“Resisting distant central authority must have felt, to some degree, like a reaffirmation of 
values central to the American political tradition […]. And consequently is likely to crop 
up more often” than in European countries where this does not resonate” (L. F. Goldstein 
2001, 52f.). This suggests because of their antipathy to federal authority, Americans tend 
to think differently about how markets are created. Focusing on the specific American 
content of market ideas is also supported by a growing literature on nation-building and 
race. Here the argument is that an order based on racism, empowered states-rights views 
that ultimately trumped liberalism in the shape of the US single market (D. S. King and 
Smith 2005). Conflicts over the racial ordering of society have legitimated a foundational 
discourse over states’ rights that is in the way of central market authority. Under these 
conditions a different conceptualization of markets that relies more on competition than 
authority might evolve. At the same time, German and French ideas about political order 
were much more amenable to strong federal market authority (Marcussen et al. 1999; 
Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung 1998) 
The literature on neoliberalism suggests a similar entry-way to understanding 
market ideas. Blyth shows how policy-entrepreneurs in think-tanks, Congress, and 
business creatively combined supply-side ideas with monetarism to create American 
neoliberalism (Blyth 2002). This implies, in different contexts these ideas might be 
differently combined. As we will see later, the openness of interpretation of neoliberal 
ideas, can be traced back all the way to Friedrich Hayek. 
In sum, the ideational literature suggests that policy-making elites understand 
economic challenges and appropriate responses in many different ways. The solutions, 
they adopt, do not only reflect those different understandings, but also turn on how 
political movements connect ideas about authority and markets. Similarly, the position of 
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interest-groups cannot simply be understood as a reflection of structural and institutional 
position, but as playing out of the former within the context of market ideas. 
Unfortunately, the specific applications discussed do not seem to shed light on the EU-
US comparison. In particular, we would have expected the more heterogeneous, less pro-
market Europeans to resist European integration more than their American counterparts. 
The ideational approach, does not give us an easy, testable hypothesis. Instead, it invites 
us to develop an explanation by taking into account the discussed concepts. 
II.c.  A New Theoretical Account of Market-Building 
Political science is as much about testing competing theories as it is about telling 
a compelling story to explain an outcome that can subsequently be tested, modified, or 
refused by other scholars. Here I develop the story to be told in this dissertation. There 
are two parts to this: in the US, federal market authority is not used, and institutions not 
transformed, because a competitive federalism conception of markets has become 
dominant among neoliberal policy-makers, or more broadly among federal officials. The 
ordoliberal conception of markets, held by EU policy-makers and member state 
executives on the other hand, prescribes institutional reforms to create and use federal 
market authority, leading to an ever-expanding single market project. The sub-national 
and firm-level is also influenced by those dominant ideas. In addition, equally important 
are specific institutions that lead to the aggregation of pro-single market interests and the 
transformation of vested-state interests. In the EU and the US, the structural conditions—
increasing economic interdependence, increasing density of economic transactions, 
dampened by rent seeking behavior of distributional coalitions (also increased 
homogeneity of identities)—push firms and governments toward more federal market 
authority. However, the US context puts those interest into a double bind: first, 
competitive federalism ideas diffuse down and are prevalent among some firms and state 
governments. Secondly, the US system of territorial interest representation and traditions 
of private rule-making fragment any pro-federal market authority interests and diffuse the 
benefits of central and uniform rules. As a result, I argue, the EU has moved much more 
toward federal market authority and has established more liberal rules for its internal 
market than the US. In the following case studies, I do not explain the European case but 
38 
use it as a mirror two show that conventional theorizing cannot account for the US’s 
peculiar trajectory in terms of federal market authority. Taken together, the two 
explanatory elements laid out in this section can account for the loosening of federal 
market authority and the limited number of market-unification initiatives by private 
actors in the US—thereby answering the question posed in this dissertation. 
II.c.1. Two Selective Conceptions of Market Authority 
The first part of my theoretical account is that institutional obstacles are 
overcome, or existing federal market authority is used to create single markets under 
specific ideational conditions. To understand the influence of these conditions—on social 
movements or elite strategies—we have to start with an idea that is open to interpretation. 
The specific idea here is the idea of the free market, pursued by the neoliberal movement, 
and the degree to which they imagine those markets to rely on strong central authority. 
As I show, beyond the ‘superiority of markets’ there has always been an ambiguity in 
neoliberal thought, specifically on the question of how the beneficial effects of markets 
can be realized. This leaves policy-makers open to adopting free-market strategies that fit 
their context. While one groups sees federal government as crucial in preventing anti-
competitive forces from undermining competition (‘ordoliberals’), another group sees 
competition between sub-national governments as crucial (‘competitive federalists’). As I 
will demonstrate, the latter interpretation became hegemonic within US scholarship and 
later in government. There are strong indications that the former conception was adopted 
by EU policy-makers, but this dissertation will only provide systematic evidence for the 
US case, only pointing at some illustrations of the EU context. The reason for the 
divergence in market conceptions can be found in differing cultural and political 
contexts. 
Neoliberalism has been defined in so many different ways (reaching from a theory 
of human nature to a pejorative term for everything bad or unjust associated with 
globalization) that one might abandon it as a concept altogether (Harvey 2005; D. S. 
Jones 2012; Centeno and Cohen 2012; Swarts 2013; Prasad 2006; Saad-Filho and 
Johnston 2005; Steger and Roy 2010; Pepinsky 2013). However, there is a common 
denominator to all neoliberals and the power of neoliberal ideas is recognizable even 
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when the borders are fuzzy. I take neoliberalism as an ideology, meaning it tells us what 
is bad about existing society, what a good society looks like, and how we get there. As 
ideology, the tenets of neoliberalism do not have to be empirically true, but we can 
observe whether its prescriptions are followed and whether they have the intended result. 
The first tenet of neoliberalism is individual freedom and the opportunity to be 
prosperous. Its main analytical claim is that markets have certain good effects, in 
particular that they are the most efficient mechanism to organize production, distribution, 
and consumption; that they are the only way to disseminate information efficiently; and 
that they are perfectly “in tune with human nature” (D. S. Jones 2012, 106f.; Coase 1976, 
544f.). The second tenet of neoliberalism is limiting government. This is closely 
connected to the definition of freedom (government is coercive) and a general skepticism 
of the possibility of governments to deliver any desirable results—at a minimum it is by 
definition seen an inefficient mechanism of allocation (Coase 1976, 544).  
Despite this general critique, neoliberals have to differing degree recognized the 
need of government to uphold the market (M. Friedman 1951, 91). The list of necessary 
tasks has always included the provision of a legal framework, most importantly property 
rights, an arbitration service, especially for enforcing contracts, as well as national 
defense and a monetary system. Some have added state activities that help maintaining a 
competitive order, like anti-trust legislation and enforcement, regulation of natural 
monopolies, and dealing with external effects that remain excluded from private 
calculation. And some neoliberals, like German ordoliberals, have even added limited 
redistribution to guarantee social peace and stability which they see as threatened by the 
constant innovation in a capitalist society (D. S. Jones 2012, 121ff.).  
From these two tenets follows a normative push to establish markets. However, 
neoliberals disagree over how to set up a government that will allow or bring about 
markets—especially in the context of multi-level governments like the EU or the US. If 
governments in general can be expected to incline towards impairing markets, does that 
mean that a well-constructed overarching (federal) government should preempt the 
powers of lower-level units to be protectionist? Or does shifting any power to a higher 
(federal) level, even in the name of neoliberal principles, simply worsen the fundamental 
problem of government interventionism?  
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The argument can be traced back to Hayek and the founding of the Mont Pelerin 
Society in 1947 as a neoliberal thought collective—since then the exact role of 
government has been the central disagreement within neoliberalism (Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009). Neoliberalism here is not clear on how much, which level of government 
should do (Hayek 2001; Popper 1952; Mises 1969). Despite the opposition to 
government intervention and fear of totalitarianism, the authors saw a clear role for the 
state to ensure the working of the market: 
It is important not to confuse opposition against this kind of planning with a 
dogmatic laissez-faire attitude. The liberal argument is in favor of making the 
best possible use of the forces of competition as a means of coordinating 
human efforts, not an argument for leaving things just as they are. It is based 
on the conviction that where effective competition can be created, it is a 
better way of guiding individual efforts than any other. It does not deny, but 
even emphasizes, that, in order that competition should work beneficially, a 
carefully thought-out legal framework is required […]. The functioning of 
competition not only requires adequate organization of certain institutions 
like money, markets, and channels of information-some of which can never 
be adequately provided by private enterprise-but it depends above all on the 
existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to 
preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as possible. 
(Hayek 2001, 38f.) 
But just how “effective competition can be created” has been controversial among 
neoliberals, in particular whether any deliberate ‘creation’ is necessary at all. To frame it 
differently, how should we organize political power to guarantee the proper framework 
for competition? Many neoliberals, including Hayek, focused on the ability of multi-level 
government to deliver economic liberty and innovation. Hayek discussed the beneficial 
effects of state competition under federalism: “The absence of tariff walls and the free 
movements of men and capital between the states of the federation has certain important 
consequences which are frequently overlooked. They limit to a great extent the scope of 
the economic policy of the individual states” (Hayek 1939, 140). According to Hayek, the 
great thing about federalism is, that it restricts government intervention in general 
because states are thwarted due to competitive disadvantages, and the federal government 
thwarted because it is too hard for everybody to agree: “The main point is that, in many 
cases in which it will prove impossible to reach such agreement, we shall have to resign 
ourselves rather to have no legislation” (Hayek 1939, 140). 
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However, guaranteeing the absence of quotas and tariffs is not enough, because 
states will find other ways to protect their industry: “The experience in these federations 
makes it appear that, to prevent such trends, it is scarcely sufficient to prohibit tariffs and 
similar obvious impediments to interstate commerce” (Hayek 1939, 141). As a result, the 
central government has to actively intervene: “In view of the inventiveness shown by 
state legislators in this respect, it seems clear that no specific prohibitions in the 
constitution of the federation would suffice to prevent such developments; the federal 
government would probably have to be given general restraining powers to this end” 
(Hayek 1939, 142). 
As will be demonstrated, in the American context, this kind of thinking built the 
literature on competitive federalism. Scholars here focused solely on the first competition 
aspect and downplayed the strong central government aspects. Instead they assumed, the 
use of federal government will lead to more market distortions than competition among 
states. This seems to be located in a radicalization of the anti-government sentiment and 
an emphasis on the ‘naturalness’ of markets. “By the 1970s, neither Milton Friedman’s 
intelligent loquaciousness nor Ronald Reagan’s warm sentiments could disguise a 
philosophy that was built on a cold and abstract individualism […]. And yet the vision 
was still very much a utopian one, centered on a fantasy of the perfect free market” (D. S. 
Jones 2012, 87). 
Friedman elevated limiting the role of central (federal) government to the main 
principle. He argued that while there might be need for government intervention due to 
market failure, in most cases this is a bad idea because politics in most cases leads to 
even worse results (Jones 2012, 109). For example, in the case of natural monopolies he 
writes, “I reluctantly conclude that, if tolerable, private monopoly may be the least of the 
evils” (M. Friedman 1962, 31). The implication of federal market authority is clear: “If 
government is to exercise power, better in the county than in the state, better in the state 
than in Washington” (M. Friedman 1962, 3). Beyond central rules against explicit state 
discrimination, subunits should be sufficiently disciplined by interstate regulatory 
competition, not central mandates. This is related to his view of markets as ‘natural’ 
order—competitive markets will exist automatically when government intervention 
ceases (M. Friedman 1962). 
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Chapter IV demonstrates how this interpretation became dominant in much of 
American academia—or at least among law and economics, as well as conservative think 
tank scholars—mostly because neoliberal thought fused with the push to apply the 
parsimonious models of neoclassical economics to politics, law, and regulation (D. S. 
Jones 2012, 88). George Stiegler from the Chicago School basically argued that 
regulatory agencies will eventually be captured by powerful industry interest (Stigler 
1971). Positions like this undermined any faith one might have had in the federal 
government’s ability to police subnational units. While William Riker, founder of the 
rational choice school in political science, lamented inefficient outcomes from sub-
national competition, the mainstream federalism perspective soon agreed on its beneficial 
effects (Riker 1964; P. E. Peterson 2012).  
The Virginia School of Economics developed similar arguments by applying 
public choice theory to federalism. The result of these ‘fiscal federalism’ models is that 
only jurisdictional competition can protect citizen from government exploitation and 
provide optimal bundles of public goods (Oates 2005; Tullock 1969): ‘‘Total government 
intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to 
which taxes and expenditures are decentralized’’ (Brennan and Buchanan 2006). The 
main mechanism behind this result are exit options—federalism gives citizens choices 
that discipline subnational government. Accordingly, welfare increases as mobile 
individuals choose among local offerings of public goods (Tiebout 1956). While these 
arguments where developed in respect to fiscal policy and have lots of limitations, 
conservative scholars have applied them axiomatically and uncritically. 
The best know articulation of these results is Barry Weingast’s model of Market-
Preserving Federalism. He argues that markets do well if “Subnational authorities have 
primary authority over regulating the economy […]. As long as capital and labor are 
mobile, market-preserving federalism constrains the lower units in their attempts to place 
political limits on economic activity, because resources will move to other jurisdictions” 
(Weingast 1995, 5). This implies that markets appear naturally—little deliberate action in 
the center or in the states is necessary—fitting with the broader Hayekian image of the 
market as a naturalistic, default set of relationships. 
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Empirically then, this is one answer to the question of whether central 
government can be used to bring about markets or whether markets will arise naturally 
when central government is limited. This view—let’s call it competitive federalism—
makes two central claims: (1) if government cannot be eliminated altogether, lower levels 
of government that will be kept in check by market competition are preferred. 
Guaranteeing markets in multi-jurisdictional spaces is all about limiting federal authority. 
(2) There is no positive role for regulation because regulatory capture cannot be avoided. 
Policymakers should always seek to deregulate. It follows: the first task for neoliberals is 
to decentralize and deregulate.  
However, as the Hayek quote showed, early neoliberal ideas can be interpreted in 
a different way as well: “the federal government would probably have to be given general 
restraining powers to this end” (Hayek 1939, 142). The ambiguity can be resolved into 
trusting a central government over many sub-national ones. After all, if government tends 
to distort the market, maybe one is better than many? 
Polanyi, not a neoliberal, is one of the first scholars to take this position in his 
analysis of 19th century liberalism. He argued that empirically “the road to the free 
market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally 
organized and controlled interventionism” or in short “laisser-faire was planned” (Polanyi 
1944, 140f.). In particular the “self-regulating market” needs the state to manage the 
“fictitious commodities” labor, land, and money to make them actual commodities that 
follow the laws of supply and demand. At the same time, these commodities, especially 
people, will resist their complete commodification so the state will have to protect them 
from the market because otherwise the whole economic order will be destroyed. In other 
words, individual and groups do not like being commodified. Losers and winners—be it 
businesses or sub-national political authorities—oppose competition to either secure their 
privileged position or overturn their losing position. In either case, it has to be up to a 
strong central state to force all participants into market-behavior. Because of this, some 
scholars have equated neoliberalism not with a program to dismantle the state, but to 
empower it and make it more authoritarian (Harvey 2005; W. Brown 2000). 
Independently of the normative assessment of markets, institutional and 
sociological scholarship has recognized, as Hayek did, that an equally plausible theory is 
44 
that markets need strong federal market authority to guarantee it (for example: Fligstein 
2001; North 1991; Gamble 1988; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010). In ideological 
terms, this is nicely expressed by German neoliberals (Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, 
Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow and Alfred Müller-Armack), i.e. ordoliberals. In the 
1930’s they argued that, left to its own devices, competitive tendencies can be destructive 
to the market order, necessitating a competitive order based on social intervention and 
political regulation (Young 2013, 39). Eucken criticized laissez-faire: “Without any 
mechanism to hinder and check monopolies, laissez-faire contributed to the replacement 
of competition through achievement (Leistungswettbewerb), in which entrepreneurs are 
rewarded and punished by the selection process of the market, by competition to prevent 
competition (Behinderungswettbewerb), namely the use of predatory measures such as 
boycotts, price discrimination and cartels to drive out and close the gates to competition“ 
(cit. in Sally 1996, 237). Ordoliberals see the danger of both firms and subnational units 
accumulating powers that undermine the market. Therefore, a strong state is required—it 
is not a state that intervenes to redistribute but a state that intervenes to maintain or create 
competitiveness: “Ordering does not mean central planning. Central planning of all 
economic processes is impossible […]. The complicated workings of the economic 
apparatus have to be left on a liberal basis. Ordering means ordering liberty” (Miksch 
1937, 11). 
The conservative roots can easily be seen in ordoliberals’ obsession with order 
overcoming human imperfection. The common worker has to be continuously made into 
an entrepreneur by state intervention: „There is no freedom without surveillance to ensure 
that the orderly conduct of self-interested entrepreneurs does not give way to 
proletarianisation” (Bonefeld 2012, 13). The beneficial effects of markets are not the 
natural state of the world—their existence must be constructed and will not evolve 
spontaneously like US neoliberals imagined (Renner 2000).   
However, as American neoliberals do, they see the danger of the state being 
instrumentalized by “greedy self-seekers” who see it “as a suitable prey” (Rüstow 1932, 
255). But instead of hoping that jurisdictional competition will prevent that, they imagine 
that a strong central state, “above the economy and above the interest groups” can solve 
the problem (Rüstow 1932, 258). “The ordoliberals conceive of the agents of the strong 
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state as modern day aristocrats of the common good, who connect with the honest core of 
the workers on the basis of reason and through educational effort” (Bonefeld 2012, 15). 
While this sounds authoritarian—and indeed some ordoliberals like Müller-Armack were 
sympathetic to Hitler—it could be reinterpreted as empowering elites that institutionally 
are interested in maintaining competitive conditions, like the European Commission. 
Habermas, for example, calls the European Council a “post-democratic exercise of 
political authority” (Habermas 2014, vii).  
While not comprehensively explored in this dissertation, the EU looks a lot like 
the ordoliberal solution to the problem of how to overcome anti-competitive behaviors by 
governmental and non-governmental entities. It does not rely on jurisdictional 
competition, but instead, as ordoliberals suggest, on mechanisms to tame anti-competitive 
demands brought to the political system. For instance, Werner Bonefield argues:  
The EU provides a supranational anchor for the domestic pursuit of market 
freedom […]. The often-lamented democratic deficit of European governance 
is […] not a design fault. Rather, the market-liberal constitution of Europe 
identifies democracy as an impediment to the achievement of a free labor 
economy. In distinction to majoritarian democratic theory, according to 
which voting ‘is a method for citizens to participate directly in making law, 
which is then the will of the people’, the liberal Right holds that, at its best, 
democracy is a method of circulating governing elites” (Bonefeld 2015, 
869f.).  
In this sense, executive federalism and empowered guardians of liberty, i.e. the 
European Commission, are another solution to the neoliberal ambiguity—the solution 
preferred by ordoliberals. 
This ‘ideological’ view is also supported by scholarship in political economy and 
sociology. Steven Vogel’s study of pro-competitive reforms in Western democracies 
comes to the conclusion that markets actually require more rules and deregulation is often 
followed by juridical reregulation" (Kelemen 2011, 23; S. K. Vogel 1996). For him, the 
competitive federalism conception of free markets is a myth. Producing a free market in 
the sense of liberalizing economic flows within one country does not only require 
willingness/ability to liberalize but also willingness/ability to allow strong governments 
to intervene in the market for this goal. He argues that liberalization (more competition) 
and deregulation (less rules) are not the same goal and shows in his case studies that 
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meaningful liberalization was only possible in countries that specified and centrally 
enforced more rules. If this is true—and I argue it is—we should see a proliferation of 
interstate barriers in countries that adopt a competitive federalism conception of markets. 
Today, many economists expect any regulation to be a non-tariff barrier, i.e. be 
potentially discriminatory: “If all regulations that disadvantaged importers were classified 
as non-tariff barriers, then virtually all regulations could be considered protectionist” 
(Grieco 1990; S. K. Vogel 1996, 14). Moreover, economists question how much inter-
jurisdictional mobility and competition drives US states to regulatory change. In a review 
of 38 studies trying to relate jurisdictional competition to smaller government, only 25 of 
38 studies found some support (Feld 2014). Economists have also questioned whether the 
assumptions of the Tiebout model hold. If they, do not, competition among governments 
might lead to inefficient public policies (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). These arguments 
can be found in the literature as ‘harmful competition’ or ‘race to the bottom’ (Oates and 
Schwab 1988). For example, in 1998 the OECD published a widely-noted report Harmful 
Tax Competition, an Emerging Global Issue (OECD 1998). Similarly, some economists 
have found evidence that jurisdictional competition leads to a race to the bottom in 
environmental standards (Woods 2006). In general, people tend not to move to ‘more 
efficient’ jurisdictions leading to suboptimal outcomes (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). 
All these points suggest that promoting markets could require extensive central 
action to restrict or replace state regulations. Neoliberal ideas therefore give raise to a 
second view—let’s call it ordoliberal—making two different claims: (1) Markets are a 
political creation. It follows, that while government is often a bad allocative mechanism, 
it must be used to create markets, in particular by banning anti-market activities and 
policies by sub-national units. (2) Strong regulation by a central authority is necessary 
because losers from competition will always try undermine the existence of competitive 
markets. Central authority works best when it is partly insulated from populist and 
economic pressures. It follows: the first task for neoliberals is to centralize, insulate, and 
regulate. 
Why have those different ideas become dominant in the respective polities? My 
dissertation shows this evolution for the US case. Existing scholarship and ideational 
explanations, especially on US conservatism give a good account of why this happened. 
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However, the crucial aspect they miss is how neoliberal ideas have systematically 
differed across the Atlantic, with the result that neoliberalism in the US has undermined 
the free market. To understand this, we have to focus on pre-existing attitudes about 
federal authority and how policy entrepreneurs and policy-makers mixed these ideational 
commitments with the rising neoliberal creed.  
As will be demonstrated, neoliberal and neoclassical economics with its affinity to 
competitive federalism has long been dominant in American academics. This is well 
documented in accounts on the rise of neoliberal thought in the US (Prasad 2006; D. S. 
Jones 2012; Blyth 2002). In addition, the competitive federalism conception generally 
resonates more with American’s antipathy to federal government. This has been widely 
noted, from Hartz’s Liberal Tradition to current public opinion data (Hartz 1991). Open 
any textbook on US Politics and one will find a statement like this: “Indeed, central to the 
American political culture is a strong anti-government sentiment […]. Yet, there are 
many programs administered by the federal government that Americans favor. This 
seeming paradox reflects a cultural animosity to government combined with the 
widespread acceptance of specific government programs” (Bowles and McMahon 2014). 
Or similarly: ”large majorities say they favor free enterprise and dislike government 
meddling in the economy” (Kernell et al. 2017, 374).  
An emphasis on the distinct attitudes toward government making the US a distinct 
political culture can also be found in Fabbrini’s comparison of EU and US democracy. 
He argues:  
Several factors explain why the formation of a national market was a political 
project in the European nation‐states, whereas it was the outcome of a 
judicial action in America. Contrary to the European experience, America has 
shown that it is possible to build a market without a state, provided that a 
legal order is effectively promoted and guaranteed by the judiciary system. 
(Fabbrini 2010, 81).  
However, as I show, building a market without a state has limitation, specifically 
the possible proliferation of interstate barriers by local governments. Hence, the fact that 
America was founded on contractual while European Countries were founded on statist 
foundations has important results: “Unlike the Jacobin legacy for France, republican 
ideology in America merely deepened the distrust of national mobilization. In Europe, by 
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contrast the centralized state not only established the legal conditions for the birth of the 
market, but also intervened in its material structuring” (Fabbrini 2010, 91).  
Because of the general antipathy to government, competitive federalism also fell 
on fertile ground in the business community. David Vogel for instance argues that “the 
most characteristic, distinctive, and persistent belief of American corporate executives is 
an underlying suspicion and mistrust of government”(D. Vogel 1978, 45). Another study 
finds that one of the most common beliefs in the business community is “1. The state is 
intrinsically evil. State intervention in economic affairs is dangerous. 2. Freedom is 
defined as freedom from governmental intervention in economic affairs. Freedom exists 
naturally as long as government does not destroy it by interfering with economic affairs” 
(cited in D. Vogel 1978, 47). Similar arguments can be found in books like A Necessary 
Evil: a History of American Distrust of Government (Wills 2002).  
After falling on such fertile ground and being elaborated by many academics, the 
competitive federalism conception was ready to be invoked by politics, which I show by 
following conservative think tanks scholars and conservative administrations. According 
to Robertson, states’ rights have always been the second dimension of political debates in 
the US—an argument to be invoked instrumentally when other arguments have failed: 
“Public debates may evoke highly principled arguments for or against federalism or 
national power, but these philosophical assertions usually cloak the real purpose behind 
the struggle over states versus national power: to get government to do something that 
they want it to do, or to prevent government from doing something they want to prevent" 
(Robertson 2012, 9). In this way, Republicans starting in the late 1960 fused pro-market 
advocacy with states’ rights as a political strategy, that unintentionally lead to the 
competitive federalism conception. This is well documented in the literature on the 
‘Southern Strategy’ but interestingly has never been put together with the effects of 
increasing market barriers. In short, conservatives tried to break the New Deal coalition 
by combining selectively state’s rights arguments to support socially conservative policy 
as well as color-blind racism with pro-business policies sold as deregulation on the 
federal level (Lowndes 2008; Hohle 2015). This account complements other arguments 
about how neoliberalism became dominant in the US. Blyth describes how conservatives 
adopted a coherent combination of monetarism, supply side economics, rational 
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expectations, and public choice as alternativeless response to the inflationary crisis in the 
1970s (Blyth 2002). Similarly, Prasad describes how single elements of this new ideology 
were adopted because it allowed to combine several electorates (Prasad 2006). 
While not systematically analyzed in this dissertation, there is some evidence that 
in continental Europe, rising neoliberal ideas in the 1970s connected in almost the 
opposite way with a new rationale to build central market authority, not weaken it. The 
ordoliberal conception fell on fertile ground due to a different cultural identity of the state 
as creator of markets and liberty (Fabbrini 2010). Support for government management 
of the economy is much for prevalent in continental Europe, particularly among 
conservatives and Christian Democrats as a careful study of post-war public opinion 
shows (Borre and Scarbrough 1998). There is quite a consensus on this: “At the end of 
the reconstruction of the economies shattered by war, redistribution and discretionary 
macroeconomic management emerged as the top priorities of governments of most 
Western European Governments” (Baake 1996, 1). Many authors write that in the 1980s 
Europe like the US shifted toward neoliberalism—however again they overlook how 
different their conceptions were. Even when France abandoned dirigisme they moved 
much more toward ordoliberalism than competitive federalism (Levy 1999). Early on, 
drivers of European Integration held ordoliberal conceptions. This was particularly true 
because ordoliberal market ideas mixed well with ideas about a United States of Europe 
that had been made relevant by two world wars. This is exemplified by Walter Hallstein, 
first President of the European Commission, who specifically invoked the ordoliberal 
theory discussed earlier: 
A free market economy is a basic principle of the Treaty of Rome. Such a 
liberal economic system […] does not exclude state intervention. On the 
contrary, it presupposes that the state provides a framework for the operation 
of such a system; for only an appropriate framework allows each section of 
the economy to exercise its freedom of action, in fact compels it to exercise 
that freedom. (Hallstein, Götz, and Narjes 1969, 110) 
While in the US, state’s rights were combined with the pro-market agenda, in 
Europe political leaders’ economic agendas combined with their political commitments to 
the legitimacy of EU authority. This has been well demonstrated by the ideational 
scholarship on European integration (Parsons 2003). In short, the idea of Europe was able 
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to build a new coalition, in particular between free-marketeers, and usually more leftist 
pro-Europeanists. As with competitive federalism in the US, this new coalition set the EU 
on a new path. For example, in the Single European Act, German and BeNeLux 
ordoliberals were able to convince the British pro-market government as well as the 
supra-nationalist French government to support the deal by selectively emphasizing 
different aspects (Parsons 2007). This has been spearheaded by British European 
Commissioners Arthur Cockfield and Leon Brittan. As Hoffmann shows with evidence 
from interviews with political actors, the European Commission supported federal market 
authority—using specifically ordoliberal ideas to support mobility and more uniform 
regulation as the necessary condition to enact unfettered markets in Europe (Hoffmann 
2011, 327ff.). For instance, one Commission official is cited explaining “the starting 
point is of course [that] the EU internal market is a political objective as such”—he 
believes that markets are politically created (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 326) 
Why has the so-called neoliberal era, in the world’s foremost liberal market 
economy—the US—not led to a buildup of federal market authority? The answer is, 
because in the US the competitive federalism conception of neoliberalism has become 
dominant in conservative circles of policy-makers, while in the EU the ordoliberal has. 
As a consequence, interstate barriers in the US increase to the detriment of neoliberal 
goals—empirically, competitive federalism is not effective. It is my assertion, that only 
when institutional reformers or federal policy makers have an ordoliberal conception of 
markets, barriers fall. In the absence of these ideas, even strong central power will remain 
unused. As discussed in the literature review, these ideological views do not simply map 
onto material, institutional, or broad cultural patters. Instead, we can only understand this 
rise by tracing the emergence these specific neoliberal ideas.  
On the level of firms and interest groups, some are ideologically driven and 
embrace the predominant neoliberal ideas. This means that interest groups that inhabit 
comparable structural positions in the EU and the US, have different opinions on market 
barriers. Neoliberal ideas matter because “interests do not exist, but constructions of 
interests do. Such constructions are inherently normative and subjective/intersubjective 
conceptions of self-good—of what it would advantage the individual to do or to have 
done either on his or her behalf or inadvertently by others” (Hay 2010). Or as Woll puts it 
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in her careful study of actual business interests: “[they] rely on social devices to reduce 
uncertainty, such as traditions, networks, institutions, and the use of power”(Woll 2008, 
12, 2005). Competitive federalism is such a ‘social device’, we can expect to be salient 
especially among those interests groups that were directly involved in promoting a new 
neoliberal agenda (Blyth 2002). Other researchers have shown that firms often rely on 
cues from higher level, more ideologically driven organizations when forming their 
preferences (C. J. Martin and Swank 2012). The fact that most people in the construction 
industry lean Republican should also lead to them perceiving of their interests within the 
conception of competitive federalism (Verdant Labs 2018). This argument does not even 
have to be framed in constructivist terms: assuming bounded rationality, and a high level 
of uncertainty in the policy arena, it seems reasonable that firms would have either no 
position at all on federal market authority, or having positions that simply reflect their 
personal identity or the identity of an industry association (A. Smith 2016; C. J. Martin 
and Swank 2012). However, I find that only few firms and interest groups, especially 
those that identify as Republicans, have strongly bought into competitive federalism, for 
instance Associated Builders and Contractors. Similarly, local legislators and regulators 
show some affinity to competitive federalism in that they cannot imagine how federal 
market authority could reduce market barriers or in that they do not see local 
heterogeneity of regulation as barriers at all. More importantly, most firm are influenced 
by it indirectly. In the absence of a national agenda or political entrepreneurs to mobilize 
them in favor federal market authority, they usually prefer to not get into politics and just 
take the regulatory environment for granted (see also A. Smith 2010).  
However, in the activities of firms and local policy-makers, certain institutional 
effects are undeniable. As economic analysis shows, there are incentives and direct cost-
saving related to single-market building. For example, an Oregon architect presumably 
has a strong incentive to dislike Washington laws that directly discriminate against them. 
While neoliberal ideas are influential on the federal level, on the local level these actors 
run into specific institutional obstacles, which is what we turn to next. 
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II.c.2. How the US Configuration of Federalism Stands out 
The second part of my account focusses on institutional incentives for firms, 
interest groups, and sub-national governments. While the general institutional hypothesis 
(more federal resources, less state vested interests, high interaction density) did not seem 
very helpful, a more careful reading of the literature lets us identify specific institutional 
differences between the EU and US that prevent the mobilization of those interests. I 
argue that in the absence of ordoliberal institutional reformers, pro-single market interests 
cannot be effectively aggregated, and sub-national resistance not overcome. Specifically, 
dual federalism and the separation of powers in state-legislatures incentivizes state-
officials to have anti-cooperative, autonomy-preserving attitudes, and pursue sectoral, 
non-binding ways of standardization. Given the virtual non-existence of inter-
governmental cooperation combined with the extreme pluralism of the interest group 
organization and the weakness of the party system, firms and officials with a preference 
for federal market authority have no obvious point of contact to further their agenda. 
Furthermore, with the European Commission and the ECJ, pro-integration interests have 
natural allies on the federal level. In the US, it is no-one’s job to reduce internal-market 
barriers.  
In general comparison, it is often observed that the EU has little power compared 
to the US:  
Once the single market was completed and the EU was given the necessary 
policy competences to regulate this market, a new European ‘constitutional 
settlement’ had effectively been established: where the European level of 
government is responsible for the creation and regulation of the market (and 
the related external trade policies); the domestic level of government is 
responsible for taxation and redistribution (within constraints agreed at the 
European level); and the domestic governments are collectively responsible 
for policies on internal security (justice and crime) and external security 
(defense and foreign policy). (Hix 2007, 143f.) 
The EU has little in terms of “resources for exercising core state powers” 
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014, 7). Its budget is roughly 2% of all government revenue 
while the US federal government commands at least 51% of all revenue (OECD 2017). 
Similarly, the EU employs less than 0.1% of civil servants while in the US 12.3% of 
public employees are federal (OECD 2017). As Kelemen puts it, European “bureaucracy 
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is tiny, roughly the size of the administration of a typical midsized European city” 
(Kelemen 2011, 7). As discussed earlier, theoretically the EU and the US have similar 
federal market authority. In addition though, the US federal government has much more 
competencies and resources from foreign policy to internal security. Due to these reasons, 
institutionalist expect the US market to be more integrated. However, a closer look shows 
key institutional differences that might just put the EU ahead. 
Many have described the EU as Regulatory Polity or termed its style of 
governance Eurolegalism and thereby likened it to US (Majone 1994; Kelemen 2011). 
Fabbrini even argues that a closer analysis shows that both polities’ governance structures 
are becoming extremely similar (Fabbrini 2010). However, the European 
Council/Commission have very different competencies and incentives than the US 
federal government. Consider the example of ‘commandeering’, i.e. the issuing of central 
commands to force sub-national governments to take regulatory action toward private 
actors. In the US, this is generally seen as prohibited (M. D. Adler 2001), making the 
dormant commerce clause an oddly inefficient tool. If the federal government wants 
something to happen (outside of enforcing civil rights), it can either creatively use its 
spending power to incentivize states to follow federal rules (grant-in-aid) or use its 
preemption power under the commerce clause. This means it has to do everything itself: 
set up the rules and enforce them nation-wide, cutting state-policy makers out of the 
process. Meanwhile, in the EU commandeering is generally accepted as an efficient tool 
of policy-making: “Member states […] prefer that the Community pass directives, which 
command a Member State to regulate in a particular area and thus require further 
Member State legislative action to become fully effective within that State” (Halberstam 
2001, 215).  
This relates to a more fundamental difference in institutional structure of 
federalism. Halberstam suggests that “under a simplified conception of the component 
State as a unified actor, these key features—that is, the corporate representation of the 
component State within the central law‐making bodies, the relative completeness and 
effectiveness of the central and component State systems, and the prominent alternatives 
to commandeering—may account for differing component State preferences regarding 
commandeering in the various systems” (Halberstam 2001, 281). In short, under a form 
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of executive federalism, where state governments directly participate in central decision 
making, sub-national units are much more accepting of central action than under dual 
federalism. Under dual federalism where “each level of government has an autonomous 
sphere of responsibilities,” and institutions are replicated on every level of government 
(Börzel and Hosli 2003, 183). Separation of powers is strictly maintained by the fact that 
the federal second chamber represents only functional electoral interests. In this system, 
inter-governmental cooperation is voluntary and hard to maintain. 
Federal-state relationship, as described by Halberstam, are knows as cooperative 
federalism in the literature. It relies on a functional or fluid division of powers and 
empowers territorial interests through their representation in the second federal chamber: 
“The functional and fiscal interdependence of the two main levels of government […] 
gives rise to ‘interlocking politics’ and ‘joint decision-making’” (Börzel and Hosli 2003, 
183). As demonstrated in many examples, cooperative federalism like in the EU is much 
better at overcoming vested state-interests because state-executive remain decision-
makers (Pierson 1996). This is for instance shown by Brown’s analysis of institutional 
and economic reforms in Australia and Canada (D. Brown 2002). Combining 
parliamentary institutions with a tradition of cooperative federalism, Australia 
successfully mobilized pro-integration interests to create more federal market authority 
(D. Brown 2002). In the US meanwhile, states have little to gain from transferring power 
to the federal level. Goldstein calls this the ‘member state resistance paradox’, arguing 
that “Virtually every institutional reform advocated by rebellious voices during those 
antebellum decades of state protest against U.S. Supreme Court authority was 
implemented in one or another version on the European side” (L. F. Goldstein 2001, 44). 
Her study of 19th century integration resistance argues that there is more pro-European 
sentiment in member state officialdom than there is pro-federal sentiment among 
American state politicians: “The reason is that the pro-federal ones in the United States 
could be siphoned off to the federal capital, a source of power and prestige” while state-
level politicians had nothing to gain from supporting integration (L. F. Goldstein 2001, 
55f.).  
Alberta Sbragia’s analysis confirms this (Sbragia 1992). She argues that the main 
difference is that US sub-national units lack formal representation in Congress, 
55 
undermining the transformation of regional into national interests (Sbragia 2005; same 
argument in: McKay 2001, 148; L. F. Goldstein 2001). In addition, in US politics 
“territorial and functional politics are usually entangled” because regions are much more 
economically specialized than in the EU (Sbragia 2005, 209). As Krugman puts it, the 
“U.S. [automotive] industry is a Midwestern phenomenon, with only a scattering of 
assembly plants in other parts of the country. The European equivalent would be a 
concentration of half of the industry within 150 kilometers of Wolfsburg” (Krugman 
1991, 78). This means, members of Congress are much more likely to represent one 
specific economic interest (that might be opposed to federal market authority) than a 
Head of Government in the EU, who represents a diversified economy. According to 
Sbragia, this for example explains why it was much easier for the EU to regulate acid rain 
and vehicle emissions than for US Congress (Sbragia 2005, 217). “The fact that ministers 
represent an entire nation rather than a limited constituencies allows them to make trade-
offs […], which any single legislator is likely to find impossible to do” (Sbragia 2005, 
220).  
Similarly, Sergio Fabbrini argues that interests of officials and businesses alike 
remain local due to the organization of federalism:  
Federalism hampered the formation of a trans‐state class movement pushing 
for the public control of the economy in order to protect the weaker interests 
operating within it. Instead, the territorially decentralized organization of 
state authority fostered the formation of sectional cleavages more than social 
or economic ones. This territorial diffusion of power also impeded the 
formation of a common interest of the business community, which in fact 
continued to be divided along regional lines. [… As a result,] the federal 
structure has restricted not only direct intervention by the (federal) state in 
market activities, but it has also curtailed the organizational development of 
political parties able to appeal to a national electorate. [Parties remain] 
confederations of state and local parties, vehicles for the promotion (or the 
defense) at federal level of sectional, state, county, and local interests. 
(Fabbrini 2010, 81, 138) 
This is confirmed by studies of fiscal federalism; David McKay emphasize the 
fragmentation of power in Congress as undermining federal market authority: 
The organizational and institutional ‘connective tissue’ between state and 
federal governments has always been weak in the US. For the federal 
government successfully to challenge the states’ fiscal powers would have 
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required the emergence of a national coalition of both state and federal 
interests operating through federal institutions. But since the effective 
‘nationalization’ of the Senate in the early part of the nineteenth century, no 
federal institution can facilitate such a process. Federal and state decision 
making processes are essentially separated. As a result, most of the conflicts 
between the two levels of government have been brokered through the courts. 
(McKay 2001, 43) 
For us this means no federal market authority agenda. Legislative fragmentation 
leads to interest-group fragmentation: as a result, no one interest groups would aggregate 
all the benefits of market integration: “Policy fragmentation resulting from congressional 
institutional rules has also served to fragment interest-group activity and the operation of 
the federal bureaucracies. As a large and rich literature shows, the consequence for public 
policy has been to make it inordinately difficult to build winning coalitions across issue 
areas, let alone across states and regions” (McKay 2001, 43). 
It is not only the incentives of the federal structure that make US states wary of 
central government action. Bolleyer’s interviews with intergovernmental actors show that 
separation of powers within state legislatures and weak parties undermine attempts of 
inter-governmental cooperation in the US (Bolleyer 2009, 7f.; see also: Kousser and 
Phillips 2012).  
The coexistence of multiple, highly institutionalized IGAs [inter-
governmental associations] present in the American system can be attributed 
to the striking inability to pool power within the individual state as well as 
the inability to speak with one voice for the states as a level of government. 
This has proven particularly detrimental to any cooperation efforts between 
the states. […As a result,] unable to represent the states as coherent actors, 
IGAs focus on lobbying for the interests of their particular members, 
members perceived predominantly as professionals, not as representatives of 
a political system with a particular interest profile. (Bolleyer 2009, 111f.) 
This means ‘cooperative institutions’ like the National Association of Attorneys 
General (NAAG), National Governor’s Association (NGA), Council of State 
Governments (CSA), and National Association of State Legislatures (NASL) are service 
organizations that provide lobbying networks and legislative expertise to their members 
(Bolleyer 2009, 118). Within this structure, farther undermined by “by numerous ‘lower 
level’ arrangements competing with state IGAs […] such as the United States Conference 
of Mayors,“ the only thing they can agree on is opposing federal encroachment (Bolleyer 
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2009, 114f.). The best hope for policy harmonization is policy diffusion, as promoted by 
the Commission on Uniform State Laws (Bolleyer 2009, 131). Table 1 displays the 
spectrum of possible mechanism for achieving an integrated market. It contrasts the 
general structure of the EU with the specific mechanisms I find in my US cases studies.  
 Mechanisms for single market 
building 
Federal market authority Harmonization/Preemption~* 
General mutual recognition~ 
                                    EU~ 
 
Voluntary/sectoral 
cooperation 
 
                                   US* 
State compact~ 
Bilateral reciprocity* 
Model laws* 
Voluntary accords* 
Administrative cooperation* 
Private actor harmonization* 
                                    
 
State protectionism 
Heterogeneous regulations* 
Intentionally discriminatory laws* 
Tariffs and quotas  
Table 1: Schemata of Mechanisms to Achieve Single Market 
In sum, “Compulsory power‐sharing leads to a strong emphasis on ‘institutional 
interests’ because it creates a distance in orientation between executive actors (who focus 
on policy delivery) and legislative actors (who want to protect legislative autonomy)” 
(Bolleyer 2009, 132). As a result, all state cooperation is sectorally fragmented and non-
binding. An additional factor is the fragmentation of state-executives themselves: 
“bureaucracies have never developed a cross‐cutting set of loyalties capable of tying 
departments together and connecting them to a hierarchical superior; governors must 
share executive power with other directly elected officials like secretaries of state (P. 
Peterson and Chubb 1989; Bolleyer 2009, 129; Kousser and Phillips 2012). This means 
agencies, like the National Association of Architecture Licensing Boards (NASCLA) 
work for uniformity under the constraint of trying to minimize legislative and executive 
involvement. This pattern is also congruent with the literature on standardization that 
describes the American approach as private, fragmented and competitive, and the 
European as integrated, government-driven, and cooperative (Krislov 1997; Schepel 
2005). As a result of these institutional incentive structures, “efforts to address market 
barriers in the US have largely been ad-hoc and reactive […]. Except in specific moments 
of crisis, there has been little interest in the internal market as such among politicians and 
business advocates (C. Weiler 2012, 188f.).  
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Beyond the structure of federalism, it is two specific institutions that differentiate 
the EU from the US. As Leiff Hoffmann argues, in the US it is no one’s job to reduce 
interstate barriers while the European Commission basically does just that (Hoffmann 
2011). The European Commission is “essentially […] a well-endowed, official think tank 
with a basic mandate to propose more and more liberalizing and centralizing policies” 
(Hoffmann 2011, 62). They have an institutional mandate, with the sole power of 
legislative power to back it up, to create and use federal market authority. According to 
interviews conducted by Hoffmann, present and former Commission officials themselves 
saw “the creation of an internal market as their political objective, going even beyond the 
original demands and desires of their respective member states” and often emphasized 
that their understanding was ideologically different from similarly positioned officials in 
the United States” (Hoffmann 2011, 65).  
Similarly, while the ECJ is much less powerful than the US Supreme Court, it has 
a narrowly-focused mandate on the single market: “In dealing with the discriminatory 
effects of regulatory barriers to trade, the European Court of Justice has played an active 
role in negative integration, by invalidating discriminatory national rules. [… In addition] 
the Court has provided the window of opportunity for the Community to foster positive 
integration through the creation of a new regulatory regime” (M. Egan 2001, 108). 
According to Joseph Weiler, ”Because Member States enjoyed full voice—that is, a 
veto—in the decision‐making process that produced the Community norms, [they] 
remained sanguine about ECJ’s decision foreclosing exit options” (cited in: Halberstam 
2001, 228). The pro-integration agenda is supported by the fact that judges and 
commissioners basically self-select for “political messianism” (J. Weiler 2012, 825). In 
addition, the ECJ could generate legitimacy by empowering traditionally less powerful 
lower courts (J. Weiler 1993) and appeals to member states by representing them 
explicitly on the court (L. F. Goldstein 2001). However, this is not an institutional 
argument per se. Under different ideational conditions, the US Supreme Court, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), or the White House could have become motors of 
integration similar to the EU—but so far their more general roles and surrounding 
institutional incentive have encouraged them to focus on other issues and make different 
calculations (M. Egan 2015).  
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It could be different, if policy-makers relied on different coalitions and adopted a 
more ordoliberal conception of markets as a result, they might appoint different judges, 
executives, and administrators. Under these conditions, it seems plausible that US federal 
institutions would not necessarily be an obstacle to federal market authority. The FTC 
could use the court system to go, not only after companies as it does now, but also after 
discriminatory state legislation. It is imaginable that the Supreme Court would revise the 
market participant doctrine that now shields much of states’ use of their police powers, 
emphasizing interstate commerce implications of state-by-state licensing for instance. 
Congress could use its preemption powers with the explicit goal of harmonizing 
regulation to reduce barriers to interstate commerce. Congress could also encourage 
states to transform their inter-governmental institutions from forums of exchange to 
decision-making bodies. These counterfactuals suggest that the developed ideational 
explanation is important, despite all those institutional factors. 
I find evidence for the causal influence of the two institutional factors in the 
preferences of state legislatures, state regulators, firms, and interest groups. It blocks 
states from cooperating effectively for consumer interests and leaves business interests 
with nobody to talk to. Specifically, I find that big national firms that would benefit from 
federal market authority express diffuse interest for it but emphasize that there is nothing 
they can do about it. They take the impossibility of change due to state authority for 
granted and feel helpless in the absence of actors with a federal market building agenda. 
State and local regulators insist on their institutional autonomy, participating in sectoral 
coordination with other states in institutions that are mostly of ‘service’ not legislative 
nature. Particularly, executive agency regulators emphasize how it is outside of their 
authority to make any binding agreements with other states. As Bolleyer and McKay 
suggest, I do not find any inter-governmental cooperation that would aggregate benefits 
across several issue areas like the EU service liberalization. Instead, every niche has their 
own organizations leading to negative economies of scale (in terms of harmonization) 
which is cited by those organizations as inevitable costs. Given the decentralized and 
territorial nature of the US party and interest group system, I find nation-wide interest 
groups to only express a diffuse preference for federal market authority. As expected 
under dual federalism, I find that state-level interest groups are torn between preserving 
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state autonomy (which is where they have influence and where most of their members 
operate), and federal market authority preferred by their big competitive members. Given 
these difficulties in mobilizing pro-federal market authority interests, I find many 
‘creative’ solutions to the problem of interstate mobility that look inefficient but can be 
explained as a path of least resistance. For example, architects are highly mobile and have 
been organized as a profession for more than a century. Given the material incentives for 
federal market authority, they founded a private non-profit organization that works with 
states to unify architecture licensing requirements. While this looks basically like a 
national license, states still issue their own licenses—because their interest in institutional 
autonomy remains the limiting factor—no actual authority is transferred. As expected, 
this kind of voluntary executive cooperation does preserve many interstate barriers, as 
architects from said association explained, “Yes this is inefficient, but this is as good as it 
gets” (Personal Interview, NCARB 2016).  
Having presented the ideational and institutional part of my explanation, the 
question remains whether the two approaches are complementary or competitive. My 
answer is that they are discrete but complementary. Most generally, I am interested in 
understanding one case in comparative perspective here, not probabilistic regularities 
related to several variables. This means, I am looking at a case in-depth and carving out 
two main factors that help us understand the outcome. In addition, I do not want to 
assume that every politicians and firm is subject to the same exact causal model, the 
social world probably does not consist of law like regularities. 
Generally, the ideational dynamic accounts well for the actions of national 
politicians and administrations, judges, as well as think tanks. All of them to some degree 
self-select into subscribing to dominant ideas of markets and authority. Due to their job, 
federal politicians need to have more elaborate, normative conceptions of markets and 
government. They cannot rely on statements of personally benefitting from a policy but 
must embed their arguments into conceptions that make policy congruent with the 
general public interest. Therefore, they regularly use those conceptions to argue for 
policies or win debates.  
Firms, state officials, and interest groups seem to be more clearly influenced by 
their immediate material concerns filtered by the institutional dynamics. The more local 
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or private an actor, the more likely they are to argue with their perceived self-interest. 
Doing so can be done without explicitly referencing conceptions of markets—but often 
invokes those implicitly. Local policy-makers and officials are interested in preserving 
their autonomy, and due to the institutional structure, they have no authority to leverage 
their power into binding interstate agreements—often they emphasize both, their interest 
in autonomy, and they the perception that it was out of their power to initiate any changes 
to the system. At the same time, a national market building agenda based on ordoliberal 
ideas might just change their perceived self-interest. 
Many firms perceive barriers, like local licensing, to their mobility but do not 
have an elaborate public policy position on how to ameliorate the situation. They clearly 
recognize the institutional obstacles along the lines of “I don’t know who could help me 
with this” (Personal Interview, Warwick 2017). At the same time, many firms, despite 
complaints, cannot even imagine any changes. Similarly, some interest group cite clearly 
the absence of a federal agenda and the belief in localism as the problem, while other 
seem more influenced by the fragmentation of their organization. While my research is 
structured to distinguish between those dynamics, I often find them to be present at the 
same time.  
As has been pointed out, the dynamics are inherently linked. At its outset in 1945, 
nobody could have predicted the rise of federal market authority in Europe. It can only be 
understood by looking at transforming ideas in connection with institutional innovations 
that led to a re-orientation of interests toward federal market authority. In the US, there is 
plenty of mobilizable interests for federal market authority, but nobody is assembling 
them. 
Why has the so-called neoliberal era, in the world’s foremost liberal market 
economy—the US—not led to a buildup of federal market authority? I have argued that it 
is due to different dominant conceptions of markets and institutional dynamics that 
situate sub-national actors differently. How can we evaluate the interplay of those two 
explanations? How can we evaluate my story against conventional structural and 
institutional explanations? In particular, how can this be done without designing a study 
that encompasses multiple countries and centuries? Theoretical and practical questions of 
research design is what I turn to next. 
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II.d.  Methods 
Political science offers a wide range of epistemologies, ontologies, and methods 
to choose from (Jackson 2011; G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Goertz and Mahoney 
2012; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). Ideally, to answer a research question, I would 
look at all policy sectors of both polities overtime—and combine different methods and 
logics of inquiry (Lieberman 2005). Specifically, on might try to combine qualitative and 
quantitative evidence, and try to convince positivists and interpretivists of each other’s 
results alike. However, in a world of limited material and cognitive resources that is 
hardly possible. Instead, epistemological, ontological, and methodological decisions have 
to be made. In those decisions, I am a pragmatist, using whatever method furthering the 
goals of this dissertation effectively. However, as we will see those goals have certain 
implications suggesting certain methods over others. In the following, I lay out the meta-
theoretical foundations for opting for a qualitative process-tracing approach that focusses 
on contrasting alternative explanations. Subsequently, I discuss how this method will be 
implemented in the empirical chapters. As justified below, the chapters will focus on two 
empirical realms: (1) tracing the agendas and ideological commitments of policy-makers, 
think tank scholars, judges, and federal agencies, who seem most likely to pursue pro-
market policies, i.e. conservatives since the ‘Reagan Revolution’. (2) Documenting 
existing interstate barriers in one important sector of the economy—the construction 
industry. Here I will focus on explaining the politics of maintaining those barriers in three 
areas that construction firms identified as the most discriminatory: licensing of 
professionals and firms; building codes and inspections; public procurement laws and 
practices.  
II.d.1. Meta-Theoretical Considerations 
A covering law model of explanation, coupled with a large-N analysis of 
correlated patterns, is a fairly mainstream method of analysis in political science (G. 
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Within this frequentist paradigm, one would try to 
develop a good measure of the dependent variable—federal market authority—and then 
correlate it to the explanatory models of the competing explanations expressed in 
indicatory variables. To deal with the problem of a limited number of observations—
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since the universe of cases is so small—the literature would suggest to disaggregate those 
cases into policy-areas (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). However, this method is 
inadequate here for several reasons: (1) Most of the data required does not exist. 
Gathering and coding comparable data on regulations in the US and EU is an immense 
challenge, even just in selected sectors. This means, to track regulatory change over time 
in ways that would be rigorous enough to defend the assumptions necessary for 
regression analysis is hard to imagine.7 (2) Within a limited amount of cases—EU, US, 
perhaps Canada, Australia, India, and Brazil—the results of quantitative methods are of 
little power and contribute little to our understanding of the specific cases. It is not an 
accident that most foundational work on political development on both sides of the 
Atlantic has used qualitative methods. (3) I am fundamentally not concerned with the 
explanatory power of isolated causes expressed as regularities, but with understanding the 
specific case of the US; i.e. with the “causes of effects” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). (4) 
Given a highly developed field of explanations on both sides of the Atlantic, what is 
needed is a careful study of the underlying ‘causal processes and mechanisms’ (Hedström 
and Ylikoski 2010). In other words, in a world of collinearity, we need to investigate the 
observable implication of the causal mechanisms underlying theories that are often 
observationally similar. (5) Investigating ideas as causes is generally deemed problematic 
using quantitative methods (Jacobs 2011). If we assume that causes have to pass through 
meaning-making actors, statistical investigation is often “frightfully inadequate” (Nathan 
2005). Even working within a strictly rational-materialist framework, interview research 
often reveals that despite convincing correlational evidence, the causal assumptions 
cannot be verified when speaking to people on the ground.8 
                                                 
7 Using composite indices from several policy areas makes it problematic to sustain necessary 
assumptions, like specifying the causal relationship correctly in a parametric form, the randomness of the 
unexplained error term, the relationship between statistical significance and causality, and the data being 
sampled randomly from a ‘population’ (Freedman 1999; Seawright 2005). As a mathematician puts it: “If 
random sampling assumptions do not apply, or the parameters are not clearly defined, or the inference are 
to a population that is only vaguely defined, the calibration of uncertainty that is offered by contemporary 
statistical techniques is rather questionable” (Freedman 2010). 
8 As an example, consider the notion that globalization forced a ‘golden straightjacket’ on leftist 
governments’ social policies based on the demands of global capital (Cerny 1995; Rodrik 2002). While this 
seemed to be confirmed by the tendency toward more neo-liberal policies, interviews with actual investors 
revealed that they did not even know about the policies that they had been assumed to oppose (Mosley 
2003).  
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These factors suggest a broadly scientific realist position, focusing on causal 
processes and their specific manifestations, as well as a qualitative methodology. Most 
fundamentally this means this dissertation will be a “systematic examination of 
diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses 
posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011, 823). To do so, I will use process tracing 
methods to examine the different causal patterns and processes that underlie the 
competing hypotheses. I am using a broad definition of causal mechanisms in this 
inquiry, including micro- and macro-level processes that transform the causes into the 
outcome under investigation (Brady and Collier 2004). Akin to a critical realist view, I 
assume that we can identify general causal mechanisms, but only explain in specific cases 
how their potentiality is translated into an outcome (Gorski 2013; D. Beach 2014; 
Jackson 2011; Wight 2006). The underlying model of causality therefore is deterministic, 
mechanismic, but skeptical of the existence of a world that can be generalized into laws 
(D. Beach 2014; Fischer 1998). I assume that  
Causal relations are not constituted by regularities or law connecting classes 
of social events or phenomena [even though regularities are important clues] 
instead, social causal relations are constituted by the causal power of various 
social events, conditions, structures, and the like, and the singular causal 
mechanism that lead form antecedent conditions to outcomes. Accordingly, a 
central goal of social research is to identify the causal mechanism. (Little 
1998, 197f.) 
This view has gained traction in political science due to scholarly works 
popularizing scientific realist ideas (among others: Wight 2006; Wendt 1987; Gorski 
2013; Jackson 2011), the general dearth of ‘social laws’ discovered by social scientists, 
and a new focus of political scientists on ‘problem-solving’,’ mid-level theorizing’ or 
becoming more relevant for policy in general (among others: Flyvbjerg 2001; Sil and 
Katzenstein 2010; Yanow 2006; Reus-Smit 2013, 2013). However, instead of adopting an 
interpretive or eclectic stance, I argue for the competing engagement of theories in a 
limited empirical realm9 (Parsons 2015). 
                                                 
9 This can bridge the gap between interpretivist and positivist methods. In the Handbook of 
Interpretive Political Science Bevir and Rhodes argue that interpretivists “define objectivity as evaluation 
by comparing rival stories according to reasonable criteria” (Bevir and Rhodes 2015a, 12). 
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The goal is to test the explanatory power of several theories (explicated through 
causal processes) and use them to provide an explanation of federal market authority in 
the US. In doing so, I do not test the theories as hypothetico-deductive laws, but as 
models that have different degrees of usefulness for the cases at hand. This is in line with 
modern political science’s view that models have multiple functions and that prediction is 
often not a useful goal10 (Clarke and Primo 2007). While method books often try to 
clearly distinguish between inductive and deductive or between cause-of-effects and 
effects-of-causes approaches, this study recognizes that actual research is most often a 
non-linear iterative process that oscillates between those logics; i.e. an ‘abductive’ and 
‘retroductive’ process (Fairfield and Charman 2017a). This means that this theory chapter 
itself is part of the research process it describes11. While iteration may lead to ad-hoc 
theorizing and confirmation bias12, this can be successfully avoided within a Bayesian 
logic, because it automatically looks at all evidence from the perspective of competing 
explanations (Fairfield and Charman 2017a). Hence, my study follows the recent trend in 
political science to focus more explicitly on contrasting competing explanations (Parsons 
2015, 2016; Tannenwald 2005). 
To fulfill the ambition of this dissertation—explaining the US case, and testing 
competing theories—I will use process-tracing evidence gained mostly from within-case 
analysis, combined with a few crucial pieces of cross-case evidence. While some authors 
object to the combination of within-case process-tracing with cross-case evidence, those 
types of information can be integrated if I adopt a Bayesian logic of making inferences 
about the world (D. Beach 2014; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; Fairfield and Charman 
2017b): “Bayesian logic provides us with a set of logical tools for evaluating whether 
                                                 
10 “Models should be assessed for their usefulness for a particular purpose, not solely for the 
accuracy of their predictions” (Clarke and Primo 2007, 741). 
11 “Theory testing—understood in Bayesian terms as inference to best explanation using 
probabilistic reasoning—takes all evidence into account, regardless of whether or not it was known to the 
investigator at the time hypotheses were devised; new evidence has no special status relative to old 
evidence. Scientific inference invariably entails a ‘dialogue with the data’, where we go back and forth 
between theory development, data collection, and data analysis, rather than a linear sequence from 
hypothesizing to testing” (Fairfield and Charman 2017a, 1f.). 
12 “We should not make it [our theory] more restrictive without collecting new data to test the new 
version of the theory” (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 22). 
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finding specific evidence confirms/disconfirms a hypothesis […] relative to the prior 
expected probability of finding this evidence” (D. Beach 2014, 83). This study will use 
this logic, albeit not numerically. This means I will identify prior likelihoods, likelihoods 
of observations given specific hypotheses, and posterior likelihoods. Assuming that 
causal mechanisms are more than-case specific, I can use different types of evidence 
from different sources and cases to reach more certainty about the hypothesis at hand. For 
example, I will use some limited EU-US comparison data to express my declining 
confidence into the causal processes commonly cited by conventional explanations, and 
then rely on within-case process tracing to increase the confidence into the here-proposed 
explanation. The advantage of this method is that evidence can be used eclectically with 
the only criterion being that it discriminates between hypotheses in increasing/decreasing 
certainty in specific ones.  
Specific tests in which the evidence can be used have many names in the 
literature, for example ‘hoop’, ‘straw-in-the-wind’, ‘smoking-gun’, or ‘doubly 
decisive’—however, fundamentally they refer to a continuum of strength in tests with 
two-dimensions: certainty (how much does confidence in the hypothesis decline when 
certain evidence is not found) and uniqueness (is the hypothesis uniquely confirmed 
given certain evidence?) (Collier 2011; D. Beach 2014). The goal must therefore be to 
find observable implications of the different causal mechanisms that maximize as much 
as possible uniqueness and certainty. Within the process tracing method, “observations 
are [are regarded as] raw material data; they become evidence only after being assessed 
for accuracy and interpreted in context” (D. Beach 2014, 120). This acknowledges the 
subjectivity of the research process. However, at the same time the explicit nature of the 
method combined with the emphasis on competing theories, creates a degree of inter-
subjectivity similar to following certain procedures in a regression analysis. Expressed in 
the oft-used court metaphor, reasonable people might disagree about the verdict and 
interpretation of evidence; but this does not mean we should abandon the idea of verdicts 
altogether. Knowledge is uncertain in the whole spectrum between neo-positivist 
methods and interpretivism, but we should nonetheless strive for it (Bevir and Rhodes 
2015b, 18). In the following, the logic and criteria used to evaluate explanations within 
this dissertation are laid out.  
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II.d.2. Concrete Empirical Implementation 
The ambition of this dissertation is to answer the question, why has the so-called 
neoliberal era in the US not led to a buildup of federal market authority, by contrasting 
alternative explanations gained from the literature of European integration and market 
building. To get there, the first step was to distill existing scholarship into a respective 
materialist and institutionalist hypothesis, as well as to develop a novel explanation based 
on combining hitherto unconnected strands of institutional and ideational theorizing. I 
have shown in this chapter that the logic of conventional theories gained from EU 
scholarship awkwardly fits the US case and suggested in turn that my explanation can tell 
a more compelling story. 
To evaluate this, I follow two broad empirical steps. The first one is to document 
federal level outcomes and the behavior of federal policymakers (US) in light of the EU 
trajectory (see Table 2). To boost feasibility, I focus on self-described neo-liberal actors 
that by this self-identification have economic incentives to (supported by big nationally 
operating firms) and are ideologically (pro-market) inclined to foster federal market 
authority. If they are not mobilizing around and pushing for rules facilitating single 
market building, nobody will. To establish, the outcome of central inaction on and lack of 
mobilization against interstate market barriers, I therefore focus on the agenda and 
achievements of the last three Republican Presidents—Ronald Reagan, George H. Bush, 
and George W. Bush—as well as the last two leaders of Republican majorities in the 
House—Newt Gingrich, and Paul Ryan—that produced comprehensive policy agendas. 
The crucial question here is: did they explicitly pursue any single market-building 
policies? If not, did they pursue regulatory changes or reforms of federalism that can be 
construed as creating federal market authority? Since the answer is mostly no, I consider 
competing explanations.  
Overall, conventional explanations are not very convincing—as discussed in 
detail in the literature review—because the outcome happens despite the people in power 
explicitly having a pro-market agenda, and pro-market building incentives. What sets 
them apart is the specific tools they prefer to use (deregulation and devolution of power). 
I first turn to the materialist-structural hypothesis: to show that it is roughly implausible, I 
construct a few EU-US comparisons on economic interdependence and economic flows. 
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Subsequently, I turn to the institutionalist hypothesis, assessing whether there are 
constitutional or resource-based problems in addressing interstate-barriers. These cross-
case comparisons reduce the confidence in those conventional explanations and I move 
on to my ideational hypothesis. This requires a more nuanced weighing of different kinds 
of evidence: to show how market ideas intersected with an antipathy to federal power into 
competitive federalism I analyze all Republican party platforms since 1980, look at 
memoirs and writings of Reagan and his close policy-advisors, as well as of other 
Republican leaders that explicitly addressed these issues like Newt Gingrich’s Contract 
with America and Paul Ryan’s New Way. This lets me reconstruct how they imagine 
markets in a certain way. While this kind of evidence is very close to the outcome, it is 
the right kind of evidence. The writings of neo-liberal policy-makers explicitly tell us the 
reasoning behind their agenda. This reasoning happens to be nearly identical to the 
theoretically deduced conception of competitive federalism, I have laid out.  
Since the closeness between policy-makers and think tanks has been widely cited 
as influential in US politics, I conduct interviews with experts at pro-market think tanks 
(American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute). Based on these 
interviews, I can document how their competitive federalism conception of markets 
makes them overlook how state and local jurisdictions undermine the single market. 
Studying the positions of think tanks also shows how competitive federalism diffused 
from academia through the conservative law and economics movement, into policy-
research, and how social-scientific propositions regarding jurisdictional competition and 
regulatory capture became an axiomatic set of beliefs in conservative circles. Additional 
confidence can be gained by looking at how conservative Supreme Court judges have 
justified internal-market barriers in recent commerce clause decisions. I also look at 
recent complaints the Federal Trade Commission has brought against states and local 
jurisdictions to see to which degree they are influence by the competitive federalism 
rhetoric.  
Underling this approach is the Bayesian process tracing logic. I collect carefully 
selected pieces of evidence. In addition, for the analysis of documents I implicitly assume 
that particular “way[s] of talking about” the world reveal actors’ “understandings of the 
world” and thereby give us an insight into why they take the positions they do (Jørgensen 
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and Phillips 2002, 1). Using discourse as evidence can be done without adopting a post-
structuralist point of view and is pretty common in the literature on ideas (Blyth 2002; S. 
Berman 2006; Jabko 2012; Schmidt 2008; Parsons 2003; Milliken 1999; Yee 1996; 
Jacobs 2011). For instance, Jabko uses elite interviews in exactly this way to ascertain the 
causal influence of certain market discourses (Jabko 2012). The important point here is 
that, while I am using discursive evidence, I do not adopt discourse theory. I assume that 
writings give insights into the ideas of actors, but the proper discourse is epiphenomenal 
to those ideas, i.e. I am not investigating the relationship between language, subjectivity, 
and power (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002)13.  
This first empirical part creates an initial picture of why the US does not act on 
interstate barriers. This makes my hypothesis a plausible story. However, to make this 
complete, later study must investigate the EU story, but the findings from even my quick 
comparisons are suggestive for what one might find there.  
To create more confidence in my hypothesis, the second empirical step is to 
examine a specific sector. This allows me to examine the existing market-barriers and 
their effects in more detail and assess the surrounding politics beyond just federal 
lawmakers. Since all explanations have to eventually pass through human action, it is 
prudent to focus on a specific area of market barriers to be able to observe how firms, 
interest groups, and government actors actually perceive and act on those barriers. 
Following a process-tracing methodology, I need to gather evidence of actors’ positions 
and justifications to compare those to the observable implications of the different 
theories. Given the obvious time and monetary constraints, I focus on one substantial 
economic sector that is typical for the EU-US comparison, economically important, 
characterized by obvious incentives for increasing federal market authority, and that is 
exemplary for the rest of the economy. 
                                                 
13 There is some confusion because a few scholars describe the work of mainstream qualitative 
methods in political science on ideas as “discursive institutionalism,” trying to “strip [discourse analysis] of 
its postmodernist baggage to serve as a more generic term that encompasses not only the substantive 
content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed” (Schmidt 2008, 303). In 
Schmidt’s word, I am focusing on “the coordinative discourse [that] consists of the individuals and groups 
at the center of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy 
and programmatic ideas” (Schmidt 2008, 310). However, in my opinion adopting the language of discourse 
is problematic since it is really ideas I am interested in and not discourse as it has been usually understood 
by interpretive scholars. 
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The literature on the EU often analyzes barriers in terms of for the mobility of 
goods, capital, services, and labor (Fligstein 2008; Sandholtz, Fligstein, and Stone Sweet 
2001; M. Egan 2015). Therefore, an economically important sector to be selected would 
have implications for all of those areas, in particular services which accounts for at least 
70% of the economy and the use of public purchasing, which accounts for at least 15% of 
economic activity (OECD 2017).  
For the second empirical step, I have chosen to examine internal market barriers 
for the circulation of construction services as well as the politics among jurisdictions, 
firms, and interest groups to overcome those. There are several good reasons to focus on 
construction services: 
(1) Industry Structure: The construction sector is ideal because it touches on 
service mobility (for instance architectural and construction management services), labor 
mobility (for instance cross-border plumbing services), as well as direct government 
involvement (public purchasing). It is a big industry, often seen as the backbone of the 
economy, i.e. what happens in construction matters. There are between 760,000 and 
790,000 firms in the construction industry in the US (BLS 2017) with an annual revenue 
around $1.731 trillion. More importantly for our purposes, there is a significant number 
of firms that would presumably benefit from fewer interstate barriers and by extension 
more federal market authority, including the 400 biggest companies like Turner 
Corporation, Bechtel, Fluor Corporation that concentrate about 21% of the industry 
revenue (ENR 2017). In addition, there are many small and medium enterprises, for 
instance architects or construction managers, despite having less than 10 employees, 
provide their services region- or nation-wide. Combined with all the firms in border 
regions, they all have a material interest in pursuing federal market authority, which 
allows us to test whether they are thwarted by countervailing interests, institutional 
structures, or whether they hold a different idea of their own interest.  
(2) Comparable Outcomes: The regulatory outcome is typical for the US-EU 
comparison, illustrating the overall puzzle (Gerring and Seawright 2007). In the EU, 
countries are relatively constrained in discriminating against out-of-state companies and 
professional licenses, while US states regularly do so. In terms of public purchasing, the 
EU displays federal market authority by providing an overall framework for competition, 
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while in the US there is no overall nation-wide or even state-wide system for 
procurement. It terms of building codes and standards, the EU relies on its authority to 
promote Europe-wide rules through so-called Euro-codes and its associated European 
Standardization Organizations, while the US relies on private competing standards that 
are erratically adopted and amended by the states. In addition, in the EU construction has 
generated land-mark free movement cases like Laval (2007) and Rüffert (2008) and 
federal legislation like the service directive (2006) or the lift directive (1995), while in 
the US construction has received relatively little Commerce Clause attention except in the 
case of public procurement, where courts have explicitly allowed discriminating against 
out-of-state companies (market participant exemption 1976).  
(3) Case Importance: As the Economist has reported, “Construction holds the 
dubious honor of having the lowest productivity gains of any industry” and firms have 
failed to efficiently consolidate (Economist 2017). Explaining why this $1.7 trillion 
industry has not generated more demands for federal market authority is an important 
question in itself. Furthermore, findings on construction might be roughly similar to 
outcomes in other sectors. If we can ascertain the specific mechanisms that maintain 
market barriers in construction, it becomes more plausible that similar logics are at work 
in other sectors that face barriers of similar nature, like retail banking or alcoholic 
beverages, as well as professional services and public purchasing more generally. 
In choosing the construction industry, I am building on Hoffman’s pioneering 
work in several ways: he focused on public procurement laws, I am looking at formal and 
informal procurement practices and how they affect constructions firms; he focused on 
justifications for hairdresser licensing, I am looking at how different types of licensing 
and registration laws inhibit the mobility of construction firms; he focused on how 
elevator standards fragment the goods market; I am looking at how building codes and 
inspection procedures more generally impact the mobility of construction firms 
(Hoffmann 2011). Overall this will lend more empirical credence and economic 
importance to his initial claims by expanding the scope of inquiry in terms of issues and 
actors.  
The first step in this case study is to characterize the outcome in the US. This 
means illuminating the absence of federal market authority; i.e. the degree of existing 
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local and state legislation, its use in potentially market distorting ways, and its impact on 
actual firm mobility. The dependent variable is the persistence of interstate barriers and 
the lack of mobilization around it. When easily available (the general legal framework), a 
comparison is made to the EU directly. While I do rely on secondary documents on state 
legislation, I base the characterization of the outcome mostly on numerous interviews I 
conducted with different types of construction firms, interest groups, regulators, and 
policy-makers. This is necessary because in many instances ‘non-discriminatory’ 
regulatory heterogeneity, has the same effect as real interstate barriers. In this case, 
interviews can deliver insights no other method can provide. Since the amount of 
potentially discriminatory regulation is vast, I focus on three areas: professional and firm 
licensing, public procurement decisions, building codes and inspections; only paying 
marginal attention to other areas mentioned like environment regulation or local taxation. 
These three areas are obvious and intuitive examples of interstate barriers—so I favor 
investigating those since they are easy enough to understand for firms and policy-makers. 
If I chose some technical barriers to trade, that can only be understood with specialized 
knowledge and data analysis, the easiest explanation for inaction would be ignorance. In 
addition, those three areas were most often named in my interviews.  
When analyzing the impact of licensing, I contrast the liberal regime of the EU 
with the variety of barriers and heterogeneous regulations in plumbing licenses (most 
localized and discriminatory), contractor licensing (mostly state-wide but still 
discriminatory), and architecture licensing (discriminatory despite national uniformity). I 
combine data on differences with the actual experience of firms. I follow a similar 
approach for public purchasing preferences. A survey of state purchasing laws provides 
an initial insight, but as interviews with firms demonstrate, out-of-state firms are much 
more disadvantaged than a look at those laws would suggest. For building codes, 
sampling must be similarly restrictive because is just too many jurisdictions with 
different building codes. I compare the heterogeneity of model plumbing code as well as 
model residential code adoption across jurisdictions, and the differences of handling 
egress for fire safety in the residential building codes of all 50 states. I also look at who 
trains and employs building officials across the country. This is complemented by the 
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interviews with construction firms that speak more concretely to the actual effects of 
heterogeneity. 
For the second step of explaining the outcome I investigate the perceptions and 
policy position of key actors in the arena. Selection of actors is based on testing the 
different theories. In terms of firms, I can distinguish the economic incentives for 
nationally- and regionally operating construction firms from locally operating 
constructions firms. This is complemented by the positions of interest groups/trade 
unions that represent different parts of the construction industry vs. interest groups that 
represent construction industry users, distinguished by locally vs. nation-wide 
organizations. The interests of regulators are assessed with interviews of state-licensing 
boards, state-legislators, as well as procurement and building officials. This can be 
compared to the positions of organizations founded to create nation-wide uniformity.  
My sampling strategy tries to sample different groups that should have different 
positions and ideas according to the different theories.14 Table 3, (p. 210) summarizes all 
conducted interviews. Because I cannot conduct in depth-interviews with all licensing 
boards for instance (and it turned out unnecessary since they all said the same thing), I 
focused on specific clusters of states with strong incentives for federal market authority 
whenever indicated. Those clusters were the I-5 corridor in the West, i.e. California, 
Oregon, and Washington, as well as the geographic cluster of North-Eastern states (CT, 
DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT). To some degree, these are all samples of 
convenience, because conducting semi-structured interviews always has to rely on the 
willingness of organizations to participate and many of the organizations targeted are 
hard to reach. However, the samples are also purposive since interviewees have been 
selected according to the discussed characteristics to gain inferential leverage (J. Lynch 
2013). Nonetheless, statistics are inappropriate to describe the results. Instead, within the 
case study I “describe clearly which persons were interviewed, their status, [and] limit the 
findings and conclusions to these particular worldviews, which are only a certain part of 
                                                 
14 Qualitative interview sampling does not work according to a quantitative logic: Targets “are 
suitable if they can provide the objects of reasoning as well as all relevant criteria and circumstances (e.g. 
cultural background, institutions) that are needed to be taken into account in order to investigate the 
research problem appropriately. It is the unit of investigation that counts, not the way how it was identified” 
(Diefenbach 2009, 879). 
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social reality, and put them into perspective, i.e. the wider picture” (Diefenbach 2009, 
880). In accordance with the best practices in qualitative research, I describe who was 
contacted and who responded in detail in the case studies (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013). 
Answers are cross-checked with other interview partners and other available information. 
This allows me to indicate whether one groups of actors has predominantly one view or 
several views. When a diverse groups of firms agree on a specific problem perception, it 
increases my confidence that this accurately characterizes firm positions more generally 
(Bleich and Pekkanen 2013). Cross-checking also ameliorates the problem with people 
misrepresenting their own positions. I hope that the non-mainstream, low-salience subject 
matter, combined with possible anonymity, will create enough incentives for people to 
accurately describe their positions. In addition, “It is not [always] necessary to dig deeper 
in order to reveal the hidden layers of a person’s personality and his or her ‘real and 
genuine experiences or ideas’—on the contrary: It might be exactly these cultural scripts 
and stereotypes (and perhaps the first level of their reflection) the interviewer might be 
interested in” (Diefenbach 2009, 881). While one might object to this as subjective, I am 
doing my best, as most researcher do, to not be overly subjective. To further that I follow 
the best practices of the research community by being transparent and explicit in all my 
research decisions. In the end, actual research “is a creative process and its quality, for 
better or worse, is a result of the skills and courage of the researcher”15 (Diefenbach 
2009, 885).  
Interview partners where contacted via email and phone, and all interviews were 
conducted via phone or email. The specific respondents and response rates are discussed 
in Chapter V. Over 100 interviews were conducted in 2016 and 2017. The results from 
this interview research are compared to the expectations of the different theories. Table 6 
(p. 318) shows the groups targeted for interviews, as well as the expectations for their 
positions according to the theory section. In addition, I compare the observed strategies 
of market-building with the expectation of coordination mechanisms (Table 1). I find 
plenty of evidence for the institutional incentives discussed. Firms have diffuse interests 
                                                 
15 “Endless freedom in the selection and interpretation of empirical data does not mean at all that 
‘anything goes’. There are still ethical, moral, legal, philosophical, social, technical, practical and 
professional standards in place which the researcher has to take into account” (Diefenbach 2009, 886). 
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in federal market authority, but those cannot be mobilized successfully. As expected I 
find the use of private coordination efforts, non-binding agreements, sectoral 
administrative cooperation, bilateral reciprocity, and model laws as opposed to 
mechanisms like state compacts, mutual recognition, cross-sectoral coordination, or 
federal action, which are mostly non-existent. Most intergovernmental institutions are 
service providers, focusing on information exchange and lobbying access. At the same 
time, it becomes clear that given a different federal policy agenda (i.e. a different 
ideational context) federal market building might be possible. In addition, some firms and 
interest groups directly repeat the competitive federalism argument.  
In sum, I will proceed with four empirical chapters two focused on the federal 
level policy-making since the 1970s and the other two on the construction sector. They 
are each divided in a description part and an explanation part. The descriptive parts focus 
on establishing that while the EU has seen an increase, the US has experienced a decrease 
in federal market authority. The explanatory chapters evaluate the strength of 
conventional explanations for the US case and show the usefulness of the here developed 
new account.  
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Step in Analysis Evidence Sources Goal 
Establish central inaction 
and lack of mobilization 
around interstate market 
barriers/opposition to 
federal market authority 
Policy agenda and 
policy achievements of 
Republicans do not 
address internal market 
barriers, despite general 
pro-market stance 
Secondary sources, 
newspaper articles, policy-
documents by Republicans 
Establishes 
the outcome 
Test structural hypothesis US has more internal 
economic flows, more 
labor mobility, more 
national corporations, 
and more regional 
specialization of firms 
than EU 
Data on aggregate bilateral 
goods trade; Data on 
aggregate mobility; Data on 
regional payment flows; Data 
on the number of big firms; 
Data on foreign trade 
exposure; Data on regional 
economic specialization  
Reduces 
confidence in 
structural 
explanation 
Test institutional 
hypothesis 
US has more federal 
resources; constitution 
allows similar action on 
market barriers 
Data on tax revenue and 
employees. Secondary 
sources on constitutional 
interpretation 
Reduces 
confidence in 
institutional 
explanation 
Test ideational hypothesis 
 
Justifications and 
arguments of pro-
market policy-makers, 
judges, and think-tank 
experts mirrors 
competitive federalism 
conception 
Republican Party Platforms 
(1980-2016); Reagan, 
Gingrich, Ryan reform 
proposals; memoirs and 
books of Reagan advisors; 
interviews with AIA, CATO, 
Heritage; List of court cases; 
List of FTC actions 
Increases 
confidence in 
ideational 
explanation 
Table 2: Federal Policy and Think Tank Case Study 
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CHAPTER III 
COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM AND THE ‘REAGAN REVOLUTION’ 
As we have seen in the theory chapter, most theoretical accounts of market 
building expect more significant mobilization around federal market authority to deal 
with interstate barriers in the US than in the EU. This chapter demonstrates that this is not 
the case and that the presented ideational account is better than conventional approaches 
in explaining the persistence of interstate barriers and the non-mobilization around 
federal market authority in the US.  
Liberal and institutional theories to some degree predict that we should see 
increasing mobilization around federal market authority since it creates economic 
benefits. Scholars have stressed that the size of these benefits depends on the degree of 
economic interdependence, the density of economic transaction, and potentials for 
economies of scale. (Moravcsik 1998; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014; Sandholtz, 
Fligstein, and Stone Sweet 2001). While this is not a quantitative study, and as I 
discussed earlier, there are reasons to be skeptical of a quantitative approach to my 
research question, a few comparisons show that these theories would lead us to expect at 
least roughly more mobilization around federal market authority in the US than in the 
EU.  
Economic benefits of single market building increase with a mobile workforce. In 
the US, there is much higher interstate labor mobility than in Europe: In 2014, 488,000 
working-age people migrated within the EU, while in the US, at least 4.8 million 
working-age people migrated to another state (U.S. Census Bureau 2016b; Fries-Tersch, 
Tugran, and Bradley 2017). In terms of total population, in 2014 around 0.4% of the EU 
population migrated to another EU country, while over 2% of the US population moved 
to a different state. If we focus on smaller economic regions within the EU16 (NUTS), the 
migration rate increases to 1.5%, still much lower than in the US (Fries-Tersch, Tugran, 
and Bradley 2017). However, while US labor mobility has been decreasing since the 
1980s, in the EU it steadily increases, which we might interpret as an effect of increasing 
                                                 
16 NUTS regions are administrative statistical units. They are much smaller in area to the average 
US state, but much bigger population-wise, reaching from three to twenty million inhabitants.  
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market integration (Fries-Tersch, Tugran, and Bradley 2017; Wozniak 2016). Overall, the 
stock of ‘foreign’ population is very different among the two polities. In the EU about 4% 
of the working age population live permanently in a different EU country than they were 
born, while in the US 30% of the population lives in a different state than they were born 
(Arpaia et al. 2014).  
In theory, economic benefits of single market building also increase with 
economic interdependence and denser flows of goods and services across the area: the 
external trade exposure of the EU and US is roughly similar. In the EU, imports of goods 
and services accounted for 12.3% of GDP in 2015, while exports in goods and services 
accounted for 13% (Eurostat 2017). In the US, import of goods and services accounted to 
15% of GDP in 2015, while export in goods and services accounted for 12.6% of GDP. 
Most EU trade is intra-EU trade reaching up 28% of GDP for goods and services 
(Eurostat 2017). Presumably, there is much more internal trade within the US, but 
comparable numbers are not as easily available because trade is mostly tracked at 
country-borders. While not identical in measure, in 2010 77.3% of (registered) 
transported goods were traded across US state borders (Tomer and Kane 2016). In both 
polities there is still a strong home bias. For instance, one paper estimates national trade 
to be 10 times likelier that international trade for any EU country (Nitsch 2000). 
Economists, trying to measure ‘home-bias’ in inter-state trade have found that there is a 
significant bias toward intra-state trade in the US and Canada (Wolf 2000; Millimet and 
Osang 2007; Hakan Yilmazkudayy 2011). However, the few comparative works have 
found that this home bias is 3 to 4 times stronger for EU countries than for US states 
(Pacchioli 2011).  
The benefits of federal market authority should increase with economic 
interdependence since the latter implies more cross-border division of labor and hence 
more cross-border trade. If we assume that the benefits of market integration apply to any 
transaction, there are more benefits with increasing numbers of transactions. We might 
measure economic interdependence by regional specialization. While comparing regional 
specialization is difficult due to many geographic differences, we do find this more 
strongly in the US. As Krugman puts it, the “U.S. [automotive] industry is a Midwestern 
phenomenon, with only a scattering of assembly plants in other parts of the country. The 
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European equivalent would be a concentration of half of the industry within 150 
kilometers of Wolfsburg” (Krugman 1991, 78). More recent studies show that European 
industries, especially technology industries, are becoming more regionally specialized, 
while US states are becoming less so, but there is still a small edge for the US (Midelfart-
Karvik and Overman 2000; Crescenzi, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper 2007; Fagerberg, 
Feldman, and Srholec 2014; Kogler, Essletzbichler, and Rigby 2017). 
The mechanism, stressed by liberal theories for creating federal market authority, 
is that interest groups, especially the ones representing large firms present in all the 
different states, lobby for single market building (Moravcsik 1998; Frieden 2002). 
According to some observers, the influence of big business groups, that operate 
nationally, is much higher in the US (Mahoney 2008; Gilens and Page 2014); we might 
therefore expect more mobilization around federal market authority in the US. In 
addition, there are more, larger firms in the US that potentially can realize the benefits 
from measures like harmonization of standards. While the median TOP 500 American 
company is worth $18 billion with a net income of $746 million in 2015, the median 
European firm is worth $8 billion with a net income of $440 million (Economist 2016a). 
Both economies are dominated by small (less than 10 employees) companies in terms of 
numbers, and in both economies most profits are generated by big businesses; the 
difference however is that the US has many more very large companies (Economist 
2016b; Chitnis 2016; Eurostat 2015). In addition, many sectors of the EU economy seem 
to have less concentration in terms of market power than in the US (Aiginger and Leitner 
2002; Mariniello 2014; Economist 2017). 
Institutional scholars have stressed that the pressures toward federal market 
authority can only be realized within some institutional structures. Specifically, scholars 
argue that historical decisions to give power to federal agencies and courts might create a 
feedback loop for further centralization (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). Accordingly, we 
can expect much more federal market authority in the US since the national market 
already developed in the 19th century (L. F. Goldstein 2001; M. Egan 2015).  
The US also has a larger scope of (legal) federal powers and resources it can use 
to shape its national market. The most obvious example is the EU’s lack of authority over 
guaranteeing the external security of its territory and to conduct foreign policy (Menon 
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2013; Mérand and Angers 2013). While internal policing is decentralized in the US as 
well, the federal government has several nation-wide law enforcement agencies, while 
the EU can only coordinate national efforts (Kelemen 2013). The US federal government 
also has the power to levy taxes, as well as shape social policies from Medicare to Social 
Security, which the EU does not. Similarly, while there has been some military 
integration and coordination through the Common Security and Defense Policy, there is 
no unified control of the military and streamlined foreign policy as there is in the US 
(Mérand and Angers 2013). 
In terms of financial resources, the US federal government controls around 50%-
60% of all government revenue, while the EU controls 2% (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 
2011; Wallis 2000). The federal share of civilian public employment is also much lower 
in the EU. In the US 14% of civilian public employees work for the federal government 
while in the EU this lays around 0.1% (Kelemen 2013). In terms of constitutional powers, 
it is generally acknowledged that the US constitution contains clauses similar to the EU, 
that have historically, and could now be harnessed to create federal market authority 
(Skowronek 1982; Denning 2008; Bork and Troy 2001b; Barnett 2001). 
Overall then, conventional theoretical approaches would lead us to expect 
significantly more mobilization around federal market authority in the US than in the EU. 
Ideational scholars might object that those conditions alone are not enough, but that 
ideological motivations, and specific ideas are necessary for any outcome. A prominent 
branch of this scholarship has focused on the influence of neoliberal ideas since the 
1980s, arguing that this time period has been seen a revolutionary re-commitment to 
market principles in the US (Harvey 2005; D. S. Jones 2012; Centeno and Cohen 2012; 
Swarts 2013; Prasad 2006; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; Steger and Roy 2010). Many 
scholars see President Reagan as spearheading the global neoliberal movement. For 
instance, Prasad writes, “Tax cuts are not the only neoliberal policy, but the ERTA 
[Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198117] can make a claim to being the most important 
instance of American neoliberalism.”(Prasad 2012, 351). King and Wood ask in a piece 
on neoliberalism, “Why did neoliberalism flourish in the United Kingdom and the United 
                                                 
17 26 U.S.C. §1 (1981). 
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States but not in other countries?” (D. S. King and Wood 1999, 372). Roy and Steger in 
their introduction to neoliberalism call ‘Reaganomics’ “the first wave of neoliberalism” 
(Steger and Roy 2010, 21). Harvey in his Brief History of Neoliberalism notes that “The 
election of Reagan was the […] first step in the long process” that he would later call 
“neoliberalization” (Harvey 2005, 22). In another book it is remarked that “The 
emergence of Reagan and Thatcher as trailblazers for radical market reform hardly 
require[s] elaboration” (Leitner, Peck, and Sheppard 2007, 45). Blyth, in his book-length 
treatment of the rise of neoliberal ideas focusses on the Reagan’s policies as ‘the great 
transformation’ (Blyth 2002). 
Overall, as discussed in the theory chapter, many different strands of scholarship 
point toward more mobilization around federal market authority in the US than the EU. 
This chapter demonstrates the opposite—the outcome in terms of federal policy is central 
inaction on and a lack of mobilization against inter-state market barriers. Conservatives 
since Reagan have adopted a set of ideas better described as competitive federalism that 
often opposed federal market authority, and by doing so, at times undermined a 
competitive national market. I show this by first documenting federal level outcomes and 
the behavior of federal policymakers in the US since the 1980s. To boost feasibility, I 
focus on self-described neo-liberal actors that by this self-identification have economic 
incentives to (supported by big nationally operating firms) and are ideologically (pro-
market) inclined to foster federal market authority. While the EU trajectory would make 
us expect similar trends in the US, I show that they are not mobilizing around and 
pushing for rules facilitating single market building. I specifically demonstrate this by 
scrutinizing the agenda and achievements of Reagan. This receives further support by 
following the agenda of the Republican Presidents that succeeded him, George H. Bush, 
and George W. Bush, as well as the last two leaders of Republican majorities in the 
House, Newt Gingrich, and Paul Ryan, that laid out comprehensive agendas to restructure 
the US economy.  
As argued, conventional explanations for this phenomenon are not very 
convincing because the outcome of federal inaction on interstate barriers happens despite 
standard structural and institutional incentives pushing the US towards more federal 
market authority, and conservatives in power explicitly having a pro-market agenda. 
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However, what does set them apart from neoliberals elsewhere is the specific tools they 
prefer to use (deregulation and devolution of power). This quite obviously relates to the 
intersection of pro-market ideas with an antipathy to federal power that I have called 
competitive federalism. To show the plausibility of this explanation I analyze all 
Republican Party platforms since 1980 and look at writings of Reagan and his close 
policy-advisors.18 This is followed by a less thorough—because the trend is already 
established—analysis of the writings of other Republican leaders and their advisors, that 
explicitly addressed these issues, like Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America and Paul 
Ryan’s A Better Way.  
This careful reconstruction of how American conservatives imagine markets 
shows the power of competitive federalism. Fusing neoliberalism, with antipathy toward 
central government suggested that when government—a principally flawed mechanism— 
retreats, markets evolve naturally. If government is necessary, it is preferred on the local 
level, held ‘in check’ by competition with other jurisdictions. This view suggested a 
conservative agenda around a fiscal project to cut government spending and taxes, 
flanked with erratic attention to issue-specific deregulation that was conceived as wiping 
away federal intrusions to reduce business cost, not creating competitive markets. The 
notion of state- or city-based protectionism essentially never came up, and at no point 
was there any hint whatsoever of aspiring to establish a more competitive national market 
through federal market authority.  
To lend more credence to this argument and provide more historical 
contextualization, the subsequent chapter discusses the results of interviewing experts at 
                                                 
18 I analyze books by Craig Roberts (Assistant secretary of the treasury, Congressional Staff of 
Jack Kemp), David Stockman (Congressman, direction of OMB), William Niskanen (Council of Economic 
Advisors), Robert Bartley (editor of the Wall Street Journal when it started supporting Reagan), Lawrence 
Lindsey (Council of Economic Advisors), Martin Feldstein (Chairman of Council of Economic Advisors), 
Martin Anderson (Chief domestic policy advisor in the White House), Michael Boskin (Chairman of 
Council of Economic Advisors under Bush), Jude Wanniski (Journalist that popularized the Laffer Curve), 
Jack Kemp (Congressman, architect of Reagan tax cuts), William Greider (in-depth interview with David 
Stockman), Murray Weidenbaum (chairman of president’s council of Economic advisers), Edwin Meese 
(Counselor to the President with cabinet rank), James Baker (Chief of Staff), Donald Regan (Secretary of 
the Treasury), Milton Friedman (advisor to the President) and academic books from right-leaning 
economists predominantly at think tanks (McKenzie 1995; Sloan 1999; Yandle 1986; Mitchell 1991; 
Niskanen and Moore 1996; G. Peterson 1984; B. D. Friedman 1995; James M. Buchanan and Institute of 
Economic Affairs 1989; Roger E. Meiners and Yandle 1989; Robert J. Mackay et al. 1987; Gilder 2012). 
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some of the most important pro-market think tanks (American Enterprise Institute, 
Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute) supplemented by an analysis of the online archives 
of said institutions. Based on that, I document the specific interlinking beliefs within 
competitive federalism and demonstrate how this conception of markets diffused from 
the libertarian strand of law and economics scholarship, i.e. the conservative legal 
movement, through think tanks into federal policy. Like federal policy-makers, scholars 
at think tanks regularly overlook how state and local jurisdictions undermine the single 
market, question the need for federal market authority, and even when seeing the 
necessity of federal regulation, often oppose it. 
III.a.  Reagan’s Pro-Market Agenda 
The principles behind Reagan’s policy agenda can be found in the 1980 and 1984 
Republican Party platform. It combines the belief in markets with a rejection of 
government power: “A defense of the individual against government was never more 
needed. And we will continue to mount it […] for we believe that at the root of most of 
our troubles today is the misguided and discredited philosophy of an all-powerful 
government” (Republican National Convention 1980, 1984). In none of the documents 
can we find anything resembling a single-market building agenda. Instead, we find a 
policy-agenda based around fiscal priorities, justified with theories that paint government 
as a generally flawed mechanism opposed to markets. Regulatory policy, introduced as a 
crisis of overregulation, is understood similarly—regulation is seen as a detriment to 
market competition, and its reduction a solution to most problems. Decentralization 
specifically is mentioned as a remedy to always problematic federal market authority. 
Taken together, these priorities preclude any assessment of interstate barriers.  
This first impression is substantiated by reviewing the internal campaign 
document, Avoiding a GOP Economic Dunkirk (Stockman 1981) and Reagan’s 
presentation of his Program for Economic Recovery on February 18, 1981 (Reagan 
1981). Those two documents name four priorities based on similar justifications; namely 
tax cuts (especially income, capital gains, and business depreciation schedules), 
balancing the budget via growth and spending cuts (reduced eligibility for government 
programs, fighting abuse, less staff), limiting monetary growth, and a “substantial 
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rescission of the regulatory burden” (Stockman 1981). The main priority, as we will see 
below, is taxation and fiscal policy justified by the ideas that government is a generally 
flawed mechanism that undermines market allocation (Niskanen 1994). Deregulation—
which was not as seriously pursued as macro-economic policy—is explicitly motivated 
by the belief that government regulation is always bad and a cost for business, and 
importantly not from a perspective of market creation or maintenance (see also Prasad 
2006). In terms of federalism, the dominating idea is that local governments would make 
better policy because they are less likely captured by interest groups (see also G. Peterson 
1984). There is no discussion or consideration of protectionist local policies or the effects 
of national regulatory heterogeneity, based on the belief that (jurisdictional) competition 
works. 
III.a.1. Taxation and Fiscal Policy as a Priority 
It was taxation and fiscal policy, the administration spent most their efforts on.19 
Most of the insider accounts of the Reagan administration focus solely on the efforts to 
reduce taxes and balance the budget. In his book, The Triumph of Politics, OMB director 
David Stockman chronicles the fights over tax cuts and spending cuts in detail, while 
only commenting in passing on unsuccessful deregulatory attempts, making it clear that 
macro-economic policy was Reagan’s priority (Stockman 1986). Similarly, assistant 
secretary for the treasury and fellow at the Hoover Institute Craig Roberts’ book The 
Supply Side Revolution focuses solely on taxes, seeing even attempted budget cuts as 
sabotaging the original Reagan program, which is corroborated by Donald Regan, 
secretary of the treasury and later chief of staff (P. C. Roberts 1984; D. Regan 1988)  
William Niskanen, member of the Council of Economic advisors, argues that the 
main part of the Reagan program was a concerted effort to limit taxation and spending 
(Niskanen 1988, 115). Chief domestic policy advisor Martin Anderson’s book, 
Revolution, praises Reagan’s achievements which he describes solely as his macro-
                                                 
19 The Reagan administration was the first to embrace monetarism (‘steady monetary growth’). 
Tight monetary policy, after initially causing a recession, brought inflation under control (Niskanen 1988, 
Chapter 5). But the FED, that determines monetary policy independently, had started following monetarist 
prescription even before Reagan came to power (Volcker shock), so the description of policies excludes 
this part of his program. 
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economic policy (M. Anderson 1988). Other accounts that describe economic policy only 
in terms of taxation and spending include Wall Street editor Robert Bartley’s The Seven 
Fat Years, economic Advisor Lindsey’s book, The Growth Experiment, counselor to the 
President with Cabinet rank Edwin Meese’s book With Reagan, Reagan Chief of Staff, 
James Baker’s book, Work Hard and Keep out of Politics, as well Martin Feldstein, 
Chairman of the Council of Economic advisors’ summary of Reagan’s economic policy 
(Isaac 1994; J. Baker and Fiffer 2008; L. Lindsey 1990; Bartley 1992; Meese 1992; 
Feldstein 1994). 
If we look at Reagan’s legislative initiatives it becomes clear that he used most of 
his political capital for bringing tax legislation through Congress and negotiating budget 
resolutions. Reagan’s biggest success, even according to Stockman, was the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 198120 (ERTA), “The biggest tax cut in American history” (Sloan 
1999, 156). It was the first tax cut that had as a theoretical rationale an incentive effect 
(supply side theory, micro- instead of macro-level analysis) instead of a demand-stimulus 
effect (the previously prevalent model of the economy that saw government spending as a 
main determinant of economic performance). ERTA included the Kemp-Roth income tax 
cuts (5% 1st year, 10% 2nd year, 10% 3rd year), reductions in capital gains taxes, an 
accelerated depreciation schedule, and an indexing of tax brackets to inflation. 
Furthermore, a ‘bidding war’ in Congress made law makers add numerous provisions 
catering to specific constituents to make the law feasible, producing an extent of tax 
reductions nobody had anticipated (Conlan 1998, 161ff.).  
However, this was just the start of the tax policy activity of this administration. 
Confronting huge budget deficits, especially due to the 1982 recession, taxes were raised 
or reformed in 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1986 (Brownlee and Steuerle 2003, 161f.). This 
included the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198221, social security payroll 
tax increases in 1983, and the Deficit Reduction Act of 198422, all mostly focused on 
repealing special tax favors and increasing corporate taxes. The impetus in Congress 
                                                 
20 26 U.S.C. §1 (1981). 
21 26 U.S.C. §1 (1982). 
22 26 U.S.C. §1 (1985). 
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were less economic policy considerations but the need to increase revenue (Fullerton 
1994). The 1986 Tax Reform Act23 tried to simplify the tax system by reducing fourteen 
tax brackets to two, thereby drastically reducing marginal tax rates for individuals. 
However, these massive tax cuts could only be financed by shifting the tax burden to 
corporations. Despite the regression from the initial tax cuts, which led to negative 
assessment of supply-siders like Roberts, Stockman, or Regan, as overall result remained 
a significant lowering of marginal and average tax rates (Boskin 1987, 156). 
Spending cuts were an important priority for the Reagan administration, but partly 
controversial among Reagan’s advisors. The language of the 1980 Republican platform 
already anticipated this debate by being unclear on whether the budget can be balanced 
by economic growth alone or through spending cuts (Republican National Convention 
1980). On the one hand, supply-siders like Roberts and Regan argued that current budget 
deficits were largely irrelevant in the long run. Tax cuts would be partly self-financing 
(Laffer curve), and improved incentives to investment and production would eventually 
lead to growth, diminishing budget deficits (D. Regan 1988; P. C. Roberts 1984). On the 
other hand, Stockman and more traditional conservatives argued that tax and budget cuts 
had to go hand in hand, because they feared adverse effects on interest rates and inflation 
(Stockman 1986; Weidenbaum 1988; Isaac 1994). More broadly, they argued that 
government allocation of resources was generally inefficient and detrimental to market 
competition, and so every “reduction in government” would be an improvement; most 
existing government activity was described as “wasteful” (Republican National 
Convention 1980). 
In the end, this debate did not matter much, because after increasing defense 
spending and after losing the battle over cutting social security, there was not much left to 
cut. Reform of social security was the largest single item thought to be used to cut the 
budget, but the initial proposal provoked such a negative reaction that the Reagan 
administration abandoned the idea for minor changes in the 1983 Social Security 
Amendments24 (Boskin 1987, 123).  
                                                 
23 Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
24 Pub. L. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983). 
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Stockman’s book, The Triumph of Politics, mostly chronicles how despite 
increasing deficits, he was unable to win any major spending cuts (Stockman 1986). He 
learned that propitious areas for spending cuts, like social security, agricultural price 
supports, and farm subsidies, were politically not feasible. Other programs the 
administration unsuccessfully tried to cut or eliminate were maritime subsidies, 
transportation subsidies, urban development action grants, community development block 
grants, postal subsidies, and the rural electrification program (Boskin 1987, 128). 
Interestingly, major privatization of de-facto government owned enterprises was not 
attempted (Niskanen 1988, 59). So despite the necessity of major spending cuts and the 
general desirability of cuts for anti-government conservatives, the main tools for savings 
were reducing “waste, fraud, extravagance, and abuse” and cutting some other smaller 
government programs (Niskanen 1988, 25).  
The approach of balancing the budget by eliminating waste was supported by the 
administration’s Grace Commission that claimed a third of all income taxes were lost on 
inefficiency and unnecessary expenses (Grace Commission 1984). However, even more 
serious conservative scholars described this statement as ‘largely exaggerated’ (Boskin 
1987, 131) and Stockman was mostly unsuccessful in convincing federal departments and 
Congress to actually act on the suggestions (Stockman 1986, Chapter 5). 70% of 
recommendations, mostly those that could be achieved within the executive branch, were 
adopted. However, despite much effort the actual savings were estimated to be marginal 
(Niskanen 1988, 57). In all its submitted budgets (revised FY82, FY 83, FY 84, FY 85, 
FY 86, FY 87), the administration tried to convince Congress of significant reductions 
around reducing subsidies, increasing user fees, reducing federal government personnel 
costs, and reducing national support programs, but most were rejected or overwritten in 
the political process (Boskin 1987, 82). 
Successes (in terms of spending cuts) can be found in reducing eligibility criteria 
for Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and encouraging states to make it 
a ‘workfare program,’ as well as cuts to food stamps, Medicaid, subsidized housing, the 
school lunch program, child care assistance, public mental health and counseling 
services, legal aid and host of other small means tested programs (Prasad 2006, 83f.). 
Some parts of the 1983 New Federalism initiative also cut spending by consolidating 
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grants. These priorities suggest that after discovering that major spending cuts were not 
feasible, Stockman concentrated on cutting spending for vulnerable populations, that had 
previously been labeled as the ‘lazy poor’ living at the cost of the government (Lowndes 
2008; Prasad 2006, 86). None of this was enough to prevent a huge increase in public 
debt, even though later on conservative scholars at think tanks tended to either see the 
deficits as unrelated to policy or as exaggerated (Niskanen 1988, 108; Yellen 1989; 
Niskanen and Moore 1996). The important take-away from analyzing the budget policies, 
is not how much cuts they achieved, but that the administration tried very hard for a very 
long time. 
From this review we can see that the Reagan administration pursued an 
impressive amount of reforms—but not the kind of market-based reforms one might 
expect. Instead, political fights were about taxation and spending, leaving not much 
political capital for other initiatives. It was not only by design that macro-economic 
polices became a priority. The economic problems of the 1970s, the economic recession 
early in the term, and looming budget deficits forced politics to be centered on those 
issues. At the same time, the discussion of ideology makes clear that Reagan advisors did 
see those policies as the core of their ‘neoliberal revolution’ without being forced to by 
external circumstances. Tax and spending cuts were at the core because in a system of 
thinking, where critique of government takes center stage, reducing its size becomes a 
priority. 
III.a.2. Deregulation Without Regard to Markets 
The three most striking observations about regulatory policy, as opposed to fiscal 
and tax policy, are (1) that policy was always made from the vantage point of opposition 
to government, framed as reducing business-cost, which implied an across-the-board 
repeal of regulation without regard for context, (2) that efforts to reduce regulation were 
of minor priority, limited, and often failed, and (3) that more power was given to state 
and local governments without attention to effects on interstate commerce. This fits well 
with the competitive federalism conception of markets—but is surprising from a generic 
view of neoliberalism. The latter’s pro-market position might have implied that 
regulation be reformed in a market-enhancing and -creating way, or at least with some 
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language around single market building. But this was not true for the Reagan 
administration, who assumed that the market would follow naturally.  
The administration never had in mind a comprehensive overhaul of regulation, or 
the use of government power to ensure competitive markets. When initially emphasized 
as a policy priority, they conceptualized regulation as reducing the amount of regulation 
businesses have to comply with (instead of consumer welfare, or competition). Stating 
that “Well-intentioned government regulations do not contribute to economic vitality,” 
the possibility of market-efficiency for consumers or market-based regulatory reform was 
denied from the beginning (Reagan 1981b). One lonely conservative observer criticized 
this as undermining the very goal of pro-market conservatives: “The sensible goal is not 
to reduce the burden on business by easing the enforcement of existing regulation but to 
ensure that the regulations that are enforced benefit the consumer” (Weidenbaum 1988, 
241). 
Already the 1980 Republican Platform shows that the approach toward regulation 
is very different than in the EU, where competitive deficits of markets and trade barriers 
are identified systematically. While regulation is mentioned in every other paragraph, 
there is no specific passage that lays out an overall approach. Lip service is paid to the 
positive potential of regulation: “Government performs certain limited functions and 
enforce certain safeguards to ensure that equity, free competition, and safety exist in the 
free market economy” (Republican National Convention 1980). However, as a practical 
matter the program only sees room for abolishing regulations, not for market-enhancing 
regulation. In all policy areas, “The Republican Party declares war on government 
overregulation,” usually without discussing potential negative effects of deregulation 
(Republican National Convention 1980). According to the document, regulation is always 
“excessive,” “bureaucratic,” “expensive,” or “discriminatory” (Republican National 
Convention 1980). The document makes clear that government itself is always the 
problem, and the best option would be to take its “presumption of legality” away 
(Republican National Convention 1980). That regulation is only understood as inefficient 
cost, without benefit, on business is easily glanced from the 1984 Republican Platform 
saying, “Some $150 billion will thereby be saved over the next decade by […] 
businesses.” (Republican National Convention 1984). 
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While not stated explicitly, this implies efficient markets will naturally evolve, 
because everything that is needed, is for the government to get out of the way 
(Republican National Convention 1984). If government cannot ‘get out of the way’ the 
second-best alternative is “to renew the dispersion of power from the federal government 
to the states and localities.” In the Republican Party Platform, there is no concern or 
discussion of the potential for state-level protectionism or existing obstacles to interstate 
commerce (Republican National Convention 1980). The platform makes clear that the 
principle goal is limiting government, without regard whether it fosters (and might even 
be contrary to) to a single market.  
The same notion is found in the Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for Leadership, 
widely seen as the intellectual basis for Reagan’s specific policy proposals25. Ed Feulner, 
President of Heritage explains, “Seven days after the election we met with Marin 
Anderson, Dick Allen Ed Meese and other [the Reagan transition team …] and we 
delivered them the first draft copies of Mandate for Leadership” (McCombs 1983). On 
regulation, the proposal suggests, “The conservative’s dream of doing away with 
government controls and abolishing federal agencies is now more generally understood 
and accepted” (Heatherly 1981, 700). The solution to the country’s “crisis of 
overregulation” can only be found in deregulation and “returning powers to state and 
local government” (Heatherly 1981, 698f.). Reducing regulation is equated with “market 
competition” (Heatherly 1981, 304). Overall though, there is no serious discussion of 
federal market authority, preemption, or interstate barriers in over 1000 pages.  
The notion of maintaining functioning free markets, which can be partly found in 
the Republican Party platform, is completely gone in the internal campaign document, 
Avoiding a GOP Economic Dunkirk, being replaced with the notion of a “substantial 
rescission of the regulatory burden” (Stockman 1981). Regulation is not evaluated in 
terms of free markets, but is simply a list of potential cost savings for different industries, 
stating that “The most important effects of regulation […] are the adverse impacts on 
economic growth” (Stockman 1981; Reagan 1981b). Reagan’s Program for Economic 
                                                 
25 Heritage takes credit for most of Reagan’s policy proposals, saying, “Heritage was President 
Reagan's favorite think tank, and Reagan was the embodiment of the ideas and principles Heritage holds 
dear” (Blasko 2004). 
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Recovery only examines regulation in terms of costs for business without mention of 
potentially anti-competitive or market-fragmenting effects (Reagan 1981a). The promised 
“omnibus suspense bill” to curtail regulation (not improve it) never came (Reagan 
1981a).  
Many conservative authors judge regulatory reform as a failure since not pursued 
seriously—“The failure to achieve substantial reduction in or reform of federal 
regulations […] was the major missed opportunity of the initial Reagan program” 
(Niskanen 1988, 115). In addition, when successful, reducing regulation sometimes 
directly contributed to economic problems as seen in the Savings and Loans Crisis or 
empowered sub-national protectionism as seen in anti-trust (Sloan 1999). Most 
contemporary observers that do mention regulation, only comment on it ‘in passing;’ 
concepts like federal preemption, commerce power, harmonization, or state protectionism 
are never mentioned (Boskin 1987; McKenzie 1995; G. Peterson 1984; Bartley 1992; L. 
Lindsey 1990; M. Anderson 1988; D. Regan 1988; Meese 1992; Wanniski 1978b).  
Though consumer-focused, competitive-friendly deregulation of monopolies had 
momentum when Reagan entered office, write Paul Joscow and Roger Noll, 
If anything […] the Reagan administration reduced the chance that these 
reforms would endure: by refusing to let FAA programs expand in pace with 
airline growth after deregulation, by permitting several anticompetitive 
airline mergers, by failing to stop the banking debacle when the cost was still 
in the tens of billions, by allowing federal devolution to have priority over 
regulatory reform and so to be too deferential to states that seek to increase 
regulation (insurance, telecommunications), and by generally ignoring 
economic regulatory issues in the second term. (Joskow and Noll 1994, 437). 
The consumer-based deregulatory movement in the 1970s, focused on industries 
that had been regulated as natural monopolies, achieved their goals before Reagan gained 
office, and the President did not carry that momentum forward except in a few cases. The 
traditional regulation of entry, exit, and prices by government regulatory commissions 
was widely criticized as inefficient and mostly benefiting the regulated businesses by 
lawyers, public administrators, political scientists, and economists (Derthick and Quirk 
1985, 8). Initial deregulation of government-established monopolies in the airline, 
trucking, and railroads, was achieved before Reagan took office. This “Deregulation was 
a populist phenomenon, protecting consumers at the expense of particular industries, that 
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is deregulation […] was not in the interest of business” (Prasad 2006, 63). But as we have 
already seen, Reagan’s focus was on business costs. According to Prasad, performing a 
comprehensive content analysis of periodical in the 1960s to 1980s, Reagan reframed the 
critique of industry capture, which had been in the center of the deregulatory impetus of 
consumer advocates in the 1970s, as not one of business but of government (Prasad 
2006). This transformed the mainstream regulatory reform agenda into a conservative 
policy (B. D. Friedman 1995, 57). The problem description was shifted from high costs 
for consumers to high costs for businesses, regulation became not a flawed process that 
can be improved (through stronger institutions) but a principled obstacle to economic 
activity, and the problem was not capture of regulators but government intervention in the 
free market (Prasad 2006, 72ff.). The anti-government frame of regulatory critique also 
implied the inefficiency of health, safety, and environmental regulations, which had been 
seen as generally desirable by earlier deregulatory champions (Prasad 2006, 77).  
This interpretation is mirrored by the evidence of how Republicans talk about 
regulation, presented here, and is confirmed by other observers: “The [Reagan] 
Administration […] principally used the system of OMB review […] to implement a 
myopic vision of the regulatory process which places the elimination of cost to industry 
above all other considerations” (Bagley and Revesz 2006, 1265). An alternative 
interpretation—preferred by ordoliberals—could have been to improve regulation 
through better governance, but the conservative solution of regulating less prevailed.  
During the Reagan administration, there was no attempt to change the basic 
regulatory framework, just rhetoric, executive action, lax enforcement, and strategic 
agency appointments. Kip Viscusi argues: “The legislative energies of the Reagan 
administration were devoted to tax reform rather than rewriting the legislative mandates 
of regulatory agencies. Although regulatory reform was one of the four key pillars of the 
Reagan economic program, it was generally viewed as meriting the lowest priority of the 
four major areas of concern” (Viscusi 1994, 470f.). 
This becomes especially clear when looking at the second term—in the 1984 
campaign and later policy “Deregulation played no significant role” (Prasad 2006, 80). In 
the end, one account concludes “The Reagan administration made the fateful decision to 
forgo laborious attempts to institutionalize the program in statute, opting instead for an 
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aggressive management strategy. Thus, as the Reagan era drew to a close, the US Code 
contained no record of Reagan’s regulatory reform” (B. D. Friedman 1995, 158).  
From reviewing the overall policy record, we already know that the priorities lay 
elsewhere—this notion is strengthened when looking at the specific regulatory policies 
pursued. Simply reducing the regulatory burden and trusting free markets to arise 
sometimes directly undermined competitive markets, and many obvious areas for market-
based reforms were ignored. Even the limited efforts of the Reagan administration are 
seen as failure by many observers, as we have already heard.26 Even more harshly, 
Timothy Muris, a professor of law at George Mason University, argues, “Viewing 
competition across the entire range of governmental activity, our economy ended the 
1980s more circumscribed by governmental intervention than it began, particularly when 
the amount of trade subject to international restraints27, such as ‘voluntary’ quotas, is 
considered” (Muris 1989, 56f.).  
Instead of a comprehensive framework of addressing regulatory issues, Reagan’s 
main achievements—policies that scholars identify as the neoliberal turn—are restricted 
to executive action coming from the White House. A presidential task force on regulatory 
relief was established to review all regulations’ impact on business and state governments 
(Conlan 1998, 196). In complementary fashion, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 198028 
and Executive Order 12,49829 tasked the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) with a centralized review all newly promulgated regulations (B. D. Friedman 
1995). Significant executive orders coming out of this process were mandating cost-
benefit analysis for all regulation (Executive Order 12,29130) and weakening Davis-
                                                 
26 This contradicts pretty much Blyth’s argument—he presents deregulation as major success of 
Reagan (Blyth 2002).  
27 In a climate of economic recession, trade deficits, and declining international competitiveness of 
traditional manufacturing, many protectionist measures were taken. This included Japanese voluntary auto 
export restraints, steel quotas, the multi-fiber agreement, the semi-conductor agreement, as well as the 1988 
Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988), which allowed 
for aggressive retaliatory action against unfair trade practices (Richardson 1994). In addition, the US 
seemed to turn away from multi-lateral trade liberalization to bilateral trade agreements (Richardson 1994).  
28 44 U.S.C. § 3501-3521. 
29 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985). 
30 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
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Bacon regulations that had guaranteed above state-average wages in construction 
projects. According to the Executive Order, all new regulations were to be referred to 
OIRA for centralized review31—establishing a tool for presidential control of the 
regulatory agenda, a tool used to this day (B. D. Friedman 1995, 33). 
However, it is questionable whether the mandating of cost-benefit analysis had 
much of an effect initially, because authorizing legislation (which remained unchanged) 
often required a different decision criterion. Since then, the cost-benefit executive order 
has been renewed by all following presidents and accepted by most independent 
regulatory agencies (Eisner 2017). With Executive Order 12,86632, Clinton set the 
precedent for future presidents to keep using OIRA to gain influence over the federal 
regulatory apparatus (Bagley and Revesz 2006, 1267). Cost-benefit in this context 
extends the logic of competitive federalism by putting the cost of government and not 
market competitiveness into the foreground. All pending regulation was initially 
suspended, but most were later approved without changes (Niskanen 1988, 133). It is 
questionable whether a single executive office in the White House had the expertise or 
the resources to review all pending regulations thoroughly.33 In terms of rescinding 
existing regulations, “The Reagan administration’s most comprehensive deregulation 
effort was its automobile industry relief package;” however the results were mostly the 
delay of regulations that would later be approved (Viscusi 1994, 475).34 In fact, many 
observers concluded that delay was the main result of most of the review done by OIRA 
(B. D. Friedman 1995, 134).  
Public pressure mounted against the presidential taskforce for regulatory relief, 
because it seemed secretive and circumventing the normal regulatory process, leading to 
                                                 
31 Legally, following recommendations by OIRA was completely voluntary for regulatory officials 
at independent regulatory agencies (B. D. Friedman 1995, 34). 
32 58 F.R. 51735 (1993). 
33 In a Senate hearing, an OIRA officer is quoted saying, “I didn’t have the technical expertise to 
work on EPA issues. I just didn’t know [how to evaluate the conflicting arguments]. I knew I would do 
well from by boss’ perspective if I got rid of rules” (cited in B. D. Friedman 1995, 57). 
34 In addition, the power of labor was restricted symbolically through the firing of all striking 
members of the air-traffic controllers union and substantially by appointing pro-business members to the 
National Labor Relations Board that in turn consistently ruled against workers (Blyth 2002, 182). 
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its dismantlement in 1983 (B. D. Friedman 1995, 40). At the same time, in some 
instances OIRA could be harnessed to achieve, if not the goal of less regulation, the goal 
of no new regulation: “In practice, OIRA reviewed agencies’ cost-benefit analyses only 
to ensure that they do not enact regulations with costs that exceed their benefits,” 
focusing on cases of “overregulation” (Bagley and Revesz 2006, 1268f.). Another 
indirect effect, according to some evidence is, that agencies, aware that strong regulation 
might draw scrutiny, “have powerful incentives to make their regulations less stringent 
(i.e., impose fewer compliance costs) if the expected benefits of a particular regulation 
are contingent, fairly contestable, or difficult to quantify—that is, nearly always” (Bagley 
and Revesz 2006, 1270). For instance, based on interviews with regulatory officials, Erik 
Olson reports that “A more subtle and consequential internal EPA development induced 
by OMB review is a ‘guessing game,’ in which the EPA attempts to draft rules it believes 
will clear OMB” (E. D. Olson 1984, 50). Similarly, a General Accounting Office review 
found that “The knowledge that all regulations must be reviewed by OMB may indirectly 
cause delay due to intensified internal review within the agency” (GAO 1982, 51). Two 
critical observers conclude “Under Reagan’s Orders, regulatory benefits would be 
systematically undervalued, costs systematically inflated—and the administrative state 
would grind to a halt”—all because “To conservatives in the 1980s, rational regulation 
necessarily meant less regulation35” (Bagley and Revesz 2006, 1266).  
The task force adopted the principle that “Federal regulation should not preempt 
state laws or regulations, except to guarantee rights of national citizenship,” disregarding 
the potentially detrimental effect on trade from non-uniform standards (cited in Viscusi 
1994, 464). Another observer comments on this, “The regulatory relief approach was 
designed to fortify state governments with legal authority while relieving the national 
government of certain expenditures” (B. D. Friedman 1995, 57). Due to increasing 
heterogeneity of standards, the Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Independent 
Business soon argued that “The cost of OIRA review exceeded the benefits” (cited in B. 
D. Friedman 1995, 156). 
                                                 
35 “OIRA’s denials notwithstanding, there is substantial evidence that emphasizing the cost side of 
the cost-benefit ledger remains a pervasive and entrenched feature of OIRA review” (Bagley and Revesz 
2006, 1269). 
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Social regulatory agencies, like the EPA and OHSA, have independent statutory 
authority, and were therefore less influenced by the centralized review of regulation—the 
only way of influence was the appointment of executive officers. While the 1970s 
deregulatory movement had seen these agencies as potentially efficient, in the 
competitive federalism view of regulation these agencies were just another instance of 
distorting the free market. The Reagan administration reorganized the EPA, OHSA, and 
the Department of the Interior to eliminate officials opposed to their agenda and reduced 
their budgets. Reagan appointed an explicitly anti-environmental person as the head of 
the EPA and drained enforcement resources (Prasad 2006, 79). In several case studies, it 
is shown that there are many instances in which the OMB convinced the EPA and OHSA 
to take back or not establish new standards (B. D. Friedman 1995, 101ff.). For instance, 
due to pressure of the Reagan administration, OHSA relaxed lead exposure standards (B. 
D. Friedman 1995, 103). Nonetheless, observers conclude that the attempt to change 
health, safety, and environmental regulation “was a near complete failure” (Niskanen 
1988, 125).  
In health, safety, and environmental regulation there is substantial policy variation 
because states use their competencies in governing every day affairs to regulate as they 
see fit, even when implementing federal legislation like the Clean Air Act (Teske 2004). 
In none of the Republican Party platforms or Regan’s policy positions was there a call for 
a general preemption of those powers, despite their ability to severely interfere with 
interstate commerce—and Reagan’s regulatory task force principally opposed federal 
preemption in this area (C. Weiler 2012; Republican National Convention 1980, 1984). 
Observers find a stronger emphasis on cost-benefit analysis and new enforcement 
priorities at the OSHA, but none mention any attention to interstate barriers (Walton and 
Langenfeld 1989). Even in industries where business themselves lobbied for uniform 
rules like for instance packaging of consumer goods, the “Application of the federalism 
principles suggested that there is no reason for the government to intervene, and the 
government did not” (Viscusi 1994, 464). Instead heterogeneous rules, like for instance 
California Proposition 65 on labeling, were allowed to proliferate. Conservative legal-
economic scholars in the Reagan administration, often coming from places like the AEI, 
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opposed standardization as by definition inefficient government intervention36 (DeMuth 
1994, 509ff.). Similarly, James Burnley, Reagan appointee to the Department of 
Transportation, argued that there are huge theoretical benefits of complete federal 
preemption of the airline market, most significantly to create a national market, but this 
should not trump federalism concerns (Burnley 1994, 512).  
In the end, deregulation of health and environmental standards was not 
sustainable because of public opposition of the environmental movement (Prasad 2006, 
80). For instance, Reagan was forced to appoint a more pro-environment administrator to 
the EPA (Burnham 1983). An attempt by the National Highway and Traffic Safety 
Administration to scrap the airbag mandate, seen as unnecessary uniform rule, was 
scraped by courts (DeMuth 1994). While this might have led to a change in perspective 
towards federal market authority, it led to a phasing out of regulatory efforts altogether 
(Prasad 2006, 81). 
The major preemptive laws under Reagan, pushed for by trucking industry 
interests, were the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 198237 and the Motor Carrier 
Safety Act of 198438 (and successive laws) establishing federal standards for truck sizes 
and weights using grants-in-aid requirements and preempting some state regulations 
(Zimmerman 2003, 95). One of the few complete preemption laws was the Bus 
Regulatory Reform Act of 198239 preempting states from limiting entrance, exit, and 
pricing of buses (Zimmerman 2005, 78f.). However, most of the laws were not complete 
field preemptions. Because many accounts do not address the question of federal market 
authority, national market unification, or interstate barriers, it is often unclear whether 
those regulations unified rules.40 In many instances, laws were responses “to complaints 
                                                 
36 DeMuth, executive director of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, equated 
product standards with the “evil of quality fixing” (DeMuth 1994, 509ff.). 
37 Pub.L. 97-424, 97 Stat. 2097 (1982). 
38 Pub.L. 98-554, 98 Stat 2892 (1984). 
39 Pub.L. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982). 
40 For instance, Zimmerman counts 96 preemption bills signed by Reagan (Zimmerman 1991). 
However, many of them only have incidental effects on states (like the tax legislation), or even expand 
regulatory powers by state governments (Motor Carrier Safety Act). 
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voiced by state and local officials relative to several preemption statute” not part of any 
systematic market building policy (Zimmerman 1991, 15). For instance, transportation 
laws allowed states to create and enforce additional trucking standards, establishing no 
complete preemption (Zimmerman 2003, 95). Similarly, the creation of a national 
commercial operator license, debated during the passage of the Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 198641, was not adopted (The New York Times 1986). As a result, 
“The states continue to have the power to regulate noneconomic aspects of the industry, 
such as weight and height limitations, carriage of hazardous materials, and other related 
safety and environmental issues” (Teske 2004, 55). In addition, states were allowed to 
continue the economic regulation of intra-state trucking until 1994 (Teske 2004, 8). More 
generally, the Local Government Antitrust Act of 198442 made it more difficult to sue 
states for creating barriers to competition (Zimmerman 1991).  
Given Reagan’s anti-government deregulatory agenda, a few areas of remaining 
state barriers are particularly interesting because directly related to the competitive 
federalism conception that does not problematize state regulation. For instance, the FCC 
pursued competitive reforms—driven by ideology but more importantly technological 
changes—like the break-up of AT&T and loosing restrictions on regulation of 
telecommunication (Derthick and Quirk 1985). However, there was no legislative action 
and significant federal preemption did not come on the agenda until the 1996 
Telecommunications Act43 (Teske 2004). This means, state public utility commissions 
continued the regulation of intra-state telecommunication services in an anti-competitive 
ways until the late 1990s (Teske 2004, 59). A similar trend can be observed in electricity 
markets. Despite deregulating energy prices, the Reagan administration left a system in 
control in which states decide whether to allow free access to electricity markets or 
highly regulate prices and participants (Teske 2004, 72). Deregulatory changes were only 
introduced in the 1990s (Teske 2004, 80). Even today, only a handful of states allow 
completely free choice of electricity providers (Energy Tariff Experts 2017). Similarly, 
                                                 
41 Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
42 Pub. L. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984). 
43 Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
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natural gas remained a market in which the federal government highly controlled 
quantities and prices (Teske 2004, 72). The same argument can be made for the insurance 
industry: “Supposedly committed to removing unnecessary regulations, and pricing and 
availability problems, the regulatory reform movement of the 1980s passed the insurance 
industry by,” presumably because the decentralized structure of regulation was seen as 
disciplined by jurisdictional competition (Joskow and Noll 1994, 388). Establishing some 
uniformity in insurance regulation by the federal government only came on the agenda in 
the 1990s, culminating in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.  
These examples are not designed to completely contradict Joseph Zimmerman’s 
assessment that Reagan’s “silent face encouraged additional centralization of political 
power in several functional areas” (Zimmerman 1991, 7). However, they clearly show 
that the administrations conceptualization of markets did not allow a comprehensive 
assessment of regulations that impede market competition. Instead, based on a theory that 
sees no positive role for government, they initially tried to abolish as much regulation as 
possible and abandoned all efforts later on. Progress towards federal market authority 
was only made in a fragmented and sectoral fashion, like in trucking, when industries 
mobilized. Due to this ideology, areas that would have been obvious for European 
neoliberals to reform, like state barriers in insurance markets, were completely overseen. 
III.a.3. New Federalism—Trusting in Competitive federalism 
Reagan’s New Federalism initiative fits remarkably well into this pattern of anti-
government neoliberalism, i.e. competitive federalism. While government was seen as the 
problem, state and local governments were viewed as less problematic—without any 
regard to or mention of interstate barriers. With Milton Friedman as Reagan’s advisor, 
conservatives adopted the belief that while government intervention must fail, “State and 
local regulation is rarely worrisome” (Friedman 1962, 11). The idea that reducing 
spending and taxation alone would lead to a flourishing of markets, was also applied to 
inter-governmental relations, suggesting federalism reform as a fiscal project.  
Reagan claimed devolving government powers as a main priority: “It is my 
intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand 
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and 
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those reserved to the States or to the people” (Reagan 1981a). This was also expressed in 
the GOP platform in 1980, “We pledge to continue and redouble our efforts to return 
power to the state and local governments” and in the Inauguration speech, “Everything 
that can be run more effectively by state and local government we shall turn over to state 
and local government, along with the funding sources to pay for it” (Republican National 
Convention 1980; Reagan 1980). While the advocacy for states’ rights had been a long 
Republican tradition for many reasons, the main theoretical argument that became 
dominant in the 1980s, was that of competitive federalism: returning powers to the states 
would, through competition, reduce government altogether (G. Peterson 1984, 224) 
In reducing federal power, the focus was again on fiscal policy not markets. In the 
1982 State of the Union Address, Reagan promised a comprehensive federalism reform 
that was never introduced in Congress (Reagan 1982). “The crushing weight of central 
government” was never eliminated, federal-state relations were not disentangled, and 43 
federal programs were never returned to the states (Conlan 1998, 173). In the end, the 
main achievement was to consolidate 77 grants into 7 block grants increasing state 
discretion somewhat (Conlan 1998, 204). The termination of General Revenue Sharing, 
i.e. cutting funding to local governments, also fits the pattern of ‘reducing government’ 
(Zimmerman 1991). One unintended effect of giving local governments less oversight, 
but keeping the regulations that are attached to federal funds, was a proliferation of 
different local interpretation of federal law (Kettl 1983). 
The regulatory agenda was also part of this tendency: “Like other facets of 
Reagan’s ‘New Federalism,’ the regulatory relief approach was designed to fortify state 
governments with legal authority while relieving the national government of certain 
expenditures” (B. D. Friedman 1995, 56). As discussed, this could be seen by the 
principles adopted by the Regulatory Relief Task Force, as well as Executive Order 
12,37244, requiring all regulatory agencies to take criticism of state and local 
governments seriously (Williamson 1986). Executive Order 12,61245 reiterated the 
                                                 
44 47 F.R. 30959 (1993). 
45 52 F.R. 41685 (1987). Probably due to the amount of executive orders in general, this one was 
never implemented. The prescribed review of federalism effects of all new regulations were never executed 
(Gilman 2011, 349).  
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Reagan’s administration commitment to dual federalism, directing that  
Executive departments and agencies shall not submit to the Congress 
legislation that would […] preempt State law, unless preemption is consistent 
with the fundamental federalism principles set forth in section 2, and unless a 
clearly legitimate national purpose, consistent with the federalism 
policymaking criteria set forth in section 3, cannot otherwise be met. (Reagan 
1987a) 
In some areas in which the economic argument for federal market authority is the 
strongest due to external effects, more authority was given to the states. “An example of a 
major administrative decision designed to increase the discretionary authority of states 
was an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation allowing a state to employ 
the ‘bubble’ concept in determining whether a change in a stationary source within an 
industrial plant met the requirements of the Clean Air Act” (Zimmerman 1991, 10). This 
created heterogeneity among states, leading to uncertainty among businesses on how 
EPA rules would be interpreted not unlike what I found in building code enforcement 
(Conlan 1998, 198). 
Tim Conlan argues, as Zimmerman does, that despite the prevailing anti-
government discourse, “federal regulatory authority was advocated or endorsed by the 
administration in areas such as trucking, state workfare, national product liability 
insurance, coastal zone management, local taxicab and affirmative action policies, and 
the nationwide minimum drinking age” (Conlan 1998, 193; Zimmerman 1991). However 
as discussed earlier, none of those activities qualitatively addressed the major issues in 
terms of internal market barriers but are better explained by conservative social policy. At 
the same time, most of those initiatives were deregulatory, and were not designed to 
increase competition in any meaningful way. In addition, many of the changes were 
actually minor or allowed more state discretion. For example, significant state regulation 
remains in trucking that creates heterogeneity in market regulation. But because there has 
been no public attention dedicated to the internal market (and no scientific assessment), it 
is often unclear whether any of those preemptive laws actually integrated the market.46 
                                                 
46 In fact, “the most comprehensive critic of US state barriers has been the EU” with several 
publications that assess the amount of mostly external but also some internal barriers to trade with the US 
(Weiler 2012, 12; Pelkmans 1988; Business Europe 2015; Berden et al. 2009). 
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None of the laws Zimmerman simply enumerates for his assessment, has addressed any 
of the major state-level barriers of the construction industry addressed in this dissertation 
(Zimmerman 1991).  
One of the most comprehensive reviews of state regulatory activities concludes, 
“Since 1980, the state regulatory role has emerged as more robust than expected, 
solidifying and even expanding as part of a trend toward devolution of powers, in which 
some states have chosen not to phase out their regulatory powers but instead to counter 
federal deregulation and ‘de-enforcement’ with their own ‘re-enforcement’ policies” 
(Teske 2004, 1). And indeed, conservative activism on the federal level has provoked 
liberal state action from welfare policy to environmental protection which presumably 
again increases market fragmentation (Robertson 2012, 154). For instance, anti-trust 
enforcement became fragmentized because state-attorney generals, judging the 
administration’s approach as “too lax,” started creating their own anti-trust laws and 
enforcement strategies (Areeda 1994, 575). Another example are local product labeling 
laws, created in response to inaction of the FDA (Viscusi 1994, 465). Twenty state 
legislatures considered various forms of nutrition labeling laws, until in response to 
industry pressure for preemption, Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act of 199047 (Teske 2005). Similarly, due to federalism concerns the NHTSA left it up 
to the states to establish seat belt laws (Viscusi 1994, 485). 
III.a.4. Anti-Trust—Victory of Law and Economics 
Generally, a new approach to anti-trust and consumer protection was established. 
New rules allowed taking into account foreign competition or efficiency gains as 
allowable justification for mergers, focused not on market power but actual harm to 
consumers, reduced potential penalties, and considered efficiency as justification for 
near-monopoly power (Niskanen 1988, 134). These changes to anti-trust policy under 
Reagan cannot me simply described as complete inattention to competitive markets. 
However, at the same time they do displays the power of the libertarian strand of law and 
economics. Conservative takes on public choice theories that substantively justify 
                                                 
47 Pub. L. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990).  
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competitive federalism were implemented within anti-trust (see next chapter). Legal 
scholars, trained in these disciplines and coming from conservative think tanks came to 
lead key agencies. James Miller III., formerly scholar at AEI, was appointed to the FTC. 
William Baxter, Chicago style law and economics scholar came to head the anti-trust 
division of the Justice Department (Metzenbaum 1981). In addition Reagan appointed 
four Supreme Court Justices as well as numerous lower federal court justices like Bork, 
Easterbrook, Winter, and Posner, all trained in law and economics and part of the 
conservative legal movement, significantly shaping anti-trust jurisprudence (Kovacic 
1991, 52).  
Anti-trust policy since the 1930s used to see big business in general, and mergers 
in particular, very skeptically, believing in the positive effect of government intervention 
to decrease market concentration (Kovacic and Shapiro 2000, 44ff.). This was challenged 
by Chicago-style law and economics scholars, many with prominent roles in the Reagan 
administration. The new anti-trust beliefs exemplified American neoliberal thinking with 
its emphasis on markets and distrust of government:  
(a) A belief that the allocative efficiencies associated with economies of scale 
and scope are of paramount importance; (b) A belief that most markets are 
competitive, even if they contain a relatively few number of firms; (c) A view 
that monopolies will not last forever [i.e. disappear naturally over time]; (d) 
A view that most barriers to entry, except perhaps those created by 
government, are not nearly as significant as once thought; (e) A belief that 
monopolistic firms have no incentive to facilitate or leverage their monopoly 
power in vertically related markets; (f) A view that most business 
organizations maximize profits; firms that do not will not survive over time; 
(g) A belief that even when markets generate anticompetitive outcomes, 
government intervention [… ] might not be preferable. (Rubinfeld 2005, 
556f.) 
This new philosophy resulted in allowing more mergers and acquisitions with the 
exception of AT&T, and a focus of the FTC on harmful regulation by “government 
sponsored monopoly” (Roger E. Meiners and Yandle 1989, 96f.). For instance, the FTC 
tried to inhibit the Consumer Product Safety Commission for promulgating nation-wide 
standards as well as challenging the ability of governments to establish building codes 
(Roger E. Meiners and Yandle 1989, 97). 
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However, new anti-trust guidelines were not a completely successful use of 
federal market authority: “As the federal government was being perceived to leave a 
lacuna in antitrust enforcement, state attorneys general moved into it,” and state 
legislators established their own anti-trust laws (Areeda 1994, 618). Another good 
example of an issue where federal market authority would have been logically preferable 
for conservatives if not detrimental to their ideology.  
While many of the anti-trust principles of the 1980s have become mainstream 
internationally, there is still differences between the US and the EU that can be described 
as indicative of the ideological difference. Observers note that “The objectives pursued 
by the two legal systems are, for the most part, identical” and “the basic legal framework 
concerning restraints of competition is in essence the same” (Moeschel 2007, 3f.). At the 
same time there are big differences. “The particularity of EU competition law may be 
explained through the intellectual origins of its framework. It has consequently been 
argued that Article 102 of TFEU is a product of ordoliberalism” (A. Regan 2016; Felice 
and Vatiero 2014). In the meantime, under Reagan US competition policy was 
transformed to one informed by Chicago style economics (Parakkal 2016; Davies 2010). 
Nicolo Giocoli, professor of economics at the University of Pisa and anti-trust expert, 
explains that it is only in the US that the Chicago anti-trust approach as remained 
dominant: “While meeting enormous success among industrial economists, the Post 
Chicago approach has failed to have any significant impact upon antitrust courts in the 
US” (Giocoli 2015, 102). While there are many credible criticisms of this old antirust 
approach, it has remained in the center of the imagination of conservative scholars48 
(Giocoli 2015). 
In the EU, a bigger emphasis is laid on evaluating market competitiveness and 
preserving a level playing field: “The case law of the European Court of Justice seeks to 
prevent an interference with the freedom to compete; the USA tend to pursue a more 
consumer welfare-oriented approach. The difference is of importance in a philosophical 
sense, less so in the day-to-day application of competition law” (Moeschel 2007, 5). For 
                                                 
48 “Modern economic literature, especially the game-theoretic, so-called Post Chicago approach to 
industrial economics, has showed that several Chicago claims, in both theory and policy, are at best only 
partially correct and, sometimes, utterly wrong” (Giocoli 2015, 97). 
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instance, this means that predatory pricing can be more easily be pursued in the EU as 
principally anti-competitive practice, while a US court would require economic 
modelling to prove long term harm. In the EU horizontal “restrictive agreements [are 
often] deemed void unless they qualify for a particular block or individual exemption in a 
marked contrast to the American procedure of presuming an agreement lawful unless it is 
proved to be anticompetitive [per se rules vs. reason analysis]” (Abbott 2005, 3). 
In terms of vertical restraints the US follows the Chicago school thinking of 
considering them as potentially efficient, while the EU sees them as “interfering with the 
single market” (Abbott 2005, 7; J. Cooper et al. 2005). Similarly, “American antitrust law 
does not treat obtaining or maintaining a monopoly as an antitrust violation, unless the 
potential or actual monopolist has engaged in exclusionary conduct” while the ECJ holds 
in the Michelin I decision (1983) that firms with a dominant market position are subject 
to scrutiny even if their behavior is efficient (Abbott 2005, 9). This explains, for instance, 
that Google has been subject to significant penalties in the EU, while its conduct has been 
un-concerning for US competition authorities (Fox 2014).  
This leads European officials to be more critical of mergers, while US courts 
require hard facts of harm, based on Chicago models to object to mergers (Abbott 2005, 
15). It is not surprising then that US conservatives criticizes the EU for its willingness to 
“invoke non-standard theories” (Abbott 2005, 16). Consistent with the ‘ordoliberals-
competitive federalism’ distinction, EU law recognizes an affirmative obligation to make 
markets better, which has for example been used against power companies to ease access 
for new competitors. The US does not include any similar provision, seeing regulatory 
intervention always as potentially harmful (Fox 2014). Similarly congruent, most anti-
trust enforcement is done by public competition authorities in the EU, while in the US 
75% of all cases are brought by private actors (Moeschel 2007, 5). 
Overall, while conservative anti-trust policy does not shy away from using federal 
market authority, it is well contained within competitive federalism in that it locates most 
obstacles to competition in government intervention in markets and requires a 
comparatively high level of evidence to justify any anti-trust action. Even the current 
FTC chairwoman’s positions are reminiscent of Milton Friedman: She argues in a recent 
statement that even market imperfections or natural monopoly “rarely justify government 
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intervention,” especially when consumer harm cannot be demonstrated beyond 
reasonable doubt (Ohlhausen 2017, 106f., 122f.). 
III.a.5. Banking as an Exception? 
Generally, the US has established a dual banking system with nationally and 
state-regulated banks (OCC 2003). Since the National Bank Act of 186349, the federal 
government has created uniform regulations including state-regulatory preemption for a 
system of federally chartered banks. However, this is not a complete preemption. States 
are still allowed to create and regulate their own state-chartered banking system, creating 
the possibilities for banks to choose different types of regulations, and in some instances 
circumvent more stringent national standards (Silver-Greenberg 2012). In addition, 
“States retain some power to regulate national banks in areas such as contracts, debt 
collection, acquisition and transfer of property, and taxation, zoning, criminal, and tort 
law” as well as putting some restrictions on how new out of-state branches can be 
acquired (OCC 2003, 27). Current research concludes that some provisions, like the state-
wide deposit cap and prohibitions on the acquisition of single branches, still create 
significant interstate barriers (C. Johnson and Rice 2008, 20). While about 70% of assets 
are held by nationally chartered banks, more and more branches are established under 
state charters, and many banks have changed from federal to state charters since the 
2000s (Whalen 2010).  
Due to the dual regulation, interstate banking was mostly prohibited through state 
laws, even for federally chartered banks, despite Congressional attempts to change that 
(C. Johnson and Rice 2008, 7). For instance, the McFadden Act of 192750 let national 
banks establish new branches only in accordance with state law. Multi-bank holding 
companies (MBHC) were a loophole that allowed a holding company, through 
subsidiaries, to establish interstate banking. However, this practice was severely limited 
by the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 195651, except when 
                                                 
49 12 U.S.C. 343, §1 (1863). 
50 12 U.S.C. 1 § 36, 81 (1927). 
51 Pub. L. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956). 
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allowed by state law. This means in the 1980s, a patch-work of state and county laws, 
including bilateral reciprocity agreements and regional pacts, regulated to which degree 
banks were allowed to establish branches intra- and inter-state (Amel 1993). By 1994, 
only 6 states allowed interstate banking without any limitations (Amel 1993).  
In the 1980s, many states liberalized their banking laws to attract more business 
(Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Stebunovs 2015). This trend culminated in the passage of the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 199452 (IBBEA), with 
support from an overwhelming majority in Congress, which removed remaining federal 
and state restrictions on interstate bank expansion (C. Johnson and Rice 2008). However, 
it still allowed states to govern entry by out-of-state banks to some degree and to hold 
federally-chartered banks to a wide variety of state regulations (C. Johnson and Rice 
2008). 
With this law, banking became one of the few areas that saw dramatic 
mobilization around federal market authority with the use of explicit interstate barriers 
and single market arguments. For instance, one democratic member of Congress argued 
in the debate over IBBEA, “It has always seemed anomalous to me that products of every 
description could move so readily across State borders as a natural part of interstate 
commerce, but banking services could not” (cited in Rollinger 1996, 211). Thinks tanks, 
like AEI, Heritage, and CATO had long advocated for allowing interstate banking (AEI 
1993; Geunther 1985; England 1994).  
Interstate banking is one of the few fields where conservatives have argued for 
federal regulation and uniformity, curiously forgoing their usual competitive federalism 
argument (S. Horwitz and Selgin 1987). This is the only area where I have seen 
consistent arguments against state power. For instance, Heritage argues: “In some 
markets, a better model is federal pre-emption of state law or, alternatively, state 
‘passporting,’ which allows a company that complies with one state’s laws to operate 
across the nation” (Calabria 2017; Dwyer 2017). However, they point out themselves 
how much of an exception this is by qualifying immediately that in other areas, like 
“Insurance for instance […], a state-based approach might be more effective and less 
                                                 
52 Pub. L. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994). 
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costly than federal regulation“(Calabria 2017; Dwyer 2017). It is also important to point 
out that in general arguments for less regulation seems to prevail over arguments for 
more streamlined regulation as position statements by AEI and CATO reveal (Wallison 
2005, 2015; Calabria 2017). 
While think tanks have made this argument explicitly, and the banking industry as 
well as consumer advocates were embracing the federal market authority argument in the 
1980s, Reagan’s deregulatory agenda did not. The Reagan administration supported 
several financial deregulation initiatives, but interstate banking was not one of them. That 
it was not a priority was already clear from the fact that none of the Republican Party 
Platforms nor any State of the Union address mentioned banking (Reagan 1982, 1983, 
1984, 1985, 1986, 1987b, 1988, Republican National Convention 1980, 1984). The 
Reagan administration did not buy into the limited federal preemption proposal made by 
think tanks at the time, and instead preferred ‘reducing the size of government altogether’ 
(Geunther 1985). This nicely illustrates the point that deregulation might undermine the 
functioning of markets and that Reagan officials did not consider regulation as an 
important tool due to their ideology.  
John Sloan argues that deregulatory executive actions and legislative changes did 
not only worsen but led to the Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis in the 1980s (Sloan 1999, 
166). Many S&L’s were in trouble in the beginning of the 1980s due to a combination of 
the macro-economic environment and specific regulatory requirements; the Reagan 
administration tried to solve this with deregulation53 (Litan 1994). Leverage requirements 
were relaxed, concentration of ownership by investors was encouraged, and accounting 
principles were made less stringent (Sloan 1999, 170f.). However, the administration did 
not make interstate banking a priority within those banking reforms: “The first of several 
failed attempts at reform occurred in 1981, when Congress took no action in response to a 
Treasury Department report calling for more interstate banking. A House bill in 1985 was 
                                                 
53 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, U.S.C. 
§226 (1980); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 26 U.S.C. §1 (1981); Garn-St Germain Depository 
Institutions Act of 1982, U.S.C. §226 (1982). 
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also unsuccessful54. In 1987, the ongoing struggle was highlighted by the controversy 
surrounding a proposed exception to the Douglas Amendment [for failing banks].” 
(Mulloy and Lasker 1995, 195). Conservative state-banking supervisors, consumer 
groups, and politicians argued that banks were best managed and regulated on the local 
level (Rollinger 1996, 197f.). Even the Supreme Court embraced that view, for instance 
ruling in 1980 that “As a matter of history and as a matter of present commercial reality, 
banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern,” thereby upholding 
regional banking compacts excluding extra-regional states55 (cited in Rollinger 1996, 
197; Mulloy and Lasker 1995, 260). 
The Garn St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982 allowed some 
emergency inter-state acquisition of banks, but mostly phased out interest rate ceilings 
and reduced regulations on how S&Ls can invest (Mulloy and Lasker 1995). It also 
allowed S&L’s to choose between federal and state charters thereby basically inducing a 
regulatory race to the bottom (Sloan 1999, 172). Requests of the regulator FHLBB for 
more enforcement staff were ignored (Sloan 1999, 173). “OMB’s deregulation fervor 
entered the picture as the office cut staffing for the relevant regulatory agencies [with 
Stockman arguing] that deregulation meant fewer, not more examiners” (B. D. Friedman 
1995, 152). In response to increasing bankruptcies the Competitive Equality Banking 
Act56 was passed in 1987, which did not provide sufficient funds for recapitalization, but 
allowed to relax rules for banks in trouble. In the end, due to mismanagement and fraud 
one quarter of S&L’s became insolvent costing tax-payers between $90 and $130 
billion—a sum that could have been significantly reduced through government 
intervention in the early 1980s (Litan 1994, 534).  
Even conservative observers at the time agreed that better regulation and 
supervision could have prevented the S & L Crisis—making it again a case where some 
use of federal market authority might have led to better results (Litan 1994, 553; Isaac 
                                                 
54 Depository Institutions Acquisitions Act of 1985, H.R. 15, 99th Cong. (1986), would have made 
inter-state banking easier but never went into committee mark-up. 
55 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159 
(1985). 
56 Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987). 
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1994; Strunk, Case, and Associations 1988). Sloan argues, that “The ideology of the 
Reagan presidency created a blind faith that deregulation would solve the problems of the 
S&Ls” (Sloan 1999, 192). Ideology blinded the regulators that were mostly from the 
industry itself from the considerations of accompanying deregulation with increased 
monitoring against moral hazard. Many quotes show, that Reagan thought all the 
problems could be remedied with less regulation (Sloan 1999, 192). In the end one might 
think the events have a certain irony—one usually thinks of economists as particularly 
good at understanding bad incentives (especially moral hazard as main contributor) but as 
we have seen in Reagan’s neoliberalism this has not to be true.  
Despite increasing interest in liberalizing interstate banking, in 1988 the 
Republican Party did not put interstate banking on the agenda (Republican National 
Convention 1988; Bush 1990, 1989a). However, a series of hearings on the 
competitiveness of the US financial industry by the Senate Banking Committee, initiated 
by Chairmen Donald Riegle in 1989, put interstate banking on the Congressional agenda 
(Mulloy and Lasker 1995). It is important to note here that it was a Democrat, albeit a 
very centrist one, who put increasing federal market authority for banking on the agenda. 
Supported by major industry experts, the committee demanded of the treasury to propose 
appropriate reform. In response the Bush administration recommended reforms, including 
interstate banking (Bush 1991). In 1991, Congress came close to recognizing the 
obsolescence of geographic restrictions when it considered the Financial Institutions 
Safety and Consumer Choice Act57. However, in the end there was no majority for 
making major modifications to the regulatory structure, Congress confined its attention to 
enforcement issues and the recapitalization of the Bank Insurance Fund (Mulloy and 
Lasker 1995). 
It took until 1994 to pass the Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act with explicit support by the Clinton Administration, who made it a “top 
legislative priority” (Bradsher 1994). Detailed review of the Congressional debate in 
1993 and 1994 shows an overwhelming support for inter-state banking, illustrating the 
point that mobilization around federal market authority, void an agency and ideology that 
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creates a comprehensive agenda around it, only happens in specific areas in specific 
historical circumstances (Rollinger 1996). 
Congressional hearings reveal arguments very much in debt to conservative 
rhetoric, framing the effort not as single-market building effort or opposing 
protectionism, but as “deregulation” or “eliminating government imposition” (Rollinger 
1996, 215f.). Edward Kane argues that banking reform suddenly became feasible in the 
1990s because of 
The sustained surges in failure rates and in organizational and service 
reengineering experienced in the deposit-institution industry during the prior 
decade and a half. High failure rates among geographically confined banks 
and S&Ls teach taxpayer-customers important lessons about the long-run 
dangers of doing business with under-diversified institutions, especially at a 
time when advancing financial technology is fusing financial markets across 
the nation and around the globe. (Kane 1996, 142) 
In Congressional debate, concerns about the international competitiveness of US 
financial institutions dominated (Rollinger 1996; Mulloy and Lasker 1995).  
Despite these development, the bill remained indebted to competitive federalism, 
especially by preserving the dual banking system. “The preservation of states' rights 
[was] a major theme” in the Congressional debates (Rollinger 1996, 257). Accordingly, 
“The Riegle-Neal Act nevertheless respects the deeply held American conviction that the 
states are often better positioned than the federal government to make regulatory 
judgments” (Rollinger 1996, 259). 
Due to this, “The laws of the host State regarding community reinvestment, 
consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment of intrastate branches apply to any 
branch in the host State of an out-of-state national bank to the same extent as such State 
laws apply to a branch of a bank chartered by that State” (Riegle-Neal Act 1994). 
Preserving the dual system has led to a continuous shifting of power between the levels 
of government, with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency trying to declare some 
state laws invalid, and states pushing back (Ding et al. 2012). Most recently, the Dodd-
Frank Consumer Protection Act of 201058 allowed states more leeway in regulating 
lending practices of national banks (Nelson 2011) 
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Even if banking seems to be an exception to the American inattention to interstate 
barriers, then, a closer look as shown that the efforts have still been hampered by a 
hesitation to embrace federal market authority. Instead of federal preemption or at least 
national standardization of all banking regulation, the dual banking system remains, and 
federally-charters banks are still subject to a wide-range of local regulations that are 
potentially market-fragmenting. The extent to which even these banking reforms do not 
display particular enthusiasm for market-building regulations can also be highlighted by 
contrasting these steps to parallel (but earlier) developments in the EU. 
While interstate banking, branching, and acquisitions are less frequent, and the 
banking safety net is mostly on the national level, the EU endeavored earlier on a path to 
liberalize capital flows between states (Garcia 2009). Despite public interest restrictions 
to mergers and acquisitions, starting with the Banking Directive in 197759 interstate 
banking and branching has principally been allowed (Garcia 2009). With the Second 
Banking Coordination Directive60, the EU pursued its standard approach of mutual 
recognition, free establishment, common minimum standards (like capital requirements), 
as well as home country supervision. The European Commission and the ECB have 
constantly pursued more integration of the market for financial services, for instance 
through the Financial Action Service Plan in 1999 (Nieto and Wall 2015). In the 2000s, 
the European Commission published several reports on how certain national regulations 
were creating barriers to interstate banking (Nieto and Wall 2015). Since the financial 
crisis, the EU has created more centralized supervision and regulation of banks. For 
instance, the European Banking Authority and new harmonized regulations were 
established in the EU (Singh 2015). The Banking Union, mostly limited to the euro area, 
established the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB), a Single Resolution Mechanism 
for troubled banks, as well as a deposit insurance system (Singh 2015). 
Interesting is also the comparison between banking and insurance in the US, 
where state regulation has remained prevalent despite being operated by national 
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companies, specifically banks. In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act61, 
explicitly exempting insurance from federal regulation, specifically anti-trust (Scott 
2007). While the Financial Services Modernization Act of 199962 allowed some federal 
regulation, especially allowing banks and investment firms to engage in insurance 
activities, it maintained a system of state regulation and oversight. Due to industry 
pressure, states have coordinated their actions through the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, but most insurance companies continue to consider interstate 
heterogeneity as a major obstacle (Scott 2007, 154). Even today, the only areas of 
insurance the federal government significantly intervenes in is health and flood insurance 
(Hsieh 2017). In another comparison, securities regulation has fallen on the other end of 
the spectrum. Starting in 1933, and with additional laws in 1975, 1996 and 1998, the 
federal government seized nearly complete control over securities (Scott 2007). The 
trajectory of securities regulation can only be explained by the impact of the Great 
Depression and the general support for federal regulations during the New Deal63. 
Documents created by the Peccora Commission, established to investigate the Crash of 
1929, clearly show that many legislators and experts64 came to belief that the 
fragmentation of securities regulation into 50 different regulatory regimes, combined 
with lax self-regulation by the industry, was one of the main reasons why dangerous and 
fraudulent activity “was not discovered” (Peccora Commission 1934, 56). The 
Commission therefore recommended to establish federal market authority for securities, 
resulting in the Glass-Steagall Banking Act and the Securities Act of 193365. However, it 
shied away from a complete field prevention allowing states to regulate any aspect that is 
not explicitly prohibited by legislation of SEC rules (Scott 2007, 151). 
In summary, the regulatory role of government was never closely examined and 
                                                 
61 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1945). 
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never became a priority of the Reagan administration. If mentioned, less regulation was 
always seen as better; it is never examined in terms of whether it impedes or enhances the 
functioning of competitive markets, only whether it reduces business cost. “There was 
[… no] broad-based effort to adopt market-based approaches to controlling risk or to 
emphasize more performance-oriented regulations” (Viscusi 1994, 502). The general 
aversion to government let Reagan to prefer local power over central power. There was 
never any awareness of trade-barriers that might be created by political fragmentation. 
Economists and advisors see the policy record in regulation either as failure, or more 
commonly, ignore the regulatory side of policies completely. The erratic attention to 
deregulation followed more from external pressures (in S&L crisis for example), instead 
of a comprehensive program. This was quite the opposite with the main priority of fiscal 
and taxation policy, where everything was streamlined to achieve the ‘Reagan 
revolution.’ 
III.b.  Ideational Account—Competitive Federalism 
American neoliberalism bore (and still bears) little resemblance to the liberalizing 
and centralizing program that was launched concurrently in Europe. Though the 
rhetorical fervor for markets in Reagan’s circles was at least as zealous as the most 
radical voices in Europe, like some of Thatcher’s compatriots, it does not seem to have 
occurred to most American conservatives that some elements of their economic goals 
might be furthered by strong and general federal rules to bind sub-national levels of 
government to standards of open and non-discriminatory exchange. To the contrary, 
through their filtering ideas—competitive federalism in abstract theory, deeply 
American-conservative in content and motivation—they consistently saw federal 
authority as antithetical to their neoliberal agenda. Despite twelve years of Republican 
presidents from 1980 to 1992 and another eight from 2000 to 2008 (separated by a 
centrist Democratic president who openly accepted much of Reagan’s economic legacy), 
the United States made practically no progress toward a single market through the 
neoliberal period. 
The roots of the “why” argument run deeper historically than developed here, 
since a comprehensive history of the conservative movement is not the subject of this 
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dissertation. In this section, I focus on the most direct link—how the orientations of late-
mid-20th-century American conservatism for markets but against federal authority made 
significant mobilization around federal market authority unlikely. As argued earlier, this 
can be related to a split in neoliberal thinking going back to different interpretation of 
Hayek’s writings. In the next chapter, I will fill in this link more by looking at how these 
ideas became dominant in conservative think tanks before taking hold in policy-circles.  
While long ago Republicans championed federal authority against Jeffersonian 
Democrats, by the early 1970s they were broadly critics of federal authority and 
advocates of ‘states’ rights’—privileging the US Constitution’s assignation of default 
rights to the states. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the postwar boom years slowed 
and new economic challenges rose, conservatives looking for new economic messages 
were primed with an idea that would become Reagan’s most famous phrase (from his 
first Inaugural Address): “Government is the problem” (Reagan 1981a). Or, to capture 
the real content of Reagan’s thought, federal government is the problem. At the same 
time, these ideas were not only sourced in states’ right conservatism but connected to a 
specific strand of neoliberal thinking that had become prevalent. Non-Keynesian 
economists and legal scholars, that often had found refuge in conservative or libertarian 
think tanks (see next chapter), combined monetarism, rational expectation theory, micro-
economics, and public choice theory to create new policy answers (neoliberal ones) to the 
pressing problems of the day (Blyth 2002). These ideas, derived from thinkers like 
Hayek, emphasized the superiority of markets, but because of their anti-authoritarian 
origin, also resonated well with the anti-federal government discourse of conservative 
politics. These semi-academic ideas diffused into politics for many reasons (that cannot 
be adjudicated here), the perception of economic crisis, entrepreneurial politicians 
seeking for new ideas, business mobilization, and the Republican Party’s realignment 
(Prasad 2006; Harvey 2005; Lowndes 2008).  
To understand Reagan’s neoliberalism, it therefore makes sense to have a closer 
look the writings of neoliberal economists that were part of the administration or have 
associated themselves with the ‘supply side revolution.’66 Many of them have written 
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either detailed exposés on future policy or assessments of their own time in government. 
From these writings, we get a better understanding of what neoliberalism meant for them 
and how they juxtaposed ideas differently than policy-makers in the EU. 
Probably one of the most important gurus, who moved Hayekian thinking toward 
politically-mobilizable ideas for American politics and against federal market authority, 
was Milton Friedman. In writings that were unusually politically explicit for an 
economist, Friedman laid out his version of Hayekian views in his 1962 book Capitalism 
and Freedom as well as in speeches and writings in many other forums (Friedman 1962). 
He defined a minimalist role for government—including features like a volunteer military 
and school vouchers for education—and provided arguments why cutting back central 
government to this minimum would have major economic, social and political benefits. 
Friedman did acknowledge that markets could run into problems of monopoly or local 
protectionism in the absence of strong central authority, but he argued that in most cases 
central-government fixes were worse than these diseases. Politics inevitably becomes 
corrupted to serve special interests, so even the best-intentioned central initiatives could 
have dramatically bad effects. Thus, even dysfunctional market situations are preferable 
to central power. In the case of natural monopolies, he writes, “I reluctantly conclude 
that, if tolerable, private monopoly may be the least of the evils” (Friedman 1962, 31). By 
arguing this, limiting the role of government becomes a principle in itself. To this general 
criticism of government, he added the idea that, the higher the level of political authority, 
the more dangerous it was: “If government is to exercise power, better in the county than 
in the state, better in the state than in Washington” (Friedman 1962, 11). Friedman 
interprets Hayek in the ‘American way;’ from the fact that government is often flawed he 
concludes that many small governments are preferable over one central government—a 
conclusion that while not logically necessary, became dominant among American 
neoliberals. In sum, Friedman’s writings already exemplify the tenet, which I describe as 
competitive federalism, that it is better to let markets evolve naturally than using central 
government to promote them.  
Friedman himself would go on to have frequent and influential conversations with 
Reagan , but other figures played important roles in carrying similar themes into 
conservative political circles in the 1970s (M. Anderson 1988, 172). One important 
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vector for this process was an idea about taxes that grabbed Republicans’ attention due to 
the raising popular sentiment against high taxation. A famous origins anecdote concerns a 
1974 dinner with Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Wall Street Journalist Jude 
Wanniski, where University of Chicago economist Arthur Laffer sketched on a napkin a 
curve suggesting that tax cuts could increase tax revenue—a theoretical claim that could 
square tax cuts with conservatives’ historical emphasis on balanced budgets. Wanniski 
coined the name ‘Laffer curve’ and spread the idea to key conservative politicians and in 
broad publications (Wanniski 1978b, 1978a). In particular, with the help of Irving 
Kristol, then editor of the conservative journal the Public Interest and fellow at AEI, 
Wanniski was able to prominently publicize these ideas in the Wall Street Journal and the 
Public Interest (Wanniski 1975, 1974). This created ‘an in’ for self-proclaimed supply-
siders, who saw themselves as part of a broader intellectual movement, especially going 
beyond just tax rates to a broader agenda (for a similar account: Blyth 2002; Prasad 2006; 
D. S. Jones 2012). 
Supply-siders, often seeing themselves as outsider-economists67, became one of 
the leading edges of Friedmanesque arguments that a reduction in federal resources and 
authority would liberate market competition, innovation, and wealth creation in ways that 
would eventually lift all boats. They offered a new argumentation for conservative 
policies based on simplified neo-classical economic models seeing themselves in a 
tradition of classical economists like Adam Smith and Austrian School economists like 
Friedrich Hayek (Jones 2012). This markedly pushed American neoliberals to an 
understanding of markets that sees itself in opposition to federal authority.  
Conservative think tanks, and the revolving door between them, conservative 
media, and congressional staffers, “Were integral in selling this new product in the 
market place of ideas” (Stahl 2016, 96). Through generous financing, “Think tanks 
greatly decreased the entry barriers into the marketplace of ideas;” for instance the AEI 
financed Wanniski’s supply side manifesto, The Way the World Works, through a year-
                                                 
67 Many of the authors try to present themselves as academic outcasts or rebels. However, many of 
the ideas they were building on (i.e. micro-economics, rational expectations, public choice) were widely 
discussed in the academy but had not really found a way into the policy world (P. C. Roberts 1984; 
Niskanen 1988, chap. 1).  
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long fellowship (Stahl 2016, 101). Despite scathing reviews by contemporary 
economists, conservatives embraced the book—Irving Kristol urged Wanniski to give a 
‘book tour’ on capitol hill (B. J. Cohen 1979; Norman 1979, 38). Not surprisingly then, in 
the 1970s an increasing number of Republican Congressmen had close advisors that 
called themselves supply-siders (P. C. Roberts 1984). Their intellectual network 
developed a particularly strong node around the office of Republican Congressman Jack 
Kemp. Stockman recounts that in the 1970s, “Kemp’s office became a kind of 
postgraduate seminar in supply side economics” where ideas where exchanged and traded 
(Stockman 1986, 39). Bartley, then editor of the Wall Street Journal, reports on similar 
‘economic seminars’ in New York City and California (Bartley 1992, Chapter 3). 
Martin Anderson, Reagan’s chief domestic policy advisor writes,  
When an idea’s time has come, whether it’s a new one or an old one polished 
up a bit, it’s apt to occur to a lot of people at the same time. Robert Mundell, 
Arthur Laffer, Paul Craig Roberts, Robert Bartley and Jude Wanniski all 
played important roles in spreading the essential idea that tax rates matter 
[…]. There were others who also helped, writing and arguing the case—Jack 
Kemp, Norman Ture, Bruce Bartlett, Irving Kristol, Steven Entin, and Alan 
Reynolds […]. All but Kemp were intellectuals […]. They were like a many 
linked chain. Perhaps the chain would have held without any one of them, or 
two of them, but we know it would not have been without all of them. (M. 
Anderson 1988, Chapter 1) 
Several (failed) bills show that neoliberal ideas in its American brand had got 
ahold of Republicans in Congress in the late 1970s. The first supply-side argument is 
found in Congressman Rousselot’s amendment to the third budget resolution in 197768 
(Roberts 1984, Chapter 1). According to Roberts, the supply-side revolution started with 
the “Transformation of House Republicans between October 1976 and February 1977” 
(Roberts 1984, 27). While the new idea resonated with some for theoretical or ideological 
reasons, many Republicans adopted the new argumentation because within the old 
Keynesian framework (and given the economic crisis), they had run out of feasible policy 
options (Roberts 1984, Chapter 1). The Laffer curve rhetoric seemed to reconcile tax-
cutting with balanced-budget conservatism. 
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In 1980 Kemp, the leader of the movement, lost the Republican nomination battle 
to Reagan, but his ties carried the movement into Reagan’s administration and the 
Republican Party more broadly. Reagan was apparently a rather late convert, though this 
is subject to some controversy. Roberts claims that Reagan was the purest supply-sider 
and all deviations from it can be attributed to the president losing control of his staff 
(Roberts 1984, Chapter 5). Others claim that Reagan always supported tax cuts but did 
not consciously have a comprehensive economic program. Accordingly it was a swarm of 
supply-sider advisors in his presidential campaign as well as the intervention of Kemp, 
that convinced the presidential candidate of a broader neoliberal agenda (Stockman 1986, 
61ff.; M. Anderson 1988, 112; Sloan 1999; Prasad 2006).  
Either way, the influence of the new thinking reached its culmination in the 
Republican Platform of 1980 and subsequently with the election of Reagan (Republican 
National Convention 1980). He pursued a policy program, deliberately and explicitly 
based on the new neoliberal arguments, corresponded with many leading (neoliberal) 
economists like Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan, employed 74 economic policy 
advisors, identifying as supply-siders, and appointing those to key positions in his 
administration (Niskanen 1988; M. Anderson 1988, 165f., 172). Reagan’s cabinet 
consisted less of established Republicans that ‘deserved’ a post in government, but 
people that more closely identified with supply-side theories or libertarianism, often 
recruiting personnel directly from think tanks, like AEI, Hoover, Heritage, and CATO 
(Stahl 2016, 96ff.; Sloan 1999). For instance, a former Reagan speech writer remembers, 
“Perhaps the foundation's [Heritage] biggest impact was channeling a lot of conservative 
thinkers and policy specialists into the White House and agencies ” (Bakshian cited in 
McCombs 1983). 
Thus, the broad mid-century conservative distrust of federal authority appended 
neoliberal pro-market arguments, culminating in an agenda with the described priorities 
based on one logic: the idea that federal cutbacks—in terms of taxation and regulation—
would stimulate growth, increase government revenue, and make markets naturally 
bubble from the bottom-up. Opposition to government biased conservatives toward a 
competitive federalism conception of market-government relationships. Hence, they were 
unable to formulate neoliberal goals that rely on the harnessing of central authority. 
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Disregarding the influence of sub-national power in creating protectionist policy and 
disregarding the importance of regulation for competitive markets, they created a distinct 
American neoliberal ideology identity that is always optimistic that markets will come 
naturally the second government retracts. This explains the focus on fiscal policy and 
taxations, as well as the inattention to internal-market barriers. This competitive 
federalism conception of markets is often hard to miss in the huge number of ‘tell-all’ 
books by Reagan’s advisors or other participants in his administrations.  
Insider’s assessments of the ‘revolution’s’ success illustrate this in the breach by 
never mentioning interstate barriers or market building. Some criticize Reagan for never 
making policy from a strictly neoliberal perspective, instead often preferring 
compromise; as Stockman says he “proved to be too kind, gentle, and sentimental for that 
[following the theoretical prescriptions]” (Stockman 1986, 11). On the other side of the 
argument, Reagan was trying to follow a coherent policy program, but was actively 
sabotaged by Stockman who was secretly a fiscal conservative (Roberts 1984, 95ff.). 
Despite this argument, Stockman and Roberts both see the ‘revolution’ as failed, mostly 
due to the Triumph of Politics or the power of distributional coalitions in Congress. 
However, this is not shared by later published accounts: Bartley calls it The Seven Fat 
Years to emphasize the success of Reagan’s tax cuts (Bartley 1992). Even more 
enthusiastically, Anderson argues that the Reagan government changed everything: “The 
world is now in the midst of a profound intellectual and political revolution that may rival 
in scope and importance the transition from the Dark Ages to Enlightenment” (M. 
Anderson 1988, 17). Similarly, Boskin argues that while Reagan failed to institutionalize 
the changes in policy, his most important accomplishment was to “change the general 
understanding of what constitutes a reasonable economic policy” (Boskin 1987, 255). 
Failed or not, what these accounts have in common is an inattention to interstate 
barriers. Some of the Reagan officials appear to have thought only in terms of what 
effects spending and taxation have on the economy because they were concerned with 
economic forecasting and fiscal state retrenchment (P. C. Roberts 1984; Wanniski 
1978b). They wanted to switch from Keynesian demand-driven models to new supply-
side driven models based on microeconomics. But they were still mostly concerned with 
macro-economic variables (e.g. GDP growth) and focused on macro-economic policy. 
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Within the context of the movement and its attention to omnipresent government failure, 
they were not able to seriously consider priorities beyond taxation and fiscal policy. 
In Wanniski’s The Way the World Works we find the strongest emphasis on taxes. 
The title is to be read literally (Wanniski 1978b). Economic growth and decline in history 
can be explained in reference to the Laffer curve. Every time tax incentives to production 
and investment are improved (which in the examples always entails lowering taxes), 
growth ensures. According to the author, this explains a wide range of phenomena, from 
the rise of the Roman Empire, over British industrialization, to American hegemony. For 
Wanniski, the world evolves around taxes and tariffs. There is no discussion of how 
functioning markets are created or any aspect of government regulation.  
In the related book, Wealth and Poverty by George Gilder, we see a similar 
pattern (Gilder 2012). Over 400 pages it is argued that “The source of the gifts of 
capitalism is the supply side of the economy” (Gilder 2012, 28). The central theme is 
how, over history, government programs have always distorted incentives for Americans, 
forcing them into unproductive jobs (Gilder 2012, 9ff.). The cause is the attempts of 
government to redistribute and regulate (Gilder 2012, 326f.). According to him, the free 
market flourishes, when government withdraws—with no mentioning of interstate 
barriers. Inequality is not a problem because wealth will “trickle down” (Gilder 2012, 
101). Government policy is always caused by big business trying to distort the market 
(Gilder 2012, 327). “Despite the fact that [Wanniski’s and Gilder’s] claims were 
increasingly taking to the realm of the fantastical, they were widely read, widely 
disseminated and widely debated”(Stahl 2016, 117). For instance, Steve Forbes, an 
executive at Heritage would write about Wealth and Poverty: “One of the great books of 
Western Civilization, on par with Adam Smith’s the Wealth of Nations and the late Jude 
Wanniski’s ‘the Way the World Works” (Gilder 2012, x). Others would claim that Gilder 
became “President Reagan’s most frequently quoted living author” (Discovery Institute 
2017). 
For Roberts, big government itself was not the problem. Supply side policies for 
the author were foremost about what the right model of the economy is. Keynesian 
forecasting had only taken macro-economic variables into account, while ignoring any 
micro-economic effects (Roberts 1984, Chapter 2). The fight then was over putting 
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micro-incentives back into forecasting which led to a new focus on tax policy and steady 
monetary growth. The battle was basically won when Congressional Committee staff 
stopped using the Philips-curve trade-offs and put individual incentives back into 
forecasting. While he says Reagan’s supply side policies were about restoring individual 
incentives to save, invest, and produce, he exclusively focusses on marginal tax rates. 
There is no discussion of creating competitive markets and government regulation is 
barely mentioned. The only related comment is a short discussion of how special interests 
undermined Reagan’s free trade position starting with VERs for Japanese cars (Roberts 
1984, 122). Most of the book is devoted to chronicling the fight for the ‘supply-side 
revolution,’ which Roberts saw happening between the real supply-siders in the treasury 
and fiscal-conservatives and Keynesians everywhere else. In particular, he blames 
Stockman for sabotaging the revolutionary goals against Reagan’s own convictions 
(Roberts 1984, chapter 6). Of course Stockman claims directly the opposite (Stockman 
1986). 
Other books I reviewed also only focus and taxation and spending. This is true for 
the book of Wall Street editor Robert Bartley, The Seven Fat Years, who argues that tax 
cuts and technological changes were responsible for a period of remarkable growth 
(Bartley 1992). His main point is that other observers view the Reagan era negatively 
because they forgot how miserable the 1970s were, or because they do not understand 
that fairness (as opposed to setting the incentives right), is an impossible political agenda. 
Regulation or market barriers are not mentioned. Economic Advisor Lindsey’s account, 
The Growth Experiment, focuses exclusively on taxes too (Lindsey 1990). He uses 
econometric models to show that it was mostly supply-side effects, not demand 
stimulation or monetary policy, which was responsible for growth in the 1980s. Chief 
domestic policy advisor Martin Anderson’s work falls into the same category of books 
praising Reagan’s achievements (M. Anderson 1988). He does this in anecdotal form, 
without discussing policy-making in much detail. The tax cuts stand in the center of his 
description and deregulation and market-building are barely mentioned. He is focusing on 
the big picture, which is that “The ultimate irony of the twentieth century may be that 
lasting, worldwide political revolution was accomplished not by Trotsky and the 
communists but instead by Reagan and the capitalists” (M. Anderson 1988, 1). By 
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revolution, he seems to mean mostly spending cuts, tax cuts, sound monetary policy, and 
the restoration of confidence, since market-based reforms are not part of his vocabulary. 
Similar things can be said about Reagan’s Chief of Staff, James Baker’s book. 
While being more a collection of personal anecdotes and description of staff politics, the 
chapters that do deal with economic policy are solely focused on taxation and spending 
(Baker and Fiffer 2008). Donald Regan, first secretary of the treasury then chief of staff, 
also solely focuses on the battles about reforming taxation (Donald T. Regan 1988). For 
him, even short-term budget deficits were rather unimportant. Regulation and market-
building is not discussed. 
While this group of advisors focused solely on taxation, another group combined 
this more explicitly with an anti-government sentiment that precluded any mobilization 
around federal market authority. To the belief in market rationality they added the 
conviction that “The most important cause of our economic problems has been the 
government itself” (Reagan 1981b). Stockman describes himself explicitly as anti-statist 
(Stockman 1986). It is therefore not surprising then that he would not focus on using 
government to ensure the functioning of markets. As Niskanen argues, “The origins of 
‘Reaganomics’ lay not only in economic problems and new economic theories, but also 
reduced public support for central government” (Niskanen 1988, chapter 1). This is most 
clearly expressed by Boskin, “For Reagan and his advisors, freedom, including freedom 
from government interference, was enormously important, far beyond the superiority of 
free markets to controlled ones” (Boskin 1987, 3). Most people in Reagan’s circles 
appear to have assumed that the latter would follow from the former. 
Kemp’s An American Renaissance puts government failure in the center: “What 
poisons that [American] dream is when government stands in the way” (Kemp 1979, 1). 
Government always creates barriers to growth, by taxing too high and regulating too 
much, which is all due to the redistributive and flawed nature of politics—one of the 
central tenets distinguishing ordoliberal from competitive federalism thinking. According 
to Kemp, real growth happens in the private economy; markets are the only efficient 
mechanism to coordinate behavior (Kemp 1979, Chapter 7). So, the right policy is cutting 
taxes, because this will increase incentives to work harder and innovate. Keynesian 
models should be replaced with supply-side models that are closer to how real people 
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behave (Kemp 1979, Chapter 4). Similarly, he advocates a return to the gold standard so 
politicians cannot manipulate the currency—again the motivated by the belief that 
government always fails (Kemp 1979, Chapter 6). Also important, regulation has to be 
cut back (Kemp 1979, Chapter 7). While some of those are standard neoliberal 
arguments, we find everything framed in terms of competitive federalism. The biggest 
chunk of the book deals with taxes. Nowhere do we find a positive role for government in 
fostering competitive markets. In fact, government should be devolved to the more local 
level. Competition between governments will lead to efficient policies (Kemp 1979, 
Chapter 10). 
Stockman anchors his ideology in what he calls ‘anti-statism’:  
Behind the hoopla of the Kemp-Roth tax cut and my thick black books of 
budget cuts was the central idea of the Reagan revolution. It was minimalist 
government—a spare and stingy creature, which offered evenhanded public 
justice, but no more. Its vision of the good society rested on the strength and 
productive potential of free men in free markets. (Stockman 1986, 8) 
The opposition to government is mainly rooted in the believe that it is generally a 
flawed mechanism: “The sovereign state ended up an open bazaar, its fiscal and legal 
resources plundered by organized interest groups by means of political muscle 
bargaining, and logrolling” (Stockman 1986, 33). This is of course combined with a 
strong belief in the ability of markets: “I did battle with this monster [the state] every day, 
hacking away at it with a sword forged in the free market smithy of F.A. Hayek” 
(Stockman 1986, 38). For Stockman, the “dismantling of state erected barriers” is all 
encompassing: tax cuts, draconian spending cuts, elimination of all subsidies, ending 
welfare, cutting social security, and reducing all kinds of regulation (Stockman 1986, 41). 
Unlike Roberts or Wanniski, for Stockman ‘Reaganomics’ is not only about 
macro-economic policy: Reducing government and government regulation, especially 
farm subsidies and price regulation (152f.), enforcing free trade (155) and energy 
deregulation (103), are important issues (Stockman 1986). However, as noted previously, 
the focus is on cutting specific regulations, not safeguarding competitive markets. He 
sees no positive role for regulation, an attitude that can also be seen in the numerous 
memos he wrote for the Reagan campaign (Stockman 1981). He only uses terms like 
“regulatory relief” and “rescinding regulation,” never competitive conditions, consumer 
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welfare, or market-enhancing regulation—terms we would expect from an a generic 
neoliberal perspective (Stockman 1981). For the details, we only get a list of 14 
regulatory areas where standards should be rescinded with an estimate how much money 
it would save businesses—no mention of competition and markets (Stockman 1981). 
The main part of Stockman’s book—roughly 70%—is devoted to policy making 
during the first few years of the Reagan administration. Here he chronicles the fights over 
tax cuts and spending cuts, in which he became to be the main broker between the 
Executive and Congress. While a few unsuccessful deregulatory attempts are mentioned 
(agricultural price controls, automobile tariffs), it becomes clear that macro-economic 
policy, and not regulatory policy, was Reagan’s priority. There is never an explanation of 
why, but the impression is that deregulation had never been a comprehensive policy 
program, but more a set of individual grievances against specific regulations (like 
requiring airbags), that were sustained by a general anti-government attitude.  
For Stockman, the book is really an explanation of the failure of what could have 
been the Reagan revolution. The failure, which Stockman blames on the “triumph of 
politics”69 is really that tax cuts could not be sustained, spending cuts failed (especially in 
social security), and the budget deficit grew. The non-existence of efficiency enhancing 
comprehensive policy reforms is not discussed. But he again highlights the strong believe 
against government, even if in failure. “By 1985, only the White House speechwriters 
carried on a lonely war of words, hurling a stream of presidential rhetoric at a ghostly 
abstraction called Big Government” (Stockman 1986, 380).  
Niskanen’s review of ‘Reaganomics’ is more policy focused and does not contain 
direct personal statements of ideology. He argues that “The most important general 
principle guiding the initial Reagan program were its long run orientation and its reliance 
on markets as the primary process for organizing economic activity” but adds, the general 
idea was that “The most important cause of our economic problems has been the 
government itself” (Niskanen 1988, 20, 4). At the same time, he shows that the concerted 
                                                 
69 “The spending politics of Washington do reflect the heterogeneous and parochial demands that 
arise from the diverse, activated fragments of the electorate scattered across the land. What you see done in 
the halls of the politicians may not be wise, but it is the only real and viable definition of what the 
electorate wants” (Stockman 1986, 377). 
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effort was limited to spending and taxation. The book, being one of the few with a 
chapter on regulation, argues that “The failure to achieve substantial reduction in or 
reform of federal regulations […] was the major missed opportunity of the initial Reagan 
program” (Niskanen 1988, 115). And even in the few areas were progress was made, he 
criticizes, “The initial and continuing focus of the Reagan regulatory program was relief, 
not reform” (Niskanen 1994, 441).  
He blames that on the fact that “Reagan’s convictions on those issues were 
admirable, but not strong. […] The administration did not demonstrate a political 
commitment to follow through on these convictions” (Niskanen 1988, 314). According to 
Niskanen, this lacking commitment can be seen in many ways, especially in mediocre 
appointments of staff that cared more about short term budget savings than good 
economics. It can also be seen in the neglect of obvious areas for market-based reforms, 
like privatization of government owned enterprises, deregulation of the agricultural 
sector, and free trade. In all of those areas, Reagan apparently did not have convictions 
principled enough.  
Edwin Meese, counselor to the President with Cabinet rank, later attorney 
General, wrote his book With Reagan to counter all liberal pundits and ex-administration 
officials that try to misrepresent ‘the greatness’ of the Reagan administration. Most of his 
effort is designated to rebut all critics, be it that they misrepresent supply-side economics, 
or be it that they claim that inequality increased. In the end, the main takeaway uses 
language that reminds of Hayek, “Ronald Reagan led the cause of liberty to an 
unprecedented victory over the forces of oppression and slavery” (Meese 1992, XVf.). 
His chapters on economic policy do not deal with regulation or market barriers; 
especially his chapter ‘the Triumph of Reaganomics’ is silent on the issue. The main 
point seems to be to show that all economic policy was flowing directly from Reagan (he 
never needed convincing by supply siders) except when it failed, in which case rogue 
staffers like Stockman or Congress were to blame. Market-building is not important. For 
him, free markets and limited government are part of the same philosophy: “I was there 
when he translated the principle of liberty, limited government, and free-market 
economics […] into a successful policies and programs that characterized his presidency” 
(Meese 1992, XVI). 
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Murray Weidenbaum, chairman of the President’s council of economic advisors, 
is one of the few previous officials who have to say more on regulation (Weidenbaum 
1988). His critique of the Reagan era is basically presented as an account of what future 
direction policy should take. The most pressing issue, of course, is the budget deficit. But 
regulation has its chapter, and he recommends focusing on consumer-benefitting reforms. 
This is the closest thing I have found in any of this literature to a call to market-based 
reforms. In particular, he criticizes the Reagan administration for a ‘wrong’ 
understanding of deregulation that is one focused on saving money for business. “For one 
thing, the Reagan administration’s term regulatory relief should be promptly abandoned. 
The sensible goal is not to reduce the burden on business by easing the enforcement of 
existing regulation but to ensure that the regulations that are enforced benefit the 
consumer” (Weidenbaum 1988, 241). He does not present a reason for why the Reagan 
administration diverged from his understanding, but given that he argues that the biggest 
achievement was to make the claim “government is the problem” common wisdom, it 
stands to reason that antipathy toward the federal government does not combine well with 
pro-market regulation (Weidenbaum 1988, 15). Despite the fact that he is the only policy-
maker who really writes about market-based reforms, he does not advocate more central 
authority. In fact, he argues that independent action by state and local government is a 
best approach to regulation (Weidenbaum 1988, 262). So even when we find 
neoliberalism connected with the advocacy of incentive-improving regulation of the 
economy, it is still invested in reducing the authority of the central government. 
Macro-economic policy is also the focus of many conservative academics that 
review the Reagan administration. For example, Michael Boskin’s book, neoliberal 
economist associated with the Hoover Institutions, deals solely with taxation, despite the 
broader title, Reagan and the Economy (Boskin 1987). According to him, Reagan’s most 
important accomplishment was to “change the general understanding of what constitutes 
a reasonable economic policy” (Boskin 1987, 255). In particular, the new understanding 
is that one needs a comprehensive approach to the economy to win elections, which 
includes that in most cases government is the problem and not the solution. This claim 
interestingly contrasts with the actual policy Reagan pursued: He did not have a 
comprehensive program to create markets (positive), only a strategy to reduce 
128 
government (negative). In this way, Boskin’s book is another clue that American 
neoliberals simply to not perceive of the market-creating force of federal authority. 
Hence, despite the assessment of comprehensiveness, regulation and market building are 
only commented on in passing. Two things are said: “There were high hopes and good 
intentions, but the problems were so numerous and diffuse, it was unclear how much 
could be accomplished.” And, “Reducing regulation has only been partially successful” 
(Boskin 1987, 259f.).  
Richard Mckenzie’s What Went Right in the 1980s is a similar analysis that tries 
to show Reagan’s policies increased competitiveness and raised disposable incomes for 
the rich and the poor (McKenzie 1995). However, regulation is not one of the main 
causes discussed. There is a chapter on airline deregulation that tries to show how 
market-based reforms in this sector made services better, cheaper, and safer. While this is 
true, as he says himself, policy changes were brought about in the 1970s, and are largely 
unconnected to the Reagan ‘revolution’.  
John Sloan presents an account of the Reagan administration, seeing its economic 
policy as largely successful with the exception of handling the S&L crisis (Sloan 1999). 
Interestingly, what he describes as “the most ambitious policy agenda since Roosevelt,” 
solely consists of a discussion of taxation, spending, and macro-economic variables 
(Sloan 1999, 10). 
Martin Feldstein, another Chairman of Reagan’s Council of Economic advisors, 
put together an edited volume that contrasts academic analysis with the assessment of 
Reagan policy-makers (Feldstein 1994). In his overall summary he focuses solely on tax 
cuts, budget policies, monetary policy, and the trade deficit. The economists that review 
economic regulation, health and safety regulation, and financial regulation concur with 
the general argument made in this chapter, while policy-makers point out the specific 
things they achieved. They all note surprise that market-based reforms did not become an 
important priority (Joskow and Noll 1994, Viscusi 1994).  
In an edited volume for the American Enterprise Institute, Philip Cagan also 
describes tax cuts as the main revolutionary achievement; regulations are only evaluated 
in terms of how much they were cut (Cagan 1986). The chapter on regulation is typical of 
the other accounts: there is no discussion of interstate barriers and the number of 
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rescinded regulations and staff reduction is used as a measure of the success of the 
Reagan administration (Yandle 1986). With the exception of the chapter on banking, 
interstate barriers or federal preemption are not mentioned at all (Pyle 1986). A review by 
the Heritage Foundation solely focuses on how tax cuts create growth and help the poor 
(Mitchell 1991). Similarly, a retrospective by the CATO Institute is dedicated to “busting 
the myth” of increased deficits and decreased economic performance in the 1980s with 
the sole attention to macro-economic policy, not regulation (Niskanen and Moore 1996). 
Robert Meiner and Bruce Yandle, in a retrospective for the Independent Institute write: 
“Regulatory reform was quickly perceived as a set of actions, consistent with the 
Administration’s conservative philosophy, but not a program that would add noticeably 
to GNP” (Roger E. Meiners and Yandle 1989, x). While they claim “Reagan failed in his 
assault on excessive government,” they support the goal, since all regulation “is merely 
the outcome of private interests lobbying for various types of protection from 
competition” (Roger E. Meiners and Yandle 1989, xii). The book does not contain any 
discussion of market-enhancing regulation or of the problem of regulatory heterogeneity 
with retrenching federal regulation. 
Beyond thematic points, it is interesting to note that after Reagan, many think 
tank retrospectives declared that problems could be attributed to the fact that his policy 
was not radical enough. For instance, Heritage proclaimed “The radical surgery that was 
required in Washington was not performed” (Weyrich 1984, 19). Similarly, CATO 
president Edward Crane argued that Reagan’s ideology was not “internally consistent” 
enough in its “commitment to liberty” (Crane 1983). The line of attack was clear—if 
Reagan had followed his outlined principles better, he would have been much more 
successful. One scholar argues that “By Reagan’s second term, think tanks like Heritage 
were integral outposts in the project of critiquing conservatives from the right” (Stahl 
2016, 125). This allowed them to hold lawmakers accountable, while attributing every 
failing of their policies to not following their prescription strictly enough as well as the 
general tendency of “government failure” (Stahl 2016, 125). Undoubtedly, in this way 
think tanks contributed to the ‘renewal of Republican Revolutions’ under Gingrich and 
Ryan (see next section).  
In short then, reviewing books by Reagan’s advisors reveals the following about 
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their specific brand of neoliberalism. It combines great confidence in markets with a 
general critique of all government action. Their neoliberal ideology flows from and 
combines with a completely negative view of government. From this it follows that the 
regulatory role of government is not examined (in terms of efficiency) but rejected. 
Markets are thought to evolve naturally. If government is necessary, they prefer local 
power over central power. There is no concern for subnational competition leading to 
protectionism—there is unlimited optimism into the power of markets to evolve 
naturally—just as competitive federalism prescribes. It follows, that in concrete policy 
terms, they focused most of their writing and action on macro-economic policy, in 
particular on spending and taxation.  
III.c.  American Neoliberals and Federal Market Authority after Reagan 
The American neoliberal agenda has not changed much since Reagan. As I will 
show, competitive federalism has continued to inhibit any systematic mobilization around 
federal market authority. The priority of American neoliberals has remained cutting 
government spending and taxation, assuming that more competitive market will follow 
from this retrenchment naturally. This is not to say that no increase in federal market 
authority has happened. In a piecemeal fashion, always against the will of state and local 
governments, and in response to successful business mobilization, lawmakers have 
sometimes voted for national rules or standards. This took place most significantly under 
Clinton, who embraced federal market authority arguments in telecommunication and 
banking, while still maintaining a traditional deference to localism for instance by 
creating a dual not exclusively federal banking system.  
An analysis of Republican Party Platforms between 1988 and 2012 shows that 
with the exception of 2004 (foreign policy and terrorism), cutting taxes and reducing 
spending has been the main priority, guided by a theory that a retrenching government 
will lead to more market (Republican National Convention 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2012). This is often combined with a count of “business cost of regulation” 
and a call for rescinding them: “America's formula [is] to cut tax rates, loosen regulation, 
and free the private sector” or put differently “liberation through deregulation” 
(Republican National Convention 1988, 1992). Government is seen as a principally 
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flawed mechanism, meaning that “even well-intentioned regulation” will have “job-
crippling effects” (Republican National Convention 2012). The free market is always 
imagined as natural state—“Government interference […] causes the free market to take 
longer to correct itself” (Republican National Convention 2008). Returning power to the 
states is not as prominent as under Reagan, but is always mentioned: “We are committed 
to further return power from the federal government to state and local governments,” or 
“more reliance on the market and decentralized decision-making,” or “federalism is 
threatened and liberty retreats” (Republican National Convention 1988, 2000, 2012). In 
no instance are potential problem of interstate barriers discussed. Areas where 
Republicans have actively supported preemption, like in banking, are not mentioned in 
the platforms. There is never an explicit endorsement of federal market authority.  
Competitive federalism at work is further demonstrated by mentions of interstate 
barriers without endorsement of federal market authority. For instance, the 1996 platform 
criticizes the fact that federal regulation is often differently interpreted by state and local 
authorities. However, at the same time it is argued: “We reaffirm the traditional deference 
by the federal government to the States in the allocation and appropriation of water. We 
deplore the Clinton Administration's disregard for State primacy through attempts to 
preempt State law with respect to water usage and watershed protection70” (Republican 
National Convention 1996). Similarly, the 2000 platform highlights that local regulation 
makes housing construction complicated and expensive—but the solution is only a call 
on local governments to change, “We see no role for any federal regulation of 
homebuilding“ (Republican National Convention 2000). The same is said about the local 
interpretation of EPA standards and occupational licensing—while seen as problematic, it 
is stated that “Our overall philosophy is to trust state and local government to know what 
best suits the needs of their people” (Republican National Convention 2000). The same 
phenomenon can be observed in health care policy. The 2008 platform introduces the 
idea that costs could be driven down with “interstate competition” (Republican National 
Convention 2008). At the same time they see “no role for the federal government” to 
create that competition, and argue that “The federal government should respect the states’ 
                                                 
70 This is a response to democratic environmental policies that tried to protect some public lands 
from logging and mining. 
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traditional authority to regulate health insurance, health care professionals, and health 
practice guidelines through their medical boards” (Republican National Convention 
2008).  
Following Reagan, the agenda of Republicans would be constraint to some degree 
by how the policy program had been articulated. An observer at the AEI notes “President 
Reagan thus left behind [for President Bush] the need to reconcile (1) the aversion to 
taxation and regulation, (2) the benefits the public expected from government, and (3) a 
widespread feeling that reduction of the deficit was important” (Stein 1994, 415). While 
commentators note that Bush was not an ideological advocate of this agenda—“As far as 
can be judged from his history before he became vice president, he was not then a strict 
antigovernment Reaganite”—he made reducing taxes and balancing the budget a 
promised priority71 (Stein 1994, 416; Bush 1990). Major reviews of the presidency focus 
on those two (plus foreign policy) without any significant discussion of federal market 
authority (Greene 2000; Duffy and Goodgame 1992; Heclo 2014). Given the neo-
conservative, Christian background, Bush added to this the need “to make America a 
kinder, gentler place” (Bush 1990). However, “De did not want the government to pay 
for it: he wanted private individuals to rally around and deal with the problems of making 
America kinder and gentler voluntarily” (Stein 1994, 418).  
Perhaps distracted by foreign policy72, deregulation became still less of a priority. 
“George Bush’s accession to the presidency resulted in a suspension of the anti-
regulation fervor that had emanated from the White House for eight years” (B. D. 
Friedman 1995, 160). While Bush recited Reaganesque conservative ideology, “He was 
much more oriented towards maintaining the status quo” (B. D. Friedman 1995, 161). For 
this reason, he soon was criticized by the renewing Republican establishment. A one 
scholar puts it, “Bush’s traditional conservatism was distrusted by proponents of a newer 
form of American conservatism” (Heclo 2014, 51). At same time, rhetorically, 
competitive federalism had become dominant with Bush announcing, “My philosophy is 
                                                 
71 According to Bush, his goal was to “Clear away the obstacles to growth: high taxes, high 
regulation, red tape, and yes, wasteful Government spending” (cited in Han 2011, 136). 
72 Many observers agree that Bush’s interests lay in foreign policy, domestic policy did not interest 
him much (Duffy and Goodgame 1992). 
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this: that when it comes to necessary regulation of business, I’m committed to letting the 
states take the lead, not the federal Government” (Bush 1989b). This can be seen for 
instance in education policy, which Bush called an important priority, while maintaining 
that all federal programs would be voluntary, and no uniform standards would be 
mandated (Greene 2000, 104). 
Unlike Reagan, Bush did not follow a deregulatory agenda through appointments: 
“Bush’s appointments of moderates [to agencies as well as OMB and OIRA] who were 
neither programmed not inclined to undermine the missions of their respective agencies 
defused the tension between political appointees and civil servants” (B. D. Friedman 
1995, 162). Bush replaced the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which he had chaired 
under Reagan, with a Council on Competitiveness in 1989, with the goal of finding ways 
to make the US more competitive internationally. Another legacy of Reagan’s 
transformation of American neoliberal thinking can be seen in how that council evaluated 
the economy. In its first report, the internal market, interstate barriers, and even 
federalism are not mentioned. Instead, the sole focus is on how to encourage more 
savings and investment to be able to compete with foreign powers, a discussion of 
corporate structure, and a consideration of industrial policy (Council on Competitiveness 
1992). The same is true for the following reports until the Council’s dismantlement 
(Council on Competitiveness 1993, 1994, 1995). 
In terms of policy, Bush became president without having a vision or any 
comprehensive program and no majority in either chamber—which basically suggested a 
veto-strategy of governing (Greene 2000, 72). As a result, Bush mostly used his powers 
to soften Democratic legislation (C. Campbell, Rockman, and Rudalevige 2008, 3). 
Under looming deficits, budget negotiations with Democrats made it hard to keep up the 
campaign promise of no new taxes and spending reductions. To the dismay of the 
Republican establishment, Bush agreed to some tax increases (which he would later call a 
mistake) in exchange for moderate spending cuts (Greene 2000, 103). This empowered 
Republicans around Newt Gingrich to oppose the whole budget deal and provided the 
impetus for the coalition building around the coming Contract with America (Greene 
2000, 106; Heclo 2014, 76). One conservative observer argues that “The Bush experience 
[…] solidified the Republican opposition to tax increases” (Stein 1994, 424). 
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None of the industry demands for more uniformity in regulation, for example in 
banking (see Chapter III.a.5) or telecommunication (Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
see below), was put on the agenda by Bush. According to Zimmerman, “Bush approved 
thirty-four preemption bills, but only the Clean Air Act Amendments of 199073 had a 
major impact on subnational governments” (Zimmerman 2008, 127). According to 
Friedman, in terms of health, safety, and the environment, a movement for reregulation 
under the Democrat controlled Congress was gaining strength culminating among other 
things in stricter environmental policy (B. D. Friedman 1995, 161). Despite a moderate 
record given a democratically controlled Congress, conservatives soon criticized Bush for 
being a “reregulation president” (cited in B. D. Friedman 1995, 163). In response, Bush 
followed in Reagan’s footsteps in 1992 by announcing a moratorium on all new 
regulation that would last 180 days (B. D. Friedman 1995, 167). Bush’s somewhat 
tempered neoliberal fervor lead to a renewed Republican Revolution among House 
Republicans under Gingrich (Gingrich 2005). 
The tenure of Bill Clinton shows that Democrats are ideologically more inclined 
to embrace federal market authority, and do not rely explicitly on competitive federalism 
arguments. At the same time, the dominance of those arguments in American discourse 
shines through in many documents, meaning that a single market building project is not 
to be expected. As opposed to Republicans, Clinton was open to using federal market 
authority, in particular in response to business demands. At the same time, he is definitely 
not an ordoliberal—despite piecemeal endorsements of federal market authority, big 
signature initiatives, like improving regulation, completely ignored the issues of interstate 
barriers or the heterogeneity of regulations across states.  
It was a Democratic president that put some market barriers on the agenda, which 
firms had complained about. Clinton approved 64 preemption bills with only three 
significantly preempting state regulations that were undermining the single market: 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 , and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization 
Act of 1999 (Zimmerman 2008, 69). Of course, this was not part of a broader single 
                                                 
73 Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).  
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market agenda but was only responding in a fragmented way to problems that stood out 
due to significant business mobilization. We have already seen this to be true for banking. 
Similarly, after the court-mandated break-up of ATT, firms in the broadcasting and 
technology sector, as well as corporate telecommunication user groups, started lobbying 
Congress to get access to local telecommunication markets, which could only be 
achieved through federal preemption (Teske and Kuljiev 2000; Zhong, Cao, and Ning 
2008). However, the bill was mostly framed as ‘deregulation’ not as market building 
(Olufs 1999, 67). By the time the bill passed, most of the industry had embraced the new 
market expansion opportunities, despite some loss in local monopoly power. 
To some degree, understanding the regulation as business cost to be reduced 
became universal, with Clinton assessing the “total regulatory costs” for businesses and 
then promising a reduction (B. D. Friedman 1995, 176). In an effort to distinguish his 
regulatory agenda from Reagan, Clinton created a new commission headed by Al Gore, 
the Performance Review. The main focus of the first report is “eliminating regulatory 
overkill” (National Performance Review 1993). Single market issues, or even federalism 
are not mentioned, but one chapter asks to “empower State and Local Governments” in 
fiscal terms (National Performance Review 1993). The 1994 report mostly focusses on 
making government more cost-effective and customer friendly; federalism issues are not 
mentioned (National Performance Review 1994). This theme continues with the next 
reports focusing on establishing more performance based standards and improving the 
efficiency of federal agencies (National Performance Review 1996). Another report 
boasts about downsizing the federal government by 240,000 people, along with Clinton’s 
slogan, “The era of big government is over” (Gore 1996). The last reports continue the 
theme of reorganizing government like a business and adding online services (National 
Performance Review 1997b, 1997a). One observer concludes “The conservative tone of 
the reinventing-government reform program—emphasizing, efficiency, streamlining, 
rationality, and quality—is consistent with other conservative themes of the Clinton 
administration” (B. D. Friedman 1995, 178). Completely consistent with competitive 
federalism, none of those words is systematically applied to federal market authority. 
Streamlining government, as least according to these documents, did not include a 
mobilization around federal market authority. 
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To the contrary, in 1993 Clinton issued Executive Order 12,875, “Enhancing the 
Intergovernmental Partnership," which permitted states seeking to avoid federal agency 
regulations by submitting alternative policy approaches to federal agencies, who then had 
to respond to state requests within 120 days” (Gilman 2011, 346). 
In an odd intermezzo, Clinton reversed this approach in 1998 with Executive 
Order 13,083, which “listed nine nonexclusive conditions, under which federal agencies 
could displace state authority,” for instance the “need for uniform standards,” which was 
a clear departure from Reagan’s federalism order with the presumption of no preemption 
(Gilman 2011, 346). The source of this policy reversal is unclear; none of the 
contemporary news articles or academic papers report any major supporters (Broder 
1998b, 1998a; Thompson 1998; Blake 2000). An aide was cited saying, “This was a 
mistake. We screwed up” (Broder 1998a). In response, local and state governments as 
well has Congress and conservative think tanks mobilized arguing that preemption should 
“be restricted to the minimum level necessary;” Clinton was forced to meet with the 
nation’s Governors and eventually reversed his order74 (Gilman 2011, 346; W. Beach 
1998). Congress introduced the Federalism Enforcement Act of 199875, codifying the 
presumption against federal regulation and preemption in agency rule making, that had 
been in effect since Reagan’s executive order (Bailey 2000, 342). This again shows that 
US states cannot mobilize for uniform standards, but they can successfully organize 
public campaigns to prevent federal preemption. 
More important for my story is showing how the Republican conception of 
markets, in terms of competitive federalism continued its influence, preventing any 
systematic mobilization around federal market authority. This can be seen in the language 
and resulting policy of the Contract with America, which led to the self-declared 
“Republican Revolution” of 1994 with Republican winning majorities in Senate and 
House (S. Moore 2005). Newt Gingrich (to become speaker of the House) and Dick 
Armey (to become House majority leader) engineered Contract with America—a strategy 
to win the 1994 elections, and a policy program that they saw as the culmination of what 
                                                 
74 Executive Order 13,132, 64 FR 43255 (1999) remains in effect today. 
75 S. 2445, 105th Cong. (1998). 
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Reagan had started (Gingrich 2005, 1). Conservative think tanks, important conduits for 
the policy ideas behind the contract, argued “Decades from now, historians quite likely 
will reflect back upon the Contract with America as one of the most significant 
developments in the political history of the United States” (Gayner 1996). Two Heritage 
Foundation studies, widely seen as basis for the policy proposals in the Contract, squarely 
focus on the problem of too much government, with little mention of markets (Felten 
1993; G. S. Jones and Marini 1988). 
Contract with America was designed around goals similar to the Reagan’s 
program. To Armey, the mind behind the document, “Dismantling the federal 
bureaucracy was an academic, ideological, and personal quest […] Milton Friedman was 
his hero” (Maraniss 1996, 73f.). Dismantling the government and thereby “freeing the 
economy” is the main theme of his book The Freedom Revolution, written to explain 
Contract with America (Armey 1995, 161). According to the author, every problem can 
be solved by market competition, and it is achieved through radical retrenchment of 
government (i.e. “cutting the government in half”) because “The market is rational and 
the government is dumb” (Armey 1995, 285, 316). He makes clear, that he imagines 
market to evolve naturally, criticizing “a certain cast of mind, [which mistakenly 
believes] regulations ultimately make us more free;” Armey’s axiom is “Why regulate at 
all?” (Armey 1995, 171ff.).  
Operating within the competitive federalism view, according to Armey, 
government, specifically federal government will always make market-distorting policy 
advocated for by regulators and special interests: “It’s a self-justifying cycle that leads 
inexorably to bigger and bigger government” (Armey 1995, 300f.). The now familiar 
approach of counting business cost of regulation is repeated: “Regulations kill jobs, slow 
economic growth, and lower most everyone’s standard of living” (Armey 1995, 170). 
The only “healthy, common-sense regulation is generally self-regulation” or regulation 
by “local government” (Armey 1995, 172). In the whole book, there is not a single 
reference to which degree federal market authority might be necessary or whether local 
regulation might turn protectionist. For instance on federalism, where he only addresses 
state and local business subsidies, Armey argues for a hands-off approach: “Let cities 
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tend to their own fiscal affairs,” since “competition” will solve all inefficiencies (Armey 
1995, 304). 
A journalistic account of the ‘Revolution’ recounts, “Everything that Republicans 
pushed, even the most neutral sounding, had as its purpose curbing of federal government 
power” (Drew 1997, 93). But as with Reagan, it was mostly organized around taxation 
and spending ideas, aiming to end “tax-and-spend-liberalism” (Drew 1997, 26). This 
includes a balanced budget amendment to the constitution, spending reductions in many 
areas, most prominently welfare for families with dependent children, “ending the 
spending madness,” as well as tax cuts for individuals and businesses marketed as 
“supply side incentives” (Gingrich et al. 1994, 23, 126). Promised regulatory reform was 
based on the idea that “Government regulations do more harm than good” (Gingrich et al. 
1994, 141). As with Reagan, this is premised on the theory that all regulation serves 
special interests and distorts the free market that could otherwise exist (Gingrich et al. 
1994, 141). However, as expected federal government is seen as more problematic than 
local government, as in the Heritage Foundation’s description of the Republican agenda 
“Central government attempts to solve many problems have only made them worse” 
(Gayner 1996). Federal market authority does not play a role in the Contract, and 
interstate barriers are never mentioned (Gingrich et al. 1994, 22). Instead, it is argued that 
“We must replace our centralized, micro-managed, Washington-based bureaucracy with a 
dramatically decentralized system more appropriate to a continent-wide country76” 
(Gingrich et al. 1994, 22). The document elaborates that state and city governments will 
always do better because they are “closer to the people” (Gingrich et al. 1994, 133). In 
addition to these goals, the Contract also adds policies for the neo-conservative part, and 
Christian Right part of the Republican coalition, like “increasing defense spending,” 
“stopping violent criminals with harsher sentencing,” and “supporting traditional 
families” (Gingrich et al. 1994, 91f., 37f., 65f.). 
The 1994 election swept Republicans into power which would last through the 
Bush presidency until 2006. Having 367 candidate-signees, Newt Gingrich and other 
                                                 
76 Or as the Heritage Foundations puts it, “This can become the defining moment in the 
transformation of the responsibility for government in the United States away from the central government 
and back to state and local governments” (Gayner 1996). 
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leaders started with the implementation of their Contract immediately (Gingrich 2005). 
First on the agenda were reforms to Congress designed to restore trust in government, 
which of course seems unlikely given their rhetoric around government failure. 
Nonetheless, the House enacted new budgeting rules, term limits for the leadership, 
banned proxy voting in committees, opened committee hearings to the public, required a 
three-fifth vote to increase taxes, started a comprehensive audit of the House, and applied 
anti-discrimination and workplace safety rules to Congress itself (S. Moore 2005, 27). 
The attempt of creating congressional term limits failed. In contrast to these internal bills, 
most promised legislation had a more complicated fate, facing delays and abandonment 
in the Senate, as well as presidential vetoes. The main priority remained taxation and 
spending. In every year between 1994 and 2004 Republicans attempted tax cuts, with 
limited success in 1997, and significant success after the election of President Bush in 
2001 and 200377 (Haskins 2005, 37). Rolling back government by cutting spending was 
the other priority. One legislative aid remembers “Newt Gingrich’s finest hour as Speaker 
of the House was when he persuaded House Republicans to adopt a seven-year balanced 
budget plan” (S. Moore 2005, 61). After fights with the Clinton administration and two 
government shut downs, a recovering economy helped balance the budget78. Scholars at 
the Heritage Foundation soon argued that more significant cuts and better arguments 
were necessary: “Budget cutters need to convince the public that there is a financial and 
freedom dividend from smaller government” (S. Moore 2005, 69). The most significant 
achievement in terms of spending cuts were made in welfare reform, where Republicans 
were able to eventually get the cooperation of the president. Here spending cuts could be 
combined with federalism principles. In his first speech as majority leader in the Senate, 
Robert Dole, had declared, “If I have one goal for the 104th Congress, it is this: that we 
will dust off the tenth amendment and restore it to its rightful place in our Constitution” 
(cited in T. Lynch 2005, 213). AFDC was transformed into TANF, a block grant that 
                                                 
77 For conservative think tanks, this was not enough. For instance, CATO argues “Tax cutting 
continuous to be the key to electoral success, but more fundamental tax reform is needed” (C. Edwards 
2005, 56). 
78 The more significant balanced budget constitutional amendment, S.J.Res 1, 104th Cong. (1995), 
failed in the Senate (Glass 2012).  
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would give states flexibility in implementation and save money by freezing benefits and 
putting time limits on them (Haskins 2005).  
The impression of a priority on fiscal matters and the neglect of interstate barriers 
is supported by reviewing journalistic and insider accounts. For instance, Gingrich’s own 
retrospective does not mention the latter, focusing on the former bracketed by the theme 
of ‘curtailing government’ (Gingrich 1998, 2005). Similarly, the account of journalists 
David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf as well as Elizabeth Drew portray the 
‘Republican Revolution’ mostly in terms of budget fights (Maraniss 1996; Drew 1997). 
A similar retrospective by conservative authors, assembled by CATO, reviews the era 
without mentioning internal market barriers at all (Crews 2005).  
All accounts that make comments on regulatory policy do it in a manner that 
readers will now find familiar. The chief architect of the Contract’s regulatory policy, 
Tom DeLay, “Considered the central mission of his political career: the demise of the 
modern era of government regulation” (Weisskopf and Maraniss 1995). Heading the 
“Project Relief,” he initiated a 13-month moratorium to all government regulation. The 
argument was a familiar one, insisting that regulation created ‘excessive business cost’ as 
high as “$662 billion by 2000” (Eckerly 1995). However, a comprehensive regulatory 
reform act never passed Congress. The CATO retrospective complains that Republicans 
have endorsed some new health and safety regulations and not made any real progress. It 
never asks about the quality just the quantity of the regulations, because every regulation 
“undermines the market’s ability to self-regulate” (Crews 2005, 201). A good example 
for this is the open access rule of the Telecommunications Act, adopted to create more 
competition for phone providers. Here it is argued, “This is a crucial time for Republicans 
to take a solid stand against such managed competition [open access rule]” (Crews 2005, 
202). 
Despite the rhetoric around federalism, Republicans had gone along with 
Clinton’s preemption bills. Following the priority of fiscal matters, they celebrated block-
granting TANF as major return of power to the states. Most importantly though, their 
position to not embracing federal market authority was put into law through the 
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Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 199579, “Hailed as both a symbol and substance of a 
renewed congressional commitment to federalism” (P. L. Posner 1997, 53). The law 
specifies that “any mandate with an uncompensated state and local cost greater than $50 
million a year […] could be stopped by a point of order raised on the House or Senate 
floor80” (P. L. Posner 1997, 53). In addition, several bills were passed that increased the 
amount of ‘local government consultation’ required before enacting regulation (Dinan 
2004). Six other laws proposed Republicans, with more stringent provisions against 
federal mandates and preemption, for instance the Tenth Amendment Enforcement Act81, 
failed to be enacted (Dinan 2004, 83). 
With the election of George W. Bush, Republican gained control of both branches 
of government. Despite the rhetoric around federalism, “George W. Bush did not advance 
a signature federalism proposal or executive order” (Conlan and Dinan 2007, 280). As 
preceding Republicans, Bush campaigned on a deregulatory platform82 and his OIRA 
director details fights with “agencies and their pro-regulation advocates” to stop 
regulation in his assessment of the presidency (Graham 2010, 260). As with previous 
presidents, in most scholarly accounts the issue of federal market authority and interstate 
barriers is not mentioned (Graham 2010; G. C. Edwards and King 2007; Kelley and 
Shields 2013). Barring his foreign policy and anti-terror measures, “supply-side tax cuts” 
were his top priority and biggest achievement (Graham 2010, 6, 28). Other items on his 
agenda, like cuts to Medicaid, Medicare, and Social security were not successful. An 
anomaly within the Republican set of ideas, was Bush’s No Child Left Behind legislation 
that aimed at increasing the role of federal standards in public education. Contentious 
with the base, due to the inconsistency with ideas over local control, the bill passed with 
bipartisan support and opposition (Graham 2010, 92). However, Republicans were soon 
its biggest critics, with all major conservative foundations opposing it and asking 
                                                 
79 Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995). 
80 A majority can override the point of order. 
81 S. 1629, 104th Cong. (1996). 
82 He campaigned on reducing the “Unnecessary burdens caused by America’s complex tort 
liability system” and the “excessive regulatory and paperwork burdens” of the federal government (Graham 
2010, 251). 
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Congress to “break up public education monopolies” and “eliminating federal 
mandates83” (AEI 2015, 5f.). 
States saw Bush’s legislative initiatives, such as “the No Child Left Behind Act, 
standardizing public educational goals; the REAL ID Act, mandating state driver's 
license requirements; and the Help America Vote Act of 2002, imposing national election 
requirements on states,” as limiting their autonomy (Gilman 2011, 352).84 Based on this, 
some authors call the Bush administration a “centralizing agent” (Conlan and Dinan 
2007, 279). However, Zimmerman argues that many of “these standards are not 
preemptive,” are “explained by anti-terrorism,” or merely “generate pressure by citizens 
upon state legislatures to adopt the standards” (Zimmerman 2007, 433f.). Because of this, 
he reports that there was “relatively little state lobbying of Congress with respect to most 
preemption bills the President signed” with the exception of the driver’s license minimum 
requirements (Zimmerman 2007, 443). In the end, he counts 87 counts preemption bills 
under Bush but concludes that “These statutes removed relatively little power from 
states85” describing them as “ad hoc responses to problems” (Zimmerman 2008, 69, 
2007, 445). Crises, like terrorism and hurricanes have a centralizing effect, but this can be 
hardly understood as endorsement of federal market authority. As Zimmerman notes, the 
bills’ “relative silence with respect to pressing problems inherent in non-harmonious state 
regulations” is surprising (Zimmerman 2007, 445).  
Another instance of endorsement of federal market authority due to specific 
business pressures is litigation as related to health, safety, and environmental issues. 
Starting with the Contract with America, and more so under Bush’s presidential 
campaign, the “utility of frivolous and junk law suits as a political issue” was discovered 
(McGarity 2008, 4). This led to the priority of tort reform with the clear goal of reducing 
law suits through federal preemption, however no comprehensive measures passed. In 
                                                 
83 AEI: “NCLB inconsistent with the spirit of federalism, and therefore much less likely to 
succeed” (AEI 2015, 5). Heritage: “Congress should eliminate the many federal mandates” (Burke 2014). 
CATO: “The dangers of centralized education policy” (Uzzell 2005, 1). 
84 Pub. L. 107-110, 30 Stat. 750 (2001); Pub. L. 109 13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005); Pub. L. 107-252, 
116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 
85 With the exceptions of the Internet Tax Non-Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 107-7, 115 Stat. 703 
(2001), prohibiting local governments from taxing internet access. 
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2005, Bush signed the Lawful Commerce in Arms Act86, which shielded gun 
manufacturers from some law suits and thereby preempted state common law in liability 
(McGarity 2008, 123). The FDA clarified a regulation arguing that its approval of drugs 
preempted liability and tort state common law in some instances (McGarity 2008, 4). In 
addition, the PREP Act87 allowed the FDA to preempt state common law liability for 
drugs and medical devices in “public health emergencies” (McGarity 2008, 126). The 
direction was deregulatory since in none of the instances was regulation followed up with 
stricter federal standards (McGarity 2008, 4). Under the pressure of business arguing that 
they “didn’t want to have to comply with 50 different sets of regulations,” the Bush 
administration also halted the implementation of stricter vehicle emissions standards in 
California (Vock 2016; Graham 2010, 179). Similarly, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency used its preemption power more broadly to stop certain lending laws to be 
applied to national banks (Conlan and Posner 2016, 294).  
The tenure of Barack Obama is similar to the other Democratic President we 
looked at. Both were more were ideologically more inclined to embrace federal market 
authority and did not rely on explicit competitive federalism arguments. At the same 
time, the dominance of those arguments in American discourse shines through in many 
documents, making a single market project unlikely. As opposed to Republicans, both 
were more open to using federal market authority, in particular in response to business 
demands or complex public policy problems. Obama reversed centralizing tendencies of 
Bush, issuing a memo to take back all preemptions that were limiting state-level litigation 
in health, safety, and environmental matters, against the opposition of, among others, the 
chamber of commerce, who argued “Removing federal preemption forces employers to 
navigate a confusing, often contradictory patchwork quilt of 50 sets of laws and 
regulations” (cited in Rucker 2009). More generally, while Obama had a broad domestic 
policy agenda, including the stimulus package, health care reform, and climate change 
abatement, federal market authority did not gain much traction. While legislation 
“provided hundreds of billions of additional federal dollars to state and local governments 
                                                 
86 Pub. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005). 
87. Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2818 (2005). 
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and expanded the federal government’s role in setting the direction of policy,” in most 
cases states were given wide discretion in how or even whether to implement the policy, 
putting red and blue states on completely different trajectories (Conlan and Posner 2016, 
282). Due to Republican capture of the House and state governments, Obama was forced 
to allow many opt-outs and accommodations, leading some scholars to speak of “variable 
speed federalism88” (Conlan and Posner 2016, 283). For instance, maybe based on 
entrenched supply-side thinking or just due to political considerations, many Republican 
states refused to accept funds from the Keynesian stimulus package (Conlan and Posner 
2016, 887). The Affordable Care Act89 set up a state-by-state system, as Republicans had 
supported in the 1990s, forgoing a national system with uniform standards. Together with 
a Supreme Court decision limiting “coercive federal mandates, the result has been an 
increasingly complex patchwork of state implementation of health care reform, shaped in 
large part by these partisan conflicts between the federal and state governments” (Conlan 
and Posner 2016, 290). Similarly, regulatory changes to the financial system, necessitated 
by the financial crisis, “Rolled back the field preemptions of the Bush era to return to the 
regime of concurrent jurisdiction of banking and consumer protection regulation” 
(Conlan and Posner 2016, 295).  
Under Republican leadership, the trend of divergence between states will most 
likely continue, evidenced by a glance at current policy ideas. Paul Ryan, seen as the 
Republicans’ current “ideas leader” and responsible for crafting a comprehensive 
conservative agenda, has reproduced the policy priorities of Reagan and the Contract in 
many policy documents (Ehrenfreund 2017; NR Editors 2015): “Mr. Ryan has been 
rolling out grand pronouncements in bound volumes with fancy covers and snappy 
names, but the main message never changed: America‘s ‘path to prosperity’ lies in tax 
cuts for the wealthy and corporations, and slashing social programs and regulations” 
(NYT Editorial Board 2017). Or as Paul Krugman describes it, “Mr. Ryan has become 
                                                 
88 The stimulus package gave extremely flexible grant-in-aid to state and local governments. Even 
the Administration’s “signature initiatives in health care reform, financial reform, and climate change 
policy were notable for accommodations to state diversity” (Conlan and Posner 2016, 284). Among other 
things, states were allowed to exceed federal minimum standards, there were opt-outs for reluctant states, 
opt-ins for keen states, and waivers were given generously.  
89 Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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the Republican Party’s poster child for new ideas thanks to his ‘Roadmap for America’s 
Future,’ a plan for a major overhaul of federal spending and taxes” (Krugman 2010). 
Indeed, a series of detailed policy programs released by Ryan since 2010, written 
as budget proposals, has been making the point that by reducing the “size of 
government,” i.e. cutting spending, taxes, and regulation, America can be made 
“prosperous” (Ryan 2012, 2011). Issues of federal market authority, interstate barriers, or 
even federalism are not prominent in the documents (Ryan 2012, 2011). 
As Speaker of the House, Ryan published A Better Way, inspired in scope by 
Contract with America as an electoral program for the 2016 elections. It repeats the 
familiar language and priorities of American neoliberals: Cutting taxes and spending, as 
well as deregulation (House Republicans 2016a). The regulatory chapter is a manifesto 
for deregulation. Regulatory costs are counted “The American people now spend $1.89 
trillion every year just to comply with Washington’s rules—approximately $15,000 per 
household,” and regulations are mostly understood as burden for business, “Federal 
regulation particularly hurts domestic manufacturers and other businesses competing in 
an increasingly globalized marketplace” (House Republicans 2016a, 5f.). Two chapters 
detail how the “regulatory state” can be reduced (House Republicans 2016a, 2016d). 
Despite a few sentences on the importance of good regulation, in most instances the view 
is made clear that regulations are always the problem, for instance in the assertion that it 
was “too stringent” regulation causing the 2008 financial crisis (House Republicans 
2016d, 41ff.). The logic of the political process mirrors what we would expect from 
competitive federalism: “Federal agencies have every incentive to regulate—and then 
overregulate because writing regulations justifies their livelihoods and budgets” and 
regulation always undermines competition “by favoring companies with the best 
connections over those with the best ideas” (House Republicans 2016d, 10; Ryan 2012, 
28). 
Federalism concerns do not seem to play as big of a role as in previous 
Republican documents. The sole focus is on reducing the size of government in general 
(House Republicans 2016d). However, in several instances it said that devolving power 
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to state or local governments is preferred90. Most interesting is one passage, the only 
passage in all reviewed documents in this chapter, that deliberately addresses interstate 
commerce: “Facilitating Interstate Commerce: In general, federal regulations should be a 
last resort and minimally intrusive; however there are instances where they make sense 
because they facilitate interstate commerce” (House Republicans 2016d, 15). Among the 
hundreds of bills proposed in A Better Way, two are listed under this heading. A bill to 
preempt states from adopting specific GMO food labeling requirements91 and a bill to 
preempt states from regulating ballast-water discharges from maritime vessels92 (Lempert 
2016; Spangler 2017; House Republicans 2016d, 15). The two areas singled out, 
transportation and food labeling, have both seen significant business mobilization since 
the Reagan administration refused to regulate (see p. 101). So while it is not surprising 
that Republicans have supported some limited federal market authority here, as they have 
before, it is the first time they explicitly make the argument for federal market 
authority—“There should be a single, uniform, nationwide approach to safety regulation 
to provide regulatory certainty for businesses and facilitate the flow of interstate 
commerce”—despite the position that “Regulation does more harm than good” (House 
Republicans 2016d, 15, 30).  
This new position is not necessarily acknowledging the market-enhancing effect 
of regulation. It falls into the category of ‘overly restrictive regulation,’ the one area 
where Republicans are willing to tolerate federal market authority. Here, the main goal is 
to stop GMO food from being labeled and shifting responsibility for maritime regulation 
from the more stringent EPA to the Coast Guard. 93 Being a minority among hundreds of 
pages of proposals, it still raises the question, whether with Republicans controlling 
                                                 
90 On regulatory principles: “pursue and draw from local solutions” (House Republicans 2016d, 
8); on health care “regulate plans at a more local level” (House Republicans 2016a, 14); on terrorism: “we 
should rely on local forces to defeat terrorists,” (House Republicans 2016b, 9); on agency rule-making “an 
obligation that meaningful consultation with relevant state and local governments occur before a 
regulation” (House Republicans 2016c, 8); on welfare: “increase Local Control and Flexibility” (House 
Republicans 2016b, 18).  
91 Pub.L. 114-216, 114 STAT. 834 (2016). 
92 Introduced in House and Senate in 2017: S.168, H.R. 1154, 115 Cong. (2017). 
93 See S. Rept. 115-16, 115th Cong (2017). 
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Congress and the Presidency, they will be more likely to embrace federal market 
authority. In one sense, this is not surprising. In many of the cases here, Republicans have 
opportunistically voted for increases in federal power despite their competitive federalism 
stance. However, in this case, legislation might still fail due to resistance by states with 
significant waterways (Saiyid 2017). In another sense though, the main point is that 
competitive federalism creates an ideational obstacle against systematic mobilization 
around federal market authority. This seems unlikely to change, especially given the 
vehemence with which conservative think tanks defend the theory, as we will see in the 
next chapter.  
III.d. Summary and Conclusion 
In short then, reviewing writings and campaign documents by conservatives from 
Reagan to Ryan reveals that their brand of neoliberalism is specifically American. It 
combines great confidence in markets with a general critique of all government action, 
particularly federal regulation. This flows from and combines with a theory that 
conceptualizes government as principally flawed mechanism, which can only be 
disciplined through jurisdictional competition. It follows that the regulatory role of 
government is not examined (in terms of efficiency) but rejected. Markets are thought to 
follow naturally from the withdrawal of government from markets and from public affairs 
more generally. 
This conceptualization of market suggests to prefer local over central power, 
expresses no concern for local protectionism, and involves no comprehensive assessment 
of market barriers. This is exactly what I found when reviewing the major policy 
priorities of Republican administrations and House speakers, who were self-declared free 
market advocates. Most of their thinking is focused on and around spending and taxation, 
driven by the idea that cutting both would lead to more market. Unlimited optimism in 
the power of markets also leads them to embrace deregulation, mostly conceptualized as 
reducing business costs, and getting government out of the way. Their theory also 
includes a strong commitment to decentralization, sometimes more rhetorically than 
practically—however, here the effects can more strongly be seen in what they have not 
done. While Republicans have not devolved significant powers to state governments, 
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they have also not pursued any significant preemption legislation in areas with interstate 
barriers. There are exceptions to this characterization; in a piecemeal fashion, federal 
market authority has been increased in some areas, usually either due to business 
mobilization, or to create socially conservative outcomes. However, this does not deny 
the overall pattern. A strong competitive federalism rhetoric prevents any systematic pro-
market mobilization around federal market authority.  
The next chapter will lend more credence to this argument by providing historical 
contextualization and theoretical elaboration of competitive federalism thinking. Based 
expert interviews at conservative think tank, I document the specific interlinking beliefs 
within competitive federalism and demonstrate how this conception of markets diffused 
from the libertarian strand of law and economics scholarship, i.e. the conservative legal 
movement, through think tanks into federal policy. Like federal policy-makers, scholars 
at think tanks regularly overlook how state and local jurisdictions undermine the single 
market, question the need for federal market authority, and even when seeing the 
necessity of federal regulation, often oppose it. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ASYMMETRIC DIFFUSION OF ACADEMIC IDEAS INTO THE CONSERVATIVE 
AGENDA—THE THINK TANK LINK 
The last chapter provided a proximate cause for the outcome, i.e. the broad 
hostility of American neoliberals to federal authority and thus their tendency to overlook 
interstate market barriers. As demonstrated, it does not seem to have occurred to most 
American conservatives that certain elements of their economic goals might have been 
furthered by strong and general federal rules binding sub-national levels of government to 
standards of open and non-discriminatory exchange. I located this proximate cause in the 
attitude of prominent Republican policy leaders and advisors. Through the filtering of 
ideas—competitive federalism in abstract theory, deeply American-conservative in 
content and motivation—they consistently interpreted federal authority as antithetical to 
their neoliberal economic agenda. Their negative view of government as ultimately 
serving special interests, suggested imagining markets in opposition to government 
activity, in particular in opposition to the most prominent government role of taxation and 
spending. This allowed for an agenda built around a fiscal project of cutting government 
spending and taxation to become the dominant ideational framework from the 1980s to 
today. This also led American conservatives to overlook arguments about how certain 
uses of federal authority could foster open markets—instead consolidating the view that 
markets are natural arenas that flourish with minimal central government regulation. If 
government was thought to be necessary, they preferred local power over central power, 
having no concerns for subnational protectionist policies and outcomes. 
In some sense, the deep and historical causes of this specific amalgamation in 
American neoliberalism remain under the veil of complex multi-causality. The vast 
literature on American Conservatism is a testament to that94. For instance, one historical 
                                                 
94 For an overview see (Gross, Medvetz, and Russell 2011). A few illustrative example for this 
literature include: the conservative movement is conceptualized as status competition and backlash (Lo 
1982); as free-market coalition (Prasad 2006), held together by material interests or cultural resources and 
practices (Toplin 2006); as an intellectual movement (Thorne 1990); as deliberative fusionism (for instance 
Hart 2006) between an libertarian intellectual network (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Doherty 2007) and a 
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thread that led mid-century conservatives to oppose federal authority was the New Deal, 
when Franklin Delano Roosevelt created new forms of federal economic policy over 
substantial business opposition. Business’ skepticism of federal authority was reinforced 
in the 1960s, in opposition to Lyndon Johnson’s construction of the ‘Great Society’ 
agenda built around FDR’s policy foundations.  
Another historical thread that created principled antipathy to federal power among 
conservatives was the civil rights movement. As New Deal Democrats built a new 
political coalition that included Southern and urban African-Americans, Republicans 
moved into the South and became champions of ‘states’ rights’ against federally-imposed 
desegregation. Fusing the different strands of conservatism, religious, traditional, far 
right, and market fundamentalism, was a deliberate project championed by many since 
the founding of the National Review by William Buckley in 1955 (Allister 2003). 
Historically contingent but importantly, anti-government populism and anti-communism 
could unite free-market advocates, for whom government intervention was inefficient, 
with religious conservatives, who feared the imposition of liberal policies like abortion 
rights, and with the far-right, who feared imposition of racial equality through the federal 
government (Allister 2003). However, according to Joseph Lowndes, it was only 
Reagan’s articulation of these ideas that finally created a successful fusion, “seamlessly 
combining conservativism, racism, and anti-government populism into a new 
majoritarian discourse founding the Republican regime” (Lowndes 2008, 160). The 
alliance was held together by an anti-federal government sentiment—sourced from 
theoretical arguments by libertarians and conservatives but driven by pragmatic-strategic 
political considerations.  
As Lowndes emphasizes, this movement came together around Reagan’s agenda 
for several different reasons. To some degree, economic priorities were traded-off against 
other commitments—some of them might have preferred stronger federal authority 
against interstate barriers to commerce, but they ended up opposing federal authority 
                                                 
neoconservative intellectual network (Ehrman 1996). More clearly within political science there are 
materialist/economic approaches (for instance W. C. Berman and Kutler 1998; M. Smith 2011), ideational 
(for instance Prasad 2006; Blyth 2002) and cultural (for instance Lowndes 2008), as well as institutional 
(for instance Pierson and Skocpol 2011), especially focusing on think tanks and related organizations (for 
instance Stahl 2016; Teles 2008). 
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rather broadly to achieve goals on social policy or race. However, by the time period 
addressed in this study, most of these actors seem to have convinced themselves that their 
opposition to federal authority was desirable for markets too; arguing that less federal 
power was directly good for markets, the economy, and their social policy priorities. 
Hence, this analysis, does not concern itself with the broad causes of the conservative 
movement, like for instance the role of race which has received much due attention in the 
literature (among others Schulman and Zelizer 2008; Rieder 1990; Edsall 2007; Lowndes 
2008; Hohle 2015)—instead I focus on the economic ideas that simultaneously have 
enabled and were shaped by this alliance. For my purposes, it is important to note that 
these developments provided an opening for the hegemony of supply-siders and other 
neoliberals, and thereby for ideas of competitive federalism, as opposed to ordoliberal 
ideas, in the Republican Party and the national agenda. So, while this chapter hints at and 
acknowledges the broader context, it is more narrowly concerned with the lineage and 
current influence of the powerful conception of market ideas, I have called competitive 
federalism.  
In this chapter, I show that conservative think tanks are an important conduit to 
explain the diffusion and maintenance of conceptions of competitive federalism within 
the neoliberal agenda. My analysis, based on interviews with scholars at the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation (Heritage), and the CATO Institute 
(CATO), searches of their online archives, and secondary sources, emphasizes two 
crucial links: asymmetric adoption of ideas from academia and agenda setting. In the first 
part of this chapter, I demonstrate that the competitive federalism conception of markets 
as a specific interpretation of Hayek’s neoliberalism was very influential in economics 
and political science research in the second half of the 20th century. However, the 
diffusion of these ideas into conservative think tanks was asymmetric. Within academia 
these ideas became more and more nuanced, subject to many limitations, exceptions, and 
revisions. However, within the conservative legal movement, and with the absorption of 
those scholars into think tanks there as well, the ideas became simplified. I will 
demonstrate that these scholars see the tenets of competitive federalism less as 
researchable propositions and more as unshakable axioms. As a result, conservative legal 
scholars at think tanks have embraced cuts to spending and taxes, deregulation, and 
152 
decentralization as an orthodoxy. They either do not see (ideational blinding), or do not 
think that there are any feasible remedies (ideational reluctance) to interstate barriers. 
Thus, federal market authority is consistently opposed as a means to generate openness 
and market dynamism. Instead, they see it as only necessary condition for competitive 
markets the withdrawal of government. While the broader developments within the 
conservative movement, as noted earlier, are also important historical conditions, we can 
draw a very clear intellectual line from Hayek through these academic scholarships to 
their eventual absorption into these agenda-setting (conservative) think tanks. Their 
idiosyncratic transformation of neoliberalism, connecting ideas about markets and 
(opposition to) federal government, are key to understanding the persistence of interstate 
barriers in the US. 
It may be worth reiterating, I am not contradicting the broad literature on 
conservatism in the US. Instead, I am arguing that pointing at the connection between 
states’ rights, federalism, and race is an insufficient explanation. It is competitive 
federalism that allowed conservatives to knit together their social reasons for opposition 
to federal authority with economic arguments in the same direction—as opposed to 
seeing them as a trade-off. Only because of their construction of an economic theory in 
which markets flourish in the absence of federal authority, were they able to believe so 
strongly in both neoliberal economics and the rights of conservative states to resist liberal 
social norms. Otherwise the might have been in conflict. Therefore, this chapter explores 
how competitive federalism came to make economic policy sense, by tracing the 
intellectual history of neoliberal thinking in the US. In other words, while race might 
have been necessary to make this agenda a viable political strategy, it leaves out how it 
became seen as a theoretically viable agenda among scholars. Without the latter, a 
conservative social policy for white Southerners combined with an embrace of federal 
market authority could have been equally plausible. 
In the second part of this chapter, I demonstrate that these ideas are still dominant 
at conservative think tanks, which is important due to their generally acknowledged role 
as agenda-setters within Republican policy-making circles. I show that ‘competitive 
federalism,’ even today, distracts them from developing a comprehensive assessment of 
interstate barriers, and creates opposition to federal market authority; consistently, they 
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prefer local government even when it proliferates obstacles to competition. When 
possible, I give as evidence not only general statements by interviewees showing the 
absence of thinking about market barriers, but also provide their anti-federal market 
authority position in regard to the issues revealed by my construction case study: they 
either oppose (or ignore) uniform building codes, uniform licensing or mutual 
recognition, as well as outlawing discriminatory local procurement practices. In addition, 
I describe as specifically telling their general dislike of ‘EU-style’ regulations that have 
significantly fostered the single market. As I show, judicial activism is the only federal 
agent conservatives consider as potentially viable for reducing market barriers. However, 
this is internally controversial, leading to incoherent positions among scholars, sometimes 
opposing and sometimes supporting more court scrutiny in regard to state action. Overall, 
this sums up to a more complete picture of why there has been no mobilization around 
federal market authority. 
IV.a. Historical Contextualization of Competitive Federalism  
The role of conservative think tanks in the rise of the new Right in the US has 
been widely acknowledged (J. A. Smith 1991; Medvetz 2012; Ricci 1993; Rich 2004; 
Stahl 2016). “Many of the most visible expert voices today emanate from public policy 
think tanks. These think tanks have contributed to a transformation in the role of experts 
in American policy making […] their work often represents pre-formed points of view 
rather than even attempts at neutral, rational analysis” (Rich 2004, 4). The ‘Southern 
Strategy’ of the Republicans and their attempt to create a better defined ideology based 
on embracing free markets is connected with the rise of a new ideological conservative 
think tank that aggressively markets its research: “Avowing that ideas were the only 
weapons able to overturn the [liberal] establishment and working diligently to build an 
establishment of their own, conservatives founded and strengthened scores of 
institutions” (J. A. Smith 1991, 182). Conservative think tanks are part of a larger 
conservative organizational network, “primarily motivated by ideological principle” that 
includes the libertarian strand of the law and economics movement, as well as 
conservative public interest law firms (Teles 2008, 274). 
154 
To understand how conservative think tanks become substantial part of the 
American political arena, and crucial for the development of the ‘Reagan Revolution,’ 
they need to be historically contextualized. The first American think tanks emerged at the 
turn of the 20th century as means of progressives reformers to further the impact of (social 
science) on solving policy problems as politically neutrally as possible (Rich 2004). With 
the growth of government after the New Deal, there was “Enhanced institutional demand 
for independent ideas and experts, which think tanks were equipped to provide. The 
financial supporters of think tanks favored […] strict adherence to conventions of social 
science research” (Rich 2004, 43). However, in the 1970s a counter-revolution started 
and conservative think tanks with explicitly political missions proliferated driven by“(1) 
The political mobilization of business and corporations, (2) the political conversion and 
aggressive advocacy of neoconservative intellectuals, (3) the political mobilization of 
evangelical and fundamentalist Christians, and (4) the ascendance of neoclassical 
economic theory at universities and among key policy makers” (Rich 2004, 45). The 
most important of these new think tanks were the ascendancy of the older American 
Enterprise Institute95, the founding of the Cato Institute96 and Heritage Foundation97, as 
well as numerous smaller conservative and libertarian think tanks on the state level. 
Surveys among Congressional staffers and capitol-journalists rate these three think tanks 
as some of the most influential ones in politics, especially among Republicans (Rich 
2004, 84; Stahl 2016; D. S. Jones 2012, 162). Congressional staffers rely on their 
research, newspapers regularly cite them, scholars from these foundations often testify 
before Congress, and regularly get drafted into Republican administrations (Rich 2004, 
98). Another political scientist, examining the rise of think tanks agrees: “Power in 
                                                 
95 Founded as the American Enterprise Association in 1938 by a group of anti-New Deal, New 
York businessmen around Lewis H. Brown, specifically to fight price controls (Stahl 2016, 14). Renamed 
in 1961. Did not become influential until the 1970s under the leadership of William Baroody (D. S. Jones 
2012, 155). 
96 Founded as the Charles Koch Foundation in 1974 (renamed CATO in 1976) by Ed Crane, 
Murray Rothbard, and Charles Koch with a more strictly ‘libertarian’ focus on promoting the ideas of 
Hayek and Friedman (D. S. Jones 2012, 165). 
97 Founded in 1973 by Paul Weyrich, Edwin Feulner, and Joseph Coors with fusionist goals and a 
specific focus on influencing Congress (D. S. Jones 2012, 164). 
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Washington cannot be measured precisely, yet think tanks surely have a good deal of it” 
(Ricci 1993, 2). 
Starting in the 1970s, conservatives think tanks began employing many young 
scholars with PhDs or M.A.s directly out of university or more often law school, with the 
goal of making them into advocates (C. Holden 1981). There developed a revolving door 
between conservative think tanks, the conservative legal movement mobilized through 
institutions like the Olin Foundation, the Federalist Society, and openly libertarian law 
schools like the University of Chicago, George Mason University, or University of 
Virginia (Teles 2008). These new scholars, trained in law, but harnessing neoclassical 
economic theory, operated under the theory that their conservative bias98 was a positive 
attribute that would ‘balance out’ the market place of ideas (Stahl 2016, 47; Teles 2008). 
Starting with Reagan, Republican policy-makers heavily relied on these new conservative 
scholarly networks, instead of asking some ‘irrelevant academic’ from a research 
university (E. Smith 2014). Prominent scholars from conservative think tanks would hold 
important federal offices and vice versa; for instance, Antonin Scalia, conservative 
Supreme Court judge appointed by Reagan, used to edit AEI’s ‘Regulation’ papers; 
similarly, Reagan tapped many think tank scholars for executive offices, from the Federal 
Trade Commission to the Council Economic Advisors99 (G. Easterbrook 1986). The 
Reagan administration hired the entire founding cadre of the Federalist Society (Teles 
2008, 142). 
Scholars of neoliberalism have long emphasized the conservative scholarship-
policy-link, emphasizing the causal role economic theories like monetarism, public 
choice, or regulatory capture, have played in setting the conservative agenda (Blyth 2002; 
                                                 
98 According to Jason Stahl, leaders at the older Hoover Institute and AEI, as well as the later 
founded Heritage and CATO described Brookings, Ford, and Academia as a “liberally biased intellectual 
monolith” (Stahl 2016, 52). According to a review of archival documents by Stahl, William Baroody at 
AEI among other created the idea of a “marketplace of ideas as a way to undermine the liberal technocratic 
consensus. Such a framework elevated values such as balance and openness to a higher plane than those of 
nonpartisanship, neutrality, and objectivity,” explicitly pursuing a “conservative bias” (Stahl 2016, 47, 52). 
This is pretty clear in many think tank publications, for instance see Ed Feulner’s essay, founder of 
Heritage, on “Winning the War of Ideas”(Feulner 1986). Expressed by a different author: “Heritage is 
quick to admit, however, that its purpose is advocacy rather than academic research” (J. A. Smith 1991, 
205). 
99 See also previous chapter, p. 118. 
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Prasad 2006). Stahl observes, “AEI, Heritage, and other conservative think tanks 
recognized that the very idea of ‘supply-side economics’ was a new one that needed to be 
‘sold’ to the public and policymakers well before a conservative was in the White House. 
[…] Conservative think tanks were integral in selling this new product in the market 
place of ideas” (Stahl 2016, 96). Given that conservative and libertarian think tanks were 
integral to the shape of Reagan’s policy agenda, we have to understand think tanks if we 
want to know why their agenda turned out so differently from market-building projects in 
other countries. 
My analysis reveals that think tank attitudes are very similar to what I have 
described as the ideas of neoliberal policy-makers, albeit on more consciously theoretical 
foundation. Despite nuances, what they have in common is the goal to bring about more 
markets and individual liberty combined with antipathy to federal (market) authority. 
Their primary strategy is deregulation (less government activity altogether). If this fails, 
or a regulation is considered somehow necessary, their secondary strategy is 
decentralization—markets are thought to evolve naturally as response to less government, 
and only decentralized government is seen as tolerable. This is theoretically founded on 
two central beliefs:  
(1) is the problem of government; my interviewees all believed that government 
and regulation always distort the market to favor small groups. They have elevated public 
choice-derived ‘capture theory’ to an axiom with universal applicability (Stigler 1971). In 
every case, they assume small groups (industry, bureaucrats, legislators) to be better able 
to influence regulation to their benefit. It follows that due to these universal forces (i.e. 
public choice assumptions) ‘good’ regulation is basically impossible—the only solution 
is reliance on market forces, even if the results are suboptimal (M. F. Cohen and Stigler 
1971, 181). This means, private regulatory solutions, like industry standards or private 
certificates, are assumed to be always superior to government prescription. Thus 
“regulatory reform” becomes “abandonment” of regulation (Croley 2009, 22). 
Competition and regulation are seen as by definition antithetical100—except when it 
                                                 
100 “Regulation displaces competition. Displacement is the purpose, indeed the definition, of 
regulation” (F. Easterbrook 1983, 23). 
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coincides with their second central belief, the disciplining effects of (jurisdictional) 
competition.  
(2) Here they assume that competition among states is the only mechanism that 
can lead to policy that delivers broader benefits, or at least distorts the market less. In a 
modification of Tiebout’s original theory (Tiebout 1956), they argue that jurisdictional 
competition will force states to govern well, i.e. provide public goods according to public 
preferences and regulate efficiently, because otherwise capital and labor will, ‘vote with 
their feet’ and ‘exit’ the jurisdiction (Hirschman and Hirschman 1970). In this view of 
competition, the central government appears as a ‘cartel’ in which competing regulators, 
at the behest of producers, collude to “reduce the number of potential competitors and 
dilute entrepreneurial incentives” (Bratton and McCahery 1997, 204). 
While those two beliefs are not necessarily connected, they are in American 
conservative thinking. This combination precludes a comprehensive assessment of 
interstate barriers, or a federal single market building project. Several interpretive leaps 
can only be understood in reference to the ideational nature of the conservative research 
project at think tanks. For instance, it is not quite clear that 50 state governments will be 
less likely to be subject to special interest capture than the national government. In fact, 
one might imagine that on the federal level, mobilization is so costly, public scrutiny so 
high, expertise so much better, and mobilized interests so diverse, that legislators find it 
easier to follow the public interest at that level (R. T. Moore and Giovinazzo 2012; Esty 
1996; Stewart 1977). However, my interviewees consistently rejected that reasoning, 
either repeating the axiom that central government will be flawed or that local 
competition ‘just works.’ Empirical evidence, questioning the formative influence of 
jurisdictional competition on policy, the superiority of decentralization, or the formative 
influence of ‘capture,’ is disregarded (Bratton and McCahery 1997; Esty and Geradin 
2001; Bagley and Revesz 2006).  
Another similar interpretive leap rejects the necessity of some federal regulation 
to maintain interstate commerce (i.e. prevent a trade war). In theory, all scholars 
acknowledge that some federal powers are necessary for the maintenance of a national 
market; for instance, nobody argues that states should be allowed to levy tariffs. 
However, in practical applications, believers in local competition will usually argue that 
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the case at hand does not meet the conditions for federal intervention (F. Easterbrook 
1983; Epstein and Greve 2007). Instead, they either referred to (1), the outcomes of 
federal government intervention will be worse, for instance regarding occupational 
licensing, or (2), local competition will work eventually, for example regarding local 
procurement preferences. As ancillary, some suggested a stronger role for courts101 to 
prevent this tendency, while also acknowledging that many conservative judges prefer 
local control even more than the conservative mainstream. Finally, some argued that 
certain interstate barriers could not possible exist, because if they did, powerful industry 
groups would have mobilized against it. For instance, when I explained to one 
interviewee the obstacles caused by the heterogeneity of standards, he replied, that firms 
would have done something about it, if it were ‘really’ a problem. 
IV.a.1. The Link to States’ Rights and Race  
To understand why this strand of neoliberal thinking took hold in conservative 
scholarship, we have to pay attention to two factors. One is cultural resonance and its 
strategic employment. In terms of how movement frames have to resonate with pre-
existing collective identities, it is easy to see why local control and decentralization 
would resonate more with Americans than federal market authority (Snow et al. 1986; 
Polletta and Jasper 2001). A whole strand of scholarship focuses on an anti-government 
culture among Americans, so it seems likely that neoliberals would emphasize the 
competition-part over the federal market authority-part, while developing their ideology 
(Hartz 1991; L. F. Goldstein 2001). To some degree, federalism arguments have always 
been “major weapons” in debates over American political development (Robertson 2012, 
40). In addition, important social conservatives, like Frank Meyer or Russel Kirk, 
advocated decentralization for social policy reasons, creating possible commonalities 
with libertarians (J. H. Adler 2004; Russello 2004). Undoubtedly, anti-communism and 
paranoia over the Soviet Union, as well as the failure of ‘embedded liberalism’ to deal 
                                                 
101 Judges are somehow thought as an exception to the capture thesis (implied here for instance 
Greve 2005a). Many scholars, maybe due to their background in law, treat legislators as always subject to 
‘capture’ and judges as open to rational argument about how to organize the economy (for a good example, 
see F. Easterbrook 1983). 
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with the economic problems of the 1970s, created a fertile context for anti-government 
ideas (D. S. Jones 2012, 142; McGirr 2002). 
More deliberately, some scholars argue, the ‘Southern Strategy’ of Republicans 
included the adoption of ‘colorblind racism,’ states’ rights, and federalism arguments as a 
successful political mobilization strategy102 (Lowndes 2008, 31, 51ff.; Hohle 2015; D. S. 
King and Smith 2005). Scholarship on ‘racial orders,’ shows that states’ rights and 
federalism were one of the ways in which conservatives equivocated between rational, 
equitable policies for economic growth and playing on racial fears, especially of white 
Southerners (Carter 1996, 1f.; O’Reilly 1995, 350ff.; D. S. King and Smith 2005). 
Randolph Hohle, in his book on race and neoliberalism, argues that the whole of the 
American neoliberal project, cutting taxation, spending, and regulation, needs to be 
understood in relation to race:  
As desegregation became a political reality, southern whites abandoned their 
support for public life and welfare state political projects. This made 
austerity, tax cuts, and privatization meaningful in white political circles that 
[had previously] pushed for things like a progressive income tax and more 
money for public schools. […] The fusion and overlap between the 
segregationists and liberal business classes brought middle class whites to the 
side of pro-business neoliberal policy103. (Hohle 2015, 2) 
                                                 
102 From the 1950s onwards, conservatives “Thought that the issue of states’ rights, animated by 
desegregation, could exceed the boundaries of race and come to shape other political issues of the day that 
were important to northern conservatives, such as the rights of states to enact antisubersive legislation, and 
confront issues of price regulation, farm subsidies, and ‘federal aid to—and jurisdiction over—education, 
housing and road-building.’ These conservatives were willing to embrace the cause of massive resistance 
[to federal power] and make it part of the conservative agenda, bud segregationist southerners had to 
likewise extend their racial states’ rights stand to all conservative ideas and abandon populist New Deal 
commitments” (Lowndes 2008, 53f.).  
103 While convincing within the cases studies, in respect to neoliberalism as a whole, locating 
race—specifically the framing of a white-private-good/ black-public-bad discourse—as the only cause 
seems exaggerated. Hohle tries to explain everything as expression of racism. Austerity: “The preferred 
method of maintaining white power became exercising white control over state budgets. Austerity freed 
whites from the economic burden of establishing racial equality” (Hohle 2015, 8). Privatization: public 
institutions were denounced as “wasteful and inefficient” because African-American became integrated” 
(Hohle 2015, 9). Regulation: “black-public makes regulations something more than what they actually are. 
They are not simply rules to protect the public; they are unfair rules that constrain good whites ability to 
run the economy” (Hohle 2015, 12). Taxation: “The black civil rights movement changed how whites 
viewed taxes, as whites no longer supported using white tax dollars to fund desegregated public amenities 
that whites no longer used” (Hohle 2015, 13). 
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However, what those scholars seem to get wrong is the specific theoretical shape 
of the American neoliberal project. Given the evidence I present, the claim that 
“neoliberalism does not see the market itself or rational economic behavior as purely 
naturel. Both are constructed […] and require political intervention and orchestration,” 
seems to fit more clearly the ideology of European ordoliberals than American 
competitive federalists104 (W. Brown 2003, 37f.).  
Of course, there were reasons beyond race for conservatives to support states’ 
rights. For example, for some it was simply the fact that seizing power in the states 
seemed more likely than in Congress (Robertson 2012, 149f.). Even more broadly, 
throughout American industrialization in the 19th century questions about federalism had 
always been central to political debates over how to create a national economy105 
(Robertson 2012, 74ff.). However, while in the 19th century arguments consciously talked 
about federal market authority and national markets, in the second half of the 20th century 
these arguments had vanished. 
To be clear, I am not challenging the political salience of these arguments, but 
rather argue that without the economic argument described here, these ideas could not 
have become dominant among conservatives. To render other states’ rights agendas 
(social, racial, …) consistent with neoliberal market thinking, it was important to 
construct economic arguments in which federal authority over markets was illegitimate 
even for purposes of removing many interstate barriers. Without those theories, one could 
have reasonably expected a different ‘transformation of racial orders’ leading to different 
alignments around federal market authority (D. S. King and Smith 2005).  
                                                 
104 For similar statements about American Conservatives embracing the state to create markets see 
Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011), Dawson and Francis (2016), Lester (2015), and Hohle (2018).  
105 “Federalism […] allowed those who opposed government efforts to restrict market expansion 
to dig in behind states’ rights and oppose the expansion of national power to mitigate the effects. 
Federalism in the United States tended to be “market-preserving”: it limited the ability of American public 
officials to restrict business and to redistribute wealth from those who profited from capitalism to others” 
(Robertson 2012, 77). 
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IV.a.2. Competitive Federalism as Viable Theoretical Argument  
The second factor, which falls within the realm of my analysis, is therefore the 
intellectual lineage of competitive federalism thinking and its axiomatic acceptance 
within think tanks. To understand this, we have to look at how Hayek’s ideas were 
received in the US and how they were transformed within their adoption. As already 
mentioned, it was Friedman among others who interpreted Hayek in a way that elevated 
limiting the role of central government to the main principle and established this thinking 
at the University of Chicago106. He argued that while there might be need for government 
intervention due to market failure, in most cases this is a bad idea because politics in 
most cases leads to even worse results107 (M. Friedman 1962, 164ff.). For example, in the 
case of natural monopolies he writes, “I reluctantly conclude that, if tolerable, private 
monopoly may be the least of the evils” (23). The implication for federal market 
authority is clear: “if government is to exercise power, better in the county than in the 
state, better in the state than in Washington” (3). Beyond central rules against explicit 
state discrimination, subunits should be sufficiently disciplined by interstate regulatory 
competition, not central mandates. For Friedman, there is a clear connection between free 
markets, i.e. “capitalism,” and freedom more broadly (15ff.). It the former that creates 
and maintains the latter, government is an imposition on both (16f.). This is related to his 
view of markets as ‘natural’ order—competitive markets will evolve automatically when 
government intervention ceases (165). 
This interpretation became dominant in much of American academia, mostly 
because neoliberal thought fused with the push to apply the parsimonious models of 
neoclassical economics to politics, law, and regulation (D. S. Jones 2012, 88). The 
“Chicago school of economic theory was perhaps the most influential group in terms of 
the development of neoliberal politics” in the 1950 and 1960s (D. S. Jones 2012, 90). 
                                                 
106 “At the heart of many of these developments in the postwar period was the figure of Milton 
Friedman, who, along with Hayek, became the most important neoliberal activist and theorist, as well as 
the leader of the Chicago school of economics” (D. S. Jones 2012, 88f.) 
107 Friedman was much more interested in government failure than market failure, often attributing 
bad developments, like the Great Depression, to government interventions distorting the market (M. 
Friedman 1962, 166f.; D. S. Jones 2012, 109). In his earlier, more Hayekian writings, he was much more 
open to the use of federal market authority (M. Friedman 1951). 
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While older scholars at Chicago, like Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, Lloyd Mints, and Henry 
Simons, had worked on pure economic theory within marginalism, the newer generation 
pursued an “aggressively pro-free-market research program,” expanding free market 
analysis to everything from regulation to sex (D. S. Jones 2012, 91f.). George Stigler, 
also at Chicago, argued that regulatory agencies will eventually be captured by powerful 
industry interests (Stigler 1971). Positions like this undermined any faith one might have 
had in the federal government’s ability to police subnational units. While William Riker, 
founder of the rational choice school in political science, lamented inefficient outcomes 
from sub-national competition, the dominant federalism perspective soon agreed on its 
beneficial effects (Riker 1964; P. E. Peterson 2012).  
The Virginia School of Economics developed similar arguments by applying 
public choice theory to federalism. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullocks’s “main 
political preoccupation was working out how to use constitutional mechanisms to limit 
[federal] state intervention, taxation, and spending” (D. S. Jones 2012, 130f.). The result 
of these ‘fiscal federalism’ models is that only jurisdictional competition can protect 
citizen from government exploitation and provide optimal bundles of public goods (Oates 
2005; Tullock 1969): ‘‘Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized’’ 
(Brennan and Buchanan 2006). The main mechanism behind this result are exit options—
federalism gives citizens choices that discipline subnational government. Accordingly, 
welfare increases as mobile individuals choose among local offerings of public goods 
(Tiebout 1956). While these arguments where developed in respect to fiscal policy and 
local public goods, they were soon also applied to regulatory policy and standardization 
(Feld 2014). 
Even in political science these theories were well received, maybe best known 
through Barry Weingast’s model of “market-preserving federalism.” He argues that 
markets do well if “Subnational authorities have primary authority over regulating the 
economy […]. As long as capital and labor are mobile, market-preserving federalism 
constrains the lower units in their attempts to place political limits on economic activity, 
because resources will move to other jurisdictions” (Weingast 1995, 5). This implies that 
markets appear naturally—little deliberate action in the center or in the states is 
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necessary—fitting with the broader image of the market as a naturalistic, default set of 
relationships. 
Neoliberal thought, American style, could have remained a purely academic 
phenomenon, “Were it not for the growth of a network to spread its message. […] Think 
tanks acted as nodes that drew in developing neoliberal ideas from Hayek, Friedman, 
Buchanan” and wider academia, focusing on their specific policy implications (D. S. 
Jones 2012, 135). Looking at writings on competitive federalism among those 
conservatives, especially those coming from the conservative legal movement, and 
contrasting it with what economists and policy-makers, particularly in Europe, write 
contemporaneously, makes clear that it is much better understood as context-specific 
ideational product than social scientific truth. What had been lines of inquiry for 
academics, became the axioms reported above, with the mentioned problems and 
inconsistencies often ignored. 
Conservative think tank scholars with prominent writings on regulation and 
federalism were to a large degree part of the libertarian strand of the law and economics 
movement (Teles 2008). In the 1970s, conservatives “Saw in law and economics a 
powerful critique of state intervention in the economy, and a device for gaining a 
foothold in the world of elite law schools” (Teles 2008, 2008; R. A. Posner 1973). 
Congruent with entrepreneurial politics in think tanks, the conservative movement also 
mobilized to transform the interpretation of the law, starting at the same place, the 
University of Chicago (Teles 2008, 91). Legal scholars like Richard Posner and Richard 
Epstein did not only apply the lessons from their economist colleagues, they also set out 
to capture law schools and judgeships with their thinking, mobilizing their networks 
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through conservative think tanks, the Federalist Society,108 the Olin Foundation109 and the 
Law and Economics Center110.  
However, soon there was a division within law and economics. Scholars at 
conservative law schools and thinks tanks kept a strong focus on their political priors, not 
wavering in their belief in the assumptions of a simple rational models of law and 
politics. Conservative “Proponents of law and economics [like Epstein, Easterbrook, or 
Posner] offer the market as a model for thinking about the law,” and then conclude that 
these mathematical models are the only and accurate way to understand the workings of 
law and politics (Tushnet 1997, 47). “Chicago style law and economics, [is] not just more 
libertarian than what evolved at Harvard [and other schools, but is also] more of a 
‘lawyer’s’ version of the field, as opposed to the more economist-dominated Harvard 
variant” (Teles 2008, 205; R. A. Posner and Shavell 2006). Legal scholars, who remain 
indebted to Chicago style law and economics, found a permanent home in conservative 
think tanks and conservative law schools like George Mason University (Teles 2008, 
207). Those scholars hold more closely the competitive federalism beliefs, often ignoring 
the nuances and contradictions accumulated by academic research, thereby making their 
neoliberal project one of decentralization and inattention to interstate barriers.  
At the same time, with law and economics becoming mainstream, many legal 
scholars without conservative priors, became more nuanced, tracking the developments in 
economics more closely. Initially, mainstream scholars declared the libertarian law and 
economics project “dead on arrival,” due to the “obvious problems” with “simple rational 
choice models” (M. Horwitz 1980, 905). In 1980, Morton Horwitz, professor of legal 
history at Harvard, summarized: “I have the strong feeling that the economic analysis of 
law has ‘peaked out’ as the latest fad in legal scholarship […]. Future legal historians will 
                                                 
108 A conservative legal network founded in 1982 by law students ‘disillusioned’ with the liberal 
consensus, including Robert Bork, Edwin Meese, and Antonin Scalia—all scholars that would play 
important roles in the Reagan administration (Teles 2008, 141). 
109 Founded by John Olin in 1953, was central in the establishment of law and economics centers, 
the founding of the Federalist Society and Heritage, as well as the support of young legal scholars to embed 
conservative economic thinking in society (Miller 2005). 
110 Founded by Henry G. Manne 1974 to educate judges about law and economics (Teles 2008, 
108). 
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need to exercise their imaginations to figure out why so many people could have taken 
most of this stuff so seriously” (905). He was wrong. Economic thinking about the law 
became mainstream but “it came to resemble disciplinary economics in its overall 
ideological coloration,” “a far cry from law and economics’ former-free market 
enthusiasm111” (Teles 2008, 182). Now, non-conservative legal scholars, like Daniel Esty 
at Yale or Steven Shavell at Harvard, use more complex models that lead to less certain 
conclusions, precluding grand claims like ‘local competition works.’ Another scholar of 
legal history at Harvard, Mark Tushnet concludes, “The better legal economists got as 
economists, the less clear the conservative spin of law and economics became” (Tushnet 
2009, 447).  
In the following few paragraphs, I will illustrate this division in the scholarship 
between those that became more nuanced those who stayed very conservative. The point 
of the presented critiques is not to show that public choice or capture theory is objectively 
wrong—it is to suggest that conservative inattention to interstate barriers does not arise 
from a social scientific consensus, but rather is better understood as an ideational 
phenomenon that ties together several theories that happened to stimulate their 
imagination.  
In two book lengths reviews of the regulatory competition literature, Esty and 
Geradin as well as Geradin and McCahery write about competitive federalism as 
described by Frank Easterbrook112, Michael Greve113, and Richard Posner114:  
The theory originated in public economics with the publication of the Tiebout 
model in 1956, which, in turn, influenced its own field profoundly. 
Theoretical arbitrage to legal contexts occurred early in the history of law and 
economics. But, in contrast to regulatory competition’s development in its 
                                                 
111 To some degree, Teles writes, it is unclear to which degree libertarians “transformed law 
schools” or “elite law schools transformed law and economics” (Teles 2008, 182). 
112 Professor of Law at Chicago University. Appointed to US Court of Appeals for the seventh 
circuit by Reagan (for instance F. Easterbrook 1983).  
113 Professor of Law at George Mason University. Former John G. Searle Scholar and now 
Adjunct Scholar at AEI. Former Director of the AEI Federalism Project and Federalism Papers. Former 
Chairman of the Competitive Enterprise Institute (for instance Epstein and Greve 2007). 
114 Lecturer in Law at Chicago University. Appointed to US Court of Appeals for the seventh 
circuit by Reagan. Frequent contributor to AEI working paper series (for instance R. A. Posner 1973). 
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home field, where it remained closely tied to the study of the production of 
public goods by state and local governments, lawyers in the United States 
have applied it across an expansive subject matter, from corporate law and 
banking to environmental law and trade law. (Geradin and McCahery 2004, 
2; Esty and Geradin 2001)  
It is no surprise that many of the AEI, CATO, and Heritage scholars, working on 
issues related to interstate barriers or at least federalism, are legal professionals 
associated with one of the conservative law schools. They not only unequivocally 
embrace the theory of competitive federalism, they also apply it to many areas that were 
not covered by the initial theoretical assumptions laid out in the Tiebout model (Esty and 
Geradin 2001, 2; Tiebout 1956). Tiebout applied his model to a limited set of public 
goods, i.e. things local governments ‘produce’ such as police and fire protection, primary 
education, roads, and sewers (Tiebout 1956). However, conservative legal scholars have 
expanded this reasoning to regulation in general115. For example, widely cited116 among 
AEI scholars is Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism (F. 
Easterbrook 1983; Personal Interview, Greve 2017). The article argues that public 
finances and consumer ‘regulatory products’ like labor laws, health and safety standards, 
or contract law can be treated like local public goods (F. Easterbrook 1983). Competition 
will force product innovation and experimentation leading over time to efficient 
regulation that is welfare enhancing. Decentralization leads to an efficiency-enhancing 
race to the top.  
In analogy to the private market, the scholars see federal market authority, or 
jurisdictional cooperation, as “Regulatory equivalent of price-fixing, retarding the 
competitive evolution of efficient law”117 (Geradin and McCahery 2004, 7; F. 
Easterbrook 1983; Greve 2000b). Combined with the belief that regulation, especially at 
the central level, will lead to capture by interest groups, “There emerges a presumption in 
                                                 
115 For more examples of legal scholars explicating the economic argument for federalism, 
considering reasons for federal market authority, but in the end not taking the latter seriously, see 
(Calabresi 1995; LeBoeuf 1994; Epstein 1992). Other scholars have observed this phenomenon too: “It is 
not uncommon for scholars to mention its serious difficulties and then proceed immediately to apply the 
model” (Bratton and McCahery 1997, 221). 
116 See Google Scholar Citation Index. 
117 This seems to imply that international trade agreements are unnecessary.  
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favor of locating regulatory authority at lower level units,” even in cases where 
uniformity might be preferable, like with the existence of strong external effects (Geradin 
and McCahery 2004, 3; for instance Revesz 1995). While they seem to suggest that all 
these conclusions follow from Tiebout’s model, this not quite true. It is much more the 
conclusion they arrive at by combining the idea of regulatory competition with a general 
antipathy to government, justified by public choice literature on regulatory capture 
(Stigler 1971). Given that they see government simply as a revenue maximizer, subject to 
all the kinds of irrationalities of choice pointed out by Kenneth Arrow, and ineffective 
electoral constraints, federal authority is to be avoided (Brennan and Buchanan 2006, 
15ff.). Since federal laws will be subject to private rent seeking activity, but subnational 
laws will be subject to competition, increasing the regulatory authority of states will 
increase the efficiency of the equilibrium (Romano 1993, 48). 
In reality, as many legal and economics scholars point out, the empirical evidence 
of the workings of jurisdictional competitions is mixed, and economic theory generally 
recognizes that often the necessary assumptions are simply not given118. It seem, 
conservative law and economics scholars have mostly ignored these problems due to their 
normative agenda (Bratton and McCahery 1997, 209). Business law experts William 
Bratton and Joseph McCahery argue that these arguments as stated by conservatives, 
“Materially mischaracterizes the theory actually articulated in economic literature. The 
restatement relies on an early generation of economic models, the robustness of which 
long has been questioned by advanced opinion in the field of public economics” (Bratton 
and McCahery 1997, 204). 
This means much regulatory policy might not be suited for understanding via this 
theory, and competitive dynamics might lead to inefficient outcomes. Comparative 
federalism scholar Sbragia for example notes that “there is still no consensus regarding” 
whether “competitive federalism is ‘market-preserving’ (Sbragia 2008, 247). For 
instance, the axiomatic acceptance of this model ignores a vast literature on competitive 
                                                 
118 “We argue that economic theory, in fact, supports neither the sequence of assertions [efficient 
results] nor the bottom-line presumption [mobility] in the theory outlined above. In doing so, we do not 
deny the existence of regulatory competition, however” (Esty and Geradin 2001, 3). 
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races to the bottom, albeit with mixed evidence119 (D. Drezner 2006; D. Vogel 1995; 
Woods 2006; Carruthers and Lamoreaux 2016). More importantly, it ignores the 
complications of real life, where markets are imperfect and information asymmetric, 
where there are external effects and economies of scale, and where people refuse to ‘vote 
with their feet. 
For example, there often is no adequate information about the regulatory product. 
Given the 20,000 different building codes across US jurisdictions, it seems unlikely that 
citizens or even politicians are able to gauge the utility-maximizing level of regulation. 
Even if they wanted to, there is simply not enough information about the effects. 
Similarly, how can we expect regular citizens to judge the optimal level of occupational 
licensing? Even if they had the information necessary, the potential ‘exit’ option would 
be complicated by the fact of a myriad of preferences over other regulatory issues—a 
point that is side-stepped through assumptions in economic models.  
Even the example that most of my interviewees cited as proof, corporate 
chartering, is highly controversial among economists, with some arguing that “The body 
of empirical research […] does not warrant that claim [of efficient results]” (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell 2002, 1777). Externalities, or non-internalized social benefits are also 
wider than just the standard pollution examples: just remember strategic behavior from 
trade theory—states might benefit their own jurisdiction by for example not enforcing 
anti-trust statutes or using public purchasing preferences.  
The assumption of mobility is also problematic:  
The theory remits the losers to self-protection through relocation to a more 
satisfactory jurisdiction. But that suggestion may not solve the resulting 
problem of preference aggregation, given bundled regulatory products, 
information asymmetries, associational ties, cultural preferences, and the out-
of-pocket costs of a move. Furthermore, if interest groups favoring pollution 
effectively organize themselves so as to capture regulators throughout the 
class of horizontally-situated jurisdictional alternatives, the list of clean air 
alternatives will dwindle. (Esty and Geradin 2001, 15)  
                                                 
119 Carruthers and Lamoreaux’s review shows that empirically neither races-to-the-top or bottom 
are very common (Carruthers and Lamoreaux 2016). Instead, the most common result is heterogeneity. 
Other authors do find evidence for inefficient outcomes from races-to-the-bottom for example in 
environmental and labor regulation (Woods 2006; D. Vogel 1995). 
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Presumably, economies of scales are also important. As in products, there might 
be natural legal monopolies, especially when standards require lots of technical 
knowledge and analysis. In this kind of situation, standards will be duplicated and poorer 
jurisdictions will produce suboptimal regulations due to budget constraints (Geradin and 
McCahery 2004, 14). Even minor technical differences among jurisdictions, for example 
in elevators, have huge financial implications for big companies because non-compliance 
is potentially costly (Hoffmann 2011).  
For these reasons, and more, Tiebout modeling rarely leads to any stable 
equilibriums that are predictive in the real world (Bratton and McCahery 1997, 222). 
Early economic modeling suggested that, with a few exceptions, there is either no 
equilibrium outcome for the provision of local public goods, it may not be efficient, or 
not stable (Bewley 1981; Conley and Konishi 2002). Overall, empirically, there can be no 
general statement over whether competition produces efficient regulatory policy or 
whether cooperation and centralization undermine efficient results (Esty and Geradin 
2001, 4). Or put differently, academic analysis “proceeds on a level of complexity that 
precludes global efficiency pronouncements about the location of regulatory advantage 
within the federal system” (Bratton and McCahery 1997, 205). If conservative scholars 
had taken these economics findings seriously, they might have concluded that due to “the 
instability attending Tiebout competition,” a central government would need to perform 
many “stabilizing functions”—given the amount of imperfections, the list might be a 
“Pandora’s Box” (Bratton and McCahery 1997, 230). For instance, in newer restatements 
of Tiebout-style models in tax competition, economists find strong benefits of 
coordination or federal market authority (Inman and Rubinfeld 1996, 313; J. Edwards and 
Keen 1996; OECD 1998). 
Similar problems can be pointed out with the concept of regulatory capture, so 
widely accepted among conservatives.120 We have already seen that “President Reagan's 
regulatory team latched onto public choice and capture theories” to defend their 
deregulatory agenda (Bagley and Revesz 2006, 1285). Christopher DeMuth, former 
President of AEI, and Douglas Ginsburg, appointed to the US Court of Appeal for the DC 
                                                 
120 Three recent examples from think tank scholarship (DeLong 2011; Bessen 2016; Greszler 
2017) 
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circuit by Reagan, are credited with popularizing the concept among conservative legal 
scholars, arguing that agencies “invariably” overregulate to benefit the best organized 
group (DeMuth and Ginsburg 1986, 1081). According to their public choice theory, the 
“logic and basic forces of regulation” are so flawed that the only option is to rely on 
markets instead of government—even if those market outcomes are imperfect (M. F. 
Cohen and Stigler 1971, 181). “This account holds sway over much [legal] scholarly 
discourse about public law institutions, and regulatory bodies in particular,” writes 
Stephen Croley, Political Scientist and professor of law at the University of Michigan 
(Croley 2009, 26). 
The ‘villain’ in these stories is always pro-regulatory interests like the Sierra Club 
or consumer advocacy groups121; however given ‘the logic of collective action’ invoked, 
it would seem equally (or more) likely that regulatory agencies would be captured by 
concentrated industries that benefit from less regulation (M. Olson and Olson 1965). As 
corollary, advocates offer that firms are lobbying for said regulation because it actually 
gives them undue competitive advantages (Cutler and Johnson 1975). There is many 
reasons to doubt this as a general rule—industries might have heterogeneous interests for 
one, but more importantly, actual case studies of regulatory rule-making usually show a 
multitude of factors influencing outcomes, much more complicated than simple ‘rent-
seeking’ (Daniel Carpenter 2010, 40ff.; Mesquita and Stephenson 2007; Wood 1994; 
Wilson 1980; Derthick and Quirk 1985; D. Vogel 1995). Studies of interest groups 
suggest that they often pursue (even if disingenuously) broad public goals that benefit 
more than their membership, or different interest groups from the same industry pursue 
different policies—both contradicting the predictions of public choice theory (Croley 
2009, 39).  
Similar questions can be asked of the claim, that if not captured, regulation is 
designed to enrich the regulator (Daniel Carpenter 2010, 44f.; Levinson 2005; Wilson 
1991). For instance, Croley’s in-depth study of regulatory processes at the FDA, EPA, 
                                                 
121 These groups should technically not mobilize at all, since they ask for public not member-
specific benefits. In fact, regulatory decisions driven by public sentiment, be it reducing tobacco 
consumption, spam calls, or air pollution, cannot convincingly be said to create regulatory rents for special 
interests (Croley 2009, 242). 
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and US Forest Service concludes outcomes are much more shaped by the institutional 
structuring of the administrative process and the fact that regulators pursue “general-
interest regulatory principles” (Croley 2009, 101). According to him “the cynical view of 
regulation” by conservatives, can only be upheld because they that “show far too little 
attention to the actual processes through which administrative agencies regulate” (Croley 
2009, 4).  
From an international perspective, the conservative consensus against federal 
market authority is even more curious and can only be understood as the ideational 
process described in this dissertation. Looking at the EU or the WTO, suggests that, at 
least in some areas, the world has moved on to seeing the benefits of regulatory 
harmonization or at least debating the benefits of federal market authority (WTO 2017; 
Barton 2006). Harmonization has generally been considered an important goal of global 
trade policy by scholars (Simmons 2001; D. W. Drezner 2005; De Ville and Siles-Brügge 
2015). The European Union considers it as one of its main purposes and its benefits are 
one of the main argument used by economists to argue for regulatory cooperation 
between the US and the EU in TTIP (Parker and Alemanno 2014; European Commission 
2013). The WTO considers many instances of regulatory heterogeneity to be non-tariff 
barriers: “The push for harmonization in trade originated in the early days of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its inquiry into non-tariff barriers. The result was the 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement in 1995, which asked countries to harmonize their 
standards with those that were internationally agreed upon, where available” (Faubert and 
Wood 2016). Economists studying the European Union or World Trade find many 
advantages of using some kind of federal market authority, or at least inter-governmental 
cooperation to achieve similar standards: “Regulatory divergence distorts the market, 
raising production costs, encouraging price discrimination across markets, and limiting 
the available import varieties“ (Freund and Oliver 2015, 1; D. W. Drezner 2005; D. 
Roberts 1999; Sawyer, Kerr, and Hobbs 2008; Bloomfield et al. 2015). 
There is a long line of scholarship criticizing the unquestioned assumptions of 
conservative law and economics scholars, but given the positions of think tank scholars 
revealed here, one might think those did not exist (Dibadj 2006, 2004; Leff 1974; 
Oppenheimer and Mercuro 2015; Rizzo 1980; Mattei 1998; M. Horwitz 1980). These are 
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not only leftist, or critical legal studies writers, but also mainstream economists. Tushnet 
explains, “Even when law and economics took hold, economics itself was using more 
complicated models (and mathematics) than the legal economists favored by conservative 
foundations were” (Tushnet 2009, 451). Comparative law expert Ugo Mattei writes that 
conservative legal scholars borrowed “broad theoretical categories” from economists and 
imported “simplified legal notions that economists have not re-discussed since Adam 
Smith […] into legal scholarship” resulting in rather “simplistic and unrealistic” models 
(Mattei 1998, 57). More broadly, law and economics uses rational choice theory to 
explain ‘good’ legal arrangements—the conservative scholars discussed here have not 
taken seriously common problems of rationality assumptions and findings of behavioral 
economics. Jacob Jacoby, expert in consumer behavior at NYU writes in a review of law 
and economics scholarship:  
Virtually without exception, those familiar with the extensive scholarly 
empirical literature on (individual) consumer behavior would conclude that, 
as proposed by those contemporary economists and legal theoreticians who 
espouse it [referring to Posner 1973], Rational Choice Theory is a simplistic 
theory having little correspondence with the real world of (individual) 
consumer behavior. [By relying on untestable or already-contradicted 
models, law and economics scholars] are like drunks who look for their car 
keys under the street lamp because the light is better. (Jacoby 2000, 1ff.) 
The preceding illustrations do not proof that conservative scholars are wrong—I 
am not expert enough to pronounce the final word on regulatory theory—but they do 
show that their claims are on much less secure footing than they make it appear. This 
suggests, that their opposition to federal market authority reflects an ideational 
development, a mental filtering of existing evidence, not a scholarly consensus122. 
Competitive federalism is best understood as an amalgamation of neo-liberal thinking 
and general attitudes mistrusting federal government. This conceptualization became 
historically salient and can probably only be understood within the broader rise of the 
New Right. What is important for us here, is that whatever its origins, this new thinking 
                                                 
122 This is of course congruent with Stahl’s earlier cited argument that think tanks value unified, 
coherent messaging over debate and evidence (Stahl 2016). 
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offers a set of arguments that lead these thinkers to avoid considering the potentials of 
using central authority for neoliberal goals.  
Pointing out the inconsistencies in evidence, does not suggest that this process is 
necessarily conscious. As will be demonstrated in turn, my interview partners seemed to 
wholeheartedly believe that jurisdictional competition will lead to optimal policy and that 
the EU’s approach to harmonization is misguided. The next section will provide more 
contemporary interview evidence for this prevalent view among think tank scholars. It 
shows, as implied by interviewees themselves, that their opposition to central authority is 
much more driven by their mixing of antipathy to government with neoliberalism than by 
economic evidence. If the latter were true, we would see the EU or the WTO pursue 
broadly similar policies to the US. Overall, these ideas preclude them from a 
comprehensive assessment of the state of the US single market—instead it shifts their 
attention in piecemeal fashions to ‘egregious instances of overregulation.’  
IV.b.  Conservative Think Tanks Today—Disregarding Federal Market Authority 
Positions at conservative think tanks today are outgrowths of this intellectual 
history. Focusing on their current agenda provides another piece in the puzzle of 
understanding the non-mobilization around federal market authority. As mentioned 
earlier, AEI, CATO, and Heritage were selected for their importance in the conservative 
movement, and because they span the spectrum from (self-described) strictly libertarian 
to more traditionally conservative (Rich 2004, 84; Stahl 2016; D. S. Jones 2012, 162). 
My research strategy was to identify federalism and regulation-experts at all three 
institutions and recruit them to be interviewed. Around 30 people were contacted. In the 
end, I was able to conduct seven phone interviews in November 2017. I already 
introduced Michael Greve, whose views are important due to his central role in the law 
and economics literature and the editing of the AEI federalism papers.123 I was able to 
speak with two people directly at AEI. Stan Veuger, a resident scholar at the think tank, 
works on public finance and political economy. His views were specifically insightful 
due to his background of being from and studying economics in Europe. This allowed 
                                                 
123 See Note 113. 
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him to compare transatlantic market thinking for me. Stephen P. Miller, also resident 
scholar at AEI, holds a law degree, and studies health care as well as regulatory 
competition. At Heritage, I was only able to speak to one scholar: Alden Abbott is the 
Deputy Director of Heritage’s Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, 
holds degrees in law and economics, lectures at George Mason University, and publishes 
specifically on anti-trust and regulation. To understand the work at CATO, I spoke to Ilya 
Somin. He is professor of law at George Mason University. While he is only an ‘adjunct 
fellow’ at CATO, he ensured me that he would be able to describe ‘the scene’ at the 
institute. He was specifically important to speak to due to his book, Democracy and 
Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter, in which he connects 
arguments about decentralization with arguments about regulatory capture (Somin 2013). 
I was also able to speak with Randal O’Toole, a senior fellow at CATO, who works on 
environmental and transportation issues, with a specific focus on the failures of 
government regulation. In addition, I conducted an email interview with Peter VanDoren, 
Senior Fellow and editor of CATO’s Regulation Journal. Since I was not able to procure 
more interviews, I complemented my analysis with data from the think tank’s online 
archives, often reaching back to the 1970s and 1980s.124  
The line of questioning pursued here was designed to highlight whether a 
comprehensive market-building agenda was ever developed at the think tanks. Since this 
was not the case, I focused in on specific interstate barriers and their solutions. While 
people at all these institutions have written on some of these issues, like occupational 
licensing, they do not frame them in terms of interstate barriers, but rather as 
‘overregulation.’ They do not enable or justify mobilization around market authority. 
Broadly, the reasons given fall into the two axioms and corollaries reported earlier— (1) 
belief in persistent government failure and (2) jurisdictional competition. Through 
detailed interviews regarding these processes, I was able to piece together how they 
imagine the relationship between markets and authority, i.e. as competitive federalism. 
Asking about the historical context, yielded self-reflection that among other things 
                                                 
124 When important for context, authors of referenced documents are introduced in passing. 
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pointed at the law and economics connection, as well as the background of opposition to 
the New Deal and civil rights. 
IV.b.1. The Flawed Nature of Government and the Promise of Inter-Jurisdictional 
Competition 
The reasons why conservatives, I interviewed, barely considered interstate 
barriers and consistently opposed federal market authority is not because they did not 
understand the argument for it. In my interviews they considered counter-arguments 
carefully. However, they still did not comprehensively review interstate barriers instead 
focusing solely on the reduction of regulation—not the creation of competitive markets. 
This can clearly be linked to the fusion of neoliberal thinking (the primacy of markets) 
with distrust of government. The latter belief stems from the idea that all politics serves 
special interests—founded on theories imported from the conservative legal movement 
(R. A. Posner 1973). The belief system has four important parts that I consider here: 
The first is the problem of capture, which is thought to be worse at the federal 
level of government. While federal legislation may overcome local parochialism, 
conservative scholars hold that federal level politics is even worse, because it would be 
cartel nobody can escape: “[Federal politics] is often an attempt by certain states [or 
businesses] to lock themselves into a federally sponsored cartel” (Personal Interview, 
Greve 2017; Personal Interview, Abbott 2017). The only way to “uncapture the economy 
is to limit government” (Somin 2018). In addition, “Interest groups and coalitions are 
naturally drawn to central government where the net returns on investments in lobbying 
are highest” (Greve 2003). This view of politics, is pretty clearly adopted from the old 
public choice models described earlier:  
Left unconstrained, normal politics is a coalition of producers against 
consumers. Producers ask the state for market privileges in a game that I 
think of as a prisoners’ dilemma game. […] You are correct that the 
collective action required to resist the defection has public good 
characteristics and therefore libertarians face a dilemma because one of the 
“solutions” to the equilibrium they oppose is to have strong central 
institutions that prohibit what they oppose. (Personal Interview, VanDoren 
2017) 
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The second part is the belief in the power of markets to tame the ‘bad’ tendencies 
of politics, specifically through jurisdictional competition, or as they describe it, 
competitive federalism. Somin explained that he prefers ‘foot voting’ over ‘ballot box 
voting’ for all those public choice reasons; in particular he emphasizes that that the 
general public is too uninformed for democratic government (Personal Interview, Somin 
2017; Somin 2013). Jurisdictional competition is the only means that can protect the 
rationally uniformed public from special-interest politics. ‘Foot voting,’ i.e. “choosing the 
state or locality in which to live” based on “information about superior economic 
conditions, public policies, or other advantages in another jurisdiction” can only be 
achieved by maximizing subsidiarity” to create “competition between jurisdictions and 
thereby increases the likelihood that government will be more representative of the 
interests and ideas of its members” (Somin 2013, 121f.). Somin acknowledge that “Some 
people understandably fear that restricting federal power might open the door to 
oppressive state and local policies,” however, he argues, “Those functions [federal 
market authority] do not require anything approaching the sweeping authority currently 
wielded by Washington. […] Competition and experimentation by states and localities 
would offer more opportunities for people to better their lot by voting with their feet” 
(Somin 2017). 
The AEI Federalism Project Papers describe it detail why the optimal allocation 
of government powers favors the states: “Real, competitive federalism is not about 
“states’ rights” or bureaucratic “devolution” to a lower level of government where other 
interest groups hold sway. Real federalism does not seek to empower states; rather, it 
seeks to discipline governments by forcing them to compete for citizens’ business.” 
(Greve 2000a). Or put differently: “Although federalism’s virtues are often described as 
those of decentralization, laboratories of democracy, and closeness of public officials to 
citizens, the greatest advantage lies in the potential for competitive supply of government 
policy” (DeMuth 1994). The AEI Federalism Project also creates the closest link to the 
conservative legal movement. Lots of scholars related to Chicago or George Mason 
University have visited at AEI in various positions, and AEI has financed or published 
their book projects (Greve 2000a; F. Easterbrook 1983; Ribstein and O’Hara 2009; R. A. 
Posner 1973; Teles 2008; Epstein and Greve 2007; Romano 1993).  
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Together those arguments suggest that scholars imagine markets as natural, 
existing where government does not. Government has to just get out of the way. Somin 
for instance, suggests that even property rights exist naturally, and are unrelated to 
government (Somin 2010). 
The third part, important for understanding this belief system, is the confidence 
with which it is presented, despite the empirical problems discussed earlier. 
Conservatives present their theory of jurisdictional competition as unequivocally 
supported: 
Social scientists have explicated the many advantages of federalist 
competition. Theorists in the tradition of Friedrich A. Hayek emphasize that 
competition fosters the disclosure of information (we find out what works) 
and institutional learning, as states will adopt successful experiments. Other 
economists stress the so-called ‘Tiebout effect.’ Given a choice, citizens will 
sort themselves into a jurisdiction that supplies the best mix of public goods 
and services at the best price. Because individual preferences vary greatly, a 
choice among many differing regimes gives more people more of what they 
want (relative to a central regime that must accommodate a much wider range 
of preferences). Public choice theorists have proffered a third, especially 
potent rationale—discipline in government. The business of politics, they 
argue, is the transfer of wealth from unorganized groups with small stakes 
(taxpayers) to concentrated interests with much higher stakes. Federalism 
provides a defense and remedy for this ill by giving the losers an opportunity 
to vote with their feet. (Greve 2005b) 
Many more instances of this can be found. VanDoren explained that it is 
‘generally accepted, that “Left unconstrained normal politics is a coalition of producers 
against consumers” (Personal Interview, VanDoren 2017). O’Toole responded to 
evidence of jurisdictional competition not working with the statement, “Over time states 
will adapt” (Personal Interview, O’Toole 2017). DeMuth showcases how competition 
‘has proven’ to work in all areas of society (DeMuth 2004). This plays out in many 
policy issues—take health care for instance—while widely acknowledged that subject to 
all kinds of market failures, economists at all three think tanks are confident that 
“Competition works—even in health care” (Perry 2007; G.-M. Turner 2007; Cannon 
2009).  
The fourth important part to understand is that, while this axiomatic version of 
competition theory still sometimes implies support for federal market authority, 
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practically conservatives are unwilling to support federal action. Interviewees proved to 
think in quite nuanced ways about the issues, Miller explained, “The nature of the 
market, demand and supply, and the nature of the product, for example, will tell you 
where it should be regulated”—however for every example of interstate barriers I made, 
he tended to side with state competition, even when it was leading to obvious 
protectionist results (T. Personal Interview, Miller 2017). To get to this point, scholars 
either invoked the first belief, the flawed nature of government to not embrace federal 
market authority or pointed at the movement politics within the bigger conservative 
movement, to explain why other scholars did not take the argument for some federal 
power seriously.  
Veuger was to some degree as puzzled about this as I am, explaining that in his 
perception, the people that understood the importance of harmonization for markets were 
either from Europe (like he is) or studied international trade: 
This is a big trade-off in all of trade policy. On the one hand you want to 
maintain local political power over a certain set of regulations and on the 
other hand, those regulations automatically become non-tariff barriers […]. I 
don’t think anyone on the right has come up with a good answer to when 
should federalism triumph and when should harmonized trade rules triumph. 
I think interestingly, a lot of libertarians have much stronger beliefs on this 
when it comes to international trade, than when it comes to US trade. And 
they are more comfortable with product market deregulation set by treaties 
than by Congressional action. I don’t know why that is. (Personal Interview 
Veuger 2017) 
Greve took the position that using federal market authority was problematic, even 
when theoretically necessary: 
There might be areas in which complete federal preemption is more useful. If 
Congress could restore itself, it would be useful to extend the preemption that 
we now have for generic manufacturers to patent manufacturers, you know, 
that's a very useful thing to do. So, it's not that Congress can't do anything, 
but it would have to do it by sort of ordering rules with respect to, you know 
what, what is a federal monopoly effectively and then you know block states 
from regulating on top. And there are lots of areas where it could do that. […] 
Competitive federalism does not always lead to the lowering of market 
barriers. […] I could draw up a list of stuff that would be useful [on the 
optimal allocation of powers between state and federal government]. But 
would I then want to cram that through Congress? The answer is absolutely 
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not. Because, I mean, what might come out of that is, you know, would be 
worse than what you have now. (Personal Interview, Greve 2017) 
This argument was similarly made by scholars at CATO:  
[Do conservatives support federal preemption in some instances?] It varies to 
some extent, because the political right does recognize on the one hand that 
sometimes these state standards can be a problem, but on the other hand they 
are very concerned about giving the federal government more power in these 
areas. And if a state enacts a bad standard, then it is just that for a particular 
state. But if the federal government enacts a bad standard, that harms 
everybody throughout the whole country. (Personal Interview, Somin 2017) 
Here we see the working-together of beliefs in inter-jurisdictional competition 
with capture and related theories. VanDoren confirmed this: 
There are two basic strategies to manage subnational protectionism. The first 
is to create federal institutions that can overrule sub national democratic 
decisions i.e. either the courts or insulated bureaucracies. The second, and 
economists’ answer to almost all policy questions as Albert O. Hirschman 
[1970] so famously said, is to allow free movement of labor and capital to 
allow “exit” to discipline the mischief. You are correct that we seem to use 
“exit” rather than national intervention as a policy strategy. We don’t use 
federal institutions in part because of the cultural DNA I mentioned earlier. 
(Personal Interview, VanDoren 2017) 
This aforementioned “cultural DNA” is the assumption that “strong central 
institutions (i.e. monopolies) make errors that are difficult to remedy” and more broadly, 
a skepticism toward the possibility of good government (Personal Interview, VanDoren 
2017). “The worry is that the national rules will be stricter than the least strict rule in a 
state” following the idea that only less regulation leads to good outcomes (Personal 
Interview Veuger 2017). As O’Toole puts it, “That is why conservatives in Congress 
want to deregulate, they know that they cannot make good rules for the country. It is 
much better to let states compete” (Personal Interview, O’Toole 2017). This also implies 
opposing typical ordoliberal strategies of trying to insulate against protectionist pressures: 
“Libertarians at CATO always want all regulation at the lowest level possible. We don’t 
trust them, so insulating them like the European Commission or Courts is not that good of 
an idea” (Personal Interview, O’Toole 2017). So, while reasons for federal market 
authority are acknowledged, skepticism of government usually leads conservatives to 
prefer the local solution, even if it is suboptimal.  
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However, it is not only the strong belief of scholars like Greve and Co, in public 
choice theories, that leads to those results. Conservative policy makers have additional 
reasons to be skeptical of arguments for federal market authority. According to Veuger, 
“Once you generate a national instrument, it will get used too much, is what Republicans 
learned from the New Deal” (Personal Interview Veuger 2017). Similarly, Miller related 
the fact to the broader historical context: 
If you look at what drives these things on a larger scale, it has to do with the 
states being resistors on other types of issues, like civil rights, that tended to 
color [conservatives’] attitudes of whether it was a good thing for states to 
have a bigger hand in policy or whether we need it to be Washington 
centered. And because of a lot of the narrative our 20th century political 
history is caught up not only in economic issues but also the issues of North 
vs. South, and civil rights, all of that tended to color how people align and 
affiliate themselves politically, depending on which issues they see as most 
salient, they see the issue of state vs. federal. And so, you are somewhat 
fighting against that longer standing narrative in history in terms of saying ‘it 
is a good thing for states to do different things’ as opposed to ‘we need to 
clean that up on the federal level.’ And some of our politics reflects that from 
time to time. (T. Personal Interview, Miller 2017)  
In addition, arguments for federal market authority seem to get lost easily: 
The translation of think tank work into real politics is often imperfect — what 
is a complex theory of federalism, may become state’s rights advocacy in 
Congress. I mean, yes, for the simple reason that this kind of stuff we are 
now talking about this is just hard to explain. Especially because the 
immediate sort of conservative impulse is to say, well, what about states’ 
rights. And what about local autonomy and, you know, all the rest of it. And 
then you have to explain why that is a dumb argument, and by the time you 
have to explain something you have already lost. (Personal Interview, Greve 
2017; also: T. Personal Interview, Miller 2017; Personal Interview, Abbott 
2017). 
Miller elaborated that the jurisdictional competition model, is an “academic idea” 
that is used politically in “simplified, bastardized forms” (T. Personal Interview, Miller 
2017). This can also be interpreted more strategically: “Ultimately, the federalism 
argument is used mostly as a rhetorical device to justify outcomes that are generated by 
local control over the ones that would be generated by nation-wide control. People just 
don’t pay as much attention to local product and service market regulation or 
occupational licensing” (Personal Interview Veuger 2017). 
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Abbott conveyed the sense that there were lots of ideas floating around about 
reducing interstate barriers, but they were held back by more traditional conservative 
institutions (Personal Interview, Abbott 2017). While AEI has published the theoretical 
arguments by legal scholars for federalism, it seems Heritage represents more the 
traditional conservative, ‘emotional’ argument for local control. This makes sense since 
Heritage sees itself as a ‘big tent’ think tank that bridges the gap between libertarian and 
traditional conservative scholars (J. A. Smith 1991, 279). According to the latter strand of 
conservatism, decentralization is always better, because “Politics [is] a zero-sum battle 
for liberty between the federal government and the rest of the country (individuals, the 
states, etc.). Most [Republican] Members of Congress identify as conservative and 
generally talk and think in terms of less government, and more freedom” (Azerrad 
2017).125 Heritage seems to at times support the view of Yuval Levin, an editor of the 
National Review and conservative intellectual, arguing that, local communities, not 
government institutions, should regulate society: “A decentralized, ‘modernized politics 
of subsidiarity’ that would push decision-making ‘as close to the level of the 
interpersonal community as reasonably possible’ thereby empowering civil society’s 
mediating institutions to address local problems (Levin in Azerrad 2016). Similarly, some 
social conservatives argue that “character and virtue” is “lodged more specifically in the 
state and local governments” (W. Campbell 1988) or that in conservative vision “The 
decisions most directly affecting the lives of citizens are made locally and voluntarily” 
(Kirk 1987). 
Greve is confident that conservative will stop making arguments for states’ rights 
for traditional reasons and replace them with jurisdictional competition arguments: 
The view of states’ rights as an end in itself “is breaking up. I mean that used 
to be the conventional view of the matter. But there are people who have 
begun to rethink this. It is my sense is that over the past, let's say 15 years, 
this states’ rights stuff has really been in decline, and people have begun to 
rethink this sort of at more basic and fundamental level. I mean, it's true at an 
academic level. There is lots of people that swirl around Scalia law school 
and Chicago law school that have written about this. Frank Easterbrook’s 
piece [1983] is now several decades old. (Personal Interview, Greve 2017) 
                                                 
125 David Azzerrad is the Director of Heritage’s Kenneth Simon Center for Principles and Politics. 
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But as we have seen, it is unclear whether that would change much. While the 
capture theory easily implies that local government will tend toward state protectionism 
and fragmentation, that part is mostly ignored. In practice then, this fourth factor lead to a 
situation where every theoretical argument for federal market authority is immediately 
relativized: “Even in instances in which a uniform solution seems sensible, it is often best 
to allow that solution to emerge gradually, under conditions of competition” (Greve 
2000a). This can be explained by the historically created (what interviewees say about 
post-New Deal politics), but is contemporarily justified by the axiomatic reading of 
public choice theory), the attitude that government is always problematic: “The numerous 
efforts to ‘harmonize’ the domestic policies of nation states—in taxation, labor standards, 
environmental standards, and price regulation—are for the most part efforts to form 
policy cartels in response to the increasing mobility of commerce and finance; they 
should be resisted” (DeMuth 1994).  
The incentive for think tanks is to sell an unambiguous ideational product, not to 
achieving balanced research (Stahl 2016). That is why other findings, like for instance the 
benefits of cooperative federalism, are categorically rejected: “The difficult task of 
revitalizing a real, competitive federalism—even in the face of the political attractions of 
its evil cooperative namesake—will occupy the AEI Federalism Project and future 
Outlooks” (Greve 2001). Similarly, it explains that conservatives imply that competition 
can lead to both, policy diversity and uniformity: “Tax competition is a good thing 
because it keeps the rates low. But that is carried over to lots of product market and labor 
market regulations. There is no reason to think that there is some steady-state equilibrium 
where everybody will have the same regulations, even though it is regularly implied” 
(Personal Interview Veuger 2017). Another example, pointed out by Somin, is property 
rights. Conservatives have long opposed the use of eminent domain for ‘public interests’ 
but have argued at the same time, that jurisdictional competition should prevent local 
government from exercising that power (Been 1991; Cole 2007; Fischel 1995; Serkin 
2007). Interestingly, Somin argues that judicial activism is necessary here, because the 
competitive forces will not be strong enough, citing evidence — like limited factor 
mobility — that would theoretically apply to all arguments about jurisdictional 
competition, even though it is not (Somin 2015, 221ff.). 
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Conservative legal scholars have produced a vast amount of scholarship to prove 
that jurisdictional competition works, much of which has already been cited here, but to 
outside legal observers the acceptance of arguments appears “mostly axiomatic” (Lipsett 
2008, 643). Greve’s Real Federalism is emblematic for the genre (Greve 1999). One of 
the most popular examples is corporate law126: “The closest thing to policy nirvana in 
American law is corporation law” where state competition has led to “a race to the 
optimum” (DeMuth 1994). In a recent book, Larry Ribstein, professor of law at Chicago 
and George Mason University, as well as scholar at the AEI, argues that while ‘feet 
voting’ might not always work, this can be remedied by creating a law market in which 
all contracting parties can chose the state law they prefer (Ribstein and O’Hara 2009). 
This is based on the assumption that the normal political process leads to bad laws, even 
though it becomes clear that by bad laws they just mean ‘overregulation’(Ribstein and 
O’Hara 2009, 26). While they admit that jurisdictional competition might sometimes be 
harmful they argue that “As a general policy matter, we believe that long-term consensus 
is better achieved through state judicial, constitutional, and legislative evolution than by 
federal constitutional determination” (Ribstein and O’Hara 2009, 171). Similar 
arguments are repeated over and over again by conservative scholars, especially in the 
law profession (F. Easterbrook 1983, 2013; Romano 1993; Greve 2000b; Epstein and 
Loyola 2014). The only cases, it seems, when conservatives actually support federal 
market authority is when is can be harnessed for deregulation, for instance, to reduce tort 
liability in the states, or to stop state Attorney Generals from suing under the Clean Air 
Act or suing the FCC to enforce anti-trust laws (Greve 2004).  
In the following five sections, I will illustrate the practical effects of this thinking 
about markets: Interviewees consider the EU as a “system of massive and intrusive 
regulation,” do not systematically analyze interstate barriers, support local government 
action despite protectionist results, describe harmonized standards unnecessary or 
impossible, and oppose (or articulate incoherent views on) judicial activism.  
                                                 
126 For contradictory evidence, see Bebchuk et al. (2002). 
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IV.b.2. Making Contrasts to an Undesirable EU 
First, I consider think tanks’ positions regarding the EU. This demonstrates that 
they have a simplistic understanding of regulatory authority that does not consider federal 
rules important for national market competition to occur. Despite the wide-spread 
recognition of the neoliberal impetus of European institutions (for example: Parsons 
2007), American conservatives like to decry it as some kind of mixture between socialist 
overregulation and a centralizer’s dream. This is maybe best epitomized by the National 
Review’s editorial position on ‘Brexit’: “Britons should leave the European Union,” in 
which they among other things write “the EU is a lawless organization as well as an 
undemocratic one” (NR Editors 2016). By lawless, they mean that there is absolutely no 
democratic accountability among European institutions, a statement that is more telling 
for its prejudice than its accuracy. They disregard all of the market promoting policies of 
the EU, calling it “A system of massive and intrusive regulation” (NR Editors 2016). 
Veuger suggested to me that conservatives’ attitudes toward the EU are the best way of 
understanding the difference between European and American neoliberalism, a difference 
that can only be found in the axioms of competitive federalism:  
The best case study of this is actually how sympathetic most American 
Conservatives were to Brexit. Most of the economic arguments for Brexit are 
the opposite of what you were saying [harmonization creates markets], they 
were all about there is too much regulation coming from Europe, even though 
this was all service and product market regulation and harmonization. That is 
something you should like if you want to realize gains from trade. That is a 
perfect example of where people’s sympathies lie. (Personal Interview 
Veuger 2017). 
Dalibor Rohac, a research fellow at AEI, has been writing for a decade about 
centralized power in the EU as problematic for the free market—which clashes with the 
widely-held view among European scholars that those ‘centralized regulations’ are 
making the EU a ‘neoliberal project’ (Drahokoupil and Horn 2008, 22; for instance: 
Scharpf 1996). However, in 2016 he became one of the few American conservatives to 
change his mind: “Most worryingly, a preoccupation with sovereignty has led some 
conservatives to embrace agendas and political leaders [Brexit] directly inimical to free 
markets and limited government” (Rohac 2016). In the meantime, other thinkers at AEI 
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continue to miss how central power can contribute to economic freedom. Peter J. 
Wallison, Senior Fellow at AEI and former Counsel to Reagan writes: 
Britain will be the big winner of Brexit. […] when finally free of EU 
controls, Britain will also liberalize its trade policies. […] The success of 
Britain’s policies in producing economic growth, new employment, and 
expanding trade will induce other EU members to break with Brussels and 
the euro to join the growing free trade area (Wallison 2016b).  
Similarly, AEI adjunct scholar Flavio Felice dreams of “dismantling European 
bureaucracy” (Felice 2016).  
In all this writing, the competitive federalism theory shines through in the sense 
that all central regulation is described as necessarily protectionist and undermining 
competition. The EU is recognized as a harmful cartel as is the federal government in the 
US: “One can view the actions of the EU government as being an attempt to form a cartel 
to harmonize policies across member states, and standing in the way of, rather than 
advancing, competition” as two other scholars at AEI put it (Hubbard and Hassett 2016). 
The only logical conclusion for another AEI staff member is, “The UK should bid adieu 
to the EU” (Bolton 2016). Matt Mayer makes the parallels between “the general failure of 
the federal government” in the US and the European Union more explicit: “Europe’s 
member states sit in a very similar position as U.S. states did in the mid-1930s. The 
European Union, like the federal government after the New Deal, is just starting its 
ascent” (Mayer 2016). And according to Mayer, the federal government mostly just 
causes problems. Overall, I obtained 391 results searching for articles on Brexit in the 
AEI web archives (AEI 2017). Within those, only one scholar, Rohac, has consistently 
(in the last 2 years) taken pro-EU positions. 
Document at Heritage repeat the same arguments. Abbott writes, “Brexit will free 
the UK economy from one-size-fits-all supervisory regulatory frameworks in such areas 
as the environment, broadband policy, labor, food and consumer products, among others” 
(Abbott 2017). The actual neoliberal impetus of those regulations is never acknowledged 
because the belief that central government is bad is so engrained. Nile Gardiner, Director 
of the Thatcher Center for Freedom at Heritage explains, “The EU has evolved into a 
decaying, overregulated, bureaucratic and fundamentally undemocratic entity. It is a 
monument to supra-nationalism and big government, increasingly trampling upon the 
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power of nation states” (Gardiner 2016). If evidence is needed that conservative scholars 
ignore empirical evidence to support their theory of capture and jurisdictional 
competition, it can be seen in how they treat the EU, without regard for reality. The 
President and Founder of the Heritage Foundation writes, that the EU has “become a 
bureaucratic monstrosity, unaccountable to national parliaments, imposing a heavy thumb 
on the regulatory scale of its 28 members” (Feulner 2016). I could not find a single 
Heritage scholar publicly arguing against Brexit, or as they themselves put it “Heritage 
experts advocated for Brexit from the very beginning” (Heritage Foundation 2017a). 
Scholars at Cato also overwhelmingly supported Brexit, as a search of their 
archives reveals. Again, in synch with the American perspective on regulation, they do 
not see the need for centralized market maintenance: “The British people always wanted 
a common market in Europe, not a common government” (Hannan 2017). In this quote, 
Daniel Hannan, contributor at CATO, implies that free markets evolve in the absence of 
government. Ryan Bourne, in charge of ‘Public Understanding of Economics at Cato’ 
writes, “Libertarians in particular should have been concerned with the ever-growing 
concentrating power at a higher EU level, and its commitment to high levels of 
harmonized regulation under unresponsive government” (Bourne 2017). Central 
government is always seen as the problem not a potential solution, harmonization is not 
seen as necessary for single markets, “As I have explained, the EU is not only failing to 
address Europe’s problems, it exacerbates them” (Tupy 2016). 
Interestingly, American conservative thinkers attribute any free-market deviations 
to the existence of the European institutions, while European neoliberals usually think 
that the insulated EU institutions are an improvement over national-level government. 
While there was some debate among British neoliberals, many argued against ‘Brexit.’ 
For instance, a libertarian scholar at the London-based Adam Smith Institute writes:  
For decades the EU has acted as a check on that kind of state overreach 
[British domestic policy]: stopping the Scottish government from establishing 
a prohibitionist price floor on alcohol, forcing member states to open up 
state-dominated markets to private competition, and barring European states 
from subsidizing or otherwise protecting their native industries from foreign 
rivals. (Bowman 2017) 
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An author at another British free-market think tank, the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, suggests, “Hayek would have voted to remain” (Zuluaga 2016). In Germany, 
neoliberals similarly praise the EU for overcoming market-distortions caused by national 
governments. The Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, a German free-market think tank 
opined that the EU would bring Britain much closer to libertarian ideals than ‘Brexit’ 
(FNST Editors 2016). Similar sentiments were echoed at the French free-market think 
tank Generation Libre, and the Italian Instituto Bruno Leoni (Koenig 2016; Sileoni 2015). 
IV.b.3. Refusing to Consider Interstate Barriers as a General Problem 
Turning to US internal market barriers, a search of all three foundation’s web 
archives showed that they have never thought about them comprehensively. They do not 
post any assessments on the state of the internal market, or review interstate barriers 
across a range of subjects. They do not consider obstacles to internal trade a general 
problem. General policy positions and reports, for instance on federalism, are only 
focused on overregulation or federal overreach, not interstate barriers. When a specific 
barrier to mobility is mentioned, like licensing restrictions for instance, it is not 
embedded into a larger market building agenda; it is always in framed deregulatory 
terms. In addition, no statements generally advocating federal preemption or more state 
cooperation could be found. 
This is confirmed by personal interviews: “There are specific people that work on 
all the issues. But the kind of broader EU style regulation and harmonization is just not 
something people think about or push much. I agree with you that this is 
counterproductive, but people are kind of caught up in their own rhetoric about 
federalism” (Personal Interview Veuger 2017). Veuger told me that while ‘bad’ 
harmonized standards can be better than heterogeneous standards, “typically it is the 
deregulatory impulse that drives policy” among conservatives (Personal Interview 
Veuger 2017). Similarly, in response to my examples of a wide range of interstate 
barriers and the question of what could be done about them, Greve explained:  
My sense is that nobody thinks about it at that level of abstraction. They 
might sound like they're doing it, but that's just to support whatever policy 
they want at the moment. There isn't in the entire government an agency that 
thinks through this and coordinates things, for all general levels. That is very 
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different in the EU, where every single policy item they have on deck, 
starting in 1960s, was always built to give life to an ever-closer union. We 
just don't think like that because we were already an integrated country. And 
so, people think about this on a on the level of policy by policy, or at least 
policy sector about policy sector. (Personal Interview, Greve 2017) 
Most generally, Abbott told me, Heritage does not have a comprehensive 
approach to interstate barriers “because we have to address federalism concerns” 
(Personal Interview, Abbott 2017). He added, “To some degree, they [conservatives] are 
undermining themselves with putting too much emphasis on state autonomy.” Federal 
market authority is often opposed—“The idea of having uniform regulation” is more 
important in the EU, because of “the history of German ordo liberalism, that influenced 
European constitutional theory on that” (Personal Interview, Abbott 2017). The attitude 
at Heritage is mostly that regulation is “federal” and “bad” (B. Lindsey 1993). Heritage 
opposes harmonization: “That [harmonized standards] is problematic. As Heritage has 
previously observed, harmonization is likely to be driven in practice by international 
commissions and to harmonize up to higher levels of regulation” (Riley 2015). It is no 
surprise then that Heritage scholars saw TTIP very skeptically (Abbott 2014; Bromund 
2015). In terms of their theory of markets and federalism, they seem to agree that most 
federal regulation is harmful, even in cases where state competition might have negative 
consequences127 (Gaziano 2011; W. Beach 1998; Engdahl 2011; Thierer 1999).  
VanDoren explained to me, “Libertarians in general, and Cato in particular, 
oppose the economic favoritism and protectionism you describe”—but the only 
mechanism they favor to preclude is it deregulation on all levels of government (Personal 
Interview, VanDoren 2017). Indeed, CATO scholars have analyzed local regulations 
much more comprehensively than scholars at AEI or Heritage. However, they have not 
done so comprehensively or as a coordinated effort to reduce interstate barriers. Somin 
elaborated: 
There is a debate in the US on the question of whether there should be unified 
standards for different kinds of regulations—interestingly, it is more 
commonly the Left that argues for that. The Right is much more worried 
about overregulation on the federal level. But some business groups like the 
                                                 
127 Except in the case of taxing online activity (Thierer 1997). 
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U.S. Chamber of Commerce128 argue that for broad preemption of regulation, 
so states cannot regulate on top of that. (Personal Interview, Somin 2017). 
CATO’s approach is one of fighting ‘overregulation’ on all fronts, without ever 
conceptualizing it as interstate barriers (CATO 2017a; C. Edwards and CATO 2017). 
Their general perspective does not come from a will to create competitive markets but a 
principled opposition to government, i.e. “downsizing the federal government;” this 
means they would never endorse federal market authority (CATO 2017a). This can be 
specifically seen in comparison to the EU: 
The EU commission is to a large degree insulated from political pressures 
and voters and that has some advantages and disadvantages. But one 
advantage is that the EC can spend lots of its time focusing on these technical 
issues that are hard to understand—that sometimes that means they can 
improve what goes on in those issues and break down barriers to market 
competition but that also means that they can do a lot of stuff that I think is 
pretty questionable. Whereas the Republican Party has to some degree to 
satisfy voters, many of whom know nothing about those technical issues, so 
they can’t just spend their time focusing on these sorts of questions. 
Obviously the second differences are that it is much harder to get legislation 
through Congress. […] I certainly would not want to replicate the 
Commission in the US. Beyond constitutional problems, I think there would 
be lots of other problems with that. And I would not want to federal 
government to regulate more than it currently does. I would cut the enormous 
growth in federal authority to regulate since the 1930s. (Personal Interview, 
Somin 2017) 
Similarly, AEI scholars tend to oppose federal market authority, with a few 
exceptions. Searching the AEI archives for some comprehensive view on interstate 
barriers or federal market authority, does not produce much at all. Of the few articles that 
can be found, only a few call for federal preemption to reduce barriers. One example is 
taxation and another some limited cases of local telecommunication restrictions (Viard 
2012, 2007; Brownwyn 2017). However, most conservatives oppose a system that would 
actually avoid interstate taxation barriers and externalities, like a VAT: “You see that on 
                                                 
128 For instance, in transportation and product labeling (see previous chapter). Generally, the 
lobbying of the Chamber of Commerce is fragmented and issue-focused. For instance arguing for more 
federal preemption as protection against local liability law suits (Rickard 2009), endorsing a preemption 
that creates an exception from local insurance regulation for certain self-insured companies (U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce 2008), or attempting to prevent local regulation of self-driving cars (U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce 2017). 
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the tax side too. Lots of people on the right don't like a value added tax because they are 
afraid it would be too easy to raise it” (Personal Interview Veuger 2017).  
Even in areas where one might expect consensus on federal action due to external 
effects there is none because federal rules are seen as always anti-competitive: “Non-
competitive states will go to Congress or some regulatory agency and push to suppress 
competition and raise their rivals’ costs. That's what the entire Clean Power Plan was 
about. Attempts of certain states to lock themselves into federally sponsor cartel. That is 
the reason why after all you have to be skeptical of federal legislation” (Personal 
Interview, Greve 2017). If AEI scholars do take general views, they usually argue for less 
regulation and more decentralized federalism (Ponnuru and Salam 2015). They paint 
national administration as the main problem for economic growth. As one AEI 
publication puts it:  
Modern conservatism is closely linked to decentralization. Free markets are 
by definition decentralized markets. Also important to modern conservatism 
is the decentralization of government itself, allowing decisions to be made 
close to the communities they affect, while also encouraging policy 
competition and experimentation. Both these forms of decentralization, 
however, are now increasingly challenged by federal administrative agencies, 
which are a growing force for the suppression of diversity among individuals, 
businesses, and state and local governments. (Wallison 2016a) 
IV.b.4. Local Government Action is Preferred, not Problematized 
A pattern of anti-government sentiments (capture) and the promise of 
jurisdictional competition trumping arguments for federal market authority can be 
observed in a variety of issue related to protectionist local government action. I will 
consider, local subsidies, local procurement preferences, and the heterogeneity in 
building codes across jurisdictions.  
In the EU, state and local subsidies to business are considered protectionist, in 
need of explicit justification to and approval by the EU Commission. In the US, 
conservatives might consider these subsidies inefficient, but they do not frame them as 
protectionism in need of federal regulation. I could not find any publication at AEI or 
Heritage that would address the issue systematically. For instance, Heritage has only 
published arguments against specific subsidies that conservatives tend to dislike, like for 
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solar power, health care, or agriculture (Heritage Foundation 2017b; Frydenlund 2001; 
Kreutzer 2012; DeMint 2015). Miller, at AEI, explained the rational, “this is just 
spending money unwisely” but “jurisdictional competition” will limit this kind of 
behavior (T. Personal Interview, Miller 2017). While AEI scholars have regularly 
criticized foreign business subsidies as inefficient and distortionary, they never supported 
a federal rule against state and local subsidies (Perry 2008; Pethokoukis 2014b). Equally 
important, they do not ever use the frame of interstate barriers, but address this issue as 
one where businesses they dislike receive subsidies, like public transportation or electric 
cars (P. Cooper 2017; Perry 2010, 2013). In a recent law review article, two AEI scholars 
argue for a stricter application of the dormant commerce clause against some 
discriminatory taxes and subsidies129, but concede that “subsidies for economic activity 
conducted within a state, including credits for new investment, research spending, hiring 
state residents, and construction or improvement of business facilities […] are 
permissible” (Lirette and Viard 2016, 533). 
On the topic of state and local procurement preferences, I could find not 
publications by AEI or Heritage. This resulted in Veuger’s comment, “If you find out 
[why conservatives are not critical of local procurement preferences], I’d be happy to 
know” (Personal Interview Veuger 2017).  
In terms of heterogeneous building codes, AEI scholars have rarely paid attention 
to, except in a few articles that denounce too stringent codes as ‘overregulation;’ I could 
not find any publications by Heritage mentioning the issue (Perry 2011; Hess 2008). In 
none of the articles did they discuss these things in terms of market barriers, or even 
actual solutions. Mostly they are quick to assume, that if those things really were barriers, 
they would not exist:  
So, what you are talking about, building codes, licensing, inspection that is 
traditionally been seen as much more a locally and regionally directed 
                                                 
129 The authors criticize the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, for being incoherent and too 
lenient on allowing local protectionism. Instead, they propose a new accounting test, called Commerce 
Neutrality Framework that can be used to calculate whether a tax or subsidy distorts commerce. Looking at 
private transaction intra and interstate, the test requires “combined treatment of inbound and outbound 
transactions at least as favorable as their treatment of intrastate transactions” (Lirette and Viard 2016, 467). 
In practice this means that certain subsidies will be allowed and others not. However, incentives to hire in-
state residents, as common in public works contracts, would be permissible.  
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approach. But if they go too far, and local regulations actually become 
barriers, they will lose out in the broader competition—I can't give you some 
absolutist standard on that—sometimes it depends on the issue you are 
talking about—but in construction, if the market becomes more dominated by 
large national businesses it will become more standardized. (T. Personal 
Interview, Miller 2017). 
Similarly, Abbott offered the fact that conservative law-makers “are concerned 
about political opposition along the lines of, ‘You are inhibiting our legitimate state 
regulatory activity from being carried out.’ It just creates lots of potential political 
problems. That is my inclination” (Personal Interview, Abbott 2017). However, neither 
convincingly explain why think tanks would not put in on their agenda—it seems more 
likely that is just escapes their view since there exists no comprehensive thinking about 
single markets.  
The treatment at AEI and Heritage contrasts with CATO publications. To be fair, 
CATO scholars have probably written about every imaginable government regulation, 
and ‘denounced’ it as ‘overregulation.’ However, given their opposition to central market 
authority, there is not much that can be done about local protectionism: 
Yes this [state subsidies and procurement preferences] is a huge problem, 
cities competing over Amazon, cities building stadiums for Basketball teams. 
That’s not good for the market. But I don’t trust the government to make one 
national rule against it. That does never work. The EU might have a rule 
against it, but European states don’t follow it, like Spain subsidizing light rail 
or being bailed out. With trains you can similarly see that government 
regulations and subsidies are always bad. So the best strategy is to get rid of 
them. (Personal Interview, O’Toole 2017) 
Beyond his opposition to public transportation, for which O’Toole is known, he 
conveyed the sense in the interview that many CATO scholars consider local subsidies a 
problem, but not one that should be addressed by the federal government. Instead he 
offered the mechanism of jurisdictional competition and reducing the scope of 
government in general as possible solutions.  
CATO scholars have also analyzed problems that are caused by the heterogeneity 
of building codes. However, what sometimes sounds like critiques of non-uniform 
standards, is usually a complaint of too stringent regulation: “There has been little use of 
manufactured housing in New York City, however, partially because of extremely 
rigorous local code standards, which out-of-state housing plants may not meet, and 
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partially because of organized labor and political and bureaucratic stumbling blocks” (C. 
Moore 1990, 62). They also have criticized differences in general, but again from a 
perspective of too strict not different codes: “Since New York's code is arguably even 
more Byzantine [than New Jersey’s], its effect on costs is undoubtedly greater” (C. 
Moore 1990, 57). As expected, in none of the reports is federal market authority ever 
considered as a solution; instead they opt for local efforts to repeal as much regulation as 
possible (CATO 2017a). In particular, there is a presumption that local competition will 
eventually produce good results—or must have already done so: “Also, non-harmonized 
standards can be a problem, but I don’t think it is as big of a problem as people say it is 
because states have incentives to have standards that are not too weird or unusual, 
especially small states” (Personal Interview, Somin 2017). 
This is compounded by concerns over ‘federal overreach’: “Different standards 
are definitely a problem, but if we let the federal government have a uniform rule, what if 
it’s a bad rule. I much rather have the option of not working in a state, than being forced 
to. And over time states will adapt. I mean there are private institutions that promulgate 
building codes. That is much better than getting the feds involved” (Personal Interview, 
O’Toole 2017). Again, the implication is jurisdictional competition and markets will 
adapt without federal market authority. This notion is repeated in several CATO papers. 
In addition, the predictive leap is made that capture is much more likely at the central 
level. Accordingly, a trend towards more uniform buildings codes is ”concerning,” 
because on higher levels of government, they “may be subject to political interferences 
by manufacturers and trade associations” (Dehring and Halek 2014, 45; Bandow 1997; 
Firey 2017).  
In sum, in most cases when discriminatory barriers between states are noticed, 
they are always interpreted as the necessary consequence of interest group politics, to be 
prevented on the local level (D. Coates and Humphreys 2000; Ikenson 2012; Hufbauer 
and Moran 2015). If this does not work, the only considered remedy is judicial oversight 
by courts—to be discussed later—but that remains controversial within conservative 
circles. 
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IV.b.5. Uniform Licensing Standards are Considered Impossible  
Scholars at all three think tanks have been very prolific in opposing occupational 
licensing. However, they have solely focused on the issue as one of regulatory capture 
and on cases with the least plausible public health justification like ‘hair braiding’ (Perry 
2012; Winneset 2017; Goodnow 2015). In none of the think tanks have scholars 
addressed mobility restrictions through firm licensing laws, an issue that frequently came 
up in my interview with construction companies.  
CATO has spearheaded the movement against occupational licensing, by 
encouraging local political changes and supporting legal challenges through amicus briefs 
(I. Shapiro 2017; I. Shapiro and McDonald 2017; I. Shapiro, Engstrom, and Colomba 
2015; Svorny 2017; Neily 2017). However, their belief in interstate competition is so 
strong that federal action is not an option discussed. In most, cases, they see it not as a 
case of interstate barriers, but as a standard case of overregulation: “There has been a big 
push from CATO and places like that to get rid of those regulations. But what they are 
making is not really a federalist or interstate commerce argument—they just don't like the 
occupational licensing rules” (Personal Interview Veuger 2017). O’Toole explains, “Yes, 
it [licensing] is a huge barrier. But I would not want to get federal government or courts 
involved. You just got to educate people on the local level and push for changes in laws. 
Now you see lots of state adopting legislation that reduces licensing. The local 
competition approach works130” (Personal Interview, O’Toole 2017). Libertarian scholars 
do not see the market enhancing effect of some regulations, even in areas where Heritage 
and AEI hesitate to say ‘overregulation.’ For instance, they prefer to reduce interstate 
barriers to telemedicine by stopping to license physicians altogether: “A significant 
barrier to telemedicine is the requirement that physicians obtain licenses from each state 
in which their current or potential patients are, or may be, located. The best option is to 
eliminate government licensing of medical professionals altogether” (Svorny 2017, 1).  
However, some libertarians have played with the idea of “mutual recognition of 
occupational licenses” through a state compact, not federal action—suggested as a 
                                                 
130 This seems to contradict the general notion that licensing is increasing (Kleiner 2013), but it 
illustrates how strongly ‘competition’ has captured those scholars’ attention. 
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“possibility” in the 800-page CATO manual for policy-makers (CATO 2017b, 67). But 
this has never been generally accepted in libertarian circles131 and has never been put on 
the political agenda by any of the three think tanks (Personal Interview, O’Toole 2017). 
Somin adds, 
“But Congress has never even become close to doing it [discussing a mutual 
recognition law]. I think because the interest groups that benefit from the 
status quo are very powerful. They have a lot of influence on Capitol Hill—
lawyer, doctors, dentists, professionals, and they have a lot of influence in the 
Republican and Democratic party, maybe that could be overcome if ordinary 
voters realized that that is a problem and forced Congress to change, but most 
ordinary voter have no idea that that is a big problem. (Personal Interview, 
Somin 2017) 
Given that according to my interviews, many big national corporations and 
professional associations support uniform standards and licensing, the failure seems to 
stem more from the anti-government worldview of policy-makers than interest groups 
pressures. 
Heritage and AEI have also pushed the issue of ‘excessive’ occupational licensing 
(Abbott 2016; Larkin 2016; Sherk 2016; Furth 2016; Allen and Daniels 2013; 
Pethokoukis 2016). In none of their articles did I find this category of regulation 
described in terms of interstate barriers. In accordance with their antipathy to federal 
government, solutions always focus on calling on state legislatures and cities to reduce 
licensing. The problem is singularly framed in terms of public choice theory: “Incumbent 
firms favor licensing because it prevents competition by new entrants that would drive 
down prices […]. The licensing requirement generates economic rents for incumbents 
(supra-competitive profits) and political rents for politicians (campaign contributions, 
book sales, voter-turnout efforts, etc.)” (Larkin 2016). In this view, all regulation is bad 
and the only reasonable action is to “repeal licensing” (Abbott 2016).  
Scholars at AEI and Heritage generally reject the view that a national rule could 
provide a more level playing field and more competition, independently of the specifics 
of that rule. This can be easily seen by the fact that when they acknowledge the 
                                                 
131 The only two references to this in the online archive is the Policy Manual and the article on 
tele-medicine (CATO 2017a).  
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legitimacy of some licensing, like for EMTs or optometrists, they do not argue for a 
national license that would break down state barriers (Sherk 2014). Greve was clear in 
saying that a national patchwork of rules for him is preferable over states coordinating in 
some generalized reciprocity agreement: “That’s what they tried when they formed the 
interstate nurse licensing compact. And lo and behold, the most regulated state, I mean, 
the most pro regulation states rules. […] And then you achieved the opposite of what you 
wanted to do (Personal Interview, Greve 2017).  
This is of course related to the fact that they see all political processes as flawed, 
especially on the federal level: “Trying to have uniform licensing standards is impossible 
[…]. There is no political will by Congress—it is all public choice and rent seeking. The 
beneficiaries of occupational licensing would be combining their lobbying efforts” 
(Abbott 2017). For conservatives generally then, most regulations are “licensing cartels” 
to be eliminated, not tools that could be harnessed to increase competition and efficiency 
(Personal Interview, Greve 2017). 
It is clear that individual thinkers have more nuanced opinions about those issues. 
Abbott and Greve both told me that a general mutual recognition scheme is congruent 
with conservative principles and that they would support it—however, due to their worry 
about too stringent federal regulation, they do not want the federal government involved 
with it, or at least are hesitant about it (Abbott 2017). As with Greve and Somin’s 
position on judicial activism (see below), my interviewees made clear that they did have 
some misgivings about the principled rejection of federal market authority by 
conservatives. At the same time, they provided arguments against it, objected to most of 
my examples for ‘good’ uses of federal authority, or deemed justifications for federal 
action theoretically sound, but practically undesirable. Overall, this left an impression of 
incoherence; federal authority might be theoretically acknowledged but not practically 
advocated.  
For that reason, neither at Heritage nor AEI is there general agenda to promote a 
general mutual recognition regime. Similarly, if attention is paid to national solutions, 
they are for specific professions, not regarding the system generally. Other considerations 
seem to always trump arguments for federal market authority, like federalism and the 
flawed nature of politics. There is no single public statement in which AEI and Heritage 
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scholars or the FTC endorse mutual recognition as a principle for licensing (Heritage 
Foundation 2017b; FTC 2017; AEI 2017). The only place where they mention this is the 
so-called ALLOW Act, a law that would create mutual recognition of licenses for 
spouses of military service members (Larkin 2017). This case seems to avoid the 
‘political risks’ of federal preemption by focusing on one specifically ‘deserving 
population’ (Personal Interview, Abbott 2017; Skocpol 1992). 
In all three think tanks litigation against occupational licensing is supported. 
Abbott explains, ”The substantive due process and equal protection clause of the 
constitution” are good avenues to use to restrict occupational licensing, but “Those 
arguments have not been widely accepted” (Personal Interview, Abbott 2017). 
Apparently, “There is some talk [in conservative circles] about the FTC perhaps to be 
more aggressive, to redirect resources, to bring more of these anti-trust cases” (Personal 
Interview, Abbott 2017). One example, is North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC132, in which the Supreme Court ruled that only directly supervised 
regulatory agencies are covered by the state action doctrine, that allows states to act in 
protectionist manners (Larkin 2015). However, this, and other action are restricted to 
anti-trust considerations, not more general questions of discriminatory treatment of out-
of-state firms and professionals. Similarly, the newly created ‘economic liberty task 
force’ of the FTC focusses among other things on reducing excessive licensing; but does 
not pursue federal policy change or a mutual recognition scheme—mostly litigation and 
local experimentation133 (FTC 2017, 2014). Of course, as will be explained below, the 
legal strategy is difficult because since the New Deal, “Conservative justices have been 
ambivalent about the dormant commerce clause in particular” and reigning into state 
action in general (Abbott 2017).  
                                                 
132 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
133 Unfortunately, they did not reply to any of my interview requests. 
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IV.b.6. Incoherence in and Opposition to Strengthening Judicial Action against Interstate 
Barriers 
The question to which degree jurisdictional competition needs to be supplemented 
by strong courts to curb protectionist behavior is controversial among conservatives. 
Greve, for example, argues that the Supreme Court could act much more like the ECJ by 
taking the dormant commerce clause, privileges and immunities clause as well as anti-
trust laws much more seriously (Greve 2002b; Personal Interview, Greve 2017). 
However:  
In the wake of the New Deal, we [conservative legal scholars] thought it was 
a great idea to give states something meaningful to do. And what that meant 
was to ramp up protectionist barriers and you know give advantages to their 
own industries and so forth. And that mode of thinking is so deeply ingrained 
in a lot of conservatives, who obsess about state powers. So, the general idea 
is that, you know, once the federal government got all these new powers on 
the Commerce Clause, […] the idea came up that we should at least allow the 
states to regulate and protect themselves on top of whatever the feds say to 
my mind, that's an idiotic idea but there you have it. And you see a lot of that. 
I mean, if you look at the jurisprudence and the literature that comes from 
conservatives on the Dormant Commerce clause or federal preemption, it 
reflects those impulses. (Personal Interview, Greve 2017) 
Miller concurred, explaining that the conservative legal movement partially 
entrapped themselves into abetting state protectionism because their originalism—
thought as an argument against the New Deal expansion of the commerce power—
implied to some abandoning attempts to reign into state regulation through courts or 
through federal preemption (Will 1995; T. Personal Interview, Miller 2017). And indeed, 
conservatives at AEI remain divided on whether the appointment of Neil Gorsuch, who is 
supportive of deferring to legislators and states, to the Supreme Court, is a step in the 
right direction or not (Ponnuru 2017b, 2017a; Thomson 2007; Wilkinson 2001). Ramesh 
Ponnoru, a visiting follow at AEI writes that “these libertarians counsel judicial 
‘engagement’ instead of restraint but ‘real’ conservatives, like Gorsuch do not” (Ponnuru 
2017a). Similarly, Harvie Wilkinson, appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, in a lecture at AEI, praises the Supreme Court for “ceding authority to 
state and local governments” (Wilkinson 2001)  
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A more libertarian vision is described by some think tank publications and several 
books by Epstein and Greve (Kendall 2004, 51; Epstein and Greve 2007; Greve 1999, 
2000a). These writings describe already familiar arguments about the benefits of 
jurisdictional competition (Greve 1999, chapt. 1). To this, they add an “activist 
judiciary,” because limiting the authority of federal and state governments can only be 
achieved by the courts: “What Greve means by ‘real’ federalism is protection from 
regulation of almost any sort,” through strong dormant commerce clause (and related 
constitutional articles) jurisprudence (Kendall 2004, 32). This is clearly expressed when 
Greve salutes the Rehnquist court for advancing more limited federal powers under the 
banner of states’ rights, but criticizes that it did not limit state action equally due to 
skepticism of the dormant commerce clause (Greve 2002a). Greve wants to return to pre-
New Deal times (the Lochner court) where the Supreme court134 laid stricter scrutiny on 
economic regulation (Greve 2005a). 
This view is elaborated on in the AEI Federalism Project Papers, which broadly 
criticize the Supreme Court’s reading of preemption powers, including conservative 
justices, as both giving Congress too much power for regulation, and giving states too 
much power to regulate. The “presumption against preemption135” created “concurrent 
powers” which “cut in only one direction: stricter regulation” (Epstein and Greve 2007). 
According to Greve, “cooperation does not work” and “cooperative federalism requires 
government growth” creating a “pro-regulatory bias” (Greve 2000b; Epstein and Greve 
2007, 310). These scholars argue that under concurrent powers, the state with the strictest 
regulation will win out because firms will always follow the strictest standard136 (Epstein 
and Greve 2007). Instead they argue, legislation should be exclusively federal or state—
the important question of course being which is which. Theoretically, this suggests an 
endorsement of federal market authority: “In the context of network regulation, from 
                                                 
134 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
135 If preemption is not ‘clearly’ intended by Congress, states can treat any federal regulation as 
minimum floor. In addition, preemption is constructed as narrowly as possible, as opposed to a complete 
field preemption of a legislative field; before the New Deal courts did not allow concurrent legislation. The 
latter was thought to compensate for increasing federal powers (see Epstein and Greve 2007, chapt. 1). 
136 It is unclear how this is different from a situation without a federal minimum standard. 
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interstate airline transport to communication, we are inclined to support exclusive 
national regulation. Conversely, we favor exclusive state or local regulation where effects 
are purely local and where active state competition seems plausible” (Epstein and Greve 
2007, 312).  
Of course, “Federal preemption is only a second-best approach for Greve because 
it requires an exercise of federal power”—but can sometimes not be avoided since 
conservative justices are skeptical of the return to the Lochner era argument (Kendall 
2004, 48; see Epstein and Greve 2007, 337). If possible, Greve suggests to turn around 
the exception of state governments from anti-trust and dormant commerce clause 
considerations, i.e. the market participant and parker doctrine that “immunized state-
sponsored cartels from challenges under antitrust and constitutional law” (Greve 2005a). 
A cynical interpretation is that the principle behind those two points is this: “States 
should be free to act only if they are shedding regulations” (Kendall 2004, 37; see Epstein 
and Greve 2007, 310f.). In any case, the theoretical endorsement of preemption appears 
slightly disingenuous here, because for all practical purposes, the superiority of 
competition over federal intervention is advocated (see the specific areas discussed in this 
chapter). In most cases, federal rules are seen as unnecessary and federal agencies are 
described as “captured” (Epstein and Greve 2007, 19). For instance, occupational 
licensing is seen as warranting court scrutiny not uniform rules, despite its obvious 
interstate commerce implications. At the same time, the main line of attack behind the 
argument for preemption is concerns with state product liability law and the use of 
imminent domain in the states (Epstein and Greve 2007, 323f.; see also: Somin 2015). 
Some libertarians at CATO hold the same position. Somin explained: “We should 
use the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment to strike down local 
licensing laws. The Institute for Justice, has done that. They are doing it under the due 
process clause of the 14th amendment due to current jurisprudence. […] So what I would 
do is I would strengthen constitutional rules to prevent states from erecting trade barriers, 
enforced by the courts” (Personal Interview, Somin 2017). In his book on eminent 
domain, Somin denounces conservative scholars for believing that jurisdictional 
competition without strong judicial enforcement is stable (Somin 2015, 221). However, 
other libertarians disagree: “Obviously, there is some disagreement on these issues 
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among conservative thinkers. In my view there is no conflict in the constitution, breaking 
down trade barriers was one of the main reasons why the constitution was created in the 
first place” (Personal Interview, Somin 2017). But, Somin explained, beyond the 
technical reason—the dormant commerce clause it not explicitly contained in the 
constitution—there is a “broader attitudinal reason,” specifically the fact that “Most 
conservatives, until recently, were just very suspicion of the Courts in general, since they 
associated strong judicial review with the political Left, and with the Left doing things 
they did not like such as imposing the right to abortion etc.” (Personal Interview, Somin 
2017).  
Greve concurred with Somin—historically conservatives have associated growth 
of central government, judicial activism, and liberal policies as part of the same 
package—but he said, his position is slowly becoming more accepted (Personal 
Interview, Greve 2017). The critique of stronger jurisprudence against interstate barriers 
is driven by the fact that judges are considered ‘undemocratic.’ O’Toole argued that he 
would not want to endow “unelected justices with that kind of power” (Personal 
Interview, O’Toole 2017). More broadly it can be related to originalism as a way of 
understanding the constitution. “Originalism was the conservative legal movement’s 
foundational commitment” because it allowed cogent arguments against “judicial 
activism” and the “expansion of federal power” (Greve 2011, 244). Conservative scholars 
found soon that there is “little or no support” that the framers believed that the Supreme 
Court could invalidate state laws, creating market-barriers, under the dormant commerce 
clause (Fallon 2002, 461). Instead they decided, there is no such thing as a dormant 
commerce clause, preferring to defer to the states’ democratic institutions. This attitude is 
mirrored in the federalist revival of the Rehnquist court. The “federalism five (Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas)” were quick to limit federal authority, but did 
not apply the same scrutiny to state activity (Pryor 2001, 361). While definitely not a 
conservative mainstream opinion Justice Thomas opined, “The negative Commerce 
Clause has no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice” (550 U.S. 
330, 2007) and Justice Scalia called it “a judicial fraud” (575 U.S. 13-485, 2015). 
Scholars at Heritage have taken up this rejection of strong dormant commerce 
clause jurisprudence, maybe because they are more traditionally conservative, even in 
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cases where state competition might has obvious negative consequences137 (Gaziano 
2011; W. Beach 1998; Engdahl 2011; Thierer 1999). Todd Gaziano, founding director of 
Heritage’s legal center, and educated at the University of Chicago law school argues, that 
“The commerce clause was written to prevent the states from enacting protectionist tariffs 
that would restrict trade ‘among’ or between the states, and that it should not be applied 
to state action that has ‘indirect or incidental’ effects to interstate commerce (Gaziano 
2011). Doing so, he refers to Bork’s argument that “commerce does not include 
manufacturing, agriculture, labor, or industry,” implying a more narrow reading that only 
in few instance might mean more federal market authority (Bork and Troy 2001b, 885). 
Heritage’s Constitutional Guide for Lawmakers seems to suggest a slightly negative view 
of judicial activism to rule in discriminatory state behavior (Forte 2011). Overall, courts 
are seen very skeptically at Heritage. A senior fellow lament, “Over time, the Supreme 
Court has grabbed power by declaring that ‘the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution.’ The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to 
declare that its decisions that interpret the Constitution are the supreme law of the land” 
(Alt 2012). Due to these reasons, conservatives remain conflicted over the role of courts, 
while self-declared libertarians are more likely to support strong jurisprudence (Personal 
Interview, Abbott 2017; Personal Interview, Somin 2017). 
Overall, discussions of the dormant commerce clause are the only area where 
significant attention has been paid to the issue of interstate barriers. While this has not 
been a major issue item on the conservative agenda, scholars around Greve have spent 
considerable resources on creating a legal movement towards limiting discriminatory 
state action. As we have seen, this movement has been received controversially among 
conservatives. Its impetus has been deregulatory, recognizing legitimate interests in 
regulation rarely, spending always more time on explaining the importance of 
competition, while passing over important arguments for federal preemption in a few 
sentences. In slightly exaggerated form, conservatives think it is more reasonable to strike 
down all state medial licensing laws than to push for a national license to increase 
                                                 
137 Except in the case of taxing online activity (Thierer 1997). 
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mobility. While it seems like the latter might be a good political strategy, it does not fit 
into their image of how markets work.  
 
IV.c. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how conservative scholars have adopted several theories 
from economics, without assessing and taking seriously the limitations of said theories, 
widely known within the field of economics. In doing so, they weave together several 
strands of scholarship into competitive federalism, a set of beliefs that views the creation 
of markets as a natural product of the absence of central government. To maintain this 
view, scholars make several interpretive leaps that are not necessarily supported by 
empirical evidence but are understandable as an ideational product of antipathy to 
government and the strategic politics within the conservative movement. In this chapter, I 
have traced these beliefs to contradictions within Hayek’s writings and to an enthusiastic 
reception within the American academy of one possible interpretation of those writings, 
especially epitomized by the works of Milton Friedman. From there, competitive 
federalism beliefs diffused into the libertarian law and economics movement, 
conservative think tanks, and eventually into conservative politics. Through this process 
it became more of an axiomatic orthodoxy than a scholarly proposition. While several 
historical conditions explain the resonance of this set of beliefs—Post-New-Deal 
Democratic majorities and the Southern Strategy of Republicans including the adoption 
of ‘colorblind racism,’ states’ rights, and federalism arguments as a successful political 
mobilization strategy—the specific economic policy of Republicans was only made 
plausible through this historical process of mixing several ideas about markets in this 
contingent way. As a result of competitive federalism, the agenda of Republicans has 
been shaped around a project to cut spending and taxation, to deregulate, and to 
decentralize. This is reflected in presidential and congressional politics as we have seen 
in the last chapter, and in current research, positions, and advocacy of conservative think 
tanks as we have seen in this chapter. Specifically, conservative think tanks do not 
develop a comprehensive review of potential interstate barriers, dismissing the role of 
federal market authority for the creation and maintenance of single markets. This could 
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be seen in their opposition, and generally negative view of the EU as a central regulator, a 
general reluctance to acknowledge or will to remedy local protectionist policy, as well as 
a dismissal of potentially market-widening effects of harmonization and standardization, 
for instance in occupational licensing. Even when conservative scholars see the 
detrimental effects of local competition, for instance local business subsidies, they are 
paralyzed to act since central rules are opposed, and stricter jurisdictional scrutiny 
remains controversial. In the end, this chapter demonstrates how an ideational construct 
takes on causal power that cannot simply be explained by its ‘objective truth.’ 
The last two chapters have provided macro-evidence and a historical explanation 
for the inattention of American neoliberals to interstate barriers and opposition to federal 
market authority. The next chapters will complement this analysis with a focus on a 
narrower subject—the construction industry. We will see evidence for the continued 
existence of interstate market barriers. Exploring the politics around those barriers, based 
on interviews with various stake-holders, will demonstrate how in addition to competitive 
federalism specific institutional structures inhibit any mobilization around federal market 
authority, resulting in a maintenance of, or in some cases the creation of second-best 
solutions to a fragmented national market.  
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CHAPTER V 
INTERSTATE BARRIERS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
The last chapters have demonstrated an overall pattern of inattention to interstate 
barriers at the level of federal agenda setting and policy making that can be accounted for 
by the dominance of competitive federalism thinking. This chapter illustrates the 
continued relevance of interstate barriers today through an in-depth study of the 
construction sector. Through examination of the politics among jurisdictions, firms, and 
interest groups, I show here and explain in the next chapter how non-mobilization around 
federal market authority leads to the maintenance and proliferation of interstate barriers 
for construction services. The theoretical account I offer taps into ideational and 
institutional elements.  
As discussed in the methods section of this dissertation, the construction sector 
was chosen for several theoretical reasons: It covers several interesting areas from 
barriers to service and labor mobility to more traditional government protectionism 
through public procurement preferences. There is a significant number of big firms in the 
construction sector, which would benefit from more federal market authority. This lets us 
ascertain whether they are thwarted by countervailing interests, institutional structures, or 
sets of ideas (see Table 6, p. 318). In some instances, the explanation can be read directly 
from the interviews. For instance, many firms directly referenced the inaction of their 
trade groups due to their decentralized organization. In other cases, interpretational steps 
are necessary. For instance, local regulators clearly believe that heterogeneous 
regulations are no obstacle for interstate mobility. While this clearly contradicts structural 
explanations, some interpretation is needed to see whether this might fit within the 
competitive federalism framework. 
What happens in the construction industry is also substantively important since it 
is often seen as the backbone of the economy. As the Economist reports, “Construction 
holds the dubious honor of having the lowest productivity gains of any industry” and 
firms have failed to efficiently consolidate (Economist 2017). Explaining why this $1.7 
trillion industry has not generated more demands for federal market authority is an 
important question in itself. Furthermore, findings on construction might be roughly 
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similar to outcomes in other sectors. If I can ascertain the specific mechanisms that 
maintain market barriers in construction, it becomes more plausible that similar logics are 
at work in other sectors that face barriers of similar nature like retail banking or alcoholic 
beverages as well as professional services and public purchasing more generally.  
Finally, the regulatory outcome in construction is typical for the US-EU 
comparison, illustrating the overall puzzle (Gerring and Seawright 2007). In the EU, 
member-states are constrained from discriminating against out-of-state companies and 
professional licenses, while US states regularly do so. In terms of public purchasing, the 
EU displays central market authority by providing an overall framework for competition, 
while in the US there is no overall nation-wide or even state-wide system for 
procurement. It terms of building codes and standards, the EU relies on its authority to 
promote Europe-wide rules through so-called Euro-codes and its associated European 
Standardization Organizations, while the US relies on private competing standards that 
are erratically adopted and amended by the states.  
In addition, in the EU construction has generated land-mark free movement cases 
like Laval138 and Rüffert139 and centralized legislation like the Service Directive140 or the 
Lift Directive141, while in the US construction has received relatively little Commerce 
Clause attention except in the case of public procurement, where courts have explicitly 
allowed discriminating against out-of-state companies. On industry expert in the US 
observes,  
Construction remains one of the most fragmented, least efficient, and poorly 
understood segments of our economy […]. Adding to this fragmentation is 
                                                 
138 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd, 2007 E.C.R.7 I-11767. Concerning a Latvian company 
renovating Swedish schools, paying their workers according to Latvian not Swedish law. The ECJ ruled 
that in accordance with the Posted Workers Directive, 96/71 [1997] OJ. L. 18/1, Laval could not be forced 
to sign a collective bargaining agreement with a Swedish Union. However, this was partly reversed in the 
Rome I Regulation, 593/2008 [2008] OJ. L. 177.6, that allows no derogations from some mandatory labor 
protections of the host country. 
139 Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R I-01989. Ruling that attaching 
requirements to adhere to local collective bargaining agreements in public procurement contracts is 
discriminatory. However, Case C‐115/14, RegioPost GmbH & Co KG v Stadt Landau, [2016] OJ. L. 16/6, 
clarifies that requiring adherence to regional minimum wages laws is permissible.  
140 03/123 [2006] OJ. L. 326/36. See discussion below, CHAPTER V.b.  
141 95/16 [1995] OJ. L. 213/1. See discussion below, CHAPTER V.d. 
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the fact that construction is overseen by over 44,000 jurisdictions at the state 
and local government level, which regulate building design, construction, and 
renovation through a confusing, diverse, and at times, conflicting array of 
codes, standards, rules, regulations, and procedures. For these reasons, 
economies of scale […] achieved by other industries […] have not been 
achieved in the US construction industry. (Wible 2006, 288) 
The next section summarizes my process of data-collection and analysis, 
specifically how interview evidence was obtained and processed. Meta-justification of 
my methods can be found in the theory chapter (CHAPTER II.d.1, p. 62). Taken together, 
this fulfills the transparency guidelines for qualitative research (Elman and Kapiszewski 
2014). The following three sections give plenty of evidence of the relevance of interstate 
barriers in the construction sector. In each case, I motivate the comparison with an 
illustration of the European system, emphasizing the point that the US case cannot simply 
be explained by referencing technical requirements and material conditions. 
Subsequently, after considering the literature on each of these areas in American political 
economy, I have a look at the evidence of interstate barriers. I pull together publicly 
available documents and the perception of firms to describe interstate barriers caused by 
occupational licensing and firm requirements, local procurement preferences, as well as 
building codes. Overall, I present sufficient evidence to support the claim that there are 
significant interstate barriers for the circulation of construction services and that EU rules 
are much more liberal because it has used its central market authority in stark contrast to 
the US federal government. After summarizing the position of firms, the subsequent 
chapter considers different explanations. I analyze different actors in turn—national trade 
associations, local trade associations, state/local law-makers and regulators, as well as 
their national cooperative institutions—showing that decentralization and separation of 
powers prevents them from mobilizing for federal market authority and from creating 
uniform standards across sectors. At the same time, in many instances it becomes clear 
that given a different ideational context, many actors could be mobilized for federal 
market authority.  
V.a.  Research Strategy 
The first step in this case study is to characterize the outcome. This means 
describing the absence of federal market authority, i.e. the degree of existing local and 
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state legislation, its use in potentially market distorting ways, and its impact on actual 
firm mobility in the construction sector. Thus, the dependent variable is the persistence of 
interstate barriers and the lack of mobilization around them, operationalized as 
perceptions reported by nationally and regionally operating construction firms, their 
industry trade groups, as well as state- and national regulators. This is the focus of this 
chapter. 
The second step in this case study is to explain the outcome by investigating the 
policy positions of key actors in regards to goals and methods of reducing interstate 
barriers. This is operationalized by observing the demands and experiences of firms, the 
policy position of construction industry groups and stake-holders, as well as the positions 
of state- and national regulators. This is the focus of the next chapter.  
Since the amount of potentially discriminatory regulation, especially through 
heterogeneous laws and informal practices, is vast, I rely on semi-structured interviews to 
ascertain what barriers are significant to firms in the construction sector. I obtained a long 
list of regulations perceived by firms as barriers to mobility reaching from varying tax 
treatment in states and cities to uneven interpretation of environmental laws. The three 
issues named the most—professional and firm licensing, public procurement decisions, 
building codes and inspections—build the backbone of this study and were focused on in 
the interviews. For each of the three areas, I rely on secondary sources to characterize the 
broad outcome. However, the real extent and effect of local regulation can only be 
ascertained through interviews with construction firm and interest groups. I rely above all 
on their self-reported perception to describe the impact of interstate barriers. In many 
instances ‘non-discriminatory’ regulatory heterogeneity has the same effect as direct 
interstate barriers. In this case, interviews can deliver insights no other method can 
provide.  
The goal of the interviews was to ascertain the extent to which jurisdictional 
differences act as non-tariff barriers. First, I asked about the existence of significant legal 
barriers to mobility between states and cities for construction businesses. I focused on the 
perceived impact of licensing, building codes, and public procurement preferences, but 
all other mentioned obstacles were noted as well. Second, I asked about whether these 
differences caused significant costs and difficulties to moving across state lines, as well 
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as whether they advantaged certain firms over others. Third, given the overall perception 
of significant barriers to interstate commerce, the goal was to understand what firms saw 
as the cause of these obstacles and whether they advocated for any changes. Fourth, given 
an expressed interest of the firms in reducing the national fragmentation, the last line of 
questioning tried to understand what kind of attempts of change had been made and what 
had prevented them from being successful. Especially for the last two areas of 
questioning, evidence from industry associations and lobbying groups, as well as state 
regulators and their national associations was crucial. For these groups, I asked more 
specifically about their policies regarding out-of-state persons/entities and their 
justification, as well as their positions towards potential changes toward a more 
nationally unified system of regulating different aspects of the construction industry.  
Entities to interview where chosen systematically to address the theoretical 
expectations of different theories (see Table 6, p. 318). Table 3 summarizes the 
conducted interviews. 
The first set of interviews was conducted with retail contractors. They are a good 
subset to study, because they operate across multiple or the majority of states, even 
though as medium-sized enterprise they are more challenged by the costs of regulatory 
compliance and licensing. Retail contractors work mostly for national chains that build 
similar stores across the country, ranging from McDonalds, to Target, Motel 6,  
or clothing boutiques in shopping malls. Usually they will have a national client and 
travel with them across the country. As one firm representative explained to me, “Our 
business primarily is retail construction, so we work for a handful of clients and we go 
wherever they go. Wherever they want to build, we go” (Personal Interview, Shrader 
2017). 
For this research, I obtained a list of all 83 members of the Retail Contractor 
Association, a professional association that brings together most of the national 
construction companies with a focus on retail (RCA 2017). The 83 companies were 
contacted via email in Spring 2016, no response was followed up with another email, and 
a phone call later on. Companies were invited to participate in a phone interview, or to 
answer my questionnaire via email. 17 Presidents, Vice-President, and Project Managers 
agreed to interviews, resulting in seven phone and ten email interviews ranging from five 
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to 40 minutes. The company size varied from Warwick Construction, with an annual 
revenue of $246 million (rank 246) and work across all 50 states for clients like H&M or 
Jack in the Box, to smaller companies like Hays Construction Company, whose annual 
revenue is only about $10 million and works in about 11 states. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 After speaking with nationally operating construction firms, it would be important to contrast 
their position with small, local firms, as a kind of control group. Unfortunately, a survey I sent out to a list 
of all general contractors in Portland, OR and Vancouver, WA in Spring 2018 was exclusively answered by 
big firms with interstate operations. Further research needs to utilize a different method of contact. 
Targeted Interviewed 
Retail Contractors: Members of RCA 17; 7 phone, 10 email 
Home and Apartment Developers: TOP 100 list 7; 2 phone, 5 email 
Commercial Contractors: TOP 400 List  22; 6 phone, 16 email 
Specialty Contractors: TOP 100 List 4; 1 phone, 3 email 
Design & Architecture: TOP 300 List 23; 10 phone, 13 email 
Small Local Firms: Portland, OR; Vancouver, WA None obtained142 
Construction users: National Chains and CURT 1 phone 
Industry Groups and Professional Associations:  
- RCA 
- AGC in Cluster I 
- ABC in Cluster I 
- AIA in Cluster I 
- Fiatech 
- Solibri 
- CIRT 
- PHCCAs in Cluster I 
- MCAAs in Cluster I 
- UAs in Cluster II 
 
- 1 phone 
- 2 phone 
- 2 phone 
- 2 phone 
- 2 phone 
- 1 phone 
- None 
- None 
- None  
- None 
Licensing Agencies: 
- Architect: NCARB, Cluster I 
- Engineer: NCEES, Cluster I 
- Contractor: NASCLA, Cluster I, Cluster II 
- Plumber: Cluster II 
 
- 3 phone 
- 2 phone 
- 4 phone 
- 6 phone 
Building Officials: 
- ICC 
- IAPMO 
- CSI 
- Cluster I, Cluster II 
- Snowball 
 
- 1 phone 
- None 
- 1 phone 
- 8 email 
- 2 phone 
State Legislators 
- Colorado: House/Senate Business Committee 
 
- 3 phone  
Table 3: Interviews Conducted by Author 
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The second set of interviews focused on big commercial contractors. These were 
specifically suggested by retail contractors as crucial to understanding the impact of 
public procurement policies. A similar procedure was followed. I obtained a list of the 
biggest 400 commercial contractors in terms of revenue (ENR 2016), ranging from $132 
million (The Sollitt Construction Company) to $28 billion (Bechtel). I first contacted 
them via email and followed up with phone calls. Unfortunately, in most cases it was not 
possible to reach more than their customer service hotline, which usually turned out to be 
futile. I conducted a total of 22—six phone, and 16 email—interviews in Spring 2017. 
Seventeen firms declined to be interviewed due to only doing work in one state. The 
companies interviewed reached in size from Manhattan Construction Company (rank 47, 
$1.2 billion annual revenue) to T.N. Ward Corporation (rank 376, $143 million annual 
revenue). They were working in between 50 and two states, averaging a presence in 22 
state-markets.  
The third set of interviews targeted home and apartment developers. They had 
been suggested by several interviewees as particularly affected by differences in building 
codes and local interpretations due to their focus on building many standardized homes in 
different locations. I followed a similar procedure. I obtained a list of the largest 100 US 
home builders in terms of revenue (Builder 2017), ranging from $11 billion (D. R. 
Horton) to $0.095 billion (Tilson Home Corp.). I first contacted them via email and 
followed up with phone calls. Again, in most case it was not possible to reach more than 
their customer service hotline. In Spring 2017, I was able to conduct 2 short phone 
interviews and to receive 5 email responses. The companies interviewed were operating 
in between 20 and 30 states. However, home developers are mostly regional, operating in 
an average of 4 states in the TOP 100, with 51% only being in one state. Many firms 
declined to be interviewed for that exact reason. 
The fourth set of interviews targeted specialty contractors, i.e. plumbing, heating, 
cooling, and pipe-fitting businesses. They were suggested because most general 
contractors provide some basic services beyond construction management but sub-
contract most of their work. One reason, as many told me, is that construction is 
inherently local. People on the ground are needed and it is not feasible to ship a whole 
workforce around the country. However, in the interviews with retail and commercial 
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contractors it became clear that licensing and procurement rules incentivize the use of 
local sub-contractors by making it more complicated and expensive for general 
contractors to bring their own subcontractors to a new city or state. As one company 
explained, “The mechanical contractors, and plumbers, and electricians are less likely to 
be national because they need local licenses. The only companies that are national are 
doing something that is so specialized that there won’t be local people. National 
companies are only competitive if they have some specialty” (Personal Interview, 
Shrader 2017). 
I approached national specialty contractors to see how they were affected by 
market fragmentation. To this end, I obtained a list of the 100 largest (in terms of 
revenue) plumbing, heating, cooling, and pipe fitting contractors, reaching from $1 
billion to $4 million in annual revenue (PHC 2012). I first contacted them via email and 
followed up with phone-calls. I received 9 responses saying that the company was only 
operating in one state. I was able to conduct two short phone interviews with national 
plumbing companies and two short email interviews with national HVAC contractors in 
Spring 2017. 
The next logical subset to speak to, especially for a better insight into building 
codes and public procurement barriers, were Design, Architecture, and Engineering 
firms. I focused specifically on architecture firms—many of them act as construction 
managers giving insights into all steps of the construction process. Like the rest of the 
construction industry, architecture firms are mostly small enterprises. There is around 
20,800 architecture firms in the US with an average of 5 architects with 26% of firms 
consisting of one architect only (Design Intelligence 2016; K. Baker 2012). While 88% 
of firms have only one office, architectural work is relatively specialized resulting in 
much cross-jurisdictional work; most architects hold licenses in at least two different 
states (Design Intelligence 2016; K. Baker 2012).  
I followed a similar procedure. I obtained a list of the 300 largest architecture 
firms, reaching from $7 million to $1.2 billion in annual revenue (Architectural Record 
2017). I first contacted them via email and followed up with phone-calls. In Spring 2017, 
I conducted ten phone interviews and 13 email interviews. The firms interviewed reached 
from the largest architectural firm, Gensler, to one of the smallest ones, Marshall Craft 
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Associates. On average, the firms interviewed were active in 29 states, employing 
between 4500 architects and 45 architects.  
In total, 73 nationally-operating firms were interviewed. 
The seventh set of interviews targeted the users of construction, specifically big 
companies with interests in building similar structures in different jurisdictions. In Spring 
2017, I contacted national chains like CVS Pharmacies, Target, Hilton, Kaiser 
Permanente and Walmart via email, and later phone. Unfortunately, I was only able to 
speak with one person at one of these companies—however, this interview turned out to 
be crucial since this person was able to explain how their, and similarly-situated 
companies, approached dealing with jurisdictional differences. I also contacted the 
Construction User Round Table (CURT), but was unable to conduct an interview. As 
with other organizations, assessment of their position will be based on their website. 
The eighth set of interviews targeted industry associations on the national level as 
well as their local chapters in my state cluster, California, Oregon, and Washington. 
Successful interviews were conducted with the following interest groups in Spring 2016 
and Springe 2017: RCA (Retail Contractors Association), AGC (American General 
Contractors), AGC Oregon, ABC (Associated Builders and Contractors), ABC Oregon, 
AIA (American Institute of Architects), and AIA Oregon. In addition, I was able to 
obtain interviews with two industry consortiums and think tanks, Fiatech and Solibri. I 
was unable to conduct interviews with the following industry associations, and evidence 
for those will solely be based on publicly available documents: AGC California and 
Washington, ABC California and Washington, AIA California and Washington, CIRT 
(Construction Industry Roundtable), PHCCA (Plumbing Heating Cooling Contractors 
Association) National as well as California, Oregon, Washington, MCAA (Mechanical 
Contractors Association of America) National as well as California, Oregon, Washington. 
I also contacted plumbers’ unions in my two state clusters, but none were willing to 
comment. 
The ninth set of interviews targeted regulators of the construction industry, 
specifically state or city licensing agencies as well as their national associations. 
Successful interviews were conducted with the following licensing agencies in Spring 
2016 and 2017: NCARB (National Council of Architectural Registration Boards) and 
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architect licensing agencies in Oregon and California; NCEES (National Council of 
Examiners for Engineering and Surveying) and the engineer licensing agency in 
California; NASCLA (National Association of State Contractors Licensing Agencies) 
and contractor licensing agencies in Oregon, Rhode Island, and California; and plumbers 
licensing agencies in Main, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Massachusetts, 
and Albany, New York. The following agencies declined to be interviewed for this 
dissertation: Architect licensing agency in Washington, engineering licensing agencies in 
Oregon and Washington, contractor licensing agencies in Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New York City, as well as plumber licensing 
agencies in Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New York City.  
The ninth set of interviews targeted building officials. I successfully conducted 
interviews with ICC (International Code Council) and CSI (Construction Specification 
Institute). Unfortunately, other code development organizations were not willing to grant 
interviews. In February 2018, I conducted interviews with officials at the Connecticut 
Building Officials Association, the Maine Building Officials Inspectors Association, the 
New Hampshire Building Officials Association, the Massachusetts Building 
Commissioner & Inspectors Association, the Texas Building Officials League, the 
Building Safety Association of Vermont, as well as the Washington Association of 
Building Officials Association.  
Lastly, I targeted state legislators on business and labor affairs committee to 
ascertain why the described interstate barriers do not come on the political agenda. 
Specifically, I was able to speak with three legislators in Colorado, which was pointed 
out by many interviewees as very difficult jurisdiction. Future Research needs to target 
others state with these characteristics like for instance California, Florida, or Hawaii. 
The evidence from the interviews follows in the next three sections. Each section 
starts with a short consideration of EU rules on the issue at hand. This sets up the puzzle 
since the EU has in every case, despite similar structural conditions and much more 
national differences, created much more liberal rules exercising central market authority. 
I then consider the literature on each of these areas in American Political economy, 
showing how their attention has been shaped by competitive federalism, and mostly 
glanced over issue of interstate barriers. Subsequently, I present evidence of the existence 
215 
of interstate barriers and their effects. Each time, I first present evidence for interstate 
barriers learned from publicly available document and contrast it with the perceptions of 
firms and interest groups. In each case, this demonstrates two things: (1) the American 
inattention to interstate barriers is mirrored in the dearth of information on their 
existence—nobody has even compiled relevant information. (2) While basic research 
gives some indications for the existence of interstate barriers, interview evidence shows 
that they are much more wide-spread and dramatic than the publicly available documents 
suggest.  
V.b. Occupational Licensing and Firm Registration 
The service regime generally and occupational licensing regulations specifically, 
is symptomatic for the puzzle addressed by this dissertation. To appreciate the amount of 
interstate barriers existent and the absence of mobilization around federal market 
authority in the US, we can first consider the European approach. This demonstrates just 
how much more service mobility is feasible in the US, countering arguments by 
regulators that the US is too large or diverse to establish a federal framework for 
licensing. The US case appears to be unusual (or vice-versa) because EU member states 
allow much more mobility for professionals, despite the fact that qualification 
requirements vary much more widely there than in the US. The EU has adopted a single 
set of coherent rules for exchange in the services, including rules that encourage cross-
border competition, while the US has not in any way. As a result, interstate barriers to the 
provision of services proliferate in the United States.  
For instance, European officials usually argue that it is “primarily the 
heterogeneity of national service regulations, rather than the intensity of national 
regulations, that hampers bilateral trade and investment” (Santagostino 2017, 69). In 
contrast, conservative politicians in the US usually consider the intensity of regulation, 
not their heterogeneity a problem (see CHAPTER IV.b). Even further, the EU considers 
double burdens as potential trade barriers. For example, asking a professional to 
demonstrate skills (for instance through a test), that have already been demonstrated to an 
authority in another country, might be considered discriminatory (European Commission 
2018d; De Witte 2007, 14).  
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As Hoffmann demonstrates in his study of barbers and cosmetologists, in the EU 
it is usually assumed that if someone can provide a service safely in one country, they 
will be able to do so in another country as well (Hoffmann 2011, 250ff.). For instance, a 
former Director General at the European Commission argues: 
If you take regulation of the professions, doctors, kinesiotherapists, was 
pretty easy, because in a way the massive argument was, what do you expect, 
are the German citizens different from the French citizens across the border 
to the point that they need an expertise to be dealt with? So, you end up with 
the sole argument that we want to be sure that the people are well-trained; 
okay that’s pretty easy. There is no other reason for discrimination. (cited in 
Hoffmann 2011, 265) 
The general approach of the EU is based on the treaty guarantees of the freedom 
of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and the freedom to provide services in any territory 
(Article 56 TFEU), which generally imply that labor mobility and services are regulated 
like other commodities, by mutual recognition and the home country principle143. This 
means, except under specific circumstance, entry of a good or service cannot be denied if 
it is legally produced and marketed in its home country. Mobility for the cross-border 
movement of services is slightly more complicated as described in the Service 
Directive144 and the Qualification Directive145. Mobility for European firms can also fall 
under these directives but more commonly is subject to other regulations that establish 
some minimum standards for corporate structures and regulates when whose laws apply. 
When trying to expand a business to another state, a firm can rely on a single point of 
contact that must process the completely online-application within 3 days for a maximum 
of €100 (European Commission 2018d).  
The EU differentiates between temporary and permanent provision of cross-
borders services. Temporary provision of services, which might be rendering services 
remotely, or work for a single project in another country, is generally allowed, and 
typically only requires notifying the local authority (European Commission 2018d).  
                                                 
143 [2010] OJ. L. C326/13. 
144 03/123 [2006] OJ. L. 326/36. 
145 05/36 [2005] OJ. L. 255/22. 
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For the permanent establishment of professionals, the EU has a regime based 
around mutual recognition that regulates what has to be automatically accepted and what 
kind of measures are allowed to be taken when qualifications are not deemed equivalent 
(European Commission 2018d). For example, a doctor from the Netherlands has to be 
granted a license to practice in Germany automatically. A German lawyer can practice 
under his German title in France, and after three years adopt the French equivalent. If a 
profession does not fall under mutual recognition, the qualification directive still 
establishes general principles for the application process like a single point of contact, 
maximum amount of fees to be paid, and the structure of potential aptitude tests. The 
burden of proof is reversed when compared to the US case. If a qualification is not 
recognized, the licensing authority has to provide evidence why an exception to the rule 
of free establishment is necessary. Additional requirements imposed by a state have to be 
judged proportionate by the European Commission making it hard to use trivial 
difference for discrimination (Commission 2015b). This tilts the balance toward more 
integration, despite the fact that actual differences between national regulations can be 
quite significant because the process is streamlined and under close scrutiny by the 
Commission. For instance, an EU official of the Directorate that approves such 
derogations and with knowledge of the US rules, explained: “It would be very difficult 
for member states to justify that this is proportionate. It’s quite difficult to say that [a 
professional], who is coming, had only 1200 hours instead of 1500 or 1800 and will 
create problems. This is hard to justify” (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 214). 
The EU service regime is also notable to the degree which it does not conform to 
the expectation of conventional theories. “While business in Europe was largely 
supportive of the Commission’s proposals [for service liberalization], it did not strongly 
mobilize in favor of it” (Hoffmann 2011, 233). Another author observers,  
It is striking that the European services business did not come up with its own 
estimates or empirical studies. With a proposal so crucial for the sector and 
so controversial in many circles, one would have expected the deep expertise 
of business to be brought in. The reason is likely to be the fragmentation of 
the EU services business over numerous sectors, sub-sectors and highly 
specialized activities, without any umbrella organization capable of devising 
a powerful, well-researched response. (M. Chang, Hanf, and Pelkmans 2010, 
106) 
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This is an important observation. US firms similarly articulate a diffuse interest in 
reducing interstate barriers. However, without an actor to bundle and mobilize these 
interest, no changes are initiated. It is not surprising than that experts attribute service 
liberalization in the EU to the existence of an actor with an ordoliberal ideology and the 
goal to promote the single market (Hoffmann 2011, 271ff.). As one author puts it, this 
“formed a distinct example of Commission entrepreneurship, since it [service 
liberalization] has been advocated neither by the other EU institutions nor by major 
interest groups. It was the Commission’s own invention” (De Witte 2007, 9). To 
understand how interstate barriers through licensing in the US are maintained, we 
therefore have to look at both, institutional structures and the absence of a federal market 
building agenda. 
In the US, meanwhile—as we will see in detail below—states regularly deny 
entry to licensed professionals from other states, just based on their origin. Regulators do 
not consider heterogeneity per se to be a market barrier, and redundant licensing 
requirement are not considered a double burden as they are in the EU. Arguments against 
mutual recognition by American officials due to geographic differences and safety 
hazards seem hollow compared to the EU with more heterogeneity and more mutual 
recognition. In particular, the European Commission scrutinizes those arguments, while 
in the US there is no federal agent that monitors the system. For instance, an US state 
licensing board can easily require retraining for a plumber journeyman with a hundred 
less hours of training, citing safety concerns or no reason at all. This leads to a situation 
where even small differences in training can be used as a reason for denying entry: 
“Oregon believes that a minimum standard has to be assured and other states are not 
doing it […]. For instance, in Idaho and Washington they only register contractors.” 
Accordingly, a member of the Oregon contractor licensing agency explained, out-of-state 
licensed contractors have to go through the same licensing process as completely 
unlicensed Oregon firms (Personal Interview, Denno 2016). 
Also consider the distinction between temporary and permanent service provision 
in the EU, where the former is always generally legal. This already goes much further 
than in the US, where the rendering of cross-border services without obtaining a local 
license, is generally prohibited. As we will see, in many cases US companies are not even 
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allowed to compete for construction projects before becoming established as a licensed 
engineer/architect/contractor in said jurisdiction. Allowing the temporary provision of 
services increases mobility immensely, because it allows even small companies to test 
out a new market without needing to learn and comply with a whole different set of 
regulations. In the US, every state regulates out-of-state businesses differently, there is no 
single framework or point of contact established, and licensing agencies sometimes have 
specific requirements for professional firms.  
V.b.1. Licensing in the US Literature 
Occupational licensing for individuals has received significant attention within 
the economics profession in the US. Firm licensing and registration practices for firms 
have not. Most of the research mirrors the ideas we have encountered in conservative 
think tanks: occupational licensing is mostly analyzed as a phenomenon of regulatory 
capture and monopoly rents, not as one of interstate barriers. This is not surprising since 
most research on occupational licensing is closely related to the Chicago School of 
Economics and Milton Friedman: 
The overthrow of the medieval guild system was an indispensable early step 
in the rise of freedom in the Western world. It was a sign of the triumph of 
liberal ideas, and widely recognized as such, that by the mid-nineteenth 
century, in Britain, the United States, and to a lesser extent on the continent 
of Europe, men could pursue whatever trade or occupation they wished 
without the by-your-leave of any governmental or quasi-governmental 
authority. In more recent decades, there has been a retrogression, an 
increasing tendency for particular occupations to be restricted to individuals 
licensed to practice them by the state. (M. Friedman 1962, 137) 
Most research on licensing, including the work of Morris Kleiner—the most 
prolific scholar on the issue, coming from the University of Minnesota—regularly cites 
Friedman and Stigler when discussing the effects of occupational licensing (Kleiner 
2013, 2005). Licensing is portrayed from the perspective of only two theories: either it is 
a plot by practitioners to limit competition and increase prices, or it is a legitimate 
government intervention to solve problems of market failure, specifically asymmetric 
information.  
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According to standard economic models, licensing raises prices for services-
rendered by restricting entry into a profession (Kleiner 2005, 44f.). Assuming that the 
demand curve is downward sloping, this increase will partly be reallocated in form of 
wages to the service provider and partly to demand reduction or substitution. This results 
in dead-weight loss, which some economists estimate to be around $35-$42 billion 
annually in the US (Hamermesh 1993; Kleiner 2005). It is assumed that it follows from 
this theory that the profession itself lobbies for licensure, capturing state regulators, to 
realize these benefits (Kleiner 2013, 210).  
Economic models provide one alternative to this perspective: several market 
failures might justify government intervention to create the necessary conditions for 
competition (Benham and Benham 1975). One might see licensing as a mechanism to 
encourage skill formation, dealing with time-inconsistent incentives. In this view, these 
regulations guarantee higher wages and thereby make the investment in years of 
education incentive-compatible. More generally, one can think of licensing as solving 
problems of asymmetric information. Consumers can often not judge the quality of a 
product so a non-market mechanism is needed to communicate that information. From 
the consumer’s point of view, who might only rarely buy a specific professional service, 
it would not be rational to expend much resources into researching the best service 
provider or join a group that certifies such service provider. In this case, it would make 
sense for the state to regulate a profession. However, especially conservatives object to 
this rationale by pointing out that licensing outlaws the market for low quality services, 
thereby benefiting the well-off while outpricing the poorer segments (C. Shapiro 1986). 
Given these two theories, most research has focused on just three variables, labor 
supply, wages, and some measure of service quality—with the first two being seen as 
vindicating the capture perspective, and the latter being evidence for the public interest 
perspective (Kleiner 2005, chap. 3-5; for an overview of current research: White House 
2015). To some degree, empirical findings are inconsistent. Studies find increased wages 
for skilled professions like doctors, lawyers and dentists, but no or smaller effects for 
lower skill professions like cosmetology and barbers as well as nurses and teachers 
(Kleiner 2005, 73). The most sophisticated approach that tries to make sense of these 
findings can be found in Stages of Occupational Regulation (Kleiner 2013). This model 
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relies on capture tendencies over time derived from Stigler as well as Olson’s ideas about 
the effects of collective action problems over time (Stigler 1971; M. Olson 2000). 
Accordingly, in the initial stage of becoming licensed, there are limited effects on wages 
and supply in a profession. This is true for interior designers or childcare services that 
have started to become licensed in the 2000s. In the next stage, when stricter 
requirements like insurance are added, as for mortgage brokers, there is a positive impact 
on wages. Professions that have been regulated for longer, like electricians and plumbers, 
show a stronger correlation between licensing and wages, for instances giving electricians 
a 12% wage premium. Finally, universally and historically regulated professions like 
dentists an lawyers reap the biggest gains in terms of wages (Kleiner 2013, chap. 7). 
Findings on service quality vary even more, probably due to the fact that the 
measures are often either very rare events (workplace deaths) or causally distant (public 
health outcomes). For instance, separate studies find that licensing dentists improves 
outcomes (Holen 1978), has no effect at all (Carroll and Gaston 1983), or worsens public 
health (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). Kleiner summarizes in a literature review: “There is 
little to show that occupational regulation has a major effect on the quality of service 
received by consumers or on the demand for the service other than through potential price 
effects” (Kleiner 2005, 56). However, in the same paragraph he mentions that it was 
“questionable” whether any of the studies actually captured causality, and in later studies 
he finds that licensing plumbers and electricians actually does prevent workplace 
accidents (Kleiner 2013, Chap. 5).  
For this dissertation, it is not important to assess which side in these debates is 
correct, or even if there is one homogenous causal model that can explain wage and 
quality effects of licensing. For our purpose it is important to note what the literature does 
not do, i.e. analyze the issue from a perspective of interstate barriers and actually 
investigate the politics behind the creation and maintenance of those barriers.  
While many authors mention the detrimental effect of licensing on interstate 
mobility in passing, their actual research is mostly focused on price and quality effects. 
Searching various databases, I could only identify 12 empirical papers that explore the 
effect of occupational licensing on interstate mobility (Holen 1978; Ladinsky 1967; 
Shepard 1978; Pratt 1980; Mulholland and Young 2016; Kleiner, Gay, and Greene 1982; 
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Arbury et al. 2015; Roback 1943; Pashigian 1979; Stange 2014; Tenn 2001; J. Johnson 
and Kleiner 2017). Of those, 11 found a negative effect. However, none discuss the 
politics behind or causes of these restrictions. It follows, that I could not find much in 
terms of solutions. Most authors leave it at suggesting more reciprocity or less regulation 
in general. None discuss the different mechanisms that could be used, i.e. how states 
could overcome their collective action problems and cooperate in licensing or how the 
federal government could intervene to create more interstate mobility. Moreover, 
research on occupational licensing is dominated by scholars from conservative think 
tanks that want to see it abolished, not reformed, focusing solely licensing as a 
phenomenon of regulatory capture (Larkin 2016; Pethokoukis 2014a; Dick Carpenter et 
al. 2012; Brannon and Albright 2017). 
Related is the fact that most studies only operate within the two economic theories 
discussed, and solely use econometric models. Reviewing dozens of papers on licensing, 
described as the “major studies” in the field by Kleiner as well as a recent White House 
report, I could only identify a few that would actually investigate alternative theories or 
the politics of licensing (Kleiner 2005, 60; White House 2015, 58). Most studies 
implicitly assume that since professionals benefit from licensing in terms of wages, they 
are the cause via capture of the regulators, using simple functionalism. However, this 
connection is rarely ever scrutinized empirically. Scholarship coming from conservative 
think tanks uses public choice theories axiomatically without considering alternatives 
(Larkin 2016; Pethokoukis 2014a; Dick Carpenter et al. 2012; Brannon and Albright 
2017). 
Of course, there are many alternative theories that might lead to different findings 
or a different interpretation of the evidence. But realistically, not even the assumptions of 
the two main theories are thoroughly tested. For instance, finding increased wages with 
licensing might only be incidental or due to higher necessary but unobserved skills of 
professionals. Having spoken with actual licensing boards, often consisting of part-time 
volunteers, the assumption that they easily calculate and achieve the optimal labor supply 
for rent extraction is questionable. While there are a few studies that try to provide 
evidence for the capture theory, none of them go beyond correlating some macro-
variables to the strictness of licensing (B. D. Peterson, Pandya, and Leblang 2014; 
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Kleiner 2005; Graddy 1991). The kind of evidence I would like to see, especially 
investigations of the motives and ideas of political actors, is non-existent.  
Similarly, alternative explanations are never considered. For instance, licensing 
has been conceptualized as identity-creating club that represent certain values which, by 
having licensing, are communicated to prospective professionals as well as consumers 
(Frank 1988, 65). In this sense, licensing “promotes positive aspects of their work 
experience, disseminates information about how to do the job better, require job-specific 
training, promote ethical, standards, or devise methods of adjudicating disputes between 
consumers and producers (Kleiner 2005, 43; Hirschman and Hirschman 1970). This 
argument has been specifically made in describing the institutionalization of the medical 
field (Starr 2008). In a related way, sociologists have conceptualized licensing as a 
structuring and institutionalization process that allows broad access to an occupation, 
thereby creating a more public market (Redbird 2017; Zhou 1993). Accordingly, without 
public licensing arrangements entry into professions might be limited by “network 
connections and the right demographic make-up” of a person as well as general socio-
economic barriers (Redbird 2017, 618). 
Unfortunately, no economist has investigated these theories, especially not with 
detailed case studies that would show how different political actors interact to create the 
current licensing regime. There is some statistical evidence that private capture and 
public interest theories of licensing are limited in their explanatory power. Xueguang 
Zhou shows that licensing is better conceptualized as part of a wider institutionalization 
process that conforms with society’s expectation of organization and legitimates the 
knowledge of the profession (Zhou 1993). In this sense, professionals lobby for licensing 
arrangements because that is what delineates them as professionals. In a more recent 
contribution  that relies on a dataset spanning 30 years and 300 occupations, sociologist 
Beth Redbird finds no evidence of occupational licensing increasing wages, challenging 
Kleiner’s extensive research directly (Redbird 2017). Instead she finds that licensure 
actually increases supply of professionals by creating a codified mechanism of entry into 
a profession and legitimizing its practitioners independently of socio-economic 
background (Redbird 2017, 619).  
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In sum, the literature on occupational licensing provides ample evidence for 
potential market barriers. However, being highly influenced by competitive federalism, 
scholars have rarely investigated the rules and regulations as market-barriers and have not 
inquired into the politics of creating and maintaining them. Because of that, they have not 
investigated other aspects of licensing and registration that creates barriers, like for 
instance registration requirements for firms. 
V.b.2. Licensing as Interstate Barriers for Construction Services  
Professional licensing is widespread in the US, as many studies attest. However, 
they do not look at it from the perspective of market barriers. As Figures 1 and 2 
demonstrate, States license between 41 professions and 6% of the workforce in 
Mississippi and 177 professions and 30.4% of the workforce in California, with an 
average of 94 (Adam B. Summers 2009). There are over 2000 professions in the US that 
require licenses, certificates, or registrations (Kleiner 2005). If registration requirements 
are added, over 40% of the labor force requires some kind of state or local government 
approval before being allowed to offer a service (Kleiner 2013). Generally, licensing has 
become more stringent over time and with a few exceptions, there has not been any 
significant changes in terms of mutual recognition of licenses between states (Kleiner, 
2005, 112). The astonishing part is not that professions are regulated, but the big variety 
between states, which impedes the mobility of workers and services. Due to a lack of 
research, the specific differences between states’ licensing regimes, and their impact on 
professionals, firms, and service provision is often unclear. This will be remedied by the 
evidence from my interviews with construction companies. 
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The firms interviewed all reported to be affected by licensing arrangements, 
specifically licenses for architects, engineers, contractors, plumbers, various licenses for 
their subcontractors, as well as licensing and related regulations for architecture and 
engineering firms. Out of 68 companies answering the question, 61 reported that various 
jurisdictional differences in the issuance and handling of licenses significantly impeded 
their cross-national mobility, reaching from redundant bureaucracy and unnecessary 
costs, over costly delays, to the decision to decline suitable project or to not compete in 
certain jurisdictions at all. Five firms described significant costs associated with licensing 
differences, but did not want to call it a barrier due to it being “a normal business 
expense” (Personal Interview, Webcor 2017). Two firms rejected the perspective of costs 
and barriers altogether, arguing that “local control is important for safety” and not an 
issue that should be discussed in the terms I proposed (Personal Interview, Crowder 
2017).  
Regulations for contractors vary quite significantly across the country 
(HomeAdvisor 2016). There are only six states, Texas for instance, that do not require 
any license or registration for general contractors. Six states require a simple registration, 
27 states require a contractor’s license. The remaining 11 states let counties and 
municipalities regulate contractors, meaning that there are different licensing 
requirements for each jurisdiction. For instance, in Kansas most counties have their own 
licensing agency with different requirements. Similarly, in Colorado regulations differ 
city by city. For instance, Denver has a complicated process to become licensed while the 
neighboring Castle Rock only requires the filling out of a registration. This is seen as 
especially burdensome for firms, as one interviewee explained, “Municipality licensing 
requirements can be onerous, time consuming, expensive ,and lengthy (Personal 
Interview, Metropolitan 2017). Another firm added, “City licenses are problematic for 
national companies as they require the license holder to be present at all inspections 
[which is infeasible when managing several work sites]. Boston, MA; most cities in CO; 
and San Marcus, TX are a few examples (Personal Interview, Warwick 2017).  
In every state or municipality, the scope of the license (what can you do) and the 
requirement of a license (who needs it) is different (HomeAdvisor 2016). For instance, 
some states have a very inclusive license, while others require special licenses for many 
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tasks like digging wells, building dry walls, or working on a roof. Similarly, some require 
a license for any work exceeding $500 (California), while others set the limit much 
higher, for instance Delaware with $50,000. Even others require licenses only for small 
home improvement projects while commercial contractors only need to register as a 
business (Maryland). To complicate things, requirements of states and cities are not 
publicly available in one place, and in some cases have to be found out by actually 
calling the agency in question or communicating via fax (Personal Interview, Rosser 
2017).  
While this patchwork might be made workable through mutual recognition rules 
like in the EU, this is not the case in the US. General contractors are not allowed to 
temporarily or permanently operate in another state without first acquiring the local 
license—in some cases they cannot even submit bids for projects without holding 
jurisdiction-specific licenses first. Doing so is quite difficult, since there is no general 
system that manages the recognition or translation of out of state licenses. While many 
US states have entered into reciprocity agreements, these agreements vary from state to 
state and from profession to profession and are not universally applied. States enter 
‘bilateral’ reciprocity agreements with other states, waiving some requirements for 
applicants from said state. Within the US context, reciprocal recognition does not mean 
that service providers can simply enter a jurisdiction. Instead, it only means that a firm 
will face a somewhat expedited or simplified licensing process. A system of automatic 
recognition for temporary service provision, like in the EU, does not exist, creating a 
confusing patchwork. 
In addition, many states reciprocate only with immediately adjacent states or not 
at all because they are “very passionate about their laws and regulations,” as a 
representative of NASCLA told me; for instance “Washington only reciprocates with 
Idaho and Oregon” (Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). In other states, the 
regulatory boards would like to cooperate more with other agencies, but state laws do not 
allow for that146 (Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). In addition, those reciprocity 
                                                 
146 This is usually not an outright prohibition, but budgets lack line items for participation in 
cooperative efforts with other states. However, some states prohibit it outright. For instance California 
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agreements are not widely known or publicly posted and can often only be ascertained by 
calling an agency about a specific case. Even professionals in the field are often not sure 
which state has reciprocity and which state does not (see also Hoffmann 2011, 220). 
However, reciprocity is not to be confused with something like mutual 
recognition. A firm will still have to go through an application process that might include 
a background check, payment of a fee (usually between $100-$600), and a state law 
exam, which depending on the state may only be offered in certain locations and on 
certain days. Most licenses need to be renewed every two or so years and require state-
specific continuing education, meaning that renewal of licenses might be more difficult in 
some states than others. One representative described the complication of different 
continued education requirements in different locations as prohibitive for market entry to 
some firms (Personal Interview, Hays 2017) 
The National Association of State Contactors Licensing Agencies (NASCLA) 
brings together different regulators to exchange information and encourage reciprocity. 
However, NASCLA has only 40 members, with some cities and states choosing not to 
participate in this process (Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). For instance, a 
representative of NASCLA told me that “Ohio does not allow its regulatory agency staff 
to travel out of state147, and participate in NASCLA meetings and conferences (Personal 
Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). Being an agent of state regulators, NASCLA’s main 
activity is to provide a forum for networking and the exchange of information between 
the states; while their mission is to promote uniformity this is thought to be achieved 
without usurping any of the state regulatory authority or activities (Personal Interview, 
Wilberscheid 2017). NASCLA is not independent enough to put any significant pressure 
on states to change their behavior (Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). Besides 
information exchange, the main tool to promote uniformity is NASCLA-produced 
national exam. However, the exam is only accepted by 13 states, and state-specific exams 
and applications are still required (NASCLA 2017). When asked about the reasoning 
behind this, I was told some states 
                                                 
prohibits travel for official business for all its employees to AL, KA, MS, NC, SD, TN, and TX (CA 
Attorney General 2016). 
147 Ohio does not give any funding for out of state travel to cooperate or network with other states. 
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Are just really passionate about their examination. They feel like other states 
standards are inferior and they are not willing to budge on it. So, they will say 
we accept the NASCLA exam as the trade portion, but you will still have to 
take our business exam. Or they may have personal vendettas with another 
state. They have had issues for several years with another state, so now they 
just don’t want to do it. That might change. Some states suddenly join when 
[their agency] gets a new executive director. (Personal Interview, 
Wilberscheid 2017) 
While these different requirements might be surmountable, especially for big 
firms with big budgets, the complications are quite significant when operating across 
more than two or three states. Imagine keeping track of all the differences in what can be 
practiced with a license, different renewal cycles and fees, different continuing education 
requirements as well as renewal procedures for expired licenses. Of course, all of this has 
to happen before a firm can start working on a project. Delays are not uncommon because 
part-time boards will often only meet irregularly to approve new licenses, and part-time 
staff does not pick up the phone (Personal Interview, Wolverine 2017). One firm 
explained, “Recently due to ownership changes, we were trying to get licenses transferred 
or modified—this has been horrible. Many times waiting for over a week for a return call 
and 2 weeks for a return email” (Personal Interview, Martin 2017). Another firm reported 
having passed on projects, in Oregon, Colorado, Washington, and California because 
their licensing requirements had been too burdensome for out-of-state companies 
(Personal Interview, William 2017). A president of an Mid-West based company told me 
that getting licensed in Oregon was infeasible for him, because their mandatory 
knowledge test was only offered at specific times in specific in-state testing locations148 
(Personal Interview, Construction I 2017). 
The majority of my interviewees emphasized the degree to which time required to 
fulfill local requirements had caused significant costs or the loss of a contract. One firm 
explained, “We have passed on multiple projects in the past 12 months due to not 
currently holding needed jurisdictional licenses. In all cases, these are licenses we were 
capable of procuring but simply did not have the time to procure them to meet project 
                                                 
148 Oregon has since moved to an online test. 
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requirements” (Personal Interview, Construction IV 2017). Many firms named at least 
one state they had not expanded to because of regulatory complications they faced. 
Nationally operating firms spend quite a bit of resources on this, as one person 
explained, “We have 4 or 5 full time attorneys that make sure we remain compliant, as 
well as division managers at the local level who are responsible for understanding all the 
local rules and regulations” (Personal Interview, Crossland 2017). A representative of 
Gray Construction similarly reported, “We have 2 people dedicated to monitoring and 
maintaining these licenses” (Personal Interview, Gray 2017). In terms of costs, I was told 
that it was “very costly, both in dollars and time spent” or put differently, “So they are 
collecting $400 a year. I have 40 licenses across the US. That’s $5000-$8000 to just 
maintain my licenses” (Personal Interview, Construction II 2017; Personal Interview, 
NTS 2016). 
While fees might not seem that high, given the number of licenses a firm needs, 
they might become significant. A representative of a Colorado firm explained, “There is a 
cost to tracking everything; between the municipalities and counties, we have 100 
licenses in Colorado—that does not seem like an efficient way to handle licensing. And 
everybody wants their $100 a year licensing fee, so part of it is just revenue generation” 
(Personal Interview, Haselden 2017). It is important to note here though, that most 
licensing agencies are revenue neutral and have accounts separate from state budgets149. 
Thus, these revenues are not generally part of the justification for this regulatory 
structure. Instead, they simply pay for the costs of the fragmented regulatory structure 
itself. 
Only four of 68 companies affected by contractor licensing did not describe it as a 
significant barrier to crossing jurisdictional borders. No firm opposed the concept of 
licenses in general, they just opined that the current structure of state and local 
differences was incredibly costly and inefficient. At the same time, many firms just saw it 
as a cost that would be passed on to clients, especially because there is nothing they could 
immediately do about it: “We spend around $100,000 a year on maintaining all the 
licenses, it’s just the cost of doing business, it’s just part of our overhead” (Personal 
                                                 
149 See for instance the budges of the Oregon and California Contractor Boards (CAB 2010; CCB 
2016). 
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Interview, Triad 2017). Another representative explained, “It’s is very costly for us, but 
we work with a lot of large companies, so if they want us to build there, we spend the 
money, to keep that relationship, it just becomes part of the project costs” (Personal 
Interview, Hays 2017).  
Another complication reported was the specific requirements of contractor 
licensing, sometimes allowing only individuals or companies to hold certain license: 
“Another issue is that states require different legal structures for some activities. Some 
states prohibit the design and construction being done by the same company. So we have 
special-use companies setup to perform the design—but operationally, it makes no 
difference” (Personal Interview, Austin 2017). Another company reported, “From time to 
time, we have to procure either licenses at a corporate level and/or have individuals 
complete testing and license procurement for what is essentially redundant purposes“ 
(Personal Interview, Construction II 2017). For instance, “Denver requires the 
superintendent to be the license holder, that's not very effective, that's very hard for us 
because we work all over, we may or may not have a superintendent available who may 
or may not have a license” (Personal Interview, Fulcrum 2017). 
In related fashion, some states will only issue licenses to residents of states: “We 
failed to expand to Hawaii because it required the managing employee to be an actual 
resident of HI” (Personal Interview, Warwick 2017). Another construction manager told 
me, he had been denied a license due to “lack of experience” despite holding license in 
most other states (Personal Interview, Fulcrum 2017). 
The interviews made it clear that in all those ways local contractor licensing is not 
only unnecessarily costly but also discourages companies from working in multiple areas, 
thereby reducing market competition. While some firms explicitly reported disadvantages 
vis-à-vis local firms, especially for medium sized companies, others normalized it as an 
inefficiency but in the end only a cost to be passed on to clients—they had never 
considered the implications of mutual recognition regimes like in the EU, because they 
see the status quo as an unchangeable reality (Personal Interview, Shrader 2017; Personal 
Interview, Rectenwald 2017). Some put it very clearly that “There is that imaginary 
border called state line that has some real barriers to entry” or that it was “quite a 
deterrent,” especially in states “where you have to acquire a license before bidding on 
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projects” (Personal Interview, Fortis 2017; Personal Interview, Construction IV 2017; 
Personal Interview, Murphy 2017).  
The majority of firms described jurisdictional differences as a disadvantage for 
firms wanting to be mobile. Others though argued that because everybody was treated the 
same, differences in rules could not be properly called barriers: “There are obviously 
significant costs associated with understanding and dealing with these issues. I don’t 
perceive a competitive advantage or disadvantage because everyone is subject to the 
same rules” (Personal Interview, Haselden 2017). This is a curious view, which I mostly 
encountered by licensing boards I interviewed. Because firms are so used to the current 
reality, they do not view the double burden for out-of-state companies as 
discriminatory—it is assumed to be an unavoidable fact. Of course, given the discourse 
of competitive federalism, they do not have a concept of how barriers could be overcome. 
One firm, despite complaining about the inefficiency of jurisdictional differences, 
explained that they were just necessary because “Local owners need to make certain that 
they are able to procure work in a manner that will deliver quality, competitive, safe 
projects” (Personal Interview, Crowder 2017). Another one, despite criticizing 
jurisdictional differences, did not see the double burden: “The licensing laws are the same 
for everyone that wants to open a construction business in that state so I don’t see any 
undue advantages” (Personal Interview, Martin 2017). It seemed clear in my interviews 
that political ideology played a role in these perceptions. The few companies that did not 
report any interstate barriers would also argue that only local regulation is good and the 
federal government would always create flawed regulation (Personal Interview, Austin 
2017). Another firm explained, “I’m in favor of state rights and licensing. It is expensive 
and time consuming as most states require continuing education to keep your license 
active. However, each state should have their own requirements because they all have 
different issues” (Personal Interview, Warwick 2017).  
Some industries have been shaped to accommodate the jurisdictional 
heterogeneity. Nationally-operating real estate developers are set up as a system of local 
subsidiaries to match local rules for the reason of avoiding delays and complications with 
jurisdictional differences (Personal Interview, Hovanian 2017; Personal Interview, 
Alliance 2017). Six of seven home-builders interviewed explicitly related their company 
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structure to problems with jurisdictional differences. A representative of Alliance 
Residential, a company operating in 19 states, explained:  
As you alluded, the complexities with licensing and local codes create major 
challenges to outfits working across multiple markets […]. We work through 
regional offices in order to become experts in our given markets. Our 
regional offices have individual(s) licensed as general contractors in each 
state they service […]. I’m pretty sure the vast majority of all single and 
multifamily builders are setup this way. (Personal Interview, Alliance 2017) 
Given these complexities, it is not surprising that 50% of the 100 biggest real 
estate developers in the US only operate in one state or even only a few counties (Builder 
2017). The only dissenting voice came from the 64th biggest home-building company, 
operating in two states. Their view was clearly colored by a general antipathy towards 
central government: “I don’t want to do it [licensing] on the state level either. Keep it on 
the local level, where there are people that live in the community that have to respond to 
real problems and solve them […]. The last thing we need is a national board trying to do 
anything. Once you get a national anything, I have never seen that work out well” 
(Personal Interview, Green Brick 2017).  
Another barriers for general contractors is created by the fact that trades they 
subcontract with—like plumbers or electricians—are even more nationally fragmented in 
their regulation. Often, a firm cannot bring their regular subcontractor across borders 
because they lack, and sometimes cannot acquire new licenses due to differences in 
licensing scopes (Personal Interview, Rusco 2017). One firm explained, 
The sub-trades perform differently in different areas, for example the painters 
do all the dry wall sanding whereas in CA it's done by the drywall 
subcontractor, or in CA we have a separate company to do all the flashing 
and sheet metal work, whereas in other places the roofer does that. That's an 
area where if we go into a new area we have some problems […]. We need a 
lot of different subcontractors in different states for that reason. (Personal 
Interview, Fulcrum 2017) 
The effects are pretty significant. The 8th biggest home developer told me the fact 
that they were forced to only rely on local subcontractors, which “clearly reduces 
competition” (B. C. Personal Interview, Taylor 2017). Another retail contractor 
explained: 
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This highly limits competition, for example, I can’t bring my electricians 
with me, because they need a separate license and it becomes too costly for 
me. It forces me to use local subcontractors. Which for the local contractors, 
they like that […]. When we are operating out of state, we are subcontracting 
over 90% of the work […]. When things are busy, this becomes very 
difficult, because I can’t find workers to do my work. (Personal Interview, 
Wolverine 2017) 
The relative rarity of national subcontractors was specifically attributed to this 
legal situation: “The mechanical and plumbers and electricians are less likely to be 
national because they need local licenses. The only companies that are national are doing 
something that is so specialized that there won’t be local people. National companies are 
only competitive if they have some specialty” (Personal Interview, Shrader 2017). 
Plumbing firms and their regulation though plumbing boards is a good illustration 
of this phenomenon. Licensing for plumbing is even more fragmented then for general 
contractors: eight states locally license plumbers, while 42 have state-wide licenses150. 
However, requirements and scopes vary much more significantly than for general 
contractors. States vary on whether they license apprentice plumbers, journeyman 
plumbers, master plumbers, or of all of them. Even other states just license plumbers as 
specialty contractors. Jurisdictional mobility is complicated by the fact that all states have 
different apprenticeship programs with different educational requirements. For instance, a 
lobbyist for ABC told me, “We don’t have apprenticeship reciprocity between 
Washington and Oregon, for instance on the electrical side. So, if they are full 
journeyman, they can come in and get licensed. But if they are apprentices—you can 
basically not bring labor across the state border, it a big issue” (S. Personal Interview, 
Miller 2017). The other way around it is even more difficult “If I go through an 
apprenticeship in Oregon, it will not meet the standards of Washington to get a license” 
(S. Personal Interview, Miller 2017). 
In most cases, a state will only recognize the training of another state after 
individual scrutiny by the licensing agency for that specific person. Reciprocity 
agreements are very rare, and if existent usually only cover one or two neighboring states. 
For instance, Hawaii only issues plumbing licenses to persons having completed courses 
                                                 
150 Websites of state and city plumbing boards. 
235 
at Hawaii Community College. Louisiana requires an out-of-state master plumber to first 
sit for a journeyman exam in Louisiana and acquire a journeyman license, to be able to 
apply for the master level exam. Delaware deems the education of seven states as not 
sufficiently similar, requiring professionals from those states to have seven years of work 
experience before being allowed to sit for its exam. For other states, acceptance of out-of-
state licenses depends on individual board petitions. Similarly, Massachusetts only 
considers for licensure professionals from out-of-state if they have at least four years of 
work experience.  
In many other states, requirements are unclear, because their websites are 
incomplete and there is no national organization that is trying to bring together plumber 
licensing agencies—apparently, “Plumbing boards do not talk to each other about 
mobility” (Personal Interview, Kilb 2017). According to regulating agencies, “Code 
books and their adoption process varies from state to state and region to region,” which 
makes “uniform licensing requirements impossible” (Personal Interview, Cyr 2017). A 
representative from the Maine plumbing board told me, with an out-out-state license, 
“You might qualify to sit for our exam, but we would have to peruse your individual 
application” (Personal Interview, Caroll 2017). A representative from the New Jersey 
plumbing board told me there was nothing they could do for me as a plumber from 
Pennsylvania, because they were not working together with cities that issue licenses 
(Personal Interview Baccile 2017). Similarly, a representative of the plumbing board in 
Albany, NY explained that they could not offer reciprocal licensing to plumbers from the 
neighboring Troy, NY, because Troy’s standards were not sufficient (Personal Interview, 
Mage 2017). Different requirements can be very opaque. Most states do not post on their 
websites how to obtain a license quickly when coming from out-of-state. Some states go 
even farther. For instance, applications for an Arkansas plumbing license can only be 
obtained in person. 
For plumbers and electricians, an industry publication writes,  
Where to find the laws? […] There is no general guide to find out what 
licensing requirements and restrictions exist throughout the states. In some 
places, licensing is through a county court clerk, State Revenue Commission, 
the Department of Public Health, or in a rare act of clarity, a Contractor 
Licensing Board. For nonresident contractors, there may be excise taxes or 
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bonding requirements. For residential construction, there may be a fund 
which requires a contribution. Where asbestos may be encountered, a 
different set of rules applies. (Electrical Contractor 2000). 
Roto-Rooter, one the few national plumbing companies, explained to me, 
“Municipal, county and state laws regulating plumbing repairs vary considerably and 
each of our 600+ locations throughout the U.S. must comply with all jurisdictional 
regulating authorities. It can be challenging at times but the situation is what it is, so we 
do what we have to in order to conduct business effectively.” The company pointed out 
that the problem was not that ”markets require all plumbing repairs, no matter how 
minor, to be completed only by a licensed plumber,” but that they were not able to 
transfer their employees across borders “to adapt to local changes in demand” (Personal 
Interview, Roto-Rooter 2017). 
Another plumbing company operating in the North-East told me that licensing 
was the biggest obstacle to operating across several states that were all within a small 
radius (Personal Interview, Gem 2017). In many cases, their employees had to go back to 
school and take new exams to be able transfer their licenses. For instance, “If you are 
holding a CT license you can test in RI because it is ICC [same plumbing code], but they 
will impose a waiting period. But in MA you have to do the whole apprenticeship thing 
all over again” (Personal Interview, Gem 2017). The reason is that MA issues its 
plumbing license together with a gas fitting license, so individuals that only hold a 
plumbing license from another state cannot be licensed there at all. In addition, their 
plumbing codes are different requiring another exam. Another issue for the companies is 
the varying ratios between apprentices and journeyman on a job—due to those, work 
teams and revenue number have to be adjusted for every jurisdiction.  
A Vice-President of one of the few national electrical contractors explained: 
We have 14 separate state licenses, and I can probably spend two to four days 
a month prepping for tests, completing take-home exams, and obtaining 
continuing education credits […]. I’ve been taking tests since 1984 for the 
company, and I’ve also accumulated over 46 municipal electrical contractor 
licenses in Texas alone over the years so we could do work in those areas. 
And each year they had to be renewed. (cited in Zind 2006) 
Another nationally operating electrical contractor pointed out that while the 
knowledge required for electrical licenses was mostly the same across the country, states 
237 
still required taking exams in person and state-specific continuing education: “It can be 
an expensive proposition for a company like us to send people to the different states, 
spend several days there, and take continuing education classes. The complexity of 
complying with licensing requirements affects all of us in the contracting industry” (cited 
in Zind 2006). To deal with that exact problem, there are national companies that try to 
“customize a [continuing education] program for you that meets your requirements [in as 
many states as possible] for the best price” (Holt 2018b). However, many states will not 
accept those courses (Holt 2018a). 
At the other end of the construction process, design companies are affected by 
engineer and architect licensure151. At a first glance, it seems like these longer established 
professions have already overcome problems with jurisdictional differences in licensing. 
Licensing boards explained that rules were nationally standardized, “Reciprocity is easy, 
the system is very similar across jurisdictions […] there are no problems, […] I have not 
heard any complaints from firms” (Personal Interview, Brown 2016). A representative of 
the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES), a private 
association bringing together engineering regulators, explained, “The examination 
process is standardized and developed in accordance with national testing standards.  
Each state accepts the results of the national examinations and no further tests are 
required in order for an individual to obtain a PE license. There are some nuances among 
the states about certain things such as degrees that are deemed to be acceptable” 
(Personal Interview, Carter 2016). Similarly, a representative of NCARB, the association 
of all state architecture boards told me that through the certificate they offered, mobility 
for architects was “very easy” (Personal Interview, NCARB 2016). 
A deeper examination shows that things are much more complicated. First of all, 
the NCARB certificate is not a national license. Architects are prohibited from providing 
any service, advertising their service, or bidding for a project, before acquiring a state-
specific license. Mobility is also not cheap. To become licensed in another state, an 
architect will have to pay to acquire ($1100) and maintain their whole career ($225 
annually) the NCARB certificate. In addition, they will have to pay application and 
                                                 
151 The licensure system for both is relatively similar, so I only describe the details for architects.  
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maintenance fees in every state (between $100-500). The process is also not fast. While 
the NCARB certificate is transferred to another state electronically, in 14 states a board 
vote is required, and boards might only meet every other month (Personal Interview, 
NCARB 2016). Nineteen states will have some additional requirement, like for instance a 
local jurisprudence exam (Personal Interview, NCARB 2016). California and Alaska 
require a whole other exam relating to earthquakes and permafrost respectively. In 
addition, continuing education requirements will vary from state to state. After listing all 
those issues, the representative of NCARB admitted, “The system will remain 
burdensome for those people that are in the 30 or 40 jurisdictions” and is inefficient and 
redundant, but there was nothing they could do about it (Personal Interview, NCARB 
2016).  
Of 23 architecture firms, 20 explained that licensing rules created significant 
barriers to mobility. In terms of time required and costs, most big firms judged the effects 
as disadvantageous compared to local firms. One firm explained, “Licensing is the 
biggest issue for us, we have 750 professionals and they all need the appropriate 
engineering and architecture licensing. There is good reasons for licensure, and NCARB 
has made things easier, but it is a pain and a cost to keep track of all of those 
requirements” (Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017).  
There are many complications that are not obvious from interviews with licensing 
boards. Optimally, an architect would be able to gain licensure through reciprocity, after 
being hired for a project. However, this is rarely possible. As many firms explained, 
“Some states are very stringent about this, you cannot even talk to a client if you are not 
licensed in that state. Sometimes it takes 3-4 months to get licensed as a business in a 
state, and in the meantime your client is waiting or not” (Personal Interview, Hord 2017). 
While the NCARB certificate theoretically simplifies things, specific requirements make 
mobility still costly:  
I just was registered in the state of Tennessee, I asked NCARB to send my 
packet, it took them about 2 weeks to send my packet there, Tennessee sent 
me an email with a one-page form, and I put my credit card number in for 
$150 and I was registered. CA is not that easy. Texas you have to go and get 
a background check and show up in person, give them a picture and a thumb 
print. CA you have to take an additional seismic test and an oral exam. 
Michigan, I just had to send $200. (Personal Interview, Rosser 2017). 
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Mobility is definitely costly, when adding up fees, time, extra testing, and 
continuing education. California was often pointed out as the most complicated:  
CA and AL have their own testing, there is a lot of costs involved. Maybe a 
couple thousand dollars to get yourself ready for the test, if you factor in the 
time and the cost of the materials and test taking. I have 6 licenses that I 
maintain. They all require continuing education, you have to report regularly, 
and there are costs for the NCARB file. It’s a lot of paperwork and keeping 
up with all of that takes a lot of time. (Personal Interview, Hacker 2017)  
Another representative estimated that maintain all his licenses cost about $10,000 
a year (Personal Interview, Sink 2017). For that exact reason, many medium sized 
companies cannot afford maintaining multiple licenses and are thereby excluded from 
competing in those markets (Personal Interview, Dekker 2017). Many also pointed out 
specific continuing education requirements as problematic, “Additionally, most states 
now require continuing education on an annual basis in order to maintain your license in 
their state. In many cases the jurisdiction will has specific continuing education units they 
require, which perhaps no other state requires. So those unique courses add to the cost as 
well as the inconvenience of keeping your license active in numerous states” (Personal 
Interview, Dekker 2017). 
Due to these complications, most big firms have a person whose only job it is to 
monitor licenses. However, as with other firms, they just accept that things are that way: 
“We see licensing restrictions just a part of doing business. It is not necessarily a barrier 
for us” (Personal Interview, Olson 2017). A legal counsel at SGA Design explained: 
And so even if you wanted to move quickly it is just impossible to do in a lot 
of places because of the amount of work that goes into it. And so that takes a 
pretty big chunk of my daily activity, and I am constantly needing 
information from the managers all over the country. It is a big burden 
internally. This is a cost that we eat in order to comply with all of that stuff. 
And then the cost to maintain licenses in 50 states for 7 different companies 
that I have to use, we got 3000-5000$ a year times that many registrations it 
is a significant cost. (Personal Interview, SGA 2017) 
SGA, as many other firms, brought up the issue of firm registration, which is not 
addressed by NCARB at all. While general contractors only need to register with the 
secretary of state in a jurisdiction to be allowed to operate, all states impose some specific 
requirements for architecture and engineering firms. Usually this regulates who can own 
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a company, who needs a license, and what the name can be. Due to these regulations, 
firms might have to set-up different entities for different states. A representative of 
Lothrop Associates explained:  
But firms like Lothrop Associates LLP need to have a business license to 
practice in most other states. Each state has difference requirements for 
professional firms like architects or engineers that make things difficult. For 
example, New Jersey requires that all Partners of an LLP be licensed to 
practice in New Jersey. But other states only require that one partner be 
licensed to practice in that state. And there are many other variations too. 
Most states recognize LLPs or LLC or PLLCs. However, New York State 
also has a DPC which permits a professional firm to have up to 25 percent 
ownership by non-professionals. Many firms have converted to this type of 
firm to allow key people like marketing directors or CFO’s to have 
ownership in the business. But it is unclear if this entity will be accepted in 
other states. Many firms have therefore created multiple firm entities to work 
in different states. This is a tremendous burden requiring multiple legal 
entities, multiple tax returns and other duplicate efforts. (Lothrop Associates). 
These different requirements make it very hard for firms to work in multiple 
states because before doing work they might be required to set up new companies 
excluding and including specific employees. Most interviewees had some personal 
example of difficulties:  
Some states have regulations like you cannot register as a licensed firm 
unless every owner of the firm is a licensed architect (I am not). In those 
cases, we have to set up different entities where I am not listed on the board 
of directors. A cumbersome and unnecessary exercise as the individuals 
practicing architecture are licensed, my lack of licensure has no effect on a 
project. (Personal Interview, Sink 2017) 
For instance: 
In our home state of Oklahoma, we are required to operate as SGA Design 
Group, P.C. In Oregon, however, we are required to operate as SGA 
Architecture, P.C. This is because in Oregon, architectural firm names must 
include some form of the word architect/architecture. In other states, such as 
California, we cannot use the designation ‘P.C.’ because the state doesn’t 
allow that for architecture firms. And in some other states, we operate under 
the name of an individual architect rather than our firm name because of 
unique state requirement such as ownership or corporate governance 
thresholds. In MI for instance, it is required that that 2/3 of the firm’s board 
of directors have a MI license to practice architecture (Personal Interview, 
SGA 2017).  
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There are many similar examples in which even firm names can become obstacles 
to mobility. Nevada, for instance, does not allow firm names consisting deceased 
persons’ names (Personal Interview, Dekker 2017). A big company with dispersed 
shareholding told me that they had “run into trouble” in Nevada, because the board there 
required 2/3 of the shareholders to be licensed in the state , which the firm deemed 
impractical (Personal Interview, Dekker 2017). Another firm explained that they had to 
use different stationary for different states, because they required different letterheads 
(Personal Interview, SGA 2017). In terms of company structure, these rules cost time, 
money, and creativity:  
We have an energy practice that does oil and gas pipelines design and in 
Michigan we had to create a new professional corporation that is owned by 2 
engineers. We have to concoct behind the scenes side agreements for the 
shareholder of the actual company that says you can’t sell your share from 
the company. Then the engineers who are the shareholders say wait a minute, 
I never signed up for this. So, we have complicated and detailed 
indemnification agreements, we provide tax services for them, since they 
have to report income that is really not theirs but it looks like theirs since they 
own that company. So it is a lot of effort to comply. (Personal Interview, 
STV 2017) 
Overall then, despite statements to the contrary by licensing agencies, there are 
significant interstate barriers for most nationally operating construction firms. In contrast 
to the EU, the US has not used federal market authority to set some general liberal rules 
for the movement of construction firms and professional across its whole market. In the 
absence of those rules, interstate barriers proliferate—caused by the prohibition of 
temporary interstate service provision, the prohibition of permanent service provision 
without a local license, in-transparent or non-existent reciprocity requirements, 
substantial differences between license scope and requirements, bureaucratic and 
financial hurdles, as well as prohibitions on out-of-state marketing and project bidding. 
As a result of double-burdens and discriminatory treatments, the national market is 
significantly fragmented, dis-incentivizing interstate mobility. 
V.c. Local Procurement Preferences 
This section demonstrates similar interstate barriers caused by the local public 
procurement preferences. I start with a short consideration of EU rules on public 
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procurement. This sets up a puzzle since the EU has, despite similar structural conditions 
and much more national differences, created a transparent, non-discriminatory public 
procurement regime exercising federal market authority, while the US has not. I then 
consider the literature in American Political economy, showing how their attention has 
been shaped by competitive federalism, and mostly glanced over issue of interstate 
barriers. Specifically, attention has mostly been diverted to international, not interstate 
issues. Subsequently, I present evidence on of how states, counties, and cities prefer local 
firms, thereby creating a significantly nationally fragmented market for procurement. As 
before, I first present evidence from publicly available documents showing that there is a 
dearth of information. This is then contrasted with the perceptions of firms and interest 
groups, suggesting that there are significant competitive disadvantages for out-of-area 
firms.  
Government procurement, i.e. all goods and services public entities purchase, 
account for around 10% in the US and 14% in the EU of all economic activity in terms of 
GDP (OECD 2017). Government spending is specifically important to the construction 
industry. Around 23% of all US construction (in terms of value) is paid for by 
government directly, and even more indirectly (U.S. Census Bureau 2018). Given this 
high amount of spending, government entities can significantly shape the construction 
market—by either creating a national framework to encourage fair competition among 
providers regardless of origin, or by creating protectionist policies that fragment the 
market into state and local subsets.  
The EU has used its federal market authority to create a competitive market for 
government purchasing. The treaty principles of free movement of goods and services, 
the right of establishment, and non-discrimination apply to government purchases except 
defense procurement (European Commission 2018b). Discrimination based on 
nationality—like a percentage preference to a local company152, a requirement to use 
                                                 
152 Preference premiums in government procurement work like tariffs (Deardorff and Stern 1998). 
A 10% premium is formally equivalent to a 10% tariff on the (potentially) imported good. However, if the 
government is not the only buyer of the product, the effect of the preference is not necessarily trade 
distorting. What will happen depends on the proportion of private-to-public demand, as well as market 
structure (Trionfetti 2000). The only definitive effect is that the government will have to pay more for the 
goods and services procured. 
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only local workers, or a requirement to work with only national materials—is considered 
illegal for any procuring entity from local to national governments. The White Paper for 
the Completion of the Single Market identified public procurement as a significant non-
tariff barrier and argued that central regulation is necessary to “create a public 
[procurement] market across the EU” (Bovis 2008, 4). “European institutions have 
assumed that encouraging the public […] sectors in the EU to adopt purchasing behavior 
which is homogenous and based on the principles of openness, transparency and non-
discrimination will achieve efficiency gains and public sector savings” (Bovis 2008, 13). 
Based on these observations, the EU has passed several directives constituting today’s 
procurement regime. Current legislation153 instructs the European Commission to publish 
and enforce thresholds above which procurement contracts have not only to be awarded 
non-discriminatorily but also to be published Europe-wide (reaching from €144,000 for 
goods to €5.5 million in construction) using the mandatory ‘E-Procurement System’ 
(European Commission 2018b). Above threshold procurement by all public entities has to 
be submitted to the European Commission for translation into 10 working languages and 
publication. Additionally, procuring entities have to publish pre-information notices each 
fiscal year, report all awards, and send explanations to unsuccessful firms. While 
transparency requirements for below threshold procurement are less stringent, preference 
legislation is generally illegal. Countries can take into account social (e.g. disadvantaged 
groups) and environmental criteria (e.g. pollution levels), but these have to be applied 
universally to firms from all member states (so it cannot be the unemployment rate). To 
encourage small business participation in public contracts, the EU has pursued a strategy 
of transparency and standardized procedures, not local preference laws like in the US154 
(European Commission 2018b). 
In addition, the EU has opened up it public procurement market globally by 
participating in international agreements, most importantly the Government Procurement 
                                                 
153 Directives: 14/23 [2014] OJ. L. 94/1; 14/24 [2014] OJ. L. 94/65; 14/25 [2014] OJ. L. 94/243. 
154 The EU Commission deems the way US jurisdictions prefer small businesses as discriminatory: 
“The EU is, however, concerned that the US ‘set-aside’ measures and their exemption from the GPA favor 
US industry and have exclusionary effects to the detriment of foreign competitors” (European Commission 
2007, 56) 
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Agreement155 (GPA) signed first in the Tokyo Round in 1979, and revised in 1987, 1994, 
as well as 2012 (WTO 2015). The GPA prescribes non-discrimination and transparency 
on an opt-in basis, meaning every country can submit which of its entities will be covered 
by the agreement (Arrowsmith 1998). Based on the GPA, the EU and its member states 
have opened about 85% of their over threshold public procurement to participating 
nations (Commission 2009).   
The EU has produced a single market for government procurement spanning all 
levels of government. This contrasts starkly with the United States (see Table 4). As we 
will see, the US has not established a single transparent public procurement system. Not 
only every state, but even municipalities and school districts follow their own rules and 
procedures. Local laws and informal practices often discriminate against out-of-state, or 
even out-of-city companies. Even the federal level is much more protectionist than the 
EU. While all federal entities are theoretically covered by the GPA, the Buy American 
Act156 (BAA) requires preferences to domestic goods and services (Kim 2009). The 
European Commission explains, 
Buy American Act restrictions not only directly reduce the opportunities for 
EU exports, but via content requirements also discourage US bidders from 
using European products or services […]. Suppliers based in countries that 
are parties of the GPA are generally not directly excluded from the scope of 
the BAA and other restrictive regulations. Instead, legislation generally 
foresees the granting of waivers as regards these suppliers (inter alia, through 
the 1979 Trade Agreements Act). However, the actual implementation of 
these waivers may lead to legal uncertainty and act as a barrier. (Commission 
2009, 51). 
As a result, despite official openness European firms have to apply for waivers for 
each particular tender, discouraging competition—the European Commission estimates 
that only 12% of US above threshold procurement market is accessible for European 
companies (Weiss and Thurbon 2006; European Commission 2007). For subnational 
procurement, the US follows a voluntary compliance procedure in which state 
governments can sign onto the agreement (Reich 1999). Thirty-seven states have 
                                                 
155 1869 U.N.T.S. 508 (2012). 
156 Pub. L. 72-428, 47 Stat. 1589 (1933). 
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submitted aspects of their procurement to be covered, but exclude local procurement in 
all cases and in many cases procurement not administered by the state’s central 
procurement authority (Kim 2009). In addition, it is unclear whether states actually grant 
waivers of Buy American Act and their own requirements; according to the European 
Commission, they do not (European Commission 2007, 52). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of USA and EU Participation in GPA 
The mobilization around federal market authority to create a competitive 
framework for public procurement in the EU can, according to many authors, be 
attributed to the activism of the European Commission that framed the issue in ordo-
liberal terms, suggesting the necessity of government involvement for a competitive 
market. While there was diffuse interest by European businesses, it was the single market 
discourse and the Commission that allowed this to happen. One expert on the European 
procurement system, José Maria Fernández Martin, writes: 
It is true that the policy was carried out by all Community institutions, not 
just by the Commission. However, this should not conceal the fact that the 
main actors in the conception, justification, and implementation of the policy 
were the Commission services, who were especially active under the Delors’ 
Presidency. Thus, even though the public procurement policy is formally a 
Community policy, adopted on the basis of the Community’s decision-
making process, the Commission bears most responsibility for its conception 
and implementation. (J. M. F. Martin 1996, 23) 
Similarly, based on interviews with European officials, Hoffman concludes that 
the outcome is “attributable to the presence of the European Commission in promoting 
market integration“ and assembling diffuse public and business interests into a viable 
political coalition (Hoffmann 2011, 126). Cowles observes given the “lack of big 
business participation in the early years of the Community” there seems to be hardly any 
USA EU 
12% open 85% open 
50+ policy frameworks One policy framework 
Protectionist laws No discrimination 
Limited state/local compliance All levels of government 
Unknown number of agencies Single point of contact 
No transparency, limited enforcement Transparency, strong enforcement 
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doubt that it was the framing and initiative of top level bureaucrats that assembled a pro 
federal market authority coalition (Cowles 1995, 501f.). These arguments are important 
because, as we will see, American construction firms are largely in favor of creating a 
more unified national system for procurement. However, their preferences cannot be 
roped into a national agenda or single-market discourse since competitive federalism 
precludes this from happening. In addition, decentralized structures of interest 
representation discourage any communication of their preferences.  
V.c.1.Procurement Practices as Interstate Barrier 
There is not much data or literature on local procurement practices in the US. 
Even NASPO, the National Association of State Procurement Officials, only reports 
limited results from a survey of state governments (NASPO 2012). The extent of local 
preferences and its impacts are basically unknown, beyond anecdotal evidence. As we 
have seen, the issue has been largely ignored by federal policy-makers and think tank 
scholars. 
The Journal of Public Procurement has only a few articles on in-state preferences, 
not addressing the politics behinds it or its effects. Procurements officials point out that, 
“While procurement programs are controversial [and wide-spread], empirical research on 
its impact is limited” (Qiao, Thai, and Cummings 2009, 382). There are only a few 
economics papers that try to estimate the effects of in-state preferences, usually operating 
solely in a public-choice framework (Vagstad 1995). Here the assumption is that in-state 
preferences illustrate how “well-informed, active interest groups have an upper hand over 
rationally less-informed voters and consumers” (Hoffer and Sobel 2015, 5). The latest 
study finds that, “Capital expenditure regressions indicate that states with broad 
preference policies spend $158 more per capita on capital projects than do states without 
any preference policy” (Hoffer and Sobel 2015, 10). Of course, overall expenditures are 
only a very rough proxy for the costs associated with preference policies. Another author 
finds that California spends around 3.8% more on road construction due to its preference 
policy (Marion 2007). Using similar data, Krasnokutskaya and Seim estimate that 
CalTrans spends an additional 7.8 percent on construction due to its preferences 
(Krasnokutskaya and Seim 2011). While these papers give a good idea of the potential 
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effects of in-state preferences, they do not address why the US maintains them while the 
EU does not. 
The legal literature in the US has mostly focused on the market-participant 
doctrine, a carve-out from the dormant commerce clause that allows states “to 
discriminate [against other states] when acting in their roles of proprietor of their 
respective public domains or as employer” (Zimmerman 2003, 5). While attacked by 
some legal observers as anti-competitive, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the 
right of states and cities to discriminate, citing five reasons: state sovereignty, the right to 
safe-guard state citizens, the freedom of the private trader (‘sowing and reaping’), limited 
impact, and the difficulty of separating protectionism from legitimate state interests 
(Coenen 1989, 398; Bogen 2005). Some scholars point specifically at the failure of 
Congress to act, as legitimating the market-participant doctrine, “If the problem is 
sufficiently severe to disrupt the economy, Congress may deal with it expressly” (Bogen 
2005, 578). Initially legal scholars criticized the market participant doctrine as an 
“anomaly” that “courts should retreat from” (Blumoff 1984, 73). Some author argued that 
states should, as they are in the EU, be subject to non-discrimination rules enforced by 
the courts (Abate and Bennett 1997). Others agreed: “The market participant and the 
publicly owned monopoly exceptions are relatively robust encroachments on the free 
movement of goods across state lines” (Schragger 2008, 1120). However, searching for 
recent law review articles shows that the debate over the doctrine has quieted down.  
To understand why there has been no mobilization around federal market 
authority to reduce interstate barriers through local procurement preferences, we first 
have to consider how widespread they are and to which effect. 
According to a database maintained by AGC, there are only five states that do not 
have any statutory preference laws that prescribe giving advantages to local construction 
companies (AGC 2018). Seventeen states have reciprocal, or better retaliatory preference 
laws—i.e. they call only for discriminating against out-of-state companies from states 
that do the same. Twenty-eight states have laws that prescribe some kind of preferential 
treatment of in-state contractors. This can be a percentage preference that artificially 
increases the cost of an out-of-state bid, or a local labor requirement. For instance, 
Hawaii requires that 80% of work in public contracts is performed by Hawaii residents 
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(HRS § 103B-3), Idaho requires 95% (Idaho Code § 44-1001). Similarly, Wyoming will 
add a 5% increase to bids from out-of-state contractors (WSA § 16-6-102a-c), California 
adds up to 10% (CPCC § 6107). In addition, 17 states have some statutory preference for 
using local materials in construction. For instance, a Georgia law specifies, that whenever 
feasible, Georgia-sourced wood products must be used in construction (O.C.G.A. § 50-5-
63). A New Mexico law specifies, “In all public works, preference must be given to 
materials produced, grown, processed, or manufactured in New Mexico by citizens or 
residents of New Mexico” (NMSA § 13-4-5). In addition, 38 states have laws giving 
preference to minority- and women-owned, as well as small businesses, which often 
works to the detriment of out-of-state firms.  
These statistics probably underestimate the amount of discriminatory public 
procurement practices because they only count laws that require them. In many cases, 
procurement officials might have the discretion to give local preferences beyond those 
specified in law. In addition, most of the laws apply only to central state procurement 
agencies; however, most states do not have a centralized system of public procurement. 
This means, some state departments might use the central procurement agency while 
others do not. Furthermore, these laws do not cover the preference laws of counties, 
cities, school districts, or public universities. There does not exist a database of all of 
those, but anecdotal evidence suggests that most larger cities and counties operate some 
kind of local preferences. 
Many California counties and cities have a 5-10% preference for county residents 
(S. Chang 2012, 20). In San Diego, CA contracts below $500,000 are only open to local 
companies, defined as companies with at least one quarter of their workforce living in 
San Diego County (LaVecchia 2015). In Cleveland, OH, the mayor has made it a priority 
to “have 30 percent of subcontractors be firms that are certified as small and local” 
(LaVecchia 2015). Montgomery County, Maryland reserves 20% of its contracts to local 
companies (LaVecchia 2015). The city of Camden, New Jersey, has “adopted an 
ordinance requiring that at least 40% of the employees of contractors or subcontractors 
working on municipal construction projects be Camden residents” (Schragger 2008, 
1109). New York City considers local procurement preferences as its main tool for 
economic development (Gotbaum 2003). According to city laws, any contractor using 
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public funds must make a good faith efforts to hire local resident workers through Hire 
NYC, the city’s own website (NYCEDC 2018). Mayor De Blasio makes hiring local a 
priority arguing, “Every year the City of New York spends billions of dollars on 
everything from paper clips to playgrounds, plus additional investments in development. 
Through HireNYC we are making sure that more New Yorkers have a first shot at jobs 
related to City projects, and that employers have access to an expanded pool of talent” 
(De Blasio 2015). According to news reports, the political debate in NYC mostly 
concerns whether the city is doing enough to hire local, not whether it might be 
protectionist or discriminatory (Savitch-Lew 2016). 
Interviews with big contractors and design firm provide a better insight into just 
how wide-spread local preference laws are, and to which degree they fragment the 
national market for procurement. Forty of the firms interviewed were bidding for public 
projects on all different levels of governments. Of those, 38 reported being negatively 
affected by local preference laws. For many firms, those laws are a deterrent, “If there is 
a preference that the local government uses, we just don’t participate in the project,” or 
put differently, “We work diligently to be on the positive side of the in-state preferences. 
If we can’t be on the positive side, we don’t pursue work in that state” (Personal 
Interview, Construction I 2017; Personal Interview, Construction IV 2017). 
Another firm explained:  
You are at a disadvantage if you are not local. And even with the federal 
government, most federal government projects […] typically require that 
35% of the work be done in that state. So, they are trying to support the local 
economy where the project is. And that is a big hindrance. And that affects 
big decisions on whether you are going to pursue a project or not, but 
definitely the percentage of work you have to give up or team up with 
somebody one, that is doing some work, you wanted to do, so that you could 
be seen as local. (Personal Interview, EYP 2017) 
Especially local labor participation laws were judged as problematic. They 
prohibit construction firms from bringing their own workers or subcontractors: 
Wyoming also has a labor preference, 60%, but if you go through a process 
of advertising etc., you can get exceptions. For a long time, everybody was in 
the oil fields, and there was a labor shortage, but we can’t just bring in our 
own subcontractors as we want. You’d rather work with someone you know 
has the ability to get things done, in general Wyoming subcontractors are 
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smaller and less sophisticated […]. We have a 100million dollar high school 
project in Wyoming, they don’t have qualified subcontractors. (Personal 
Interview, Haselden 2017) 
Another firm similarly reported, “If contracts require us to give advantage or 
higher consideration for local firms, we do so, but it can inhibit quality, schedule and 
budget of the project” (Personal Interview, Joeris 2017).  
Many firms were worried about preference on the local level because they are 
much less transparent than state laws: “Unusual local requirements are the biggest 
hurdles. Jurisdictions will often put unusual clauses in the code or ordinances to restrict 
competition to local companies or firms. It is hard to know what these may be until you 
examine the project” (Personal Interview, Lothrop 2017). 
Even examining local ordinances and policies is not enough, because local 
preferences are often only expressed in the request for proposal or are completely 
informal: “Rules are less important than local practices. We do find, especially when 
dealing with municipalities and school systems, that there are a lot of areas in the country 
where they have a preference to want to use a company that is located in their city or 
state. So that can be a real business impediment”(Personal Interview, Little 2017). 
Another company confirmed this, “It usually is an informal thing” (Personal Interview, 
Olson 2017).  
Some areas of the US are known for rejecting out-of-state companies: “If you 
have some work done in NY, you won’t even make it past the first cut [if you are not 
local]. And those aren’t written down, this is just known” (Personal Interview, STV 
2017). These informal practices are a deterrent for out-of-state companies: “Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Washington, DC are places that are notorious for that. So there are some 
opportunities where we got a resume that is very attractive, but […] we know we will 
never win because those markets are more about being local than being the best“ 
(Personal Interview, STV 2017). Another firm explained, “There are places like Portland, 
OR, where I have found in my experience, if you don’t have a local partner or an office 
there, it is just very unlikely that you'd get it. And some firms will just say we don’t go 
out to projects in Portland” (Personal Interview, Olson 2017). Some institutions go as far 
as having specific distance requirements: “For the CA state university system, they have 
requirements on how far you can be away from the site, and you have to be licensed 
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there, and within x numbers of miles. They require all architects on the projects to live 
there. So we can’t do those projects” (Personal Interview, Hacker 2017). 
It is not only outright discriminatory laws that fragment the procurement market. 
The fact that there is no centralized system or common rules across the US makes it hard 
for non-local forms to compete: 
Probably the most significant difference in regulations from State to State is 
in the procurement laws. Some states allow alternative procurement methods 
such as Design-Build, Construction Manager at Risk, EPC, etc. Currently 
most states have drafted their own requirements. Some states restrict self-
performance while others have established requirements for a minimum level 
with self-performance encouraged. Some states select purely on qualification, 
others have a cost component, others have some mixture of criteria. (Personal 
Interview, Crowder 2017) 
Similarly, another company explained, “The fact that every state or municipality 
has a different system to bid for public projects makes it very difficult to bid in different 
markets,” “There is not even a national database (Personal Interview, Sundt 2017; 
Personal Interview, EYP 2017). The absence of a central transparent system allows local 
governments to follow informal rules that disadvantage out-of-state companies: “There 
are always those unwritten rules […]. Any public project should be the same but it is not. 
Everybody who is distributing public funds is procuring differently. And there is different 
ways to procure labor materials, then there is a bunch of plusses and minuses of 
procuring materials for a particular project” (Personal Interview, Fortis 2017).  
In other instances, discriminatory local regulation might be hidden in collective 
bargaining agreements:  
Unions will require even among union contractors, even if I am a union 
electrician and I am based in Chicago and I want to go to Grand Rapids, then 
Grand Rapids will say well you have to have 80% from our Local, you can 
only bring 20% from Chicago. This even affects private work. And different 
Locals will have different ways they delineate between trades. There are lots 
of local nuances no matter where you build. That makes it more likely that 
we hire local subcontractor. (Personal Interview, Shiel 2017) 
Another firm concurred:  
They were building three new stadiums in NY, we argued that they are using 
up all the local workforce so we can bring our own guys in under the radar 
and build our stores quicker. It all starts with the local government. they have 
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agreements with the union in all aspects of the work, even the code officials 
in some areas on the east coast, are all union workers, it’s all about keeping 
the work to those unions. (Personal Interview, National Retail Chain 2017) 
The laws force companies to change their business structure and set up new 
offices that they do not actually need. Design firms usually team up with a local architect 
and split the work with them: “Public procurement preferences are also a hurdle. You 
pretty much need some local architect on your team to successfully bid for projects, even 
if there is no official preference”(Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017). Another firm 
concurred, “We typically deal with them by teaming with firms who meet the 
requirement to get the preference” (Personal Interview, Dekker 2017). A big contractor 
explained: 
There are preference laws in Wyoming, so they are choosing to pay more 
money to have a Wyoming contractor do the work […]. 5% is significant in a 
5-million-dollar job. So, what we did 10 years ago, and lots of people do that, 
we opened an office in WY, we moved a few people there, and after 12 
month, we were able to get a WY license. In my mind, it’s no different than 
the US and Mexico, they are paying more. A couple of years ago, CO 
legislators were annoyed by WY, they put in a statute that said if any state 
has a preference, any contractor from there will be subject to the same thing. 
Now CO discriminates against WY contractors as well. (Personal Interview, 
Haselden 2017) 
Two firms supported local preference laws, even when they were not always 
benefitting from them. According to them, those laws were not discriminatory, but just 
how local government entities should normally act: “Keep in mind, City, County, State 
and Federal projects are publicly funded” (Personal Interview, Webcor 2017). The other 
one explained, “We try and utilize locals as much as we can, it is the right thing for the 
client to support the community they operate in” (Personal Interview, Austin 2017). 
However, most companies framed the laws as protectionist and inefficient: “They 
just make it more expensive by creating a less competitive landscape” (Personal 
Interview, Shiel 2017). Another firm concurred, “I think that it does the taxpayer a 
disservice” (Personal Interview, Crossland 2017). 
In sum, the US has produced nothing resembling the liberal market for public 
procurement in the EU. No federal market authority has been used to set some general 
rules of exchange or transparency. This allows a proliferation of state and local laws as 
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well as informal practices that deliberately discriminate against out-of-state or non-local 
firms. The absence of centralized or transparent procurement procedures even within 
jurisdictions further contributes to a local bias. As a result, non-local firms are regularly 
excluded from public contracts dis-incentivizing firm mobility and increasing costs for 
tax-payers.  
V.d. Building Codes 
This section considers building codes and standards. First, I show how the EU has 
used federal market authority to set some general rules around codes and standards. This 
sets up a puzzle since the EU has despite similar structural conditions and much more 
national differences, created some general uniformity that is lacking in the US. I then 
consider the literature in American Political economy, showing how their attention has 
been shaped by competitive federalism, and mostly glanced how heterogeneous codes 
and standards might create interstate barriers. Subsequently, I present how differing 
codes and standards create interstate barriers for the movement of firms and the 
circulation of construction-related products. First, I show how publicly available 
documents and statements by standards setting organizations dramatically underestimate 
the degree of heterogeneity. I contrast this with the perceptions of firms and interest 
groups, demonstrating that the current patchwork of codes and standards creates 
significant obstacles to the free movement of firms and products.  
Building codes are a set of rules designed to secure uniformity and protect public 
health and safety in the construction and maintenance of human-built structures. There is 
a variety of codes that may or may not apply to any given structure—commercial and 
residential building codes, fire codes, plumbing codes, electrical codes, and mechanical 
codes. Codes can be prescriptive, e.g. defining a minimum height for a guard rail, or 
performance-based, e.g. a guard rail must prevent all accidental falls. In the US, most 
codes remain prescriptive (Ching and Winkel 2016). Codes will often reference standards 
that describe how code compliance can be achieved, for instance by following a certain 
procedure or using specific materials. In addition, some federal law, like the American 
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with Disability Act157 and the Fair Housing Act158, prescribe some national parameters 
for building codes. 
European countries have traditionally used central government institutions to 
establish codes and standards directly, or indirectly through semi-public national 
institutes, and are now moving towards European-wide codes and standards under the 
umbrella of European standardization bodies (Krislov 1997, 132; Schepel 2005, 101). In 
the US, codes are mostly established by local authorities, like municipalities, counties, or 
school districts. Since many local governments do not have the expertise and resources to 
develop their own codes, they will often take model codes, developed by private 
organizations, and customize them for their jurisdiction. The real developers of codes and 
standards in the construction industry are over a hundred different private and semi-
private organizations; some experts count 10,000 standard development organizations in 
the US more generally (Krislov 1997, 109; Schepel 2005, 145). As a political scientist 
and scholar of standard-setting puts it: 
To the extent that one may speak of any American ‘system’ of standards, it is 
largely shaped by weak government pressure from above and diffuse pressure 
from business and insurance from below. The avoidance of overt 
responsibility, the fear of antitrust, antibusiness, or antilocalism bias, is 
evident throughout […]. It is hard to defend this arrangement as coherent, 
rational, or efficient. It minimizes government interference159. (Krislov 1997, 
104f.) 
One code expert estimates that there are 44,000 overlapping jurisdictions in the 
US that create and maintain their own building codes (Wible 2006, 288). As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, building codes have not drawn much political attention in 
the US, and are, if ever, only looked at in terms of overregulation. Political debates are 
mostly local and focus on the trade-off between “affordability vs. profitability,” never on 
                                                 
157 42 U.S.C. §126 (1990). 
158 42 U.S.C. §3601 (1968). 
159 Krislov is an ardent supporter of the American system, writing uniform standards are “the 
archenemy of progress and represent the sort of dead hand paralysis so typical of Eastern European 
Communism” (Krislov 1997, 92). 
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internal market issues (Flavelle 2016). Nobody has thought about to which degree they 
might create barriers for the free movement of goods and services.  
In the EU, the issue of building codes has been analyzed in terms of technical 
barrier to trade, the realization that heterogeneity in standards might create market 
barriers. Generally, the right of market access for goods is guaranteed by case law 
following the Dassonville160 and Cassis de Dijon161 decision, as well as treaty obligations. 
According to the mutual recognition approach, regulatory objectives of the EU member 
states are considered to be equivalent, except when a state can prove significant health 
and safety concerns to exist to the European Commission162. While this approach has 
been deemed a success for many ‘simple’ products, it did not reduce barriers to the trade 
in more complex commodities, like elevators or houses. To remedy trade barriers created 
by the heterogeneity of national standards, the EU adopted the ‘new approach’163 in the 
1980s, and the ‘new legislative framework’164 in the 2000s, creating a system of technical 
harmonization and market access, while minimizing the amount of necessary legislation. 
Accordingly, for complex regulated goods the EU establishes essential requirements (i.e. 
performance-based standards) and delegates detailed regulation, within the objectives set 
by a directive, to the European Standardization Organizations (CEN, CENELEC and 
ETSI). Compliance with a harmonized standard automatically gives product access to the 
European market as a whole (European Commission 2015). In addition, legislation 
mandates a waiting period for information exchange via the European Standardization 
                                                 
160 Case C 8-74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville,1974 E.C.R I-00837. The 
ECJ held that a Belgium law which required a specific Belgian certificate for Scotch Whiskey imported 
from France was equivalent to a quantitative restriction of trade.  
161 Case C 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1978 E.C.R I-
00649. The ECJ held that product standards (in this case the definition of ‘fruit liqueur’) can violate 
principles of free movement, even when applied indiscriminately to domestic and imported products. This 
founded the principle of mutual recognition.  
162 The burden of proof that a product is unsafe lies within the importing state. In this case, the 
state has to show additionally that it is taking the least trade-restrictive measure for ameliorating these 
concerns. 
163 Mutual Information Directive 83/189 [1983] OJ. L. 109/8; Council Resolution 85/C [1985] OJ. 
L. 136/01, Directive 98/34 [1998] OJ. L. 204/37; and Directive 98/48 [1998] OJ. L. 217/18. 
164 Regulation 765/2008 [2008] OJ. L. 218/30; Regulation 764/2008 [2008] OJ. L. 218/21; 
Decision 768/2008 [2008] OJ. L. 218/82. 
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Bodies before countries can adopt national product regulations. While European 
countries can still promulgate their own standards—participation in European standards 
is generally voluntary (except when mandated by a directive as in the Eurocodes)—
following standards initiated by the EU, and defined by its standardization bodies, gives 
an automatic presumption of conformity, and it therefore preferred by firms over national 
standards. Similarly, it incentivizes national standardization organizations to work 
together in their European umbrella organization. Every member state has to designate 
one central standardization body to participate in European Institutions, and coordinate 
national standardization and conformity assessments (European Commission 2018a). A 
small part of the market remains ‘non-harmonized,’ meaning it is only governed by 
mutual recognition and notification procedures (European Commission 2018a). 
Hoffmann studied the market for elevators to contrast the EU approach with the 
US and found: “American elevator companies are regularly forced to modify their 
products and retool in order to comply with the ever-changing rules imposed by the great 
number of jurisdictions within the United States (Hoffmann 2011, 312). In contrast, 
realizing that the heterogeneity of national standards impeded the trade in elevators, the 
European Commission pushed for harmonized safety standards that were adopted with 
the Lift Directive165 (Hoffmann 2011, 297).  
Building codes fall within a similar approach. While national and local procedures 
for zoning, as well as for the approval and inspection of construction projects vary 
widely166, there has been a push to establish some harmonization (European Commission 
2018c). The European Commission has long argued that differences in building codes 
create obstacles for the trade in construction-related products and the free movement of 
contractors (Mork and Hansson 2007, 22). Since 1989, the European Commission has 
been working on the development of common construction standards167. In 2007, CEN 
                                                 
165 95/16 [1995] OJ. L. 213/1, now Directive 14/33 [2014] 95/261. Superseding Directives 84/529 
[1984] OJ. L. 300/86 and 90/486 [1990] OJ. L. 270/21 that regulated elevators previously. 
166 But even with those issues, there is an awareness at the European Commission that 
“Differences among the building control systems of EU countries represent a barrier to the freedom of 
movement of services in the construction industry” (De Oliveira Pedro, Meijer, and Visscher 2011, 416). 
167 Construction Products Directive 89/106 [1989] OJ. L. 40/12, replaced by Regulation 305/2011 
[2011] OJ. L. 88/5. 
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published the finalized Eurocodes, and made their incorporation into national standards 
mandatory; for instance, Austria adopted them in 2009, Germany in 2012 (European 
Commission 2018c). The Eurocodes consist of two parts, one that is common to all 
member states and one called National Annex containing so-called nationally determined 
parameters, that can be customized towards local climatic conditions and preferences 
(European Commission 2018c). However, ”Member States are encouraged to co-operate 
to minimize the number of cases where recommendations for a value or method are not 
adopted for their nationally determined parameter” and deviations need to be justified to 
the European Commission (Mork and Hansson 2007, 25). 
As we will see, this contrasts drastically with the US, where the system is not only 
much more decentralized, but the heterogeneity is also not recognized as a barrier to 
trade. Despite the fact that construction firms describe differences in codes as significant 
impediment to mobility, nobody mobilizes around federal market authority to overcome 
the obstacles. 
V.d.1. Building Codes and their Interpretation as Interstate Barriers 
Building codes, which vary between jurisdictions, were another major issue 
mentioned by firms as obstacle to interstate trade. Building codes in the US are created 
and enforced by states and local jurisdictions; and it is unknown how many there are. One 
expert estimates that there is 44,000 different jurisdictions maintaining code; the US 
census bureau counts at least 20,000 “permit-issuing entities” (Wible 2006; U.S. Census 
Bureau 2016a). 
Some degree of uniformity is achieved through the work of private organizations 
that publish model codes. While most jurisdictions follow a model code, in most 
instances they use different versions of the same code and modify as they see fit. The 
International Building Code (IBC) is produced by the International Code Council (ICC). 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) publishes a competing building code, 
NFPA 5000. As one author describes those organizations:  
Think of them as two publishing houses engaged in a war for book sales. 
Codebooks are a big business in the United States and abroad. When a city or 
a state adopts one model code or the other, it means that thousands of code 
officials, architects, engineers and others must purchase new copies to keep 
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on their desks. In 2004, NFPA pulled in $58 million from publication sales, 
while ICC earned $25 million. Both organizations can make big claims when 
it comes to their influence. That’s because jurisdictions commonly mix and 
match certain codes from each group. (Swope 2006)  
In all states, some version of a model code is in effect. However, states will often 
not adopt the newest version published by ICC. Right now states are about evenly split 
between 2009, 2012, and 2015 versions (ICC 2017). States rarely adopt codes for their 
whole areas, meaning the above statistic presented by ICC is misleading. Twenty-six 
jurisdictions promulgate a uniform building code across their whole territory, with few 
exceptions. In all other states, local governments adopt their own codes (ICC 2011). It is 
generally not known and can only be found out by inquiring with local building 
departments, what kind of codes where adopted. Similarly, while states are known to 
modify model codes significantly, there is no existing directory of the changes they 
make.  
Illinois can be used as an example, since its state building department tracks and 
publishes the adoption process in local jurisdictions. According to a recent report, 266 of 
371 local jurisdictions adopted the IBC with significant local amendments (Illinois 2016). 
Similarly, the model versions cities base their codes on vary from 1987 to 2015 (Illinois 
2016). In other states, like Texas for instance, many counties do not have building codes 
at all. Here, any attempts to impose uniform rules were thwarted. A Vice president at the 
Texas Association of Builders argued, “Cities already do a good job choosing which parts 
of the building code are right for them,” so why impose unnecessary uniformity? 
(Flavelle 2016). 
To concretize what local modifications of building codes mean, take the example 
of exit signs. While the NFPA model code only mentions that exit signs should be 
“distinctive in color,” many states and cities have taken it upon themselves to modify this 
standard (Simply Exit Signs 2018). Due to the large number of jurisdictions, it is 
impossible to know what the requirement is without reading the local building code. But 
online publications illustrate that some cities like Portland, OR, Baltimore, MD, or Salt 
Lake City, UT require green signs, while New York City or Chicago require red exit 
signs. Other states, like Texas, do not care either way. In other states, it changes from one 
city to another—for instance, San Francisco requires green signs while Los Angeles 
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requires red signs (Simply Exit Signs 2018). In the US, usually only the word ‘exit’ is 
required, while internationally a pictogram is preferred. In 2006, New York City changed 
its building code to require the ISO pictogram in high-rise buildings (J. Turner and 
Lithwick 2010). Similar observations could be made for size, placement, and illumination 
of exit signs. Contrast this with the EU. The European Sign Directive168 defined uniform 
requirements including color, the use of a pictogram pointing to safety, and optionally the 
word ‘exit,’ implementing the ISO standard. Even illiterate Europeans will be able to 
recognize the universal sign, while in the US, it depends on the city.  
While it is not apparent from this description, building codes are relatively 
uniform across the US compared to the regulation of other aspects of buildings. For 
instance, three different organizations, the ICC (International Plumbing Code-IPC), the 
Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors Association (National Standard Plumbing Code-
NSPC) and the International Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials (Uniform 
Plumbing Code-UPC), maintain plumbing codes and sell the corresponding code books. 
Thirty states use the IPC, 11 states use the UPC, two states use the NSPC, and 6 states 
develop and maintain their own codes (Test.com 2018). However, even that exaggerates 
the amount of uniformity, since nobody tracks state amendments, and in states where 
local jurisdictions adopt the codes, the local amendments. In Nevada for instance, some 
jurisdictions base their codes on IPC and while others use UPC (Test.com 2018).  
Similar issues are reported for other building aspects, for instance electrical codes 
(Zind 2006). One firm explained, “We know those issues [building codes] and get a hold 
of the local standards and get an understanding pretty quickly. It is the elevator codes, 
and the boiler codes, and the jail standards that tend to vary more than the fire life safety 
standards” (Personal Interview, Rosser 2017). This also affects the market for materials 
and construction-related products. For instance, as Hoffmann explains due to the fact that 
city building codes will reference different standards for elevators, there basically is no 
universal market access for elevators, even when fulfilling the latest ASME lift standard 
(Hoffmann 2011, 316). There is no standard, as there is in the EU, that gives a 
presumption of conformity for all jurisdictions. A representative of an international 
                                                 
168 92/58 [1992] OJ. L. 245/23. 
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elevator manufacturer explained, in the US, “A uniform standard doesn’t always exist. So 
we end up creating options or accessories that meet certain market requirements, certain 
small segments of the market” (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 319). 
Finally, building codes are enforced by local officials, often former contractors, 
without uniform training. Numerous private organizations offer certificates, but as with 
other professional credentials, states and cities vary on what they accept and many 
provide their own training. This suggests that model codes might, even if similar, not be 
uniformly interpreted. To demonstrate the inconsistency in building codes and their 
interpretation, Fiatech, an industry consortium in favor of streamlining regulation 
nationally, sent drawings made to the most stringent code of a Target Corporation Retail 
Store to cities in 14 different jurisdictions (Wible 2012). Only checking for accessibility 
and egress, jurisdictions found between zero and 16 code violations; the study concluded 
that process is “dysfunctional and totally inconsistent” (Wible 2012). Especially the 
variance in accessibility compliance, which is uniform nationally, speaks to the 
interpretive discretion of local officials. 
Differences in codes and code application are more noticeable for designers than 
for contractors (Personal Interview, Metropolitan 2017). Only a subset of my 
interviewees was therefore able to speak to the issue of building codes. Forty-eight firms 
named the heterogeneity in building regulations as a significant obstacle to jurisdictional 
mobility and a disadvantage for nationally-operating firms. For instance, “The next 
biggest hurdle is the different building codes and inspection agencies” or “Different 
building codes and inspection procedures don’t prevent us from going anywhere, but they 
cause delays a local guy wouldn’t have” (Personal Interview, Rectenwald 2017; Personal 
Interview, Hays 2017). Fourteen firms found that differences in building codes were not a 
big obstacle. They either described them as “inevitable” or explained that, since they 
applied to every firm, they could not possible be a barrier: “Everybody is on the same 
playing field—no disadvantages” (Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017; Personal 
Interview, Sundt 2017). A design firm elaborated, “Because all designers are subject to 
the same jurisdictional requirements, we don’t see this is creating an advantage for some 
firms” (Personal Interview, Sink 2017). Unlike in the EU, firms struggle to conceptualize 
how the exercise of local power might be a barrier, even though pretty obviously, “The 
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out of town General Contractor will struggle to learn these local ‘Standards’ to the 
advantage of their local competition” (Personal Interview, Webcor 2017).  
However, the majority of firms saw significant disadvantages in a market 
fragmented by so many different rules by different jurisdictions: “This affects us 
significantly, they went to the ICC to try to limit the local interpretation and challenges, 
but because they allow municipalities/states to make their own amendments to be more 
stringent, they put more layers of regulations on it which makes things more difficult,” or 
put differently, “It comes up all the time […]. Sometimes this disadvantages us relative to 
other local companies that know the code better” (Personal Interview, Wolverine 2017; 
Personal Interview, Fulcrum 2017). 
An architect explained that there was no good reason for the local protectionism: 
[Building codes are] somewhat of an impediment. […] We have several 
building codes, the IBC and NFPA, they are competing, and they don’t 
always agree. And some jurisdictions use both of them. We already got a 
build in conflict within each given jurisdiction. But then you are right: 
Maryland incorporates the model building codes but then makes 
amendments. And you see those happening in most states, […] that is a 
barrier, there is no doubt about it […]. You have to convince a jurisdiction 
that you are qualified to do work in their jurisdiction. And that is another 
excuse […]. But if you are a professional architect, you know how to apply a 
building code […]. It is not rocket science [but] certainly cumbersome. 
(Personal Interview, MCA 2017) 
Alliance Residential, national real estate company with projects in 19 states 
explained: 
Additionally, every city or jurisdiction has their own amendments. Also, as 
new revisions to the IBC are released, different jurisdictions adopt the new 
code at different rates, providing grace periods for developments that were 
already permitted or are in the permitting process. […] To add further 
complication, different neighborhoods have different design criteria within 
the same governing jurisdiction. These are usually called something like 
Special Purpose Districts (PDs). They don’t impact building codes, but they 
may institute requirements regarding curb appeal. For example, one of the 
PDs in which I’m currently building requires 80% of the exteriors to be 
masonry, they require specific types of paving, they limit light pollution, etc. 
As you can imagine, all the different governing agencies can make 
development extremely complicated, adding layer upon layer of complexity. 
In addition to building codes, there are also special codes for electrical, 
mechanical, plumbing, fire alarm/fire sprinkler, swimming pool, offsite 
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utility work, paving and drainage, water and wastewater, irrigation, 
accessibility, etc., etc., etc. And every one of these governing agencies apply 
their own permits and fees. We’ll spend anywhere from 5%-15% of our total 
budgets before we ever even break ground” (Personal Interview, Alliance 
2017) 
Due to varying codes, construction costs vary dramatically between jurisdictions: 
“The costs are quite significant but vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The issue you 
discuss isn’t just at the State level. It chases down to county, municipal and [school, 
utility, etc.] district levels. Costs can range from a few hundred dollars in hard and soft 
costs to hundreds of thousands of dollars in hard and soft costs—and everywhere in-
between” (Personal Interview, Construction IV 2017). Another firm explained, 
Private developers see that and say to hell with it, we don’t want to deal with 
that, there is way too many restrictions, that is becoming more common. 
Then they just go to a suburb [of Portland], like Washington county, planning 
is easier, building department is easier. That happens on a county level and 
on a state level. And you can’t underestimate the impact of the costs you are 
going to incur in a particular place, if you are a private company and you 
want to locate somewhere, you are theoretically already doing that analysis. 
Income taxes, property taxes, costs of building, all are going to factor in a 
location decision. And the costs of taxes are more obvious than the building 
costs (Personal Interview, Hacker 2017). 
As a result of these differences, it is quite common for national firms to hire 
specialized consultants who are experts on the local building department and their codes 
(Personal Interview, Olson 2017). “In many cities, an architect or owner must hire a local 
‘expediter’ whose expertise is actually just their network of personal connections in the 
local bureaucracy. This is a city-by-city issue—not a state-by-state issue. The city-by-city 
obstacles are substantial in large cities” (Personal Interview, MCA 2017). 
Municipalities can use their authority over building codes to deliberately favor 
local market participants. As one company explained, “Most municipalities and 
governing bodies prefer not to have outside contractors come in so they often try to 
exploit the lack of knowledge for the local building codes. This is not always the case but 
does frequently happen” (Personal Interview, Rectenwald 2017). For instance, one firm 
opined that Dayton County, FL and Fairfax, WV, were “notorious” for that kind of 
behavior; another explained, “We have found that these subtle differences [between 
Texas counties] can impact firms that are from out-of-town/state” to their disadvantage 
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(Personal Interview, Fred 2017; Personal Interview, Joeris 2017). Another firm added, 
“Local jurisdictions still tinker with the codes causing some problems [for instance] in 
New York City, Connecticut, and New Jersey” (Personal Interview, Lothrop 2017). 
Given the general political support for local protectionism, building inspectors can 
prioritize processing permits for local contractors: 
Working in the city of Chicago […] I have to meet schedules for my 
customers, I will go and file—you can’t go to the building department office, 
you have to schedule your inspections online, and you have to wait 4-6 weeks 
for an inspection. That means, I put the under-floor plumbing in, but before I 
can fill it in, I have to get it inspected. They expect me to wait 4 to 8 weeks. 
It’s impossible to meet schedules. This oftentimes advantages local 
companies that know better how to work through the local bureaucracy. But 
there is no question that what you are looking at the regulations from state to 
state vary dramatically, it’s not only state to state but city to city within a 
state. (Personal Interview, Wolverine 2017) 
Another firm explained,  
It is important to know that, every city is different. Every inspector looks at 
different things. And it can be very subjective. If you are not local to the 
market, they will be on it. If you have experience in a local market, and the 
inspector gets to know you, they are not as strict, they know who you are, 
they have seen you on dozens of projects, there is trust. It’s what is this city 
going to enforce. (Personal Interview, Fortis 2017) 
This was repeated quite often, “Adjacent cities such as San Francisco and San 
Jose have drastically different processes for reviewing the code compliance of projects. 
They also have their own custom code modifications” (Personal Interview, MCA 2017). 
“But it’s not only how a city might interpret a code, but even within that city they could 
have different plan reviewers that could interpret it differently. I don’t see this as a city 
thing, but rather as a person by person thing” (Personal Interview, EYP 2017). And it 
often differs by where a company is from, “Very subjective process we feel, not the same 
for each company submitting to the same department—or even depends on the reviewer 
who's desk it lands on and the relationship with each” (Personal Interview, Architecture 
III 2017).  
Differences in local building codes also produce challenges for companies that 
sell manufactured houses or try to build uniform apartments or stores across the country. 
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Due to differences in codes and interpretation, what might be a safe prototype in one city, 
is deemed unacceptable in another: 
“We do that every day, we build for a lot of national chains, like Red Robins, 
McDonalds, Taco Bell, and those are examples that happen at least weekly if 
not daily […]. The larger corporations give you a proto-type set of plans, 
their prototype is based on what they see as the most stringent code, picking 
California or Texas as their basis, but when you bring that plan into a 
different state, during the review process they don’t pick things up and then 
when you get into the field, one of the inspectors will come through and say, 
oh jeez, you can’t do it this way. And a lot of times we run into this with 
structural details, with mechanical details, exhaust hood systems, fire 
protection systems, welded duct work, electrical side […]. We have do 
redesigns all the time to match the local requirements. (Personal Interview, 
Fulcrum 2017) 
Especially retail chains expanding from Europe notice the extreme 
decentralization of the US system as a disadvantage: “A French firm with retail all over 
North America refuses to accept the fact that things take as long as they do. He can build 
those stores in 5 weeks in Europe, and here it takes 9 weeks. We got other companies like 
Triumph, Kern Millan, Cotman, we got them to understand that our system is kind of 
broken, it is not really efficient” (Personal Interview, Retail Construction 2017).  
A national real estate developer explained: 
If you had the exact the same code, you could save lots of money. They 
[costs imposed by code differences] are kind of regional. In almost every 
state, if you are doing a low-rise building, 5 or 6 stories, you can do the 
electrical wiring with rolex, flexible wiring. If you were in Chicago, they 
would not let you do this. It has to be inconduit. Those rules are driven by the 
unions because they don’t want lesser skilled people to come into their 
markets. So that does happen […]. Civil engineering, sewers, utilities, you 
have to hire a local for that. No one from out-of-state would pretend to 
understand that. They are all super state specific, or even power company 
specific. You really have to have that covered. Could they be more uniform? 
Yes, they could be, but utilities are all regional, North Carolina does not want 
to do anything like Georgia does, even though they are the same company. 
(Personal Interview, Hines 2017) 
Another home builder expanded, “Building code variations also create complexity 
(and thus inefficiency) in plans. While model building codes do exist (IBC/IRC, etc.), 
they are almost always modified locally. The net result is that floor plans that can/should 
be able to be shared across a region are not—requiring complete redraw/resubmittal 
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based on local modifications to the base code language” (M. Personal Interview, Taylor 
2017). Costs are created by several factors, from the inability to share plans across 
regions to difficulties in re-locating senior construction managers from one region to 
another. “It clearly it creates inefficiencies” (M. Personal Interview, Taylor 2017)  
Another firm working with standardized designs explained: 
The things that most commonly require changes have to do with energy code 
requirements, foundation design, and exterior appearance. Retail clients make 
decisions on project locations primarily based on customer demographics & 
competition.  It has been known to happen, however, that a client will look to 
an adjacent jurisdiction to build because they may not impose costly design 
requirements.  Dealing with all of these different circumstances and 
requirements is what we do. We try to mitigate the additional cost to the 
client by working closely with the jurisdiction to understand exactly what is 
required and why. (Personal Interview, SGA 2017) 
Chains, that operate the same business across the same country, are specifically 
affected by the regulatory differences. An employee at one of these firms explained to 
me, they “hired me specifically for the questions you asked. How do we manage that, 
how do we navigate it, how do we build in 50 states the same building, and why does it 
cost us more in one state than the other and why are the regulations so different? 
(Personal Interview, National Retail Chain 2017). When asked how fragmented the 
national market was, he explained: 
Inside our store, there are currently 38,000 regulations. If I expand this to the 
states that I operate in, and you look at all their modifications, it goes to more 
than 115,000 regulations. Very very complex and in some cases redundant 
system. The building code typically is on a 3-year cycle, most standards are 
on a 5-year cycle. So, every 3/5 year there is a new building code/standard 
[…]. So, if you think about that, I as an owner, have to train all of that staff 
every 3 years on the latest and greatest in every state, and yet there are 
already acknowledged problems with the regulation I am training them under. 
So, when you think about regulations and how they change from state to state 
there is an enormous amount of costs to [us] because I am building different 
systems in different states. So, hundreds of thousands of dollars a year […]. 
We don’t care what the book is, let’s everybody agree to one book and I think 
you would reduce a lot what I am talking about. (Personal Interview, 
National Retail Chain 2017). 
Cost are not only created by actual construction costs, but also personnel 
requirements: 
266 
The money that is spent to train my architects, my engineers, my construction 
personal, and my facility operators […] is enormous. I want to be able to take 
a person in San Diego and move them to NYC without having to retrain them 
[but that is impossible]. The other thing is, when we hire a national vendor, 
there is not one size fits all, he can’t develop a process to [for instance, 
manage] parking lots, because the restrictions in CA are different than MI or 
WV, and therefore he charges me more depending on where the state is. 
(Personal Interview, National Retail Chain 2017). 
Overall then, the heterogeneity in building codes creates another layer of 
complexity to the existing interstate barrier created by licensing and procurement 
preference. In contrast to the EU, the US has not used federal market authority to 
guarantee national market access to firms and products. In the absence of federal rules, 
there is heterogeneity between jurisdictions in codes and standards, as well as their 
interpretation by locally trained building officials. As a result, mobility is discouraged 
and made more expensive and construction materials need to be jurisdiction-specific. In 
addition, code differences are used as justification for further barriers through non-
recognition of out-of-state licenses.   
Table 5 summarizes the regulations and practices perceived by nationally-
operating construction firms as barriers to mobility. The next chapter will consider 
different explanations. 
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Dependent Variable 
Persistence of 
interstate barriers and 
lack of mobilization 
against 
Heterogeneity and Barriers Found Impacts According to Stake-
holders 
Professional and 
Firm Licensing 
1) General Contracting 
 
2) Design/Architecture 
 
3) Plumbing 
 
1) Prohibition of temporary service 
provision without local license 
2) Prohibition of permanent service 
provision without local license 
2) Non-recognition of out-of-state/-city 
licenses: Default is no recognition; 
Complicated, in-transparent, or non-
existent reciprocity; Incomplete national 
standardization 
3) Substantial licensing differences: 
Differences in license scope and 
requirements; Differences in exams; 
Differences in education/apprenticeship 
requirements; Differences in continuing 
education; Differences in firm type, 
structure, name requirements 
4) Bureaucratic and financial hurdles: 
(Re-)licensing fees; (In-)frequency of 
license-issuance  
5) Prohibition of out-of-state 
marketing/bidding 
1) Default prohibition of out-of-
state firms 
2) Disadvantage for out-of-state 
firms: Double burden; Cost in 
terms of time, delays, and money 
3) Incentivizes certain business 
structures: Local joint ventures; 
Decentralized firm structures; 
Local regulatory consultants; Use 
of local subcontractors 
4) Decreases competition 
5) Increases costs for construction 
users 
Public Procurement 
Preferences 
1) State, county, city, 
district, and 
institutional 
preference laws 
 
2) State, county, city, 
district, and 
institutional practices 
1) Discriminatory laws: Percentage 
preference to in-state/-county/-city firms 
and specific business types; Percentage 
preference for local goods and materials; 
Local labor requirements 
2) Practices: Informal percentage 
preferences; Informal exclusion 
3) Non-transparency: No centralized 
procurement system or procedures; No 
centralized procurement agencies 
 
1) Prohibition of out-of-area firms 
2) Disadvantage for out-of-area 
firms  
3) Incentivizes certain business 
structures: Local joint ventures; 
Decentralized firm structures; 
Local regulatory consultants; 
‘Mailbox’ offices; Use of local 
sub-contractors 
4) Decreases competition 
5) Increases costs for tax-payers 
Building Codes and 
Inspections 
1) Local building 
codes adopted 
 
2) Local plumbing 
codes adopted 
 
3) Inspection Practices 
 
4) Training of building 
officials  
1) Heterogeneity in code adoption: 
Idiosyncratic state/local codes; 
State/local amendments to model codes; 
Different versions of model codes  
2) Local interpretation of codes: Level 
of scrutiny often dependent on personal 
relationships; Divergent code 
interpretation due to non-uniform 
training of building officials 
 
1) Disadvantage for out-of-area 
firms in terms of knowledge and 
relationships 
2) Incentivizes certain business 
structures: Local joint ventures; 
Decentralized firm structures; 
Local regulatory consultants; Use 
of local sub-contractors 
3) Justifies licensing barriers and 
requires retraining of professionals 
4) Decreases competition 
5) Increases costs for firms and 
construction  
Table 5: Interstate Barriers in the Perception of Construction Firms 
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CHAPTER VI 
MAINTAINING INTERSTATE BARRIERS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
This chapter considers different explanations for the persistence of interstate 
barriers in the construction industry. This proceed as follows. First, I present the position 
of construction firms. They mostly agree that licensing, local procurement laws, and the 
heterogeneity in building codes create interstate barriers. However, absent a national 
market building agenda, their diffuse preferences for national streamlining remains 
unrealized. I then consider why national and local trade associations do not mobilize 
against interstate barriers. Subsequently, I look at the positions of public and private 
regulators, and then at state and local law-makers, as well as their national cooperative 
institutions. The overall picture that evolves from considering these different actors is 
that decentralization and separation of powers prevents them from mobilizing for federal 
market authority and from creating uniform standards across sectors. At the same time, in 
many instances it becomes clear that given a different ideational context, many actors 
could be mobilized for federal market authority. The last section summarizes and 
discusses the implications for broader theorizing about creating markets.  
VI.a.  Firm Preferences 
Most construction firms agreed that licensing, local procurement laws, and the 
heterogeneity in building codes create interstate barriers that should be reduced. 
However, the dominating sense was that there was nothing they could do about it. While 
these firms could probably be coopted into a national market-building coalition, they are 
not, because no such coalition exists: “To my knowledge, there is nobody working to 
change these rules” (Personal Interview, MCA 2017). As we have seen, competitive 
federalism has prevented the creation of such an agenda on the federal level. Absent a 
political entrepreneur and set of ideas, most firms remain politically un-mobilized; 
without a national agenda that would bundle efficiency gains across professions, a 
plumbing contractor is not going to start a national movement to reduce interstate 
barriers. Firms opposed to national measures to reduce interstate barriers cited specific 
competitive federalism arguments, like the idea that any federal regulation will decrease 
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market competition, or that local regulation cannot be conceptualized as an interstate 
barrier. The firms in favor of reforms, beyond the absence of a national agenda, named 
specific obstacles, specifically the preferences of interest groups, local regulators, and 
policy-makers.  
It is not technical requirements or geographic differences—as regulators like to 
stress—that leave firms not pushing for reforms. Most construction firms agreed that 
many of the interstate barriers through licensing could be overcome through either a 
mutual recognition scheme like in the EU, or a federal licensing scheme like for Air 
Traffic Controllers without compromising issues of local difference and safety. Forty-two 
out of 73 firms explicitly stated that they would support a national system, and that it 
would be technically plausible. Thirteen companies described licensing as a significant 
interstate barrier, but did not take a clear position regarding changes, often related to the 
fact that political reforms are “just not something that is on our radar” (Personal 
Interview, Fulcrum 2017). Many companies were very forward in their political position: 
“There should definitely be a general system of reciprocity so the firms that want to grow 
geographically aren’t hindered by local laws” (Personal Interview, Rusco 2017). 
Especially architecture firms were enthusiastic about a national license. One of the 
biggest design firms told me: 
Large firms all want a national license but it is an uphill battle and they don’t 
say it publicly. The thing is, if we want to bid for a project, we just find 
somebody who can quickly become licensed in that state, so it is not a real 
obstacle for us. But it is inefficient. The costs are hard to estimate, but they 
do exist, and are passed on to clients. Especially when lots of smaller 
licensing boards operate really badly, nobody answers the phone, it leads to 
delays. It would be easier even for them to just have one regional licensing 
board. (Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017) 
Firms took issue with the characterization by licensing boards, that there were 
some technical/geographical/safety reason for not recognizing each other’s licenses. One 
firm told me, “There could easily be a national license” (Personal Interview, Shames 
2017). Another argued, “While each one of the unique reasons can be justified 
individually in each state, overall there is no reason you cannot have one single license 
and one single exam and requirements that cover all 50 states, and it should be like that” 
(Personal Interview, EYP 2017).  
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The 14 companies that said they would oppose a national license fell into two 
categories169. Most of them were reciting arguments related to competitive federalism 
“Whenever you try to nationalize […] there is trouble” or put differently, “But in general, 
I would be against a national system—it just invites the federal government into the mix 
and that would mess things up. States should have control over how they oversee public 
safety” (Personal Interview, Martin 2017; Personal Interview, Austin 2017). Another 
company, despite describing different licensing rules as interstate barriers explained, 
“The national government has no business being involved in states’ rights“ (Personal 
Interview, William 2017). The conservative belief that one federal rule is necessarily 
more restrictive than complying with 50 different rules had diffused to some firms: “I 
suspect that a national bureaucracy would be more formidable than adjusting to local 
jurisdictions as needed” (Personal Interview, Gensler 2017). Two companies, that had 
acquired licenses nation-wide explained “At some point these differences can be an 
advantage if you are locally licensed” (Personal Interview, Kraus 2017).  
A similar dynamic was to be observed in regards to building codes. Firms 
perceived streamlining building codes nationally as hugely advantageous—but given the 
absence of a national agenda or interest groups to mobilize firms, there was no strong 
advocacy work by firms. Of the firms directly answering the question, 34 enthusiastically 
supported some kind of national framework, citing huge cost savings. Five firms 
explicitly opposed it, explaining that federal market authority was always problematic. 
Two firms explained that the differences were just “technically inevitable” and one firm 
was just generally unconcerned (Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017; Personal 
Interview, Dennis 2017) 
Some firms, and especially regulators questioned whether a national solution was 
even possible: “It’s obvious when there is a change in interpretation that there was a 
specific reason for it,” or “In Florida you have hurricanes, in California you have 
earthquakes, these are things you have to be respectful of”  (Personal Interview, Rusco 
2017; Personal Interview, Retail Construction 2017). However, the argument of 
geographic differences is less based on objective conditions, and more in the fact that US 
                                                 
169 The position of the remaining four firms was too unclear to be categorized.  
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firms and regulators can simply not imagine a different world. This can be shown by the 
fact that many experts advocate a nationally streamlined system of building codes, and 
the Eurocodes prove that it can be achieved. In addition, geographical differences do not 
account for the fact the neighboring cities will have different codes. As one architect put 
it to me: 
[The argument] is baloney of course […]. They are all going to feel very 
compelled to want to meddle with things and customize them. And it is hard 
to distinguish between legitimate safety concerns and protectionism […]. But 
I don’t believe if you were to look at it objectively that there could not be any 
consensus built. It might be a matter of diminishing returns […]. You could 
define certain sections to only apply in specific climatic zones […]. There is 
a lot influence by the local fire marshals, they have a whole series of things 
that are important to them […]. And the local officials don’t feel compelled 
to update the new code. (Personal Interview, MCA 2017) 
For local procurement preferences, the sense that nothing could be done was even 
stronger. While 38 of 40 firms reported being negatively affect by those preferences—
reaching from extra costs to the decision to not compete—none was able to propose any 
solutions or advocate any changes.170 
The absence of an overarching strategy, that would realize significant economies 
of scale, makes any single national reform efforts appear too costly. Instead, most firms 
are politically not mobilized, lobby only specific state regulators, or trust their trade 
organizations. Expending political and real capital for only one small change, like a 
federal architecture license is not worth it for companies, while trying to reform the 
overall system is not even on firm’s radar. A national license “would save the firm 
money, but it does not save the firm enough money to make it a priority to fight for it” 
(Personal Interview, EYP 2017). As a result, most firm lobbying is for more construction 
projects on the state or local level: “We spend a small amount of time supporting and 
promoting issues mostly within our own state that improve our practice,” or “We are 
active in local lobbying for construction projects that would benefit our communities” 
(Personal Interview, OZ 2017; Personal Interview, Webcor 2017). 
                                                 
170 While 73 firms were interviewed, only 40 were involved in public projects.  
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VI.a.1. Taking Regulations for Granted 
In most cases, firms take the political environment for granted unless they are 
assembled into a coalition through political actors. One firm told me “Regulations are 
30,000 feet above us, it’s not on our radar. We spend no time on thinking about how to 
change the political environment. It has never come up. We are concerned with building 
something to our clients wishes” (Personal Interview, Shrader 2017). This attitude was 
wide-spread making statements like, “A company just has to bite the bullet and do what 
is necessary to become licensed,” or “In the long run, the time lost in trying to politically 
change it is way more expensive than paying the costs […]. It’s way easier to follow the 
rules” (Personal Interview, Rusco 2017; Personal Interview, Fred 2017). The big real 
estate developers I interviewed were in favor of national licensing, but told me they had 
never lobbied for it (Personal Interview, DSLD 2017).  
VI.a.2. Fear of Public Position Taking 
The political discourse of competitive federalism dis-incentivizes taking a public 
position on market fragmentation. While some firms would like to see federal market 
authority used to reduce many interstate barriers, they generally see this stance as too 
controversial to articulate it publicly. Architecture firms conveyed the sense that in many 
cases, they were in favor of a national license, but would not want to take a public 
position on something so politically divisive (Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017). 
Similarly, many expressed the position that taking political stances might be bad for 
business (Personal Interview, EYP 2017). Another construction company explained, 
“State rights are crazy inefficient, but the political climate does not allow for change” 
(Personal Interview, Triad 2017).  
In terms of local procurement preferences, firms were especially worried to step 
on anybody’s toes: “It’s too politically sensitive. No one is gonna make much headway in 
this politically,” or similarly, “We have not lobbied those issues—we have never come 
out strongly in favor or against something,” or put more bluntly, “They [most companies] 
fear ruffling the feathers of public officials and public employees who work for 
government entities, and worry about retaliation or blacklisting on future potential work” 
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(Personal Interview, EYP 2017; Personal Interview, Shiel 2017; Personal Interview, 
Dekker 2017). 
In terms of building codes, firms were particularly worried about getting 
politically involved, because they did not want to antagonize local officials or the general 
public: 
Sometimes it causes delays, but we are building retail mall stores. So, we 
rather make the change [alter the building plans] than fighting it. We just 
make the change, pay for it and be done with it. The cost of delaying would 
cost way more money that complaining. If the store opens a month late 
because your political activity, you might have won a battle, but lost the war. 
[Political Activity] might make your life in the next project much more 
difficult. It’s just easier to fix what they tell you instead of fighting it” 
(Personal Interview, Fred 2017). 
Another firm explained, “There is nothing that a general contractor can do to 
change things at this level,” or similarly, “It’s unlikely we would lobby for reforming 
licensing or building codes. Our main concerns are as a contractor “(Personal Interview, 
Buildrite 2017; Personal Interview, Shrader 2017). A regulatory expert of a national 
company put it more bluntly,  
The same is true for architects: when you go into the city, you are not giving 
them a hard time, because this is your livelihood, this is where you work and 
operate, so nobody tells the story, it’s like the untold terrible thing […]. It 
does not really cost them [Contractors] anything, and only costs their clients, 
and I think the hardest part is—how do you extract the data that shows the 
money? Because the money will be the compelling argument, however, the 
problem is, I am a publicly traded company, I can’t go out and make a 
statement, because of that process we are absorbing an 80-90 million dollar 
hit every single year, because they will ask me what am I doing wrong. So we 
can’t publicly say that, we can only say the system is broken. (Personal 
Interview, National Retail Chain 2017) 
Another regulatory expert expanded: 
Going against local power is politically dangerous. Companies are on my 
side of this debate, they want more unification. If they want to do business 
somewhere where they usually don't do business they have to hire local 
consultants who understand the ins and out of the local code. The worry is 
more about missing some important local regulation than direct costs […]. 
This is all just crazy inefficient. But again, it is hard to change. There is not 
even an authority for them to speak to. (Personal Interview, CSI 2016) 
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This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many firms, interest groups, and 
politicians also adhere to a competitive federalism conception of markets, as one 
regulatory expert put it, “Because our political system is so fractured, it’s hard to know 
who would fight this company, but someone would, and you have the political 
philosophy of some people, that the most local jurisdiction is easier to deal with than 
government far away […]. I cannot say that we have no challenges but I believe that most 
companies and people simply accept the situation at hand and work through the process 
as they find it” (Personal Interview, Zettersten 2017). 
Even more, many firms questioned even the legality in the US of the EU 
examples of mutual recognition I had given: “I personally feel a national system might be 
easier for individual architects to navigate, but given our republic form of government 
which (in theory) gives the power to the states I can’t see it” (Personal Interview, Dekker 
2017) or but more bluntly, “It would be unrealistic, because it is by the states, it would be 
easier if there was no gravity” (Personal Interview, Macgregor 2017). A representative of 
NCARB told me, “The constitution of the US leaves licensing to the states, there is no 
national ability to do so without changing the constitution and this is simply not going to 
happen” (Personal Interview, NCARB 2016).  
VI.a.3. Institutional Obstacles 
At the same time, firms pointed explicitly at the complex structures of federalism 
(i.e. decentralized interest representation and the separation of powers) as an obstacle to 
change. In terms of licensing, one firm told me, “Nothing will change. It would take a 
board of the 50 governors to get together and agree on something,” the assumption being 
that governors would not do so (Personal Interview, Little 2017). Especially not when 
they then would need the approval from their state legislatures, “We don’t even have one 
driver’s license” (Personal Interview, NCARB 2016). Similarly, an engineering firm 
explained, “There is trade groups, like the American Council of Engineering 
Corporations, and on occasion I see stuff from them on streamlining this and getting 
engineering boards to talk to each other. But I don’t see any change. Because every place 
is different, and the boards are all given a task, mostly appointed by the governor, and 
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they take it very seriously, and why would they change the status quo” (Personal 
Interview, STV 2017). 
In terms of building codes, firms explained that lobbying was futile since local 
governments have the authority and they were unlikely to ever give it up: “[Differences] 
are inevitable, given the presence of local governing authorities. They are inefficient for 
our internal operations but are a part of growing a business […]. I cannot envision 
comprehensive change, but there could be a push for a unified minimum standards code 
(Personal Interview, Joeris 2017). Similarly, others said “It’s too big of a challenge,” or 
“Every city wants to do their own thing. You are moving mountains on this. There would 
be a lot of benefits, a lot of efficiency if people got on board. Here is your building code 
for that region, that would be sweet” (Personal Interview, Shiel 2017; Personal Interview, 
Fortis 2017). Local building officials and governments, are usually not in favor of any 
national rules: “I personally feel a national system might be easier for individual 
architects to navigate, but given our republic form of government which (in theory) gives 
the power to the states I can’t see it happening.” (Personal Interview, Dekker 2017). Or 
similarly, “Standardizing national building codes and inspection procedures would be 
great, but again states loathe giving up power” (Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017). 
VI.b.  Interest Groups 
Interest groups are mostly thwarted by the incentives set out by the structures of 
their organization. However, some explicitly adopt a competitive federalism rhetoric. 
These factors are crucial because most firms trust their trade associations to represent 
them politically. For instance, architecture firms explained: “We don’t lobby. But I will 
tell you that I am a member of the AIA, and they are typically involved in lobbying 
efforts,” or “Our efforts are mostly via AIA” (Personal Interview, SGA 2017; Personal 
Interview, Rosser 2017). Similarly, most contractors explained that they only lobbying 
activity was through ABC or AGC, and firms agreed unanimously, that none of these 
organization was actually pushing for any changes, “I am unaware of anyone trying to 
change or minimize the differences across local governmental entities” (Personal 
Interview, Joeris 2017). 
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Institutional structures deter trade associations from advocating for federal market 
authority. Most firms told me that they had never heard of any organization promoting 
national streamlining of licensure in the US, saying things like “I am not of aware of any 
efforts to create a more nationally uniform licensing system,” “No, I have given up on 
that,” or “I would if I knew where to advocate for that change” (Personal Interview, 
Rusco 2017; Personal Interview, Retail Construction 2017). Many emphasized that their 
only lobbying happened through those organizations, “I am involved with ABC, and it’s 
not their major priority” (Personal Interview, Wolverine 2017). 
The obstacle is that national organization work on federal issues, while local 
chapters only work on local issues—and actually often oppose any changes that would 
take away from their state, because “Small local members are not interested in loosening 
local restrictions” (Wolverine Building Group). No organization works on creating 
meaningful state-cooperation that actually involves a transfer of authority (Personal 
Interview, NTS 2016). An architecture firm complained, “They [AIA] mostly lobbies on 
a local level, and not for national changes. They don’t really represent the large firms, but 
local architects and engineers and they don’t see the inefficiencies of the system” 
(Personal Interview, Architecture I 2017). Another elaborated on the incentive structure, 
We feel the American Institute of Architects should be far more politically 
proactive at the state and local government levels. Among other things we’d 
like the AIA to advocate for more national standardization and simplification. 
Unfortunately, since architects are selected subjectively, most local architects 
in a given jurisdiction are unwilling to speak publicly against or even for 
issues on their own. (Personal Interview, Dekker 2017) 
Interstate barriers through licensing, procurement preferences, and building codes 
are on the radar of most industry trade groups, but are not a priority in any significant 
way, because they separate their lobbying work into federal and single-state respectively. 
Hence, there have been no major reform efforts, by trade groups, only little changes in 
specific states in specific professions. The trade groups’ efforts are hampered by the fact 
that they deem a national solution impossible and lobbying specific states to cooperate 
extremely difficult. Instead, they might approach one state if they consider its regulation 
as particularly protectionist. For instance, AGC has publicly come out against 
protectionist licensing rules in Hawaii (Personal Interview, Salsgiver 2017).  
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Most national organizations are dealing only with federal policy, while the state 
chapters are in charge of state issues, reinforcing a piecemeal approach. A horizontal 
approach, spanning multiple states or multiple professions, bundling the benefits, was out 
of the imagination of the organizations. This fits what other scholars have observed, 
”Fragmented interest group activity […] makes it inordinately difficult to build winning 
coalitions across issue areas, let alone across states and regions” (McKay 2001, 43). 
The piecemeal approach—lobbying against one regulation in one state at a time 
instead of some more general reform—is reinforced by the fact that trade groups are 
mostly service organizations and those services are provided within specific jurisdictions. 
One representative explained that most firms joined for their workforce development 
programs, safety courses, discounts, and networking opportunities at conferences 
(Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017). Another explained, “The number one reason 
members join is our SAFE corporation—we offer workers comp insurance through 
membership. They receive discounts, dividends, the best deals. We also do networking 
events” (Personal Interview, Salsgiver 2017). In addition, many industry groups, 
especially in trades like plumbing and electrics, compete with unions in offering and 
managing apprenticeship programs. 
However, there are also ideational aspects to explaining the position of interest 
groups. ABC, for instance, discarded concerns about interstate barriers with the 
comment, “Local competition works” (Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017). More 
generally, interest groups often do not conceptualize cross-state heterogeneity as a trade 
barrier, explaining that since every firm is treated the same, it cannot possibly be 
discriminatory. Interest groups do not imagine bold reforms like the European 
Commission pursued. Despite the fact that arrangements like a national licensing regime 
would be completely feasible under the Constitution, many interviewees cited legal 
reasons for not pursuing general reforms: “Professional licensure exists within a system 
of federalism in which, under the Tenth Amendment, the federal government displays 
respect for the sovereign decisions made by the states to oversee professionals providing 
services within their boundaries” (Personal Interview, Schnaidawind 2017). 
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In all of these ways, interest groups reinforce interstate barriers instead of 
mobilizing against them—despite the preference of nationally operating construction 
firms. 
VI.b.1. RCA—Retail Contractors Association 
The President of the RCA, an association of national retail contractors, told me 
that local licensing differences, especially with protectionist intent, were a big concern 
and priority of their lobbying (Personal Interview, Moore 2016). He explained that there 
could be huge savings through nationally streamlining the licensing process, but the 
organization perceived that as infeasible. Instead they were only lobbying specific states 
with particularly protectionist regulations like Florida and Hawaii (Personal Interview, 
Moore 2016). In the past, “RCA has made some efforts toward national licensing but has 
since ended them,” apparently because it was unclear to them how to achieve it (Personal 
Interview, Warwick 2017). 
He voiced similar concerns about building codes. While RCA saw the 
heterogeneity as a “huge problem for their members,” there was not really anything they 
could do about it: 
“Establishing a general framework would make sense. But I would go back to 
these issues being firmly in the hands of states, absolutely not under the 
charter of the federal government […]. It would be very unpopular to ask the 
federal government to do it. I think states would resist on the basis of state 
rights, under the constitution. They would not want to give up sovereignty 
over these kinds of decisions. So, it’s really about lobbying individual states 
to group together and do something smart. And then there is the state 
bureaucracy. And that bureaucracy is often not interested in change or 
consistency […]. Without a doubt, it could be streamlined. There is much 
redundancy. […]. The states are operated as individual countries. H & M, 
they are a big customer of ours […]. We have learned lessons from them 
comparing contracting in Europe vs. US, because in Europe things have been 
streamlined. They can build faster and cheaper that they can in the US, 
because of differences from state to state. (Personal Interview, Moore 2016) 
RCA does not have a position on public procurement preferences since it is 
exclusively concerned with retail construction. 
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VI.b.2. AIA—American Institute of Architects 
The national branch of AIA also only works on federal level policy, citing respect 
for local policy making and general principles of federalism. They seem to promote more 
uniform licensure standards: “AIA supports the use of uniform criteria for licensure that 
facilitate reciprocity and do not inhibit the interstate and international practice of 
architecture” (AIA 2017). However according to the Director of Public Affairs and 
Media Relations, they are not actively lobbying states to cooperate more: 
Professional licensure exists within a system of federalism in which, under 
the Tenth Amendment, the federal government displays respect for the 
sovereign decisions made by the states to oversee professionals providing 
services within their boundaries. State licensing boards are in the best 
position to limit the ability of unqualified professionals from entering the 
market and restrict or remove professionals when they do not adhere to the 
professional standards set by the state or they endanger members of the 
consuming public. This can be most efficiently done by the states. (Personal 
Interview, Schnaidawind 2017) 
Similarly, a representative of AIA Oregon told me that there might be 
inefficiencies, but “The states regulate things, and that’s just how it is” (Personal 
Interview, Hoffmann 2016). 
For the same reason, belief in states’ rights coupled with decentralization, AIA 
does not advocate for reducing local procurement preferences. On the federal level, AIA 
only takes positions on federal procurement issues, while local chapters explicitly support 
local preferences (AIA 2018; Personal Interview, Schnaidawind 2017). As one firm 
explained, AIA might probably “do little bit on that. But local governments are just very 
powerful when it comes to that stuff” (Personal Interview, Little 2017).  
The AIA supports uniform building codes and permitting processes but does not 
see federal market authority as a solution. Instead they support the private-local 
regulatory system: “The AIA supports regulation by a single set of comprehensive, 
coordinated, and contemporary codes and standards, which establish sound threshold 
values of health, safety, and the protection of the public welfare throughout the United 
States (AIA 2017, 11). However, “Codes are best regulated by the states” (Personal 
Interview, Schnaidawind 2017). AIA deems incentives to create more uniformity as 
acceptable, but does not want to take any power away from local authorities (Personal 
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Interview, Schnaidawind 2017). For instance, since 2007 two Democrats and one 
Republican have been introducing the Safe Building Code Act171 in Congress, 
earmarking disaster relief funds to incentivize states to adopt one minimum building 
standard state-wide. The act was never debated in committee, but was supported by AIA 
(AIA 2015). 
VI.b.3. AGC—American General Contractors 
AGC, one of the biggest industry trade groups, described licensing differences 
between states as a huge interstate barrier for commercial contractors. However, given 
the decentralization of their organization, a Director of Government Affairs deemed any 
remedy impossible: “AGC has 92 chapters, scattered across the US. At the national level 
we don’t do a lot to direct what our individual state chapters do, it’s up to them, if they 
see laws that they don’t like, or laws they would like to have. Generally this 
responsibility is up to them” (Personal Interview, AGC 2016). This leaves state chapters 
to address licensing issues for specific professions and only within their own or 
neighboring states. However, within a specific state the interests of regional or national 
contractors might not be represented. A representative of AGC Oregon explained, “Our 
average member has gross sales of $6 million. These are small companies. For a small 
company, to have to navigate the bureaucracy, is very difficult. We exist to help them to 
do it. They are afraid that a regional license would be more complicated. They are 
suspicious of government in general, so creating a new layer of government is just not 
something we would support” (Personal Interview, Salsgiver 2017). 
Similarly, AGC sees procurement preferences as a big problem: “My association 
has worked pretty hard to oppose those kinds local hire preferences, we view them as bad 
for the industry as a whole. [How often are those laws decisive for who wins a contract?] 
Nobody really tracks that kind of information. I don’t have any hard data. The evidence is 
only anecdotal” (Personal Interview, AGC 2016). But again, on the federal level 
advocacy only deals with federal issues, while local chapters only deal with their state, 
and might or might not oppose in-state preferences. Specifically, AGC does not want to 
                                                 
171 H.R. 3926 110th Cong. (2007). 
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promote any new federal market authority to create more uniform procurement rules: “In 
general, we don’t want the federal government involved, because states are opposed in 
the federal government telling them what to do” (Personal Interview, AGC 2016). When 
I pointed out that it was unlikely that local chapters would get states to cooperate and 
might actually support local preference laws, the representative responded “that’s a fair 
point, in the past we had those disagreements with our chapters” (Personal Interview, 
AGC 2016).  
While the Oregon representative of AGC explained to me that they opposed local 
procurement preferences, I could not find any statements by any chapter on this matter, 
suggesting that it is not a huge priority (Personal Interview, Salsgiver 2017). Indeed, 
perusing policy documents by local chapters in my state clusters showed nobody 
advocating for an end to local preferences (AGC CA 2017; AGC OCC 2018; AGC WA 
2018). This makes sense in terms of institutional incentives: there are no huge gains for a 
local chapter to advocate against rules that benefit its members— and advocating against 
other states’ rules is outside the scope of their activity.  
The national branch AGC does not have any position on building codes. The 
incentives of a decentralized system of interest representation become apparent again: 
“AGC members and chapters work with local governing bodies when it is time to review, 
update and enact local code” (AGC 2016; Personal Interview, AGC 2016). But on the 
local level, chapters are not involved with trying to streamline building codes across 
states since they only work within a state. If anything, they need good relationships with 
building departments and are unlikely to challenge them. As one regulatory expert 
explained, “Even AGC, a very powerful organization, they are more worried […] about 
good relations with the local building department than with good building codes” 
(Personal Interview, National Retail Chain 2017). Case in point, none of the chapters in 
my state cluster has any policies in regards to building codes posted (AGC OCC 2018; 
AGC CA 2017; AGC WA 2018). A local representative explained that heterogenous 
building codes could not be regarded as a barriers but were a common sense safety 
measure, “If you move to a different state, it’s up to the state, it’s sort of part of being a 
responsible contractor to know about those differences” (Personal Interview, AGC 2016). 
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VI.b.4. ABC—Associated Builders and Contractors 
ABC, the other big industry trade group, explained that one uniform licensing 
framework across the country would be sufficient, solve lots of problems, reduce 
redundancies, and overcome barriers. However, it was nothing they were advocating for: 
“We have never pursued something like national licensing. States like their own licensing 
and control over their state. States like licensing because it is a revenue stream” (Personal 
Interview, Brubeck 2017). As with AGC, their national government relations team was 
mostly focused on dealing with federal policy; their advocacy is limited to trying to 
encourage states to adopt more similar standards. As many others, they deemed trying to 
convince states to cooperate as “a waste of time” (Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017). 
Inattention towards interstate barriers by ABC is interesting but not really 
surprising given that they are a classical conservative organization. Their extensive 
lobbying is directed at repealing “Unnecessary, burdensome and costly regulations 
resulting from the efforts of Washington bureaucrats who have little accountability for 
their actions” (ABC 2016a). However, while using language that would lend itself to 
opposing interstate barriers, their Halt the Assault campaign is directed at federal policy, 
not state regulation. While they do not oppose state licensing explicitly, they lobby states 
extensively against prevailing wage laws, and for right to work laws as well as related 
anti-union legislation (ABC 2016b). In the end, for them the competitive federalism 
argument prevails. When asked about the problem of protectionist local licensing rules, I 
was told “If local communities adopt good rules, they get good prices—so the markets 
will push the localities to eventually adopt the good rules. Local competition works” 
(Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017).  
A representative of ABC Oregon stressed that they were telling legislators in 
Oregon and Washington about interstate barriers through licensing, especially to moving 
electricians across the border. However, their approach was limited—only focusing on 
one specific rule between two states. A more general approach encompassing several 
states or professions was not on their radar (S. Personal Interview, Miller 2017). While, 
he told me, “a national or regional system would be much more efficient,” he did not 
expect them to be able to do anything beyond changes to individual rules, “Every state 
has created their own system and they are not willing to change” (S. Personal Interview, 
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Miller 2017). Fundamentally reforming the system of licensing was just not something 
the organization even considered. 
Dealing with procurement preferences is also left to local chapters. A 
representative of the national branch of ABC explained: 
State procurement rules are different, counties have their own rules, cities 
have their own rules, school districts have their own rules. It gets even more 
complicated when it’s a local project with federal assistance. That triggers 
another set of rules to go into effect. It becomes really complicated to 
understand all these regulations. This is a huge barrier to entry. What we see 
a lot is local hiring requirements, cities say we want to give contracts to 
companies with a local workforce. Politicians from both sides of the aisle like 
that idea. So we oppose those. (Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017) 
However, ABC does not lobby for an overhaul of the national system of 
procurement. Instead, their local chapters might address local issues on a case by case 
basis. “We assess the situation, and try to educate them, and make our case. Mostly it is 
an educational process school board members etc. often do not understand how 
competition works” (Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017). While the representative 
explained, “In an ideal world, we would just have one set of rules,” he argued: “I am not 
a big fan of the federal government making rules for everybody. Local government is 
closes to the people, and that is the most effective form of government. I don’t want to be 
overly prescriptive. Local governments should just ensure competition. That's ABCs 
philosophy—local change, not federal government” (Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017).  
Of course, the problem with local change is that local chapters often have no 
position at all. They are mostly focused on reducing the power of unions. Given their 
language of “merit shop, a philosophy that awards work to the most qualified and lowest 
bidder” it is surprising that they do not oppose local procurement preference laws 
(ABCW 2017). Within a local chapter, the incentives to do so are not very big, as one 
lobbyist told me, “We haven’t really pursued this as a priority. It is always controversial 
within our organization. You have contractors on both sides—it is a hard issue” (S. 
Personal Interview, Miller 2017). In this way, the decentralization of interest 
representation together with a competitive federalism conception of markets prevent 
mobilization for federal market authority. Indeed, while ABC ‘opposes’ procurement 
preferences, their federal organization only deals with federal issues, while all local 
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chapters in my state cluster are silent on the issue, only focusing on opposing unions 
(ABC 2016b; ABC SoCal 2018; ABCW 2017; S. Personal Interview, Miller 2017). 
ABC does not have a position on building codes at all. A representative told me, 
“We are not really involved in that—it concerns architects and engineers” (Personal 
Interview, Brubeck 2017). While this does not to seem true given the evidence by firms, 
the position is not surprising. ABC is not concerned with local heterogeneity because it is 
a local issue, and their belief is that “markets will push the localities to eventually adopt 
the good rules” (Personal Interview, Brubeck 2017).  
VI.b.5. Other Interest Groups 
Smaller more specialized interest groups also demonstrate that the fragmentation 
between states and between professions prevents any mobilization for federal market 
authority. This often mixes with explicitly competitive federalism arguments. A 
representative of the national association of home builders, NHBA, explained that they 
were not taking any positions on state policies, which were solely in the discretion of 
their local chapters. My interviewee wanted to be particularly clear they do not want to 
circumvent local control in any case: “We believe in states’ rights, people belong locally” 
(Personal Interview, HBA 2016). A representative of the Oregon HBA was enthusiastic 
about Oregon’s licensing laws: “We don’t let people from Idaho build in Oregon, because 
they do not offer the same protections to consumers than we do” (Personal Interview, 
OHBA 2016). After laying out to him potential benefits of uniform rules, he conceded it 
would be more efficient, “But it would take a large effort nobody is pursuing. It just 
would be a super large effort. If not even doctors can do it, we can't do it” (Personal 
Interview, OHBA 2016). In addition, he was concerned who would decide the rules “We 
don’t want Idaho regulation” (Personal Interview, OHBA 2016). 
NHBA does not have a position on public procurement since their members only 
build residential housing. They support state-wide building codes, but oppose anything 
beyond: ”The construction industry, specifically the Oregon Home Builders Association, 
drove the impetus for a uniform statewide building code” in Oregon (Code Division 
2013). Before 1973, Oregon’s 138 jurisdictions all had different building codes, or none 
at all. As a representative of the OHBA remembers, “There would be different standards 
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for the same thing across Oregon. In one community, the railing had to be so high and the 
bars had to be so far apart. Maybe you needed an outlet in the attic or maybe you didn’t 
have to have an outlet. We believed there should be a uniform statewide building code” 
(VanNatta 2013). However, while Democrats and Republicans praised the “consistency 
and uniformity” provided by Oregon’s state-wide building code at its 40-year 
anniversary, they would not apply the same argument across state borders (Code Division 
2013). As a representative of OHBA told me, nobody is pursuing to streamline codes 
with neighboring states, even though it causes massive costs for businesses operating in 
metropolitan areas like Portland, OR-Vancouver, WA (Personal Interview, OHBA 2016). 
He told me, while it would be a reasonable thing to do, it would require “too big of an 
effort” and was therefore “not achievable,” especially because, as another representative 
put it, “uniform standards are impossible” anyway (Personal Interview, OHBA 2016; 
Personal Interview, HBA 2016).  
Unfortunately, interview requests to the two major plumbing trade groups, PHCC 
and MCC, in my state clusters were declined. However, review of all their websites 
shows that they are roughly similar to contractor associations. They are mostly service 
organizations, selling code books, offering classes on safety and management, running 
apprenticeship programs, and offering insurance and pensions programs. None of their 
government relations websites indicates that they are working to reduce interstate barriers 
caused by licensing, and they are supportive of local building codes. Most of their 
advocacy work is directed at making sure that safety and labor laws do not become too 
stringent. In electrical affairs, the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) 
does not take any position on state licensing, but focuses its significant advocacy work 
only on federal regulation (NECA 2017) 
We can also look at broader national trade organizations. The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), for instance, have not 
addressed the issue of licensing at all, except to suggest that states probably should 
regulate businesses less—their concrete policy positions are all relate to international 
trade172 (Hackbarth 2017).  
                                                 
172 Search of the Online Archive of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of 
Manufacturers by Author on February 21, 2018. 
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Following the common model of decentralization, the Chamber promotes opening 
up federal procurement to foreign competition, but does not take a position on local 
preferences, arguing, “At the state and municipal levels, we understand and appreciate 
the limitations of the federal government to further open those markets“ (Finiello 2014; 
Murphy 2018; Hoffmann 2011, 187). Anecdotally, lots of local Chambers of Commerce 
lobby cities and counties to adopt local preference laws (ACCE 2018). For instance, the 
Chamber of Commerce of Eastern Connecticut promotes buy local legislation region-
wide (Hoffmann 2011, 163). Similarly, a representative of the National Association of 
Manufacturers explained they supported competitive bidding, “But as a national 
organization we focus on national issues. State manufacturing organizations are more 
likely to focus on state and local procurement rules and procedures. But, as you pointed 
out, the in-state companies may have a bias toward protecting their home turf” (cited in 
Hoffmann 2011, 188). 
In terms of building codes and standards, the Chamber and NAM follow the same 
model, only taking international positions, either not recognizing or not wanting to 
recognize internal barriers. They advocate mutual recognition towards the EU, but not 
internally: “We have no intention to advocate the importation of the European regulatory 
practice in the U.S. Nor do we wish our problems on our European partners” (Litman 
2003). Given that they only endorse “private and voluntary standards” they do not see 
any policy options to streamline the US system nationally; the Chamber doesn’t “get into 
states,” because this would mean “we would chose winners and losers” and “we would 
have then to choose one [state member] chamber over the other” (U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce 2018; Hoffmann 2011, 187) 
The Construction User Roundtable (CURT) and Construction Industry 
Roundtable (CIRT) are both organizations restricted to the largest companies, buying and 
providing construction services. Unfortunately, they could not be interviewed, but 
judging from publicly available sources, their policy position is broadly similar to other 
national organizations, focusing on federal policy and services for their members173. 
“CURT exists to create a competitive advantage for construction users. CURT 
                                                 
173 Search of the Online Archive of CIRT and CURT by Author on February 15, 2018. 
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accomplishes this multifaceted objective by providing aggressive leadership on those 
business issues that promote excellence in the creation of capital assets” (CURT 2018a). 
One of their main concerns is the “very limited productivity gains” of the construction 
industry compared to other sectors of the economy (CURT 2018b). While they see one of 
the causes in a market fragmented into many small firms and jurisdictions, their solutions 
are all non-political, like improving management practices and communication (CURT 
2018b).  
Similarly, CIRT represents over 100 of the biggest construction, engineering and 
architecture firms, and locates inefficiencies in the jurisdictional fragmentation of the 
market:  
The process of designing and constructing is one of man’s most complex and 
daunting endeavors. This complexity is borne not just from the number of 
parties and interested players that may have a hand in or influence over a 
given project, but also from the number of layered jurisdictions (federal, 
state, local, etc.) that are involved. Taken together, it’s easy to understand the 
countless places and opportunities where delays and/or redundancies can 
creep into the process through unnecessary red tape. […] The mountains of 
laws, regulations, and rules that we insist on heaping on our private sector job 
creators is unprecedented and their cumulative burden is not really known or 
fully appreciated. (CIRT 2012, 2)  
Give this statement, one would expect them to support streamlining regulation 
across jurisdictions, but this is not the case. Their specific demands all concern the 
federal government, reaching from “The federal government should rely on the private 
sector for services readily available,” to “Institute standard procurement policies for all 
federal agencies” (CIRT 2012, 6). Similarly, their white paper on Regulatory 
Streamlining, only addresses federally-funded projects and federal environmental 
regulations (Casso 2011). While public procurement practices are described as unfair and 
inefficient, this is only applied to federal agencies (Casso 2011).  
The only time industry groups can successfully mobilize nation-wide is when they 
have a single issue that can be achieved state-by-state. This usually implies goals like 
reducing or abolishing regulations. For instance, ABC has successfully mobilized all their 
chapters to lobby state government for right-to-work legislation. Similarly, in 2008 the 
ICC adopted a new standard that every new home should have fire sprinkler systems. 
Industry groups, including ABC, AGC, and HBA successfully lobbied every jurisdiction 
288 
to not adopt that section of the model code, except in Maryland and California (Faturechi 
2016). 
I spoke to two national organizations, and one technology company, that were 
advocating for nationally streamlining building codes. However, their general sense was 
that nothing ‘dramatic’ could be done because local officials and law-makers did not 
want change, and national organizations did not pursue it. A director of the Construction 
Specification Institute174 explained, jurisdictions did not even agree on a common format 
for construction specification, “For commerce it would be better. If we could, we would 
force people to. But we would lose all our political capital trying to push for something 
like this, so we prefer to keep it on a voluntary basis” (Personal Interview, CSI 2016). 
Similarly, Fiatech175, an industry consortium, pursues “national regulatory 
streamlining” through a working group which is led by led by Robert Wible, founder of 
Robert Wible & Associates, a regulatory consulting firm, as well as initiator of the 
Alliance for Building Regulatory Reform in the Digital Age. According to the working 
group, the regulatory system is “Cumbersome, overlapping, poorly administered; Does 
not delineate clear lines of authority & jurisdiction; Leaves compliance to guesswork and 
repeated re-applications” (Wible 2012). Through the working group, I was able to 
interview several regulatory experts. However, due to the obstacles, the change they 
pursue is very limited: “First and foremost is education, telling the story, telling them 
why it doesn’t work, sponsoring and funding education […]. We engage the public 
hearing process of regulations, we testify on a regular basis (Personal Interview, National 
Retail Chain 2017). In addition they look at how “technology can bridge the gap” and 
exchange of best practices of how best to navigate the regulatory system (Personal 
Interview, Wible 2017). Together with Solibri, a software company within the design 
field, they have looked at “How do I take an inefficient process and make it more 
                                                 
174 CSI was founded in 1948. Its mission is the publication of two voluntary specification 
standards (MasterFormt and UniFormat), basically a common language for designing and managing 
construction projects (CSI 2018).  
175 “Fiatech is a global community of capital facilities stakeholders [including Bechtel, Target, 
Shell] working together to drive productivity and efficiency improvements by advancing technology and 
innovative practices” (Fiatech 2018). According to them the total capital construction cost could be reduced 
on average by over 20% by measure through national regulatory streamlining. 
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efficient and consistent by automating it” (Personal Interview, Widney 2017). The basic 
idea is to digitize the process of checking within design software, thereby making code-
compliance basically automatic. However, the initiative has not taken hold. While ICC is 
maybe best situated to promote the project, they have abandoned it, most likely because it 
would basically make their business model obsolete (Khemlani 2015). 
VI.c.  Regulators—Public and Private 
Institutional and ideational elements work hand in hand in explaining the 
positions taken by regulators, local building officials, procurement officials and licensing 
boards, as well as national private organizations that serve as platforms for those 
officials. The latter, one might think, should be most likely to mobilize around federal 
market authority to create more uniform licensing and procurement rules, as well as 
model codes. However, several institutional elements impede that. They are private 
organizations, created by state licensing agencies or local officials as coordination device. 
Membership is voluntary and no actual authority is transferred. Everything they do is 
subject to voluntary cooperation of the state agencies, within the bounds of what state 
legislatures allow—meaning there is no binding cooperation. In this sense, it is akin to 
the open method of coordination in the EU, where ministers will agree on a few common 
goals and exchange best practices, without committing anything.  
At the same time, these organizations a limited by the fact that they are organized 
differently for each profession, depending on how state agencies are set up—there is a 
national association for building officials, for plumber licensing boards, for electrical 
codes, and so on. This means, there is nobody that could coordinate all of them and 
realize the economies of scale from cross-sectoral reforms. Being a form of executive 
cooperation, all their work is autonomy-conscious—careful to not usurp any authority 
from local legislatures. This fits quite well the theoretical expectations laid out in the 
theory chapter. A lack of binding cooperation  
Can be attributed to the striking inability to pool power within the individual 
state as well as the inability to speak with one voice for the states as a level of 
government. […] As a result, [national organizations are] unable to represent 
the states as coherent actors, IGAs focus on lobbying for the interests of their 
particular members, members perceived predominantly as professionals, not 
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as representatives of a political system with a particular interest profile. 
(Bolleyer 2009, 112ff.) 
At the same time, ideational elements were visible, especially when speaking with 
licensing boards and local building officials. To some degree, they were just status-quo 
biased and lacked the imagination of an alternative system. This ties into competitive 
federalism—because its implication is that national action is unnecessary and local action 
is not problematic. This can be seen in the fact that licensing agencies simply did not 
accept the argument that redundant requirements cause a double burden for out of state 
firms. But it also ties into traditional American conservative localism. Despite evidence 
to the contrary, regulation by other states and cities was frequently presented as unknown 
and potentially dangerous. 
VI.c.1. National Institutions 
Consider NCARB, the association of architect licensing agencies, first. Despite a 
comparatively high degree of standardization, a representative told me, pushing for more 
was always difficult, because any change they proposed “does not take effect until all 
state boards vote on it. And […] the individual state board might accepts the change or 
not” (Personal Interview, NCARB 2016). He went on, “I personally, not speaking for 
NCARB, am not a big supporter of states’ rights in those kinds of things. I think there 
should be a national license instead of 54 versions of the same thing” (Personal 
Interview, NCARB 2016). However, when NCARB tried to push for that ten years ago, 
state boards were upset and changed out the leadership: “When they were unveiling this 
initiative, there was a lot of pushback. Why are we doing this? Why is there a need for 
this? How is this not a function of the states via the constitution? etc. etc. They made it 
about who has the original authority” (Personal Interview, CAB 2016). Another 
representative added, after all “It has taken 97 years to achieve the kind of 
standardization we have now,” referencing the founding mission of NCARB established 
1919 (Personal Interview, NCARB 2016).  
NCARB does not get involved in convincing state boards to transfer authority 
because they see themselves as their agents. The idea that having 50 similar but distinct 
licensing regimes is discriminatory due to putting a double burden on out-of-state firms, 
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was foreign to them. In terms of protectionism, they were only familiar with arguments 
against licensing in general. This was the only area where they were getting politically 
involved:  
I was at a hearing in Arizona, in January, the board of architects was 
considering to deregulate several professions, one of them was landscape 
architecture, they were saying just by word of mouth people will know who 
is a good /bad landscape architect. This is an overly simplistic view of how 
regulation works, and from my perspective I would much rather go to 
somebody who I know has met requirements, and who if involved in project 
that caused harm to the public, could be disciplined by the board and license 
taken away. […] There are people that would say just by having a minimum 
education requirement you are barring entry into the profession. It’s a 
travesty that they look at having some education as barring from licensure. 
(Personal Interview, NCARB 2016) 
The national organization of engineering licensing agencies, NCEES, is similarly 
situated. A representative explained, “The state boards make it more difficult than 
necessary at times but we are working to try to bring greater uniformity to the process” 
(Personal Interview, Carter 2016). Their strategy for more uniform rules is restricted to 
releasing standardized tools that states can use, explicitly not to create a national license: 
“The state boards of licensure were all created by their respective legislators and the 
belief is that it is the state’s right to determine what requirements should be in place for 
licensure as an engineer” (Personal Interview, Carter 2016). When I pointed out that a 
system of mutual recognition might be much more efficient, I was told “We hear the 
concern chiefly from individuals who are licensed/certified in other countries. I feel that 
most U.S. citizens recognize and accept the sovereignty of each individual state and have 
accepted that although it makes sense, a national system of licensure is not likely to 
occur” (Personal Interview, Carter 2016). 
While architecture and engineering has seen quite a bit of national standardization 
over the last 100 years, contractor and subcontractor licensing have not. NASCLA, an 
organization of state contactor licensing agencies was founded to “Support best practices 
in the construction industry that promote quality standards and public safety, mutual 
interests, and regulation of business practices” (Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). 
While they are trying to increase mobility for contractors, as we have seen, there is no 
consistent national standard. A representative told me, “A lot of states are going to have 
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different laws and regulations, so unfortunately many states do choose not to reciprocate 
with other states. And that is their choice. Here at NASCLA we do try to help them” 
(Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). When asked what that means, I was told, “Well 
we encourage them [states], but we don’t push them […]. We do not go to Colorado and 
tell them that it would be more efficient to have state-wide contractor licensing. It is what 
it is” (Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). Contractors and industry groups can 
become associate members of NASCLA, and “They definitely want more uniformity” 
(Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). But apparently states are very clear in that they 
do not want to go beyond voluntary cooperation:  
States don’t want that [real mutual recognition]—even if they have 
reciprocity, they still want you to go through a big process of application etc. 
We definitely get that question about national licensing a lot—but it is one of 
those things, maybe eventually? It would be nice to have something like one 
license. But for now, having some uniform exams is a more reasonable 
strategy to streamline things. We don’t really talk about something like 
giving the federal government the power do licensing—we can’t even get all 
states to accept a national exam” (Personal Interview, Wilberscheid 2017). 
For electrician or plumber licensing agencies, there simply does not exist a 
national association to organize cooperation or the exchange of information. According to 
their websites, none of the major industry associations is interested in pursuing anything 
along such lines176. When asked about coordination meetings with other plumbing 
boards, one representative explained to me, “No, I am not aware of anything like that. We 
are all unique” (Personal Interview, Kilb 2017). Another plumbing board representative 
told me, regulatory “Boards and Commissions remain unwilling to grant a professional 
license to a neighboring state” (Personal Interview, Cyr 2017). A national plumbing 
magazine writes177, “I often wonder why. If you can do plumbing in one location, you 
certainly should be able to do plumbing in another. I am licensed in New Jersey, but I 
know I could still install plumbing in California.” The author concludes, “A national 
license clearing house is needed” (Ballanco 2000). 
                                                 
176 Search of the Online Archive of PHCC and MCC by Author on January 15, 2018. 
177 Searching the websites of the major contractor online magazines (January 16, 2018), I did not 
find more than five articles over the last 20 years addressing the issue of state licensing differences. 
293 
Similarly, the Council of Licensure, Enforcement, and Regulation has members of 
licensing boards across all professions and would therefore be well situated to promote a 
cross-sectional approach to licensing reform. However, the organization is only a forum 
for the exchange of best-practices and networking (CLEAR 2018). 
Professional associations of procurement officials usually oppose local preference 
laws and consider them market-distorting. While NASPO has “historically opposed 
purchasing preferences” they now caution, “NASPO believes that more research and 
cost-benefit analysis studies are warranted” before taking a position (NASPO 2012, 2f.). 
The Institute for Public Purchasing, another association of public procurement officials, 
states in-state preferences “conflict with the fundamental public procurement principles 
of impartiality and full and open competition” (NIGP 2015). According to a 2004 survey 
of procurement officials, about 78% percent of respondents think that preference laws 
violate free market principles (Qiao, Thai, and Cummings 2009, 395). They do not 
advocate this position more publicly, because they do not want to oppose their own state 
legislatures. Hoffmann cites a former NASPO president, an Alaskan procurement 
official, as saying “Am I going to go out to lobby Congress to overturn legislation that 
has been passed in my state? How long would I, you know, how long would I be allowed 
to do that, [chuckles] by my employer here in the state who is on record as saying we like 
these preferences?” (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 187). Similarly, another former Director of 
NASPO explains, “Our members have not wanted to make a formal, state a formal 
position on it, because of increasing pressures that they are feeling to, quite frankly, to 
implement preferences. So, there is not an official NASPO policy on the books” 
(personal correspondence, Jack Gallt 2009). 
Firms perceive the organizations maintaining model codes, like ICC, as not really 
interested in pursuing significant change:  
[Could the US have a national building code?] Absolutely. That’s one of my 
pet peeves. There is a lot of special interests on the code side. There are 
organizations that build and maintain model building codes. And they are like 
little fiefdoms on themselves. And it has gotten better over the years. [But] 
there is no doubt that this is the single biggest impediment. I have talked to 
people on the codes committees, it comes up all the time in committee 
meeting, but it seems to get very little traction. Everybody talks about what 
neat idea it would be, but nobody wants to take a leadership role, in actually 
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doing something. [There] are large committees, broken down into 
subcommittees, and they have industry experts, lots of fire marshals, material 
vendors, etc. They all have their own special interests. There is so much 
redundancy between IBC and NFPA, they don’t cover exactly the same thing, 
but both of them have a very stubborn insistence on maintaining their own 
codes […]. To my knowledge nobody is working on it seriously” (Personal 
Interview, MCA 2017) 
If some entity took up the cause of nationally uniform building codes, it would be 
the ICC, a non-profit organization with 63,000 members that develops and maintains 15 
construction codes, sells a variety of publications, and offers code interpretation 
assistance (ICC 2018). However, while ICC wants to ‘sell’ its model codes to every 
jurisdiction, they are indifferent on how local jurisdictions use them. The head of ICC’s 
government relations division explained: 
These are model codes, they are meant to be adapted. We understand that it is 
impossible to have a one size fits all in the US. We have regions that have 
different climates, CA has serious seismic provision, very stringent, Florida 
has very stringent wind provisions. So, the goal is to allow jurisdictions to 
adapt the codes for their local needs. The consistency and uniformity the 
codes provide is basically in code format […]. We don’t get involved in the 
state or local amendment process. We believe that’s their business. It’s their 
business to amend the code as they see fit. We normally advocate for 
adoption of the codes with no amendments. Because in our opinion, when the 
codes come out at the end of the cycle and we issue the revised edition, that 
edition has already been revised and blessed by our members. So, our job 
here then is to get those codes adopted. We don’t have an opinion. But when 
it comes to states amending or not amending, we don’t voice an opinion. 
(Personal Interview, Yerkes 2016) 
When I pushed the fact that many firms had spoken out for more nationally 
uniform system, the representative explained, that local government would oppose any 
such attempt. “Look, we have 50 states, they are all on different cycles, some states are 
home rule within their local jurisdictions […]. They are never gonna all agree on 
anything. How to do something the same way throughout the country […]. There may be 
some in the industry who would like to see more consistency. But I just don’t see how 
that is gonna happen.” (Personal Interview, Yerkes 2016). An expert on building 
regulations confirmed this point more directly to me: “ICC cannot speak out against local 
code amendments because they are comprised of local building officials that prefer it that 
way” (Personal Interview, Wible 2017). 
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In addition to not wanting to usurp the authority of local jurisdictions, ICC oppose 
a more nationally uniform system because they might lose control and profits to the 
federal government: “We would never support a federal code […]. The codes and 
standards community is very happy with the way the system is in the US. It’s a private 
public partnership. The development of the codes is a private sector activity. It does not 
cost the taxpayer any money. The federal government cannot move as fast as a private 
organization like ICC” (Personal Interview, Yerkes 2016).  
As many observers pointed out to me, the business model of organizations like 
ICC is predicated on selling code books and interpreting codes for the construction 
industry—which requires keeping codes a private commodity. Hence, they oppose any 
proposal that would give them public authority. A person in charge of regulatory 
compliance for a national retail chain explained: 
SDOs [Standard Development Organizations], regardless of how they list 
themselves, they are all for profit, so the last thing they want to do is 
something for free or let industry to dictate what they regulate. They believe 
they are the experts, and nobody else knows […]. The problem is they make 
hundreds of millions of dollars by selling standards, so it’s a profit driven 
industry […]. There was a lawsuit in Georgia, that proposed that you must be 
able to access all those regulations for free […]. SDOs fought it successfully 
[…]178. I would know, I have 2500 live [construction] projects. (Personal 
Interview, National Retail Chain 2017) 
VI.c.2. State and Local Institutions 
Interviewees at licensing agencies, always assumed, without providing any 
evidence, that without their scrutiny, a contractor or plumber from another state might 
just do serious harm. It appeared that they were not able to conceptualize the idea that 
simply recognizing the equivalence of different state standards, at least on a temporary 
basis, might significantly reduce barriers without causing significant harm (even though 
they do this for military spouses). 
                                                 
178 Indeed, three Standard Development Organizations sued a public access website for publishing 
parts of the Federal Register and Georgia laws, which included their standards, for copyright infringement; 
they won the case (Mullin 2017; Ambrogi 2017). 
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State licensing boards make two simultaneous arguments for the status quo. They 
deny the presence of any interstate barriers with economic consequences due to the 
heterogeneity of regulatory systems and take the present situation for granted, describing 
any regulatory divergence as justified by substantive material differences between the 
states. As a corollary they offer the fact that state boards themselves cannot create any 
significant changes, because they are doubly bound by the executive authority of 
governors and the statutes passed by the legislature. Overall, they were unable to 
conceptualize a world that would somehow supersede the current patchwork of state 
regulation. 
An architect licensing board administrator explained, “Reciprocity is easy, the 
system is very similar across jurisdictions […]. There are no problems (Personal 
Interview, Brown 2016). A contractor licensing board administrator similarly expressed, 
“There are no complaints by contractors [about interstate mobility]. Nobody has 
communicated to me that they feel disadvantaged by these rules“ (Personal Interview, 
Denno 2016). A plumber licensing board employee explained, “I am working with the 
board. We think it’s working pretty well” (Personal Interview, Kilb 2017). This is 
subjectively true. However, many firms told me that they do not complain out of fear for 
losing public contracts or facing stricter scrutiny by regulators.  
Taking regulators by their word about similarities and laying out the evidence of 
significant interstate barriers given by construction firms, I confronted them with the idea 
of replacing the current system with a system of automatic mutual recognition. 
Regulators rejected this idea as absurd: “A Utah architect cannot come to Oregon for a 
day to practice architecture on a project without first becoming licensed […]. State 
licensing is necessary because of local differences” (Personal Interview, Brown 2016). 
Another board member exclaimed, “This has too big of an impact. If you would be 
comfortable with your building collapsing, then go ahead” (Personal Interview, CAB 
2016). Regulators are not willing to make a distinction between a professional from a 
different jurisdiction and an unqualified person, “A person who is licensed in another 
state is considered to be unlicensed in California, just as someone who is not licensed 
anywhere” (Personal Interview, Eissler 2016).  
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The reason given, is an odd fear of ‘the stranger’ from the neighboring state. 
“Oregon believes that a minimum standard has to be assured and other states are not 
doing it […]. For instance, in Idaho and Washington they only register contractors” 
(Personal Interview, Denno 2016). As in many other cases when I asked whether 
anybody was aware of adverse health and safety outcomes in those states, I was told “not 
that I am aware of” or “that is an interesting question” (Personal Interview, Denno 2016; 
Personal Interview, Kilb 2017). 
There are many more of those examples. When I asked is not a plumber a 
plumber, and should they not be able to work nation-wide? The answer was, “No, that is 
a very subjective opinion […]. We have some serious distinctions (Personal Interview, 
Kilb 2017). Generally, the sentiment was very similar to the findings of Hoffmann’s 
study in which he interviewed regulators of barbers and cosmetologists. The argument he 
reported, may be best summarized by this quote from a member of the Ohio Barbers’ 
Board: “If you went to school in Pennsylvania or in Mexico or India or China or 
wherever, and you only had a 1000 hours [of training], it would not be fair in Ohio […] 
to give this person a license, because […] they don’t know anything about our sanitation 
nor health rules or our laws and rules” (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 232). 
This evidence should not be construed to say that regulators in charge of licensing 
agencies are unreasonable. Interviewees usually pointed out that, even if my argument 
were convincing, there was nothing they could do. One regulator explained,  
Would a regional license make sense? Absolutely. But politics plays a role 
and states like to not lose control over that aspect of it. […] States don’t like 
to be told by anybody what to do. They like to have their own sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, they don’t look at the bigger picture and the good of the 
whole. But in the state of Rhode Island, we don’t even have a million 
citizens. And we have 12 000 contractors. They are able to go from RI to MA 
is 10 minutes. The portability for us would be really nice. But that has been 
held up. […] There is no portability whatsoever. (Personal Interview, Whalen 
2017) 
Another regulator explained, that given the legal situation, taking care of their 
own state was all they could do: “Our responsibility is to protect consumers and to 
enforce the laws that are in place. License law was established and is changed by the state 
legislature” (Personal Interview, Lopes 2016). This was echoed again and again: “It’s just 
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a constitutional issue, a states’ rights issue. It’s just a function delegated to the states. We 
have our own standards in California, and they are critically necessary. We wouldn’t 
want to see some kind of national mandate usurp our authority“ (Personal Interview, 
CAB 2016). In some cases, regulators told me that looking at the bigger national picture, 
was “above the paygrade” of a licensing board: “[A national license] is not an issue that 
the Board would address. The Board is charged with implementing and enforcing the 
laws as enacted by the State Legislature and the Governor. It would not be for us to 
address whether the federal laws, or the U.S. Constitution, should be amended to 
eliminate state licensure and enact a national license” (Personal Interview, Eissler 2016). 
To some degree, I found what was earlier theorized. Compulsory power‐sharing 
between state legislatures and fragmented executives leads to a strong emphasis on 
institutional interests (Bolleyer 2009, 132). Legislative actors simply seek to preserve 
their autonomy, while executive actors are limited in how much their policy delivery can 
rely on interstate cooperation. At the same time, the motives of state officials are only 
partly located in their desire to preserve autonomy. There is obviously an ideational 
element to the fact that they simply do not recognize the fact that they are creating 
interstate barriers. Without a national discourse or market building agenda explained by 
competitive federalism, they are unlikely to develop any desire to pursue reforms or 
broaden their perspective. In some ways, their perspective is simply parochial or lacks 
imagination. This can be particularly seen when they do not accept the argument that 
requiring the same from in-state and out-of-state state firms creates a double burden and 
might actually create interstate barriers. As discussed above, their justification is that just 
accepting out-of-state firms would be synonymous with abolishing all regulatory 
standards, even though that is demonstrably untrue.  
The same attitude was reflected by the building officials, I was able to interview. 
They seemed to combine a desire to preserve autonomy with a limited imagination, 
which simply did not include thinking about the impact of their action on other states. 
Mostly their interest is focused on their state, not on thinking about how their regulations 
affect neighboring states. In Pennsylvania, where there are discussions about establishing 
a state-wide plumbing code, a building official explained:  
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“It would be so much simpler. But we are only slowly moving towards it. 
The main factor is politics though. Manufacturers and unions have lots of 
power. Unions want to stay with the older codes, because they need a higher 
level of training and skill, and they control the training. Trying to preserve 
the jurisdictions. Some manufacturers want to preserve the old codes because 
they require more expensive old school materials. Like manufacturers of cast 
iron pipes. (Personal Interview, Wexler 2017)  
What other observers had described as inertia of local officials, was a virtue for 
this representative: “Our position is neutral. We just want safe codes. We don’t get 
involved in politics” (Personal Interview, Wexler 2017). So, in this sense, they might be 
more alike to public procurement officials, who privately see the benefits of national 
standards, but due to the position of local legislators, do not advocate this position. 
Indeed, several procurement and building officials emphasized the way they were 
constrained by the preferences of the local public and legislators. In the end, one building 
official explained, “We are here for safety. Period” (Personal Interview, Mata 2017). 
However, it soon became clear that he actually had a strong desire to preserve local 
autonomy, based on competitive federalism beliefs, explaining, “All cities are different,” 
and the federal government could not possibly create uniformity AND safety (Personal 
Interview, Mata 2017).  
All building officials interviewed, whether opposed or supportive of national 
building codes, explained that due to local interests this was impossible. Some blamed 
the general anti-federal government climate: “The United State of America is never going 
to recognize ONE national model code. Having the I-Codes was a great improvement, 
but even with a national publication, some states still modify for their specific conditions 
and needs. Home rule/State rule is strong” (Personal Interview, Rouleau-Cote 2018). 
Similarly, the president of the New Hampshire Building Officials Association explained, 
“Personally I think that [uniform codes] would be great, but in this political climate of 
anti-regulation it would be a hard sell. ‘Government intrusion’ and all” (Personal 
Interview, Richardson 2018). According to some ‘enlightened’ officials, most local 
building officials oppose nation-wide mandates because “They fear the loss of local 
control and feel the government should not be too involved in local affairs” (Personal 
Interview, McKinney 2018). In addition, “Many code officials are Firemen, and feel that 
code modifications are based on life safety issues. They understand the current codes, so 
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change would not benefit them” (Personal Interview, BSAV 2018). This is reinforced by 
the fact that “local labor unions are trying to build or maintain their influence,” which 
they can much more easily do on the local level (Personal Interview, WABO 2018). Here 
again we find the fact that they simply do not consider the impact of local actions on a 
broader scale. This can also be seen in the fact that many officials explained that they had 
never even heard of any complaint over regulatory heterogeneity. The President of the 
Maine Building Officials Association remarked, “I wish I knew why some local officials 
oppose this [national codes], I wonder if they know why they do?” (Personal Interview, 
Lister 2018). 
Another regulatory expert repeated this point. “I would tell you that sometimes 
things are intentionally kept the way they […], people want it to be fragmented. The 
longer people are in their job, the longer they guard their turf […]. There is a lot more 
politics than there is logic” (Personal Interview, Widney 2017). However, this desire 
combines with just a limited perspective. As a representative of CSI explained,  
A national standard would be great, but there is no way to achieve it. There 
are strong arguments about state/local rights. It would be hugely unpopular. 
Secondly, there is short term costs of change for small government entities 
like cities, and school districts. Thirdly, people want to hold on to how things 
have always been […]. There is also no precedent for government 
involvement. Everything has to be private. This is the difference to Europe, 
where specifications are often adopted by national standardization bodies. It 
is way easier to do business across borders in EU […]. Even Canada, which 
has more climate differences has one building code. (Personal Interview, CSI 
2016) 
Maybe the simplest explanation for the persistence of local differences and the 
inattention to the issue by regulators is that  “local officials don’t feel compelled to 
update the code” (Personal Interview, MCA 2017). According to Wible, to only thing that 
can overcome this local inertia are disasters, but even then, the involvement of the federal 
government in building codes is rejected: 
The adoption of codes is not a federal issue. The only way it ever became a 
federal issue is the ADA in terms of civil rights, and in terms of energy 
conservation […]. The federal government has done things to encourage 
uniformity, in the 60 and 70s and 80179s. Since then the federal government 
                                                 
179 He is referring to incentives set out by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). In the 1970s, Congress tasked HUD with creating a set of standards for manufactured housing, 
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has taken a hands-off approach to the issue […]. The latest state to go to a 
uniform standard was Louisiana in the wake of Katrina, I testified, and 
worked with them. Three quarters of the state did not have codes at all. And 
those that did didn’t do any enforcement […]. During the creation of DHS 
[Department of Homeland Security], it was considered to be given authority 
over building codes to make them uniform, but in the end, they did not want 
to touch the federalism issue, it would be challenged in the courts, they didn’t 
go this path. [Why do local officials not see the benefits of national 
streamlining?] Why do local building officials not see the gains? It’s not their 
job. Their job is enforcing the law. (Personal Interview, Wible 2017). 
Another expert similarly explained that thinking about the overall system was out 
of the scope of building officials: “Every one of those communities, thinks that they are 
the best communities, they all have opportunities to improve, but they don’t know 
because they look in the mirror […]. You have the people that at one time were a 
plumber and fell into a ditch and broke their back, so now they are behind a desk issuing 
plumbing permits, that does not mean they understand the regulations, how it was written 
or its intent” (Personal Interview, National Retail Chain 2017). This way of becoming an 
official deeply shapes their perspective: “Building inspectors/officials at time have a 
tendency to be very much like feudal lords overlooking their fiefdom. They don't like to 
be told what to do by any one. They have forgotten what their jobs are: Enforce the code 
how it was written (Personal Interview, Richardson 2018). Non-uniform, city-by-city 
training, explains the uneven enforcement of codes. As one official remarked,  
Even with a state-wide adopted code, administration and enforcement varies 
greatly across the states. We just don’t have the national requirement. In 
many states building inspectors are not looked upon as being that important 
on the grand scheme of public safety and a safe livening environment. Nor 
does the insurance industry recognize the true value of risk reduction on 
property that has been inspected by a competent inspector. (Personal 
Interview, McKinney 2018) 
                                                 
which went into effect in 1976 (MHI 2011). It preempts state law for some manufactured houses, but not 
all pre-fabricated products—modular homes for instance remain governed by local building codes (HUD 
2018). The Federal Housing Administration, and later HUD, published minimum property requirements, a 
minimum standard, for all federally financed housing to incentivize more safety and uniformity (NIBS 
2003, 2). However, after pressure from, among other the NHBA, and an internal report stating, HUD 
should rely “on State and/or local authorities […] to regulate the health and safety aspects of such housing, 
and on free market forces to establish acceptable performance levels for livability and marketability of such 
housing,” the program was phased out (NIBS 2003, 31). Since 1983 local codes are considered equivalent 
and the minimum property requirements have become obsolete (Pub. L. 98-181). 
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There are also other reasons that the building officials I talked to saw uniformity 
not as that big of a problem. Plumbing, boiler, or electrical codes, which vary even more 
across jurisdictions, are often regulated by different departments. One official explained. 
“Elevators and boilers are regulated by Labor and Industries [Department] who, in my 
opinion, don’t try to be consistent with other states” (Personal Interview, WABO 2018). 
State-level officials often do not see the problems on the local level. For instance, due to 
local jurisdiction not always referencing the newest national standard, “There probably is 
a problem when developers want to use methods or materials that are not addressed in 
our codes. In those cases they must obtain approval from the local building official and 
building official decisions can vary widely” (Personal Interview, WABO 2018). 
VI.d.  Policy-Makers 
Federal-policy makers, as seen in the previous chapters, are basically not involved 
with the interstate barriers discussed here. If they are, they follow the discourse 
prescribed by competitive federalism, calling for local reforms. State and local policy-
makers guard their autonomy and are not interested in endorsing federal market authority 
or creating meaningful cooperative institutions to address interstate barriers. On the one 
hand, this is related to the extreme decentralization of the interest group and party system 
as well as the separation of power in legislatures. Most broadly, they have no incentives 
to create federal market authority, because any transfer in authority will result in a loss of 
power, not a transformation of power as under cooperative federalism. On the other hand, 
the influence of the competitive federalism conception of markets is quite clear. Absent a 
national market building agenda, we simply do not know whether local policy-makers 
could be coopted into it. At the same time, the arguments of interviewees clearly 
demonstrate that they do not conceptualize markets as needing central authority—most 
describe local regulation as inevitable and unproblematic for single markets. 
VI.d.1. National 
Federal policy-makers have rarely taken positions regarding interstate barriers. 
There are no federal initiatives to create a transparent and non-discriminatory public 
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procurement system or to streamline building codes nationally in order to increase 
mobility of firms or market access for construction goods. In 2013, a report by the White 
House recognized the problem of interstate barriers through licensing for veterans and 
military spouses (White House 2013). In 2015, this was followed up by another White 
House report, this time criticizing interstate barriers through licensing in general. 
However, federal intervention was rejected; instead the report suggested, “Best practices 
in licensing can allow states, working together or individually, to safeguard the well-
being of consumers while maintaining a modernized regulatory system that meets the 
needs of workers and businesses” (White House 2015). The White House’s initiative 
leads to the absurd situation that 22 states now offer temporary or expedited licensing to 
military spouses, but not to the general public or firms.  
On the federal level, the FTC might be best situated to promote single market 
building and even change the national imagination around markets. For instance, as we 
have seen in Chapter III, the FTC together with the Justice Department were able to 
dramatically change how the US thinks about anti-trust. However, considering the three 
interstate barriers discussed here, the FTC has not taken any significant action. According 
to two reports, the FTC does not consider local procurement preferences problematic—
they are only concerned with outright corruption, i.e. bid-rigging between a procurement 
official and a private company (FTC 2010, 2007).  
The FTC has not taken any position on building codes180. The position towards 
standards is that it is a private activity that might be subject to anti-trust considerations. 
Given the fragmented nature of the private standard-setting industry, the FTC Chairman 
noted in 2001 that there were potential anti-competitive implications of firms holding 
standard-essential patents—i.e. a firm might collude with a standardization organization 
to create anti-competitive effects, or a standardization organization might decline to 
certify new materials or procedures because they are patented by a private firm, thereby 
stifling innovation (Muris 2001). In the 1990s and 2000s, the FTC pursued legal action 
against several technology and telecommunications firms holding standard-essential 
patents for not granting licenses to competitors and against competitors who refused to 
                                                 
180 Search of FTC Online Archive by Author on February 21, 2018. 
304 
pay for those licenses (Ohlhausen 2017, 119f.). However, the current chair of the FTC, in 
what reads like a competitive federalism manifesto, argues that intervention into codes 
and standards is only rarely necessary (Ohlhausen 2017, 122). Even market imperfections 
or monopoly do not justify government intervention, as long as no significant harm to 
consumers can be proven in court (Ohlhausen 2017, 106f., 122f.). Interestingly, the FTC 
has not considered the role of state and local governments; they support the private 
standard-setting industry and only look at it from a perspective of managing property 
rights (Ohlhausen 2017). Furthermore, since the 1980s they have argued against anything 
like the European Approach: “Industry regulatory standards […] are often quicker, more 
flexible, less adversarial, and therefore less burdensome, than governmental regulation. 
This is true both in adopting and in enforcing standards. Private sector self-regulation is 
thus at times less likely to impede innovation inadvertently and more efficient for 
society” (Valentine 1988; Ohlhausen 2017). Apparently, competitive federalism 
completely blinds them to how the interaction of private standards setting and local 
government adoption can actually create market barriers and impede innovation. 
According to international elevator manufacturers, the ordoliberal approach, relying on 
federal market authority to manage competition, is much more successful in maintaining 
a competitive market: 
[In the US] technical legislation is very detailed. So, we have to fulfill every 
detail of the standards. So, it means that when we have a new product, new 
solutions, new innovations, it takes quite a very long time to introduce into 
the market, to convince all the jurisdiction that the solution is safe and can be 
used until the standards, technical standards catch up with this innovation and 
become [part] of this standard. This process can take years before any new 
solutions or innovation can come into the market! So in fact, the difficulties 
in the US are non-harmonized requirements in the jurisdictions, and a second 
is rigidity of the system to introduce new solutions and new technologies. 
(Kone International cited in Hoffmann 2011, 314) 
Europe’s centralized system of performance-based standards is superior according 
to the same company: 
[This ordoliberal approach] allows us to develop and introduce innovative 
solutions and new products into the market in a very rapid pace […]. We can 
bring the new technologies through risk-assessment and when such a solution 
becomes state-of-the-art then it is included in the [EN] standards. So the lift 
directive not only harmonized the technical regulations between member 
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states, but opened the door for innovative solutions and new technologies. 
(Kone International cited in Hoffmann 2011, 310f.) 
The FTC has taken no official position on whether occupational licensing by 
states creates interstate barriers to commerce, but they do comment on particular 
instances where they deem a specific regulation by an agency anti-competitive (FTC 
2016, 9). Their position is mostly deregulatory, not arguing for reducing interstate 
barriers. For instance, influenced by competitive federalism, former FTC Chairman 
Timothy Muris argues, “Although the effect of state regulation is often bad, the 
performance of the Commission [FTC] could be worse” (Clarkson and Muris 1980, 88). 
Recent FTC testimony does not change this position (FTC 2016). Even one single author, 
who argues that the FCC could learn from the European Commission, sees licensing 
mostly as overregulation, not as interstate barrier (Sanderson 2014). The FTC has 
litigated two types of cases, the imposition of anti-competitive rules like price controls or 
advertising restrictions and the actions of licensing boards that are not “actively 
supervised by the state,” falling outside the protections established in the state action 
doctrine (FTC 2016, 2). According to recent testimony by the FTC, their “battle” against 
anti-competitive practices focuses solely on anti-trust analysis, not issues of interstate 
barriers (Lipman 2015; FTC 2014, 2016). A report by the FTC State Action Task Force 
complains that current state action doctrine does not take into account the creation of 
interstate barriers; but they do not advocate changing this, for instance through pursuing 
negative commerce clause arguments (FTC 2013).  
While the “existence of unnecessary ‘double burdens’ (in the country of origin 
and in the country of service provision) have been at the heart of the [ECJ’s] scrutiny,” in 
the US, courts have not considered this discriminatory (De Witte 2007, 4). “Most states 
do not recognize occupational licenses from other states, and plaintiffs have argued that 
such ‘non-reciprocity’ violates the dormant commerce clause by discriminating against 
out-of-state commerce in favor of in-state interests. But courts have rejected this claim” 
(Edlin and Haw 2014, 1130). As long as in-state and out-of-state firms or professionals 
are treated the same, courts have not recognized this double burden as irrational (legal 
term) in terms of the Equal Protection Clause or discriminatory in terms of the Commerce 
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Clause; and seemingly nobody has argued to change this jurisprudence (Edlin and Haw 
2014, 1130). 
Since 1959, the FTC has brought 31 cases against states or local jurisdictions due 
to licensing restrictions181. However, none of them contains any references to interstate 
mobility as an anti-competitive issue. The FCC is only concerned with restraints to trade 
unrelated to interstate mobility, for instance some restrictions on advertising or which 
profession can perform what kind of tasks (Clarkson and Muris 1980). A database search 
similarly found no cases concerning licensing boards that where argued on basis 
restraints to labor mobility. There is a few cases in which private persons have tried to 
challenge discrimination against out-of-state professionals but mostly unsuccessful 
(Sanderson 2014). 
In line with court rulings, as we have seen, state regulators do not perceive any 
barriers to trade as long as they require largely the same from in-state and out-of-state 
state firms, not accepting the argument of a double burden and defending the right to 
examine any out-of-state firm or professional. They described treating to-be-licensed in-
state providers and already licensed out-of-state providers the same as non-
discriminatory, even though it quite obviously imposes a double burden on out-of-state 
providers.  
VI.d.2. Local 
One step down from true federal market authority, states might maintain non-
federal but national cooperative institutions to make binding decisions. However, due to 
the separation of powers and weak cross-state party linkages, the US has created no such 
organizations. Interstate compacts, binding agreements between states, are rare and akin 
to a treaty revision in the EU or an international treaty in the sense that establishment and 
changes have to be ratified by every state legislature. “Being usually drafted by 
administrators, [state compacts] often do not find the support of legislatures within the 
individual states jealously guarding their legislative autonomy” (Bolleyer 2017, 532). The 
creation of state compacts requires significant political effort; hence most existing ones 
                                                 
181 Search of LexisNexis Database by Author on July 20, 2017. 
307 
focus on single important issues—like the recognition of state drivers licenses—but have 
never been established in more general terms to deal with multiple problems. As 
Zimmerman explains, compacts have rarely been used to remove interstate barriers, 
focusing mostly on the “settling of boundary disputes” (Zimmerman 2002, 54). Instead 
the most prominent mechanism for policy harmonization is voluntary model law pushed 
for by private initiative, like for instance the Uniform Commercial Code pursued by the 
American Bar Association (Bolleyer 2009, 131). Beyond this, as we will see, local 
governments carefully guard their autonomy and rarely consider their actions as potential 
interstate barrier.  
The National Governors Association (NGA) is much weaker than comparable 
European institutions like the Council of the EU. It is not a decision-making body but a 
forum for information exchange, networking, and federal lobbying. Binding agreements 
are rare, and no powers are devolved to the organization. None of the interstate barriers 
discussed in this dissertation, including licensing, is in anyway addressed in NGA’s 
policy positions (NGA 2018). According to publicly available meeting documents, 
streamlining the national licensing system has not been on the political agenda. In 
response to the White House report on licensing, the NGA Center for Best Practices released 
a study of the issue, concluding it could be addressed through better communication and the 
removal of unnecessary licensing regulations (Dunker 2015). No real cooperative or federal 
solutions were discussed (Dunker 2015).  
Similarly, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) is mostly a forum 
for information sharing, not for making binding agreements. In 2017, its research division 
released a report addressing the mobility barriers caused by licensing—however, the only 
policy options discussed are that “states should review or abolish their licensing laws” 
(Hultin 2017). They have also not taken any specific position on local procurement 
preferences, but oppose any attempts at federal preemption (NGA 2018; NCSL 2013). 
The only reference that could be found, is a statement by NCSL that presents any federal 
move to question these laws as infringing on states’ rights, stressing that state 
procurement policy and practices often are set in state law and are sometimes designed to 
serve “social or economic purposes beyond the mere provision of goods and services” for 
state government use (NCSL 2013). They have also not developed any policy position on 
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the heterogeneity of building codes and standards. In terms of the regulation of 
construction services, they only serve as “a platform of information exchange” (NCSL 
2015). 
In terms of licensing, the inaction of boards combines with legislators not wanting 
to transfer power to executive agencies or to an organization that would establish binding 
cooperation with other states. As indicated by interviews with regulators and interest 
groups, state policy-makers have shown no interest in putting a mutual recognition 
agreement or a federal licensing regime on the political agenda. Occupational licensing 
reform is never discussed across professions, and usually focusses on whether licensing a 
profession is (un-)necessary, not on jurisdictional mobility.  
For instance, in 2016 the Little Hoover Commission, an independent state 
oversight agency in California, released a report suggesting several necessary reforms to 
occupational licensing (Nava 2016). The report mostly addresses to which degree 
licensing rules are necessary. However, it touches on interstate barriers, recommending 
that “The Legislature should require reciprocity for all professionals licensed in other 
states as the default, and through the existing sunset review process, require boards to 
justify why certain licenses should be excluded” (Nava 2016, 7). They do not propose 
any solutions to increase coordination between states, or convince others states to pass 
similar laws.  
Unsurprisingly, no law to address this proposal was introduced in the state 
legislature182. The only debate and legislation coming out of this process, was an attempt 
to de-license certain professions like barbers and audiologists183. According to 
journalistic observers, like Capitol Weekly, occupational licensing did not become a 
major issue in California, and debates were limited to whether certain professions needed 
to be licensed at all (M. V. Holden 2015; Greenhut 2017, 2016). 
The situation in the state of Washington is similar. A search of the online archives 
of the Washington Wire, the capitol newspaper, turns up no recent debates about 
                                                 
182 Search of the California Legislative Information Network by author, February 13, 2018. 
183 CA State Leg. S.B. 247. Reg. Sess. 2017-2018 (2017). 
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licensing. The only exception is a recent bill184 that, among other professions, tries to de-
license landscape architects (Whitehouse 2017; Myers 2017). However, the bill has not 
been scheduled for a vote. Similarly, a search of the Oregon legislative database only 
turns up a few bills relating to one specific rule in one specific profession. The only 
references to a public debate about the issue is a few state politicians talking about 
“excessive licensing” (Boden 2017; Aristotle 2012) 
I contacted several members of the Senate and House Business Affairs Committee 
in Colorado to ask specifically about why they would allow municipalities to license 
contractors, a significant obstacle to firm mobility. First of all, I was told, licensing was 
not really on the political agenda. A Democrat explained, “ I sit on the business and local 
government committee, and I am not hearing a lot about professional licensing this 
session” (Personal Interview, Coleman 2017). In general, he was opposed to any inter-
state cooperation or federal market authority, “I think locally driven policy is more 
important than state driven policy to be honest” (Personal Interview, Coleman 2017). A 
Republican on the same committee explained to me that licensing was generally 
restrictive and should be abolished. However, in terms of solutions he explained, 
“Regardless of that, a federal occupational licensing program is not a good idea; A 
federal solution is a federal nightmare and a clear grab for power in my book. The nature 
of the states leading this issue is that the standards are unique to every state’s needs.” So 
despite opining that licensing was generally restrictive and anti-competitive, he insisted 
that the issue would have to be addressed in Colorado internally though “deregulation” 
and “state-by-state solutions.” (Personal Interview, McGrady 2017) 
A Republican Senator similarly explained, “The idea of state licensing is usually a 
barrier to entry,” however, when asked about contractor licensing, he sided with the 
argument that local control is important and the state should not intervene. He also 
explained that state legislators would never want to give up power in order to create more 
uniform licensing across the country (Personal Interview, Neville 2017). A Democratic 
Senator similarly told me about local licensing, “That’s just how it is in Colorado” 
(Personal Interview, Jahn 2017). 
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The same pattern can be observed in terms of local procurement preferences that 
seem to enjoy cross-party support among state legislators. Several recent legislative 
initiatives demonstrate that state lawmakers conceptualize those preferences as legitimate 
and unproblematic in terms of market competition. In the absence of a federal market 
building initiative, or significant state cooperation, they seem to perceive their interest in 
laying exclusively in preserving their state autonomy, even at the cost of other states. 
Lacking an understanding of the importance of central authority for the functioning of 
markets, this is not surprising. 
For instance in his work, Hoffmann tracks an Oregon bill from 2010185 that 
created a 10% cost preference to in-state providers of agricultural goods (Hoffmann 
2011). The story he uncovered suggests that state legislators do not perceive any need to 
take into account the preferences of other states, and they do not see local government 
activity as contrary to free market principles (Hoffmann 2011, 150ff.). The bill’s author is 
cited saying, “When I was figuring out how I was to frame the sale of this to go to the 
legislature, I originally started out with an environmental argument [about environmental 
benefits of “buying local”] and I quickly found out that […] it didn’t resonate with 
people. And so, then I switched it to a local economic argument. Then everyone was 
wildly enthusiastic about it” (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 154). Unsurprisingly, the bill 
passed unanimously in both Oregon legislative chambers186. One quote particularly 
demonstrates how, in the absence of cooperative relations between states, and a 
conceptualization of markets that excludes central authority, local lawmakers are 
incentivized to pursue local protectionism to preserve their autonomy. The law’s author 
answers the question of whether legislation like this might lead to a quasi-trade war 
between states, “Yeah, that’s true, but you know what, they [the others states] need to do 
the same thing” (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 190). A Republican Lawmaker, in an interview 
concerning the bill, expresses a similar sentiment, “Oregon taxpayers would like to have 
tax money stay within the state of Oregon […]. We first have to see for a while if the 
[out-of-state] providers are reliable” (cited in Hoffmann 2011, 151f.). In fact, a 
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committee reports suggests that lawmakers did not even consider this law to be 
protectionist, saying “HB 2763-A does not mandate protection for Oregon agriculture, 
but authorizes contracting agencies to pay a preference premium” (Oregon Legislative 
Information 2009) 
Plenty of other instances mirror this dynamic, currently there are bills to increase 
local preferences pending in many states and cities187. Democrats and Republicans in 
Michigan are currently arguing for more generous in-state preference laws without any 
significant political opposition (P. Egan 2017). Democratic Senator Curti Hertel argues, 
“States such as Ohio and Oklahoma already offer similar incentives, and it’s time for 
Michigan to make sure our hard-earned tax dollars are not going to create jobs in other 
state” (cited in P. Egan 2017). The Michigan Jobs First Plan passed nearly unanimously 
in Senate but has not been taken up in the House yet. 
In the mind of state legislators, there is no contradiction between free markets and 
local preference laws. A California preference law states in its preamble, “The essence of 
the American economic system of private enterprise is to be free, open, and to have 
transparent competition188.” Similarly, in a transcript of a legislative debate on a 
Connecticut preference bill189 that passed nearly unanimously, several Senators make 
arguments like, “I think it’s benign in that respect, there’s very little harm to come from 
the bill, but it can do a lot of good,” or the purpose is “Simply to provide a level playing 
field for our companies in the State of Connecticut when they’re bidding on state 
contracts and competing with companies from out of state,” or “We should give any job 
we can to an in-state company” (Connecticut State Assembly 2008).  
This impression was confirmed by several external observers. One design firm 
explained, “Well it is very political. Local politicians want to keep the jobs, I don’t know 
that anybody is really advocating to open these things up” (Personal Interview, Hord 
2017). Another firm concurred, “I personally feel a national system might be easier for 
                                                 
187 Among others: Maine State Leg. LD 956. 128th Sess. 2017 (Thistle 2017); Michigan Leg. S. B. 
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Springfield, MO (Zhu 2018); Cedar Rapids, IO (Cedar Rapids 2017) and probably many more. 
188 CA State Leg. S.B. 1176. Reg. Sess 2015-2016 (2016). 
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individual architects to navigate but given our republic form of government which (in 
theory) gives the power to the states I can’t see it happening […]. Each state has its own 
jurisdictional idiosyncrasies. This is often due to laws passed by well-meaning but ill-
informed politicians” (Personal Interview, Dekker 2017). This is also the observation of 
ABC, “Politicians from both sides of the aisle like that idea” (Personal Interview, 
Brubeck 2017). 
This dynamic is mirrored in terms of how local governments treat building codes. 
According to the representative of CSI, “It is insane that we have 4000 different building 
codes. This is hugely inefficient […]. But every city wants to customize. Or often, they 
just don’t have the resources to update their building code, so they fall behind the newest 
safety standard. There is really no need for many different building codes” (Personal 
Interview, CSI 2016). 
The regulatory experts at Fiatech made clear that there was not much interest by 
local officials in national change. The reasons include institutional incentives and an 
outlook on markets that does not see local regulation as a trade barrier. Zettersten 
explained, 
What’s happening is rather than trying to centralize more authority in the 
federal government, to overcome these obstacles, we are creating them. We 
are far less likely to create enforceable national standards to assist the 
business community, than to strip the federal government and return 
jurisdiction to the states. The interesting thing here is the Republican Party, 
that is most interested in business, would be more likely to return jurisdiction 
to the individual states, and their sub-jurisdictions, even though that would 
create obstacles. America is a country of irony. (Personal Interview, 
Zettersten 2017) 
In Texas it could be recently observed how local legislators do not want to give 
up control over building codes. In 2017, Senator Don Huffines (R), introduced a bill190 
which would require cities to show articulable public harm before being able to amend 
the model building code as promulgated by ICC. While this measure should be supported 
by most companies and industry association according to my interviews, there was not 
much support. The only two interest groups publicly supporting it were the Texas 
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Association of Builders and the Texas Apartment Association (Texas 2017). However, 
due to significant opposition, the bill failed in the House. Seven major cities as well as 
the Texas Municipal League sent representatives of the mayor, city council, or city 
manager to testify against the bill (Texas 2017). Many professional and industry 
association, including the Society of Architects, the Association of Builders, the Building 
Officials Association of Texas, as well as the Sierra Club, opposed the bill, the common 
argument being that it was an “attack on city authority” (Texas 2017). 
Selso Mata, president of the Building Officials Association of Texas was himself 
sympathetic to the law, but explained the opposition:  
It is a governance issue and how states are set up to legislate in each 
respective state. Texas is a home rule state. Meaning that each city is allowed 
to govern how they think best fits their community. The state requires each 
city to adopt a code and enforce it. Each city does so but not every city is 
under the same code […]. Some cities are behind three, six or nine years. 
Some are current […]. Politically, it may be reluctance to give up local 
control. If this occurs here it opens the gates for more State intervention 
where cities are concerned […]. Cities don’t understand the need for a 
disconnected State Senate or Representative dictating more requirements 
from an interest group/lobbyist for financial gain toward their own agendas. 
(Personal Interview, Mata 2017)  
VI.e.  Summary of the Argument 
The question of why there is no mobilization around federal market authority to 
deal with interstate barriers like the licensing patchwork, discriminatory public 
procurement rules, as well as heterogeneous building codes and standards, requires an 
answer on multiple levels. Interviews with construction firms clearly demonstrate not 
only the existence of significant barriers, but also the degree to which formally non-
discriminatory regulations can create a double burden for out-of-state companies with the 
effect of deterring competition and raising the costs of services more generally. 
Given this situation, most firms are in support of a national license or a system of 
automatic mutual recognition. In contrast to some politicians, firms acknowledge the 
necessity of licensing, but argue that safety can be guaranteed without giving every state 
or municipality the power to regulate as they see fit. Similarly, firms oppose local 
procurement preferences and describe them as incompatible with free market principles, 
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despite the position of local officials that they are not problematic. Firms would also like 
to see building codes and standards nationally streamlined. In contrast to building 
officials and legislators, they clearly think it is technically possible. 
However, these preferences are thwarted in several ways tying together ideational 
and institutional dynamics. Most broadly, due to competitive federalism as described in 
the previous chapters, there is no national political agenda for market building that firms 
could be plugged into or an actor that could mobilize firms across several states and 
professions for federal market authority. Without a ‘motor of integration’ like the 
European Commission, unified by a belief in federal market authority and the importance 
of central rules for market competitions, problems are addressed in limited and 
unimaginative ways (tinkering with single issues instead of transforming the system). 
Nobody has researched or attempted to realize economic gains that may be possible 
through licensing reforms that encompass all the states and multiple professions, through 
procurement reforms that encompass the establishment of central rules about non-
discrimination and transparency, as well as through nationally unifying building codes 
and standards. Instead, national actors follow the normal politics of competitive 
federalism. The FTC has pointed out that licensing creates interstate barriers, but only 
pursues litigation of specific practices in specific states as a strategy. Courts do not 
recognize, unlike in Europe, that heterogeneity in licensing rules, differing codes, or 
procurement preferences create a significant burden on interstate commerce. When 
political actors like the Obama White House take up small elements of these issue, like 
the study of licensing problems for military spouses, they suggest state-by-state solutions 
based on information exchange.  
The inaction of firms can be understood within this ideational context. 
Furthermore, the interviews demonstrate that most firms do not conceptualize themselves 
as political actors, and therefor are unlikely to take any radical action. Instead, if any, 
their lobbying activity is restricted to small local changes, and deference to whatever 
priorities the national trade association pursue. Put simply, a plumbing company is not 
going to start a movement for national regulation of the building industry, even if it may 
benefit from it. However, there are also more concrete, institutional obstacles. Firms are 
unlikely to lobby local politicians and regulators because they are convinced that those 
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actors will not give up any authority and might even retaliate. Similarly, they perceive 
their own trade associations as unlikely to pursue any major reforms due to their own 
internal federal structures, which generally ignore what they see as state or local issues.  
To understand the lack of mobilization around federal market authority and the 
inaction on interstate barriers, we have to specifically explain the behavior of interest 
groups, regulators, and local politicians. Here I have found institutional elements salient. 
Specifically, US federalism and its complete separation of interests into state vs. federal, 
the separation of power between executives and legislatives, as well as the fragmentation 
of political parties, has encouraged a pattern of state cooperation that is voluntary, 
sectoral, and mostly organized around exchanging information and lobbying the federal 
government. This pattern, while not unique to the construction sector as pointed out by 
others, is reproduced in the structures of interest representation I found (Bolleyer 2009). 
Overarching intergovernmental organizations, like the NGA, are mostly service 
providers, not a meaningful forum for national policy reform. Sectoral organizations, like 
NCARB, are restricted to only addressing one profession and by the fact that they can 
only encourage state licensing boards to cooperate, not make binding decisions. 
Similarly, private code developers like ICC, are mostly interested in selling their product 
to local jurisdictions, and do not want to prescribe to their customers how to adopt codes. 
National associations of procurement officials go even farther, trying to stay apolitical to 
not offend local legislators. As can be expected, the most common tools for market 
integration are thus private coordination efforts, voluntary administrative cooperation 
between licensing boards, and bilateral reciprocity agreements. These all remain much 
more ad-hoc and burdensome than the central liberal rules in the EU.  
Licensing boards and public officials themselves are constrained by the fact that 
they are ‘only’ agents of state legislatures, and therefore unable to make any binding 
commitments or transfers of authority to national organizations. Arguing for federal 
market authority, even when they see it as beneficial, is considered too politically risky. 
At the same time, they show no particular interest in giving up their authority, 
conveniently emphasizing that it is not their job to take into account effects of their own 
actions on interstate commerce—they see their job as enforcing the laws, not thinking 
about reforms. However, this cannot simply be explained by institutional incentives: 
316 
interview evidence showed that they are often not politically strategic actors, but simply 
take the status quo for granted and lacking any imagination of an alternative system. This 
ties into competitive federalism, because its implication is that national action is 
unnecessary and local action is not problematic. This can be seen in the fact that licensing 
agencies simply do not accept the argument that redundant requirements cause a double 
burden for out of state firms. But it also ties into traditional American conservative 
localism. Despite evidence to the contrary, regulation by other states and cities is often 
considered inferior or dangerous. The ordoliberal awareness that local action often 
undermines a single market, is simply non-existent. Instead, good local action is 
contrasted with bad federal policy that will always be subject to bias and interest group 
capture. 
Similarly, state legislators are just not interested in creating a national institution 
to reduce interstate barriers. Whether this is due to their incentives—lacking formal 
representation in Congress gives them no stake in a federal scheme; the separation of 
powers makes devolving power to the governors unattractive—or the internalization of 
competitive federalism could not quite be ascertained. There was evidence for both. But 
overall most prominent seemed the fact that they simply are unaware of the interstate 
consequences of their action—given the valued dichotomy between state vs. federal set 
up by their conceptualization of markets, local government appears unproblematic.  
Evidence of interest group activity similarly demonstrates that in the US groups 
find it difficult to create coalitions across issue areas or across states. As a result, we see 
federal interest groups fragmented by profession and mostly concerned with federal 
policy. As expected under dual federalism, state-level interest groups are torn between 
preserving state autonomy (which is where they have influence and where most of their 
members operate), and federal market authority preferred by their big competitive 
members. In effect that leads them to not address issues of interstate barriers at all. 
However, some interest groups are also caught up in the competitive federalism rhetoric. 
For instance, ABC clearly insisted that jurisdictional competition would eventually 
overcome interstate barriers. AIA insisted that state governments were best left alone in 
how they regulated professions. 
317 
Overall then, the answer to the question why there has been no significant 
mobilization around federal market authority to reduce interstate barriers for construction 
services has two parts: First I have emphasized that given the dominant conception of 
markets, a national agenda of market-building is illogical for federal policy-makers and 
political entrepreneurs—and absent such an agenda, I have shown most actors follow a 
logic of normal politics, advocating for changes at the margins, but mostly take the 
overall system for granted. Secondly, I have shown that several institutional elements that 
are peculiar to the US political system reinforce the tendency to only address market 
barriers in a piecemeal fashion, sector by sector, and sometimes to even allow the 
proliferation of those barriers. Table 6 summarizes expectations by different theories and 
the findings of this case study. 
How these findings fit into the overall question of this dissertation, and how they 
challenge the existing accounts of market integration, is addressed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Actors Materialist  Institutional  Ideational  
National/ regional 
construction firms 
Pro federal market 
authority, cooperate 
across industries– 
non-success 
unexplained 
No Evidence 
Diffuse interest for 
federal market authority; 
emphasize that there is 
nothing they can do 
about it; no allies; no 
cross-sectoral 
cooperation 
MOST 
Pro free markets; See 
federal government as the 
problem; prefer state 
regulation; markets will 
flourish with deregulation 
SOME 
Small firms in state 
clusters 
 
Against federal 
market authority 
MISSING 
Mostly do not care/do 
not get involved 
MISSING 
No political position or 
anti-government in general 
MISSING 
Construction industry 
groups national 
Pro federal market 
authority, cooperate 
across industries – 
non-success 
unexplained 
No Evidence 
Diffuse interest for 
federal market authority; 
emphasize that there is 
nothing they can do 
about it; no cross-
industry cooperation 
MOST 
Pro free markets; See 
federal government as the 
problem; prefer state 
regulation; markets will 
flourish with deregulation 
SOME 
Construction industry 
groups in state 
clusters 
Against federal 
market authority 
No Evidence 
Torn between small and 
big members; Insist on 
state autonomy in 
regulation or are silent; 
See federal market 
authority as a loss of 
power, because they do 
not have influence on 
that level of 
Pro free markets; See 
federal government as the 
problem; prefer state 
regulation; markets will 
flourish with deregulation 
SOME 
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government; diffuse 
interest in state-wide 
harmonization, with 
little success. 
MOST 
Government officials 
in state clusters 
Follow big industry 
demands 
No Evidence 
Insist on their 
institutional autonomy; 
nothing to gain from 
mandatory cooperation; 
participate in sectoral 
coordination of mostly 
administrative nature; 
inability to make 
binding agreements 
MOST 
Pro free markets; See 
federal government as the 
problem; prefer state or 
local regulation; 
heterogeneity not 
conceptualized as barrier 
MOST 
Legislators in state 
clusters 
Follow big industry 
demands 
No Evidence 
Insist on their 
institutional 
autonomy/states’ rights; 
inability to work 
together with other 
states, nothing to gain 
from cooperation 
MOST 
Pro free markets; See 
federal government as the 
problem; prefer state 
regulation; heterogeneity 
not conceptualized as 
barrier 
MOST 
Construction users 
and pro-streamlining 
groups 
Pro federal market 
authority 
No Evidence 
diffuse interest for 
federal market authority; 
emphasize that there is 
nothing they can do 
about it; sectoral 
streamlining 
organizations see 
themselves as ‘service 
providers’ for the states; 
cost-benefit calculation 
skewed by sectoral 
approach 
MOST 
Pro free markets; See 
federal government as the 
problem; prefer state 
regulation; markets will 
flourish with deregulation 
No Evidence 
Table 6: Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Findings 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion proceeds in three sections. The first section summarizes the 
findings of this dissertation. The second section discusses the theoretical and practical 
implication of these finding. The last section considers limitations of these findings and 
shows the future research agenda this dissertation implies. 
VII.a.  Summary of Findings 
This dissertation started out noting how market governance in Australia, Canada, 
the EU, and the US had undergone a striking but little remarked divergence since the 
1980s, leading to somewhat puzzling outcomes. The puzzle is that during this ‘neoliberal’ 
period of pro-market politics, Europe has pursued a vast single market project, while the 
US has not only largely overlooked interstate barriers, but actively proliferated them. I 
therefore set out to explain why the US had seen little mobilization around federal market 
authority to curb sub-national protectionism and interstate barriers since the 1980s, noting 
that conventional theories of European integration have in common an expectation that 
the US should have more liberal rules for economic exchange. To answer this research 
question, the reader must have expected a theoretical account and empirical 
demonstration, but first convincing evidence for my descriptive claim about the state of 
the internal market in the US. This dissertation has provided all three. 
Due to the fact that Europe’s regulatory departure from the US model had gone 
largely unnoticed by scholarly literature and policy-makers, much space was devoted to 
assembling a wide-range of data from federal policies and agendas, to state-level rules 
and their concrete effects on firms, showing the continued relevance of interstate barriers 
in the US. The first case study, focusing on the federal policy-agenda, showed that under 
conservative rule in the 1980s, 1990s, and today, self-described neoliberals have not 
mobilized around single-market issues or taken actions that would curb interstate barriers. 
Instead they have focused on tax-cuts, federal deregulation, and state’s rights. This is also 
reflected in the contemporary political agenda of three pro-market think tanks. My 
analysis demonstrated, based on interviews with scholars at AEI, Heritage, and CATO, 
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that all three do not comprehensively think about interstate market barriers, and prefer 
local decentralized solutions to national policy problems, leading them to often explain-
away or contribute to the proliferation of those barriers. 
To concretize the effects of heterogeneous and outright protectionist rules that 
fragment the US internal market, the second case study focused on firms and 
professionals in the construction sector. Based on interview evidence, I was able to 
demonstrate that jurisdictional fragmentation actually creates significant legal obstacles 
to the national flow of constructions services. Specifically, I showed this in three 
interrelated areas: The way states and municipalities license firms and professionals in 
construction and design creates a burden on interstate commerce reaching from 
inefficiency to deterrence of market entry. While in the EU redundant demonstration of 
skills and testing is considered an unnecessary double burden, in the US this is a standard 
practice, considered by regulators as non-discriminatory. Even farther, small regulatory 
differences between states lead to the denial of any automatic recognition of out-of-state 
licenses in the US, while in the EU mutual recognition is standard, and derogations need 
to be approved by the EU commission as reasonable and proportional. In addition, US 
states prohibit the temporary provision of services by out-of-state providers without 
going through the new state’s licensing process, while the EU allows this generally on the 
grounds of encouraging mobility, especially for small businesses. 
I observed a similar pattern in terms of how state and local government procure 
goods and services. Existing data on protectionist state laws demonstrated that local 
jurisdictions regularly prefer local firms, local labor, and local materials either through 
price premiums or outright prohibitions. My interviews with firms showed that these laws 
do create significant deterrence for interstate mobility, but in addition that protectionist 
practices are much more widespread than legal surveys suggest. Decentralized 
procurement systems—many state departments procure individually, and cities and 
counties use their own systems—already create distinct advantages for local firms in 
terms of transparency. Furthermore, requests for proposals will often go beyond local 
preferences mandated by law. In contrast, the EU has outlawed all of these provisions due 
to their interference with interstate commerce, and above certain thresholds has created a 
European-wide transparent system for publishing procurement opportunities.  
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I have shown that the heterogeneity in building codes, which are adopted by state 
and local governments, creates another layer of complexity to the existing interstate 
barriers. Differences in codes create uncertainty for firms operating across jurisdictions, 
make it hard to establish standard-operating procedures, and make the use of uniform 
designs impossible. In addition, the fact that standards are adopted by local jurisdictions 
means that construction material requirements may vary by area. This implies that 
compliance with for instance the newest elevator standard does not confer a presumption 
of conformity for the whole US market. In contrast to the US, the EU has used federal 
market authority to guarantee European-wide market access to firms and products. 
Despite claims by regulators that national building codes were technically impossible, the 
EU has established European-wide building codes. Similarly, while any European 
country can adopt any standard it prefers, compliance with European standards confers a 
presumption of conformity, thereby creating a unified market for construction materials.  
In sum, I uncovered that the US has produced nothing resembling the liberal 
market rules promulgated in the in the EU. In the US, no federal market authority has 
been used to curb interstate barriers and the national neoliberal agenda has not included 
any references to assessing the state of the internal market, instead focusing on cutting 
taxes and spending, deregulation, and decentralization. As a result, nationally operating 
firms confront many obstacles that are legally prohibited in the EU. 
These findings challenge existing theoretical accounts of European integration, 
US market-building, and federalism. Specifically, they all expect more mobilization 
around federal market authority to create single markets in the US. Materialist theories 
emphasize the incentives of interdependence and mobility, which both are heightened in 
the US. Institutional theories emphasize the resources of federal government and 
agencies, both pointing at a stronger capacity of the US to pursue single markets. 
Ideational theories emphasize the role of the US as leader of the global neoliberal 
movement. All these accounts fail to capture the dynamics of maintaining interstate 
barriers, I have described. They have made too many assumptions about state and local 
politics and have been hampered by a lack of comparative focus. Therefore, assimilating 
the facts of the US case and the shadow comparison to the EU required the development 
of a new theoretical account. 
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Most basically, my theoretical account has demonstrated that we have to take 
economic ideas seriously to understand what kind of issues are perceived as policy 
problems, and what kind of solutions are assigned to these policy problems. From the 
federal to the local level, I have shown that the meaning and perception of federal market 
authority in the US systematically differs from the EU. While ordoliberals learned from 
the chaos of the 1930s that strong central rules made by a central insulated authority are 
necessary to maintain competitive markets, US neoliberals have in many ways adopted 
the opposite conception. Combing economic ideas from public choice with pre-existing 
antipathy to federal government, they have created a system of thought that expects 
markets to thrive naturally when government retreats, or when it is decentralized.  
The power of this competitive federalism perspective could be observed at many 
different inflection points. Analyzing primary documents like memoirs of policy-makers 
and elite-interviews showed that this particular conception of markets accounts for the 
lack of consideration of interstate barriers in the agenda of ‘Reagan Republicans’ in the 
1980s, ‘Gingrich Republicans’ in the 1990s, and ‘Ryan Republicans’ today. Similarly, it 
leads federal market supervisors, like the FTC, to consider issues like licensing, instances 
of overregulation, not interstate barriers. Competitive federalism also strongly influenced 
the agenda-setting of conservative think tanks: they have not systematically analyzed 
interstate barriers and argue that federal market authority is unnecessary to guarantee a 
single market. While economic ideas are not the only cause, a simple thought-experiment 
demonstrates their transformative power. Given the vast powers of Congress and 
resources of federal agencies like DOJ and FTC, as well diffuse business interests for 
federal market authority, it is easily imaginable that the US would pursue an EU-like 
single market push; however, in the absence of economic ideas that would justify such an 
undertaking, institutional structures and material resources remain non-mobilized. 
Similarly, I am not arguing that institutional and structural forced did not play a role in 
the EU single market project. But even from my shadow comparison the power of market 
conceptions becomes clear—an EU based on competitive federalism would look 
differently. 
Tracing the mobilization of diverse political and economic actors in the 
construction sector, based on interviews with construction firms, regulators, politicians, 
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and interest groups, demonstrated a diffuse preference for federal market authority and 
central rules for exchange, which could not be realized in the absence of a national 
market-building agenda. National actors, particularly self-described pro-market groups, 
tended to take the competitive federalism conception of markets for granted, leading 
them to pursue policies that undermine federal market authority. Similarly, I observed 
attitudes among local regulators and legislators that are related, but not quite congruent 
with competitive federalism. They do not conceptualize a need for federal market 
authority to maintain a national market, and therefore see local regulatory activity 
generally as unproblematic. At the same time, even when acknowledging difficulties with 
firm mobility, they take the status quo for granted—they simply do not imagine radical 
reforms as for instance automatic mutual recognition like in the EU. Those factors were 
combined with an aggressive localism, one would not expect in a country with a national 
identity and much mobility: state regulators tended to treat the regulations of neighboring 
states as potentially dangerous and definitely not equivalent—because of that they saw 
their role as protecting local citizens from those ‘foreign’ jurisdictions. Similarly, they 
conceived of out-of-state as somehow ‘undeserving’ of public contracts. 
While competitive federalism creates a good frame of understanding these 
dynamics, I found specific institutional obstacles that push firms and interest groups to 
pursue specific solutions that if not reinforce interstate barriers, at least maintain limited 
approaches to dealing with them. Fragmentation, decentralization, and separation of 
powers prevent interest groups and state policy-makers from mobilizing for federal 
market authority to curb interstate barriers. Division of powers between federal and state, 
and between executive and legislative dis-incentivizes transfers of powers to the federal 
level, binding cooperation between states, and dealing with policy-problems from a 
broad, cross-sectoral perspective. Instead, state interest groups only lobby their state, 
while federal interest groups only deal with federal policy. Fragmented regulatory 
agencies deal only with their specialty, like architecture for instance, not taking into 
account gains that might be had from regarding occupational licensing in general. In the 
absence of state representation on the federal level, and cooperative institutions among 
states, state legislators do not have any incentives to pursue the creation of rules beyond 
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state borders. Similarly, interest groups focused on state policies, simply do not think 
about policy-implications for neighboring states. 
VII.b.  Theoretical and Practical Relevance 
As alluded to in the discussion of findings, this dissertation makes several 
significant contributions to existing political science literature and has important practical 
implications. Substantively, I have challenged the conventional portrayal of the US 
economy as integrated single market with limited local protectionism (Eisner 2014). I 
have also challenged the characterization of conservative thinking as generically 
neoliberal (Harvey 2005). Given that the strategies of deregulation and decentralization 
are very different from centralization to create single market rules, we cannot easily 
speak of a global neoliberal movement with globally similar effects. More pointedly 
perhaps, my findings question whether conservative thinking about markets, and 
strategies to create markets are correct: it simply appears that markets do not evolve 
naturally when government retreats. 
My dissertation contributes empirically to the debate whether markets are 
Hayekian—a default kind of human relationship in the absence of state coercion, or 
Polanyian—created by state coercion (see: Höpner and Schäfer 2012; Caporaso and 
Tarrow 2009; Polanyi-Levitt 2012; Cerny 2016). I have shown that in the absence of a 
central authorities setting clear rules, local market barriers are likely to proliferate. 
Importantly, these rules go beyond the tasks assigned to the state by classical liberals: 
regulatory differences become non-tariff barriers in the absence of a central coordinating 
institution. This contributes significantly to the literature on the social embeddedness of 
markets, suggesting not only how economic ideas shape forms of capitalism, but also 
emphasizing the complex set of central regulations and rules necessary to make the ‘free 
market’ possible (see for instance: Granovetter 1985; Fligstein and Dauter 2007).  
Methodologically, my dissertation highlights that forgoing systematic 
comparisons due to ‘sui generis concerns’ is problematic and may lead to wrong 
conclusions (see: Parsons 2015). For instance, approaches that rely on the mobilization of 
business interests due to material incentive to explain single market building may seem 
convincing in the European case (Moravcsik 1998; Frieden 2002). However, applied 
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comparatively they cannot account for the evidence. Furthermore, my findings emphasize 
the importance of considering competing alternatives and paying attention to causal 
mechanisms, or the specific instances when explanations pass through human action. For 
instance, based on correlational evidence economists have argued that state based 
licensing exists because local firms capture regulator to insulate them from competition 
(Kleiner 2013). However, the implied causal chain has not been tested against alternative 
explanations. My interviews suggested that the self-understanding of regulators is 
different from those assumptions: they believe that what they are doing is essential to 
safeguarding the public. Similarly, big corporations that presumably have the political 
clout the capture regulators actually opposed the state-based licensing system as 
redundant and inefficient.  
My dissertation has several implications for the ways ideas intersect with 
preferences. As one author has observed, “Interests do not exist, but constructions of 
interests do. Such constructions are inherently normative and subjective/intersubjective 
conceptions of self-good—of what it would advantage the individual to do or to have 
done either on his or her behalf or inadvertently by others” (Hay 2010, 79). In several 
instances, I have specifically demonstrated how ideas construct interests and mobilize 
political coalitions. For instance, the conservative agenda cannot simply be understood as 
the representation of pro-business electoral interests. Instead, competitive federalism has 
suggested specific policy interests, and ignored others. At the same time, it made the 
coalition of socially conservative states’ rights advocates and free-market libertarians 
mobilizable as a political force.  
Emphasizing the ideas as ‘social device’ constructing interest also implies stricter 
scrutiny for economic and institutional arguments, especially when they rely on 
correlation data (Woll 2008; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010). Assumptions about firm 
preferences are often wrong, firms do not automatically mobilize for those preferences, 
and interest groups often only represent those firm demands imperfectly. For instance, 
contrary to conventional assumption, most firms described themselves as apolitical, not 
even considering what kind of regulations and reforms they would prefer. In my research, 
firms did rarely appear as the strategic actors as which public choice theory imagines 
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them, instead they seemed to mostly rely on cues from higher level organizations in 
determining what is possible.  
The findings of my dissertation have policy-relevant implications, suggesting the 
possibility of a bi-partisan single market building agenda. Reducing interstate market 
barriers is the kind of centrist good-governance policy, most Democrats and Republican 
could support. A broad policy proposal around reducing regulatory heterogeneity could 
be framed as good governance, creating a level playing field, increasing market 
competition, helping small businesses, or more generally increasing national productivity. 
It might be able to avoid common criticism from the left— ‘Republicans advocate for 
deregulation and pro-business policies that favor big corporations,’ and from the right— 
‘Democrats oppose free market solutions’. Building this approach on binding interstate 
cooperation and mutual recognition schemes might also bridge the gap between 
Democrats, who traditionally support central authority, and Republicans, who 
traditionally oppose it. I have demonstrated that low productivity in the construction 
sector can at least partly be attributed to regulatory heterogeneity. This means Republican 
arguments of overregulation are exaggerated, as are Democratic arguments of crony 
capitalism demanded by big businesses. Instead, it is local regulators making policy 
without taking into account national affects that creates problems; this suggests a national 
good governance initiative that focusses on good regulation.  
Beyond these suggestions, there are also implications for leftist critics of 
capitalism more generally. Adopting strong central rules to curb business rents might be 
pragmatic and reasonable at least in the short term. Furthermore, as I have shown most 
arguments that sustain local regulatory heterogeneity are not based on convincing 
critiques of capitalism. Instead, they are barely coherent, often accounting to simple 
protectionism. This suggests two things: while the US is a relatively liberal market 
economy from a social policy perspective, its structure of federalism allows significant 
local variations from that model. However, to realize those opportunities the left has to 
articulate a more convincing set of policies that goes beyond protecting in-state firms at 
the expense of out-of-state firms and local taxpayers. Currently, policy only fragments 
the national market but does not supersede the market logic. 
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VII.c.  Limitations and Future Research 
The findings of this dissertation are not without limitations. While a good first 
step, to increase the confidence we have in my claims, research needs to be expanded into 
several directions. I have challenged some of the assumptions and theoretical 
explanations derived from simply looking at the EU or the US. At the same time, having 
treated the EU as a shadow case, future research must investigate the EU more directly. 
While it is clear that the EU has more liberal rules on the central level, concrete evidence 
from the national and sub-national level is missing. Therefore, my study of the 
construction industry should be expanded to the EU, following a similar research 
strategy. This might either reveal how EU rules enable interstate mobility, or that despite 
liberal rules there may still be many protectionist local practices. While I have alluded to 
the ordoliberal motivation behind the EU, this needs to be investigated more directly by 
looking at statements and memoirs of EU decision-makers. While there is some evidence 
for it, it might just be coincidental to the broader elite project of uniting Europe. To gain 
confidence, my approach should also be expanded to other federal polities, the next best 
cases to study are the Australia and Canada. 
For theoretical and practical reasons, my dissertation has relied on qualitative 
evidence and a process-tracing logic. To increase the confidence in my findings and 
appeal to the mainstream political science audience, future research should try to translate 
the work of my dissertation into statistically testable propositions and develop an 
appropriate data-set. While I think the meaning-making process of political actors can 
only be captured through qualitative evidence, other aspects of this project are very 
amenable to quantitative investigation. A data set of interstate barriers for the US, similar 
to already existing investigations by the European Commission, should be constructed. In 
the best case, this data set would contain measures of actual barriers and measures of the 
rules. This would allow a more global way of comparison instead of focusing on one 
specific sector. Expanding this research to more federal polities would also allow certain 
institutional and ideational explanations to be tested. Based on content analysis of 
national newspapers, federations could be coded as ordoliberal vs. competitive federalist, 
which we then could correlate to the degree to which they have created federal market 
authority.  
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This dissertation has focused on the economic ideas that have enabled the 
Southern Strategy of the Republican Party. As discussed, economic priorities were 
traded-off against other commitments—some conservatives might have preferred 
stronger federal authority against interstate barriers to commerce, but they ended up 
opposing federal authority rather broadly to achieve goals on social policy or race. But by 
the time period addressed in this study, most of these actors seem to have convinced 
themselves that their opposition to federal authority was desirable for markets too; 
arguing that less federal power was directly good for markets, the economy, and their 
social policy priorities. After bracketing issues of race for the exploration of competitive 
federalism, future research should bring it back in.  
Critical race theorists have long argued that neoliberalism reinforces the racial 
ordering of society191: “Insisting on race-neutrality at the level of law and policy, 
neoliberalism in effect privatizes racism, allowing systematic discrimination in 
employment, housing, and other sectors to persist, since to articulate a critique of 
structural inequity is to raise charges of an inverted ‘racism’ that violates the rhetorical 
construction of social policy as colorless” (Lissovoy 2013, 742). However, the distinction 
of ordoliberal and competitive federalist market thinking, I have suggested, implies that 
we cannot easily speak of neoliberal racism. At a minimum, it calls for investigating the 
relationship between different conceptualizations of markets and the perpetuation of 
racial hierarchies. It also questions the common claim that American neoliberals believe 
“Markets must be actively constructed; market behaviors must be learned; they must be 
deliberately extended to new arenas. Neoliberalism treats market rationality as a 
normative ideal to be pursued through applications of public authority”(Soss, Fording, 
and Schram 2011, 21; see also: W. Brown 2003; Dawson and Francis 2016). While the 
empirical existence of American policy might include elements of deliberate use of 
central power for disciplining market participants, in the Conservative imagination of 
markets this is not the case.  
Another avenue of research relates to the claim of neoliberalism as a strategy to 
preserve white elite power (Hohle 2015; Lester 2015). If this were true, we would have to 
                                                 
191 See for instance Omi (1994), Lipsitz (2006, 15ff., 73ff.), Goldberg (2009), Chari (2015), or 
Hohle (2015, 2018). 
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ask, what is different about Europe’s racial orders requiring a different economic 
preservation strategy? At the same, the comparison to European neoliberalism might 
suggest questioning the ‘natural alliance’ between neoliberalism and racism, seeing it 
more as distinct causal forces that happened to coalesce in the US.  
Donald Trump’s rise to power has been explained by white backlash against 
increasing power of historically marginalized groups (T.-N. Coates 2017), by rebellion of 
the working class against the cultural resentment by political elites, as well as increasing 
inequality and economic precarity ostensibly caused by globalization (Auerback 2017, 
58; T.-N. Coates 2017). For many pundits, this implies that Trump’s populist ‘America 
First’ platform naturally includes calls for protectionism. Protectionism, we are told, is a 
dangerous anomaly not repeated since the 1930s (Hankla 2017). However, this ignores 
how much local protectionism has been part of American politics. As I have shown, it is 
quite common for Michigan to argue against doing business with Ohio firms. This 
suggests more research is necessary into understanding local protectionist sentiments, and 
how and when they become scaled up to the national level. At the same time, future 
research should investigate how this state based economic nationalism intersects with 
cultural and environmentalist arguments for localism.  
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